Who Guards the Guardians? Judicial Oversight of the Authority Consumer and Market’s Energy Regulations in the Netherlands

Lavrijssen, Saskia; Çapkurt, Fatma

doi:10.1007/978-94-6265-307-8_8

Saskia Lavrijssen⁴ &
Fatma Çapkurt⁵

529 Accesses

Abstract

Independent National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) play an important role in the implementation and enforcement of European energy directives and regulation. The Dutch Autoriteit Consument en Markt (Authority for Consumers and Markets, hereafter: ACM) has been provided broad discretionary powers to regulate the energy market. This chapter examines the way in which the Dutch College van Beroep voor het bedrijfsleven (Appeals Tribunal for Trade and Industry, hereafter: CBB) has reviewed energy regulations. This chapter concludes that initially the CBB was very hesitant in reviewing the ACM’s energy regulation, since it scrutinized administrative energy decisions of the ACM based on its discretionary powers very marginally in the period between 2002 and 2013. As a result of this marginal judicial review of the ACM’s energy regulations, it has been extremely hard for appellants to realise effective judicial protection in the period between 2002 and 2013. However, in more recent judgements from 2014 and onwards, the CBB has become stricter in reviewing the ACM’s energy regulations. The CBB has done this by reviewing the substance of decisions more intensely on procedural grounds. This chapter suggests that the CBB, when reviewing the ACM’s energy regulations, should continue its recent intensification of the judicial review of regulatory decisions and favour the adoption of a procedural-proportionality review. By applying a procedural-proportionality review, courts will be given more instruments to ensure that energy regulations are made in a fair, well-informed, proportional and transparent way, which could enhance both the democratic legitimacy of energy regulations and the democratic accountability of the ACM.

Saskia Lavrijssen is professor of Economic Regulation and Market Governance of Network Industries at Tilburg University (s.a.c.m.lavrijssen@tilburguniversity.edu). Fatma Çapkurt is a researcher at the department of Constitutional- and Administrative law at Leiden University (f.capkurt@law.leidenuniv.nl). This chapter is an updated and elaborated version of the following article: S. A. C. M. Lavrijssen, J. Eijkens and F. Capkurt, ‘Rechterlijke toetsing van energieregulering door het CBb en het recht op effectieve rechtsbescherming’ (2016) 4 Tijdschrift voor Europees en economisch recht 142–161.

