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The State Obligation to Cooperate under International Law

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The Global Prosecution of Core Crimes under International Law

Abstract

This chapter seeks to establish the extent to which States are entitled to assess if the ICC enjoys jurisdiction in order to determine whether they are obliged to surrender a suspect thereto. The ICC Statute only imposes direct obligations on States which have ratified such treaty. The ICC cooperation model is best described as slanted, neither vertical nor horizontal. There is no harmonised international procedure relating to the national execution of an ICC cooperation request. Although States cannot rely on the absence of domestic law to justify non-compliance, the effect of ICC requests largely hinges on the degree to which States have domestically promulgated procedures intended to facilitate cooperation. The complementarity regime prevailing therein endows States with some discretion. Non-State Parties may only be invited by the ICC to cooperate. Yet, even non-State Parties to the ICC would need to implement legislation to execute a UNSC Resolution which directly invokes the cooperation of States. The potential repercussions of the failure to cooperate by the State may lead to the finding of a violation either by the ICC and a referral of the matter to the ASP in terms of Article 87(7) of the ICC Statute and Regulation 109 of the ICC, or else to a referral to the UNSC when the case had been triggered by a UNSC Resolution. Notwithstanding recent jurisprudence, it is still unclear whether the ASP can take any action beyond making the finding of non-compliance. Some ideas to strengthen the fragile ICC cooperation regime are suggested.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Meernik and Aloisi 2009, pp. 267–268.

  2. 2.

    Harmen van der Wilt states that Article 21 of the ICC Statute (ICC Statute (1998) Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court), fails to give ICC dicta such effect (van der Wilt 2008, p. 256).

  3. 3.

    Article 87(5) of the ICC Statute , above n. 2.

  4. 4.

    Wenqi 2006, p. 108.

  5. 5.

    Gallant 2003, p. 583.

  6. 6.

    As a matter of fact, ‘jus cogens norms recognized by customary international law and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, and the purposes and principles of the UN itself, impose limits on the powers of the Security Council that should be monitored’ {ECFI, Second Chamber (Extended Composition) Ahmed Ali Yusuf and Al Barkakaat International Foundation v Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities [2005], 21 September 2005, T-306/01, paras 277–282; ECFI, Second Chamber (Extended Composition) Yasin Abdullah Kadi v Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities [2005], 21 September 2005, T-315/01, paras 226–231, both judgments being cited in Gordillo 2012, p. 292, n. 12}.

  7. 7.

    UNSC (2005) Resolution 1593 (2005), S/RES/1593, para 2.

  8. 8.

    Swart and Sluiter 1999, pp. 105–110.

  9. 9.

    Prost 2011, p. 464.

  10. 10.

    Zahar and Sluiter 2008, p. 459.

  11. 11.

    Rastan 2008, p. 432.

  12. 12.

    Zahar and Sluiter 2008, p. 461; Sluiter 2003a, p. 651.

  13. 13.

    BBC (2011) Leaning Tower of Pisa : A Work in Progress. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/fast_track/9568633.stm. Accessed 11 April 2012.

  14. 14.

    Holmes 2002, p. 672.

  15. 15.

    ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II, Situation in Uganda , Prosecutor v Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo, Dominic Ongwen, Decision on the Admissibility of the Case under Article 19(1) of the Statute, 10 March 2009, Case No. ICC -02/04-01/05, para 45, cited in Stahn 2011, p. 240, n. 34.

  16. 16.

    This is known as ‘la compétence de la compétence’ in French (see Chap. 21).

  17. 17.

    ICTY Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v Duško Tadić , Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction , 2 October 1995, Case No. IT-94-1, para 17.

  18. 18.

    Prosecutor v Joseph Kony et al ., above n. 15, para 45.

  19. 19.

    Sluiter 2002a, p. 131.

  20. 20.

    Simbeye 2004, p. 29.

  21. 21.

    Simbeye 2004, p. 33.

  22. 22.

    In the context of judicial powers and as described here above, the words ‘implied’, ‘implicit’ and ‘inherent’ are used inter-changeably.

  23. 23.

    The telos of such powers is that ‘if an organ has been endowed with specific powers, it may solicit State cooperation if this is necessary for an effective exercise of these powers’ (Sluiter 2003b, p. 121). In other words, inherent powers are ‘those powers which are derived from the very existence of the organization’ (ICJ , Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v France) , 20 December 1974, ICJ Rep 1974, p. 253, para 23).

  24. 24.

    Even where the vertical relationship is strong and effective, such as in the case of the ad hoc tribunals , ‘the system of State cooperation within these criminal tribunals is mainly ‘judge-made’, meaning that as the Statutes of these tribunals are not conclusive with respect to these criteria, the judges before these tribunals ultimately created more clarity through their judgments’ (Cassese 2003, p. 356).

  25. 25.

    Merrills 1993, para 231, cited in Forowicz 2010, pp. 13–14, notes 59 and 60.

  26. 26.

    Sluiter 2009, p. 188.

  27. 27.

    Kreẞ 2003, pp. 603–617.

  28. 28.

    ICC , Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in the DRC , Decision to Convene a Status Conference, 17 February 2005, Case No. ICC -01/04; ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in the DRC , Decision on the Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of VPRS 1, VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4, VPRS 5 and VPRS 6, 17 January 2006, Case No. ICC -01/04, cited by Zappalà 2009, p. 221, n. 24.

  29. 29.

    Zappalà 2009, pp. 220–221.

  30. 30.

    Zappalà 2009, p. 223.

  31. 31.

    These are an internal source of law and are constituted by means of a legal text the status of which is regulated by Article 9 of the ICC Statute , above n. 2. This legal provision stipulates that the ICC Elements of Crimes (1998) International Criminal Court, Elements of Crimes, must be applied by the ICC but are not binding upon it. Instead, they are meant to be of assistance to the ICC in the interpretation and application of Articles 6, 7 and 8 of the ICC Statute , above n. 2. The ICC Pre-Trial Chamber has concluded that they must be applied unless the competent Chamber finds an irreconcilable contradiction between the ICC Elements of Crimes (see above) on the one hand and the ICC Statute (above n. 2) on the other hand, in which case the ICC Statute , above n. 2, shall prevail (ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in Darfur , Sudan , Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest Against Omar Hassan Al Bashir , 4 March 2009, Case No. ICC -02/05-01/09, paras 128 and 131, cited in Bitti 2015, p. 421, notes 46 and 47).

  32. 32.

    Vasiliev 2014, p. 46.

  33. 33.

    ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in the DRC , Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest under Article 58, 10 February 2006, Case No. ICC -01/04-01/06, cited in Schabas 2008, p. 757, n. 119.

  34. 34.

    Robinson 2010, p. 102.

  35. 35.

    Schabas 2010, p. 344.

  36. 36.

    ICC Appeals Chamber, Situation in the DRC , Prosecutor v Germain Katanaga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Germain Katanga against the Oral Decision of Trial Chamber II of 12 June 2009 on the Admissibility of the Case, 25 September 2009, Case No. ICC -01/04-01/07 OA8, paras 75–78 confirming the Prosecutor’s submissions outlined in para 66.

  37. 37.

    Jørgensen 2009, p. 123.

  38. 38.

    See, inter alia, Duffy 2001, pp. 6–8.

  39. 39.

    For an analysis of the related doctrine of constitutional autonomy and case-law connected thereto, see d’Aspremont and Brolmann 2010, pp. 130–133; see also Tzanakopoulos 2010, pp. 70–72.

  40. 40.

    By way of example, ‘the rejection of a request for surrender by the ICC is virtually impossible’ due to the legal provisions of German Law to Implement the Rome Statute of the ICC of 17 July 1998 [Entwurfeines Gesetzeszur Ausfuehrung des Roemischen Statuts des Internationalen Strafgerichtshofes vom 17 Juli 1998] {Draft Act Implementing the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court of 17 July 1998}, Act Amending the Basic Law (Federal Law Gazette 2000, I 1633) 29 November 2000 (Wilkitzki 2001, p. 201; see also Ambos and Stegmiller 2008, pp. 181–198).

  41. 41.

    d’Aspremont and Brolmann 2010, p. 118.

  42. 42.

    Jensen 2003, pp. 4–55.

  43. 43.

    Mark Ellis, Executive Director of the IBA, held that ‘implementing legislation is currently the missing link between the obligations within the Rome Statute and their implementation by State Parties ’ (Ellis (2008) IBA, News Release, 14 November 2008, London. http://www.iccnow.org/documents/IBA_NEWS_RELEASE.pdf. Accessed 3 July 2011).

  44. 44.

    This process is called ‘reverse complementarity ’ and has been adopted by Spain, Belgium and Germany (Pinto Soares 2012, p. 190, n. 68).

  45. 45.

    Bekou 2009a, p. 468.

  46. 46.

    The term ‘cooperation’ used within the Statute ‘carries insufficient weight and leads States to misinterpret the meaning of the obligation’ since it ‘implies willingness to assist and work towards the same end’ (Demirdjian 2010, pp. 182–183).

  47. 47.

    A distinction should be drawn between, on the one hand, the challenge of orders, id est the objection to requests for cooperation on the basis of a ground for refusal and, on the other hand, the challenge of jurisdiction . The Opacić and Rukundo cases are merely intended to illustrate, by analogy, the difference between the regimes of the ad hoc tribunals and that of the ICC .

  48. 48.

    District Court of The Hague, Dragan Opacić v the Netherlands , 30 May 1997, KG 97/742.