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Notes

1.
McLean and Tushnet 2015, pp. 121–130.
2.
Independent national regulatory authorities are defined by Coen and Thatcher as “an unelected body that is organizationally separated from government and has powers over regulation of markets through endorsement or formal delegation by public bodies.” Coen and Thatcher 2005, pp. 329–346.
3.
Directive 2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 2003/54/EC (OJ 2009, L211/55); Directive 2009/73/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas and repealing Directive 2003/55/EC (OJ 2009, L211/94); Regulation 714/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on conditions for access to the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity and repealing Regulation 1228/2003 (OJ 2009, L211/15); Regulation 715/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on conditions for access to the natural gas transmission networks and repealing Regulation 1775/2005 (OJ 2009, L211/36) and Regulation 713/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 establishing an Agency for Cooperation of Energy Regulators (OJ 2009, L211/1).
4.
Gilardi and Maggetti 2011, pp. 201–214.
5.
Rose-Ackerman and Jordao 2014, pp. 1–73.
6.
Generally binding regulations are rules issued by competent public bodies that have external effect and are binding on those to who it relates to. Generally binding regulations contain general, abstract rules that are suitable for repeated application in practice without further specification. Article 8:3 GALA prohibits administrative courts to directly examine the legality of generally binding regulations. The administrative judge can only indirectly scrutinize generally binding regulations: the applicant can indirectly challenge the legality of generally binding regulations when litigants question the administrative decision that has been taken by a public body on the basis of that generally binding regulation (exceptive judicial review). The underlying structural logical is a political and constitutional argument based on the Dutch understanding of the separation of powers: matters of policy and regulation should be dealt with by the executive and legislative power. This prohibition is currently heavily criticized and debated in the Netherlands. See Voermans 2017 and de Poorter and Capkurt 2017, pp. 84–95.
7.
Article 41 Dutch Electricity Act 1998 and Article 81 Gas Act, Articles 27, 31 and 36 Dutch Electricity Act 1998 and Articles 12a, 12b and 12f Gas Act. Dutch Administrative law qualifies these regulations as generally binding regulations (algemeen verbindende voorschriften). Whereas Article 8:3 GALA prohibits the judicial review of generally binding decisions, an exception is made for energy regulations.
8.
Verhey and Verheij 2005, pp. 159, Zwart and Verhey 2003 and Caranta et al. 2004.
9.
Coglianese 2015, Van Gestel 2014 and Stewart 1975.
10.
See Van Gestel 2014.
11.
Article 35 of Directive 2009/72/EC and Article 39 Directive 2009/73/EC.
12.
This is particularly important, considering that the energy market is strongly intertwined with the government, since the Dutch Ministry for Financial Affairs is also a sole shareholder in TenneT, the transmission system operator in the Netherlands that operates the national electricity transmission. This Ministry is also the sole shareholder of the Dutch Gas Transmission Network (Gas Transport Services). See Hancher et al. 2003, pp. 361–362.
13.
Gilardi and Maggetti 2011, p. 201.
14.
Lavrijssen 2016, pp. 51–57.
15.
Meuwese et al. 2009.
16.
As provided in Appendix 2, Article 4 Awb (General Administrative Law Act).
17.
However, if there is a criminal charge, there should be the possibility of higher appeal. As provided in Article 14 para 5 of the International Convention for Civil and Political Rights, which holds that that ‘everyone convicted of a crime shall have the right to his conviction and sentence being reviewed by a higher tribunal according to law’.
18.
Parliamentary Documents II, 2003/04, 29702, nr. 3, p. 123. If for instance a fine is issued on the basis of the Electricity Act or Gas Act, the appeal of first instance is the district court of Rotterdam, with the possibility for higher appeal at the CBB. In such cases, the CBB is the judge in second and final instance.
19.
Lavrijssen et al. 2016.
20.
Mak 2012.
21.
Lavrijssen and Kohlbacher 2018.
22.
On this, see Lavrijssen 2014. In the third energy directive, the term customer is used which encompasses various groups of customers: wholesale customers, household customers, non-household customers, vulnerable customers. See Pront-van Bommel 2010, p. 44.
23.
Parliamentary documents II 2008/09, 31901, no. 1–2, p. 44.
24.
Article 36(f) Directive 2009/72/EC. For Directive on gas, see Article 40(f) Directive 2009/73/EC.
25.
Article 35(5) Directive 2009/72/EC and Article 39(5) Directive 2009/73/EC.
26.
Articles 41b and 41c Electricity Act.
27.
It not always turned out to be feasible to establish a benchmark to compare different national network operators. As an example, for a long time the ACM used for the GTS a benchmark that was not based on the performance of other national operators. See: Parliamentary documents II 2008/09, 31901, no. 1–2, p. 48.