  49. 49.

    Federal Supreme Court of Switzerland, Appeal Judgment, Rukundo v Federal Office of Justice , 3 September 2001, Case Numbers 1A.129/2001 and 1A.130/2001.

  50. 50.

    The fact that the admissibility of a case is not a pre-requisite for the issuance of an international arrest warrant (see also Chap. 11, n. 12) manifests such discretion. As Dov Jacobs points out in his criticism of the fact that ‘the review of admissibility is not compulsory,’ timing is of the essence (Jacobs 2010, p. 116). Likewise, the ICC Statute , above n. 2, ‘acknowledges that the timing of arrest and surrender requires strategy and policy-oriented decision-making’ (Stahn 2010, p. 671).

  51. 51.

    Christian Tomuschat defines this corpus juris as one which aims to ‘reconcile the effectiveness of State power with the protection against the same State power’ (Tomuschat 2008, p. 8).

  52. 52.

    ECtHR Former Third Division, Vasiliy Kononov v Latvia , 24 July 2008, Application No. 36376/04, para 108.

  53. 53.

    Cassese 1999, p. 165.

  54. 54.

    Knoops and Amsterdam 2006, p. 264; Young 2001, p. 340; see also Mutyaba 2012, p. 944.

  55. 55.

    Stahn 2010, pp. 666–670.

  56. 56.

    Stahn 2010, p. 661.

  57. 57.

    Sluiter 2003a, p. 651.

  58. 58.

    Currie 2007, pp. 378–379.

  59. 59.

    Bellelli 2010, p. 212.

  60. 60.

    Ibid.

  61. 61.

    Stahn 2010, p. 666.

  62. 62.

    Mégret 2010, p. 187.

  63. 63.

    Swart 2002, p. 1688.

  64. 64.

    OTP 2003, p. 19, n. 24, and also cited in Schabas 2010, pp. 342–343.

  65. 65.

    Soler 2014, p. 292.

  66. 66.

    OTP 2003, p. 19, n. 24.

  67. 67.

    Buchan and Johnsson 2012, p. 105.

  68. 68.

    Schabas 2007, p. 2.

  69. 69.

    Nsereko 2013, p. 446.

  70. 70.

    Krings 2012, pp. 748 and 749.

  71. 71.

    OTP 2003, p. 7.

  72. 72.

    Prosecutor v Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui , above n. 36, para 78.

  73. 73.

    OTP 2013, p. 12.

  74. 74.

    van der Wilt 2011, p. 688.

  75. 75.

    Article 86 of the ICC Statute , above n. 2.

  76. 76.

    This is connected to the ne bis in idem rule which will be considered under Sect. 11.1.2.

  77. 77.

    Sluiter 2003b, p. 121.

  78. 78.

    Regulation 109(2) of the ICC .

  79. 79.

    Sluiter 1999, p. 285.

  80. 80.

    Swart 2002, p. 1640.

  81. 81.

    Llewllyn and Raponi 1999, pp. 83–84.

  82. 82.

    Ruiz Verduzco 2015, p. 43.

  83. 83.

    Prosecutor v Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui , above n. 36, para 59.

  84. 84.

    Article 86 of the ICC Statute , above n. 2, should not be considered as tantamount to a residual obligation to cooperate in situations other than those addressed by specific obligations.

  85. 85.

    Article 88 of the ICC Statute , above n. 2.

  86. 86.

    Article 93 of the ICC Statute , above n. 2.

  87. 87.

    Articles 59 and 89 of the ICC Statute , above n. 2.

  88. 88.

    Vide Article 12(2)(a) dealing with territorial jurisdiction , Article 12(3) concerning the acceptance of ICC jurisdiction by a non-State Party {with the situations in Côte d’Ivoire and Ukraine constituting classical examples of this}, and Article 13 which deals with the trigger mechanisms; see also van der Wilt 2005, p. 100.

  89. 89.

    D’Amato 2004, p. 185.

  90. 90.

    ‘…when operative as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness, consent suspends the international obligations which are incumbent on States, whereas when functional pursuant to the law of treaties, consent creates, modifies, or extinguishes the rules whence such obligations stem forth’ (Farhang 2014, p. 55).

  91. 91.

    Heyder 2006, pp. 652–653.

  92. 92.

    d’Aspremont and Brolmann 2010, p. 117.

  93. 93.

    Stahn 2010, p. 667.

  94. 94.

    Sulzer 2007, p. 125.

  95. 95.

    Ibid.

  96. 96.

    Sluiter 2003a, p. 611.

  97. 97.

    Swart 2002, p. 1687.

  98. 98.

    This portrays that ‘persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article III shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed, or by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction ’. Göran Sluiter , whilst disagreeing with the ICJ ’s interpretation {ICJ , Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 26 February 2007, ICJ Rep. 2007, p. 43} of Article VI which presupposes that the duty to cooperate under international law is a pre-requisite for the acceptance of jurisdiction of an international penal tribunal, argues that the ICC , a beneficiary of Article VI, constitutes an international penal tribunal and that the requirements of ‘acceptance of jurisdiction ’ on the one hand, and ‘the existence of a duty to cooperate on the other’ should be separated (Sluiter 2010, pp. 370–371).

  99. 99.

    Others, including Paola Gaeta, concur, though Paola Gaeta argues that Omar Al Bashir is shielded by diplomatic privileges and immunities as a sitting Head of State. However, William Schabas disagrees (Schabas 2011). This matter has sparked a lot of debate at all levels in international criminal law circles, including before the COJUR -ICC Working Group of the EU Council which was chaired by myself between January and June 2017.

  100. 100.

    Gillet 2012, pp. 63–96, but particularly pp. 93 and 95.

  101. 101.

    Dascalopoulou-Livada 2008, p. 59.

  102. 102.

    Vidmar 2012, pp. 18–19.

  103. 103.

    Coalition for the ICC 2008.

  104. 104.

    For a thorough legal analysis of deferrals, particularly the conditions and criteria which are required to invoke Article 16 of the ICC Statute , above n. 2, see Ruiz Verduzco 2015, pp. 52–60.

  105. 105.

    ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I, Prosecutor v Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi, Decision on the Postponement of the Execution of the Request to Surrender of Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi Pursuant to Article 95 of the Rome Statute, 1 June 2012, Case No. ICC -01/11-01/11, para 28.

  106. 106.

    Tillier 2013, p. 515.

  107. 107.

    Oberg 2005, pp. 879 and 891, cited in Akande 2009, p. 347, n. 44.

  108. 108.

    Gallant 2003, p. 583.

  109. 109.

    There is, however, some evidence that domestic and regional courts have found themselves competent to review Chapter VII resolutions in order to determine whether the Security Council has acted ultra vires or otherwise (de Wet and Nollkaemper 2002, p. 166, cited by Tzanakopoulos 2012, p. 50, n. 47). Such review , however, is most unlikely in such case since the UNSC has been rather cautious in using its powers of referral to the ICC on the pretext of the alleged commission of core crimes. In fact, since the ICC has been established, the UNSC has only resolved so twice.

  110. 110.

    These norms, their nature and characteristics, are dealt with in Parts II and IV of this book.

  111. 111.

    UNGA 1996, para 323, cited in Young 2001, p. 344.

  112. 112.

    Frowein and Krisch 2002, p. 708.

  113. 113.

    For an examination as to whether this is at all possible, see references to the Lockerbie case [ICJ , Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v UK) , Provisional Measures, Order of 14 April 1992, ICJ Rep. 1992, p. 114] in Sect. 13.4.

  114. 114.

    Tzanakopoulos 2011, p. 110.

  115. 115.

    Sluiter 2010, p. 377.

  116. 116.

    This legal provision is important since it arguably constitutes the only exception to the fact that the ICC Prosecutor does not have the power to rely on coercive measures without ensuring State cooperation. In fact, this legal provision allows the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber to authorise the ICC Prosecutor to take coercive measures without ensuring State cooperation in failed State situations (de Meester 2009, p. 280). Göran Sluiter upheld that the discharge of the ICC ’s mandate and the need to ensure effective prosecutions might justify the exercise of such powers (Sluiter 2002b, p. 309). For an understanding of failed State situations, see Chaps. 5 and 6.

  117. 117.

    For a comprehensive analysis of this important Convention, see van der Wilt et al. 2012, passim.

  118. 118.

    Article 29 of the ICC Statute , above n. 2.

  119. 119.

    Sluiter 2010, p. 366.

  120. 120.

    Regulation 107 of the ICC .

  121. 121.

    Hafner 2001, p. 245.

  122. 122.

    In terms of Article 2 of the VCLT (1969) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, these are States not party to a treaty, hence non-State Parties .

  123. 123.

    UN (2004) Press Release: Prosecutor Receives Referral of the Situation in the DRC . 19 April 2004, Doc. AFR/903-L/3067, cited in Mutyaba 2012, p. 956.

  124. 124.

    Hafner 2001, p. 252.

  125. 125.

    Hafner 2001, p. 244.

  126. 126.

    For an understanding of the impact of UNSC Resolutions on the ICJ , see Greenwood 1999, pp. 81–86.

  127. 127.

    Duijzentkunst 2008, p. 190.

  128. 128.

    Akande 2012, p. 299.

  129. 129.

    Sluiter 2010, p. 372.

  130. 130.

    Orakhelashvili 2005, p. 61.

  131. 131.

    Duijzentkunst 2008, p. 196.

  132. 132.

    Swart 2002, p. 1677. For a contrary view, as a result of which human rights instruments possess a normative superiority vis-à-vis binding UNSC Resolutions, see Rukundo v Federal Office of Justice , above n. 49.

  133. 133.

    ICJ , Advisory Opinion, Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) (Namibia case) , 21 June 1971, 1971 ICJ 16, para 131, cited in Paust 2010, p. 3.

  134. 134.

    ICTR, Trial Chamber II, Prosecutor v Joseph Kanyabashi , Decision on the Defence Motion on Jurisdiction , 18 June 1997, Case No. ICTR-96-15-T, paras 28–29

  135. 135.

    Swart 2002, p. 1677.

  136. 136.

    ICJ , Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v UK) , Provisional Measures, Order of 14 April 1992, ICJ Rep. 1992, p. 114, para 39.

  137. 137.

    Schabas 2010, p. 340.

  138. 138.

    A situation refers to a larger set of circumstances, whereas a case refers to circumstances in which an individual suspect has been identified. For an explanation as to the relevance of the distinction for the purposes of the admissibility test , see Olásolo 2003, pp. 99–100; see also Rastan 2011, pp. 421–459.

  139. 139.

    Schabas 2010, p. 365.

  140. 140.

    Graefrath 1993, p. 201.

  141. 141.

    See Sect. 10.2.

  142. 142.

    Barnes 2011, p. 1595.

  143. 143.

    The ASP , established by Article 112(1) of the ICC Statute , above n. 2, is not an organ of the ICC and is separate and distinct therefrom [vide Article 34 of the ICC Statute , above n. 2]. Its role and function in the cooperation saga is best explained in terms of its political clout. The more States ratify the ICC Statute , above n. 2, the more influential the ASP would be, and consequently the more likely it would affect co-operative relations between third States [non-State Parties ] and the ICC (Wenqi 2006, p. 108).

  144. 144.

    This is commonly referred to as a judicial finding of non-compliance (Sluiter 2011) and may not be appealed (Sluiter 2018a, p. 387). Article 87(7) proceedings are administrative in nature (Sluiter 2018a, p. 387).

  145. 145.

    OTP 2003, p. 18.

  146. 146.

    Such measures follow the negotiation mechanism contemplated by Article 119(2) of the ICC Statute , above n. 2.

  147. 147.

    Mutyaba 2012, p. 953.

  148. 148.

    Schabas 2004, p. 130.

  149. 149.

    Kelley 2007, p. 573, cited in Hillebrecht and Straus 2017, p. 171, n. 14.

  150. 150.

    Ruiz Verduzco 2015, p. 49.

  151. 151.

    UNGA 2018, pp. 6–113, also cited in ICC Report 2017, pp. 6–99 – 6–118.

  152. 152.

    UNSC (2017) http://www.un.org/en/sc/members/. Accessed 11 November 2017.

  153. 153.

    Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Nigeria to the UN (2015) http://redesign.nigeriaunmission.org/. Accessed 12 January 2016.

  154. 154.

    Tladi 2015, pp. 1027–1047; see also de Wet 2015, pp. 1049–1071; see also Ventura 2015, pp. 995–1025, all of which were articles published for the purposes of the symposium entitled ‘On President Al-Bashir’s Presence at the AU Summit in South Africa and the Non-Execution of the ICC Arrest Warrant’.

  155. 155.

    The resolution stipulates that ‘…African Union member States shall not cooperate pursuant to the provisions of Article 98 of the Rome Statute of the ICC relating to immunities, for the arrest and surrender of President Omar El Bashir of the Sudan ’ (AU 2009, cited in Okowa 2014, p. 236, n. 35).

  156. 156.

    Boschiero 2015, pp. 625–653.

  157. 157.

    ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II, Situation in Darfur , Sudan , Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir , Decision on the Cooperation of the DRC Regarding Omar Al Bashir ’s Arrest and Surrender to the Court, 9 April 2014, Case No. ICC -02/05-01/09, para 33.

  158. 158.

    Ibid.

  159. 159.

    Ruiz Verduzco 2015, p. 45.

  160. 160.

    ICC 2014, also cited in Zakerhossein and DeBrouwer 2015, pp. 218–219, n. 138.

  161. 161.

    ICC Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Republic of Kenya , Prosecutor v Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta , Judgment on the Prosecutor’s Appeal Against Trial Chamber’s V(B)’s ‘Decision on Prosecution’s Application for a Finding of Non-Compliance under Article 87(7) of the Statute’, 19 August 2015, Case No. ICC -01/09-02/11 OA 5, paras 94–96.

  162. 162.

    Woolaver and Palmer 2017, p. 656.

  163. 163.

    ICC , Pre-Trial Chamber II, Situation in Darfur , Sudan , Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir , Decision under Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the Non-compliance by South Africa with the Request by the Court for the Arrest and Surrender of Omar Al Bashir , 6 July 2017, Case No. ICC -02/05-01/09, para 137.

  164. 164.

    Sluiter 2018b.

  165. 165.

    ICC , Pre-Trial Chamber II, Situation in Darfur , Sudan , Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir , Decision under Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the non-compliance by Jordan with the Request by the Court for the Arrest and Surrender of Omar Al-Bashir, 11 December 2017, Case No. ICC -02/05-01/09, para 53.

  166. 166.

    du Plessis 2017.

  167. 167.

    Decision on Jordan ’s non-compliance, above n. 165, para 47.

  168. 168.

    Sluiter 2018a, pp. 390–393.

  169. 169.

    Sluiter 2018a, p. 399.

  170. 170.

    The ICC , using a critical tone, has noted that ‘the past 24 meetings of the Security Council of the United Nations following the adoption of Resolution 1593 (2005), including meetings held on the occasion of the biannual reports made by the Prosecutor to the Security Council of the United Nations, have not resulted in measures against State Parties that have failed to comply with their obligations to cooperate with the Court, despite proposals from different States to develop a follow-up mechanism concerning the referral of States to the Security Council by the Court’ [Decision on South Africa ’s non-compliance, above n. 163, para 138].

  171. 171.

    Cryer 2015, p. 280.

  172. 172.

    ICC 2013.

  173. 173.

    For this purpose, some basis of jurisdiction must be laid pursuant to Article 36 of the ICJ Statute [ICJ Statute (1946) Statute of the International Court of Justice]. Moreover, a referral of the matter to the ICJ would most likely decelerate the entire procedure (Demirdjian 2010, p. 189).

  174. 174.

    Sluiter 2009, p. 198.

  175. 175.

    Articles 25, 41 and 103 of the UNC .

  176. 176.

    Article 112(8) of the ICC Statute , above n. 2.

  177. 177.

    Ciampi 2002, p. 1635.

  178. 178.

    Jurists have attempted to counteract the ICC ’s vulnerability by proposing the following alternative enforcement mechanisms:

    1. (a)

      the use of economic aid inducements;

    2. (b)

      the use of diplomatic and economic sanctions on uncooperative governments;

    3. (c)

      freezing the assets of indicted individuals;

    4. (d)

      offering individual cash rewards for information or assistance leading to the arrest or the conviction of indicted individuals;

    5. (e)

      the use of luring by deception for locating and apprehending suspects; and

    6. (f)

      the use of military force to execute apprehension and confinement of suspects.

    (Scharf 2000, pp. 925–927). Others have suggested that the ICC should possess its own police force (see, inter alia, Scheffer 1995, pp. 649–660; see also Perritt 1999, pp. 281–324).

  179. 179.

    Danner 2003, p. 529. Three laudable recommendations for the improvement of the cooperation regime have been proposed by Göran Sluiter (Sluiter 2008, p. 884).

  180. 180.

    ASP 2013a, paras 26–27, cited in O’Donohue 2015, p. 133, n. 209.

  181. 181.

    ASP 2011, para 10, cited in O’Donohue 2015, p. 137, n. 240.

  182. 182.

    Demirdjian 2010, p. 189.

  183. 183.

    Sluiter 2003a, pp. 650–651.

  184. 184.

    Bassiouni and Manikas 1996, p. 792.

  185. 185.

    Schabas 2010, p. 1124.

  186. 186.

    Kreẞ 2018, p. 12.

  187. 187.

    See Article 61(2) of the ICC Statute , above n. 2, which, in Carsen Stahn’s rather optimistic view, is a more powerful tool than Rule 61 proceedings in the context of the ad hoc tribunals (Stahn 2010, p. 669).

  188. 188.

    Ambach 2015, p. 1280.

  189. 189.

    Just as the ICC Statute , above n. 2, triggers the obligation to cooperate, such obligation equally stems from ad hoc agreements and/or arrangements . Their breach would hence equally entail the State responsibility of the defaulting State just as though the defaulting State were a signatory of (and would have ratified) the ICC Statute , above n. 2, in the first place. In substantiation of this, Zhu Wenqi upholds that ‘if a non-Party State has expressed a willingness to co-operate and has reached agreement with the ICC on a specific case, it has consequently incurred an obligation to co-operate in that particular case just like the State parties . The ICC or State parties to the Court are entitled to ask it to perform its co-operation obligations’ (Wenqi 2006, pp. 107–108).

  190. 190.

    See Chap. 7.

  191. 191.

    Ciampi 2002, p. 1636.

  192. 192.

    Ambos 2007, p. 61.

  193. 193.

    ASP 2013b, paras 49–50, and Stagno Ugarte 2012, cited in Ruiz Verduzco 2015, p. 61, n. 185.

  194. 194.

    The ASP has already established the Committee on Budget and Finance, the Staff Pension Committee, the Trust Fund for Victims, and the Oversight Committee on Permanent Premises.

  195. 195.

    Tolbert and Kontić 2011, p. 905.

  196. 196.

    Former ICTY President McDonald, in her final letter as ICTY President to the UNSC , expressed the serious problem of non-enforcement of its orders as follows:

    During the past four years, my predecessor, Judge Antonio Cassese and I have reported, on numerous occasions, State non-compliance and many of these matters remain unresolved. In fact, notwithstanding action by the Security Council, including resolutions 940 and 1207 and several Presidential Statements, the States concerned have continued to flaunt the will of the international community, refusing to co-operate with the Tribunal and failing to carry out their legal obligations. This is simply unacceptable, and I respectfully request that the Security Council take steps to address the troubling situation (Harmon and Gaynor 2004, p. 420).

  197. 197.

    See above n. 170.

  198. 198.

    Knottnerus 2014, p. 221.

  199. 199.

    Mistry and Ruiz Verduzco 2012, p. 9.

  200. 200.

    Ibid.

  201. 201.

    By virtue of Article 103 of the UNC , the legality of UN sanctions cannot be reviewed {Yusuf and Al Barakaat International Foundation, above n. 6; Kadi, above n. 6, paras 281, 299 and 316}.

  202. 202.

    Article 18 of the UNC .

  203. 203.

    Article 6 of the UNC .

  204. 204.

    Murray 2011, p. 612.

  205. 205.

    Vinjamuri 2015, p. 15.

  206. 206.

    Ruiz Verduzco 2015, p. 31.

  207. 207.

    Grono and de Courcy Wheeler 2015, p. 1243.

  208. 208.

    Grono and de Courcy Wheeler 2015, p. 1225. One must here acknowledge that these views have been criticized by some who contend that the very nature of core crimes renders them resistant to deterrence through prosecutions which risk prolonging conflicts (Branch 2007, p. 2, cited in Grono and de Courcy Wheeler 2015, pp. 1225–1226, n. 5).

  209. 209.

    Knottnerus 2014, p. 204; see also Condorelli and Villalpando 2002, p. 579.

  210. 210.

    A valid deferral (i) should be limited to a period of twelve months; (ii) should include an express request by the UNSC to the ICC so that such ICC does not commence or proceed with an investigation or prosecution; (iii) must be issued by means of a resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the UNC ; and (iv) such UNSC ’s powers must be so exercised on a case-by-case basis (Knottnerus 2014, pp. 198–200).

  211. 211.

    Ciampi 2002, p. 1611.

  212. 212.

    Trahan 2013, p. 425.

  213. 213.

    The word ‘sprouting’ is hereby used by myself to reflect the (arguably) shaky foundation of the responsibility to protect which, in the views of some jurists, consistitutes a mere aspiration rather than a fully-fledged duty. In fact it has been stated that many critics, one of whom is Philip Cunliffe (see Cunliffe 2010) ‘…argue either that the responsibility to protect is a dangerous and imperialist doctrine that threatens to undermine the national sovereignty and political autonomy of the weak or that it is little other than rhetorical posturing that promises little tangible improvement in the protection of vulnerable people. To complicate matters, profound disagreements have emerged about the function, meaning and proper use of responsibility to protect ’ (Bellamy et al. 2011, pp. 2–3).

  214. 214.

    Schiff argues that the responsibility to protect hinges on international political mobilization whereas the ICC depends on legal judgment (Schiff 2015, p. 8, cited in Birdsall 2015, p. 55, n. 7).

  215. 215.

    This connotes ‘a naturalistic relationship between the result of a crime and wilful action’ (Murmann 2014, p. 283), and may be defined as ‘the process of connecting an act (or omission) with an outcome as cause and effect’ (Plakokefalos 2015, p. 471).

  216. 216.

    HRW 1991, p. 87.

  217. 217.

    The 2009 UN Secretary-General’s report stipulates that ‘by seeking to end impunity , the ICC and the UN-assisted tribunals have added an essential tool for implementing the responsibility to protect ’ and considers the ICC as ‘one of the key instruments relating to the responsibility to protect ’ (UNGA 2009, para 10, cited in Birdsall 2015, p. 54, n. 4).

  218. 218.

    Birdsall 2015, pp. 54–55.

  219. 219.

    Contarino and Lucent 2011, p. 196.

  220. 220.

    Ibid.

  221. 221.

    Contarino and Lucent 2011, p. 197.

  222. 222.

    International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 2001, also cited in Contarino and Lucent 2011, p. 197.

  223. 223.

    International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 2001, also cited in Contarino and Lucent 2011, p. 195, n. 9.

  224. 224.

    International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 2001, also cited in Contarino and Lucent 2011, pp. 197–198, n. 15.

  225. 225.

    Tzanakopoulos 2011, p. 198.

  226. 226.

    Tzanakopoulos 2011, p. 200.

  227. 227.

    See an analysis of the status of international organisations in Voetelink 2015, pp. 169–187.

  228. 228.

    Sluiter 2009, p. 200.

  229. 229.

    Swart and Sluiter 1999, p. 101.

  230. 230.

    Swart 2002, p. 1640.

  231. 231.

    Kreẞ and Prost 2016, p. 2011

  232. 232.

    Ibid.

  233. 233.

    Stahn 2010, p. 667.

  234. 234.

    See Sect. 11.3.1.

  235. 235.

    Hall 2008, p. 1152.

  236. 236.

    No person can judge a case in which he or she is a party.

  237. 237.

    Sluiter 2008, p. 875.

  238. 238.

    For a detailed analysis of Article 11bis of the ICTY Statute see Bekou 2009b, pp. 726–769.

  239. 239.

    ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II, Situation in Uganda , Decision on Prosecutor’s Application for Leave to Appeal in Part Pre-Trial Chamber II’s Decision on the Prosecutor’s Applications for Warrants under Article 58, Unsealed Pursuant to Decision ICC -02/04-01/05-52 dated 13 October 2005, Situation in Uganda , 19 August 2005, Case No. ICC -02/04-01/05-20-US-Exp, paras 7–8.

  240. 240.

    ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in Darfur , Sudan , Prosecutor v Ahmad Muhammad Harun (Ahmad Harun) and Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al Rahman (Ali Kushayb) , Decision on the Prosecution Application under Article 58(7) of the Statute, 27 April 2007, Case No. ICC -02/05-01/07, paras 56–57.

  241. 241.

    Schabas 2010, p. 981.

  242. 242.

    Article 119(1) allows the ICC to determine and conclusively settle any dispute relating to its own judicial functions.

  243. 243.

    Sluiter 2003a, p. 651.

  244. 244.

    ICC Appeals Chamber, Situation in the DRC , Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Judgment on the Appeal of the Prosecutor Against the Decision of Trial Chamber I Entitled ‘Decision on the Consequences of Non-Disclosure of Exculpatory Materials Covered by Article 54(3)(e) Agreements and the Application to Stay the Prosecution of the Accused, Together with Certain Other Issues Raised at the Status Conference on 10 June 2008’, 21 October 2008, Case No. ICC -01/04-01/06 OA 13, para 77, cited in Vasiliev 2014, p. 135.

  245. 245.

    Vasiliev 2014, p. 135.

  246. 246.

    Sluiter 2008, p. 878.

  247. 247.

    Rastan 2008, pp. 447–449.

  248. 248.

    Swart and Sluiter 1999, pp. 103–105.

  249. 249.

    Sometimes, the term ‘absolute liability’ is inter-changeably used (Simester et al. 2010, p. 173).

  250. 250.

    This is a ‘complex legal notion, and may be subject to various interpretations’ (Sluiter 2008, p. 877).

  251. 251.

    This phrase has not been given a precise meaning within the meeting preceding the adoption of UNSC Resolution 1593 (Sluiter 2008, p. 876).

  252. 252.

    Tzanakopoulos 2011, p. 58.

  253. 253.

    Non-State Parties and/or third parties should be construed to mean those States which have not ratified the ICC Statute , above n. 2.

  254. 254.

    These include both populous and powerful States such as Egypt , India , Indonesia , Iran , Israel, Pakistan , China , Russia , Sudan and the USA .

  255. 255.

    Wenqi 2006, p. 108.

  256. 256.

    Cryer et al. 2011, p. 512.

  257. 257.

    The former ICC Chief Prosecutor clarified that ‘international airspace’ meant ‘outside of Sudan ’.

  258. 258.

    See http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/03/04/albashir-arrest-warrant-i_n_171703.html. Accessed 13 January 2011.

  259. 259.

    Mutyaba 2012, p. 937.

  260. 260.

    See Regulations of the International Criminal Court (2004) Regulations of the Court, ICC -BD/01-01-04.

  261. 261.

    Cassese 1999, p. 166.

  262. 262.

    Mistry and Ruiz Verduzco 2012, p. 10.

  263. 263.

    Hawkins 2008, p. 107.

  264. 264.

    Zahar and Sluiter 2008, p. 475; see also Sluiter 2009, p. 199.

  265. 265.

    Decision on Jordan ’s non-compliance, above n. 165, para 24.

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Soler, C. (2019). The State Obligation to Cooperate under International Law. In: The Global Prosecution of Core Crimes under International Law. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-335-1_10

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