28.
Parliamentary documents II 2008/09, 31901, no. 1–2, p. 11; attached with consultation document ‘STROOM’.
29.
Hakvoort et al. 2013, p. 5.
30.
Parliamentary documents II 2008/09, 31901, no. 1–2, p. 46.
31.
Lavrijssen et al. 2014, p. 26.
32.
Minister van Economische Zaken, Wetgevingsagenda en energietransitie, brief van 11 december 2017, met kenmerk DGETM-EI, 17192414.
33.
Duk 1988 and Schlössels and Zijlstra 2010, p. 164.
34.
Different standards of review can be distinguished. Lavrijssen and De Visser speak of a ‘slippery scale’, where basically four different standards of review can be discerned, from extremely limited to highly intensive. Lavrijssen and de Visser 2006; Stroink 1995.
35.
Wade and Forsyth 2014, pp. 308–310; and Van den Berge 2017a, b, pp. 204–233.
36.
It is important to note that the judge always has the last word in interpreting the law.
37.
Schlössels and Zijlstra 2010, p. 164.
38.
Michiels 2011, p. 139.
39.
Schlössels and Zijlstra 2010, p. 161.
40.
Michiels 2011, p. 140.
41.
Van Wijk and Konijnenbelt 2005, pp. 141–151.
42.
Schlössels and Zijlstra 2010, p. 170.
43.
CBB 30 November 2006, ECLI:NL:CBB:2006:AZ3365; CBB 29 June 2010, ECLI:NL:CBB:2010:BM9470 and CBB 8 November 2012, ECLI:NL:CBB:2012:BY2307.
44.
Article 82 Gas Act provided as follows at that time:
1. 1.
  In contrast to Article 80, the tariffs for exercising the tasks by the network operators of the national gas transport network, referred to in Articles 10 and 10a, first paragraph, section b, c, d and e, as well as the tariffs for services needed for transportation are established in accordance with this article.
2. 2.
  For each of the tasks of the network operator of the national gas transport network, referred to in the first paragraph, the Board of the competition authority determines the method of regulation, for a period of minimally three and maximum five years, after consultation with the joint network operators and with organizations representing parties in the gas market and taking into account the importance of efficiency of business operation and the promotion of the most efficient quality of the operation of these tasks.
3. 4.
  The Board of the competition authority determines an efficiency discount after consultation with the joint network operators and representing organizations. This decision applies in the same period as the decision on the basis of the second paragraph. The efficiency discount has as goal to promote efficient business operation.
4. 5.
  The Board of the competition authority determines on a yearly basis the tariffs that can differ for the tariff carriers as distinguished. (own translation)
45.
Organizations representing parties on the energy market, including consumer organizations, have a privileged position. They are amongst others regarded as having an interest in all decisions made on the basis of the Dutch Electricity Act and the Dutch Gas Act, excluding administrative orders (beschikkingen). See Article 82 Dutch Electricity Act 1998 and Article 61 Dutch Gas Act.
46.
CBB 8 November 2012, ECLI:NL:CBB:2012:BY2307.
47.
Article 3 para 1 of Regulation 1775/2005/EC holds as follows: “Tariffs, or the methodologies used to calculate them, applied by transmission system operators… shall be transparent, take into account the need for system integrity and its improvement and reflect actual costs incurred, insofar as such costs correspond to those of an efficient and structurally comparable network operator and are transparent”.
48.
CBB 8 November 2012, ECLI:NL:CBB:2012:BY2307, para 3.3.1.
49.
CBB 8 November 2012, ECLI:NL:CBB:2012:BY2307, para 3.3.3.
50.
CBB 8 November 2012, ECLI:NL:CBB:2012:BY2307, para 3.3.1.
51.
Schlössels and Zijlstra 2010, p. 1121 and Damen 2013, p. 308.
52.
Schuurmans 2005, p. 213.
53.
Damen 2013, p. 308.
54.
Schuurmans 2005, p. 21.
55.
Damen 2006, p. 21.
56.
Damen 2013, p. 290.
57.
CBB 10 September 2004, ECLI:NL:CBB:2004:AR2366 and CBB 23 April 2004, ECLI:NL:CBB:2004:AO9530.
58.
Directive 2003/55/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas and repealing Directive 98/30/EC (OJ 2003, L176/57).
59.
Article 13 para 1 of Regulation 715/2009 reads “Tariffs, or the methodologies used to calculate them, applied by the transmission system operators and approved by the regulatory authorities pursuant to Article 41(6) of Directive 2009/73/EC, as well as tariffs published pursuant to Article 32(1) of that Directive, shall be transparent, take into account the need for system integrity and its improvement and reflect the actual costs incurred, insofar as such costs correspond to those of an efficient and structurally comparable network operator and are transparent, whilst including an appropriate return on investments, and, where appropriate, taking account of the benchmarking of tariffs by the regulatory authorities. Tariffs, or the methodologies used to calculate them, shall be applied in a non-discriminatory manner”.
60.
CBB 23 December 2011, ECLI:NL:CBB:2011:BU9127, para 4.1: “The Tribunal holds first and foremost that the NMA, in deciding how the NMA can most effectively realize the goals provided in the Gas Act, has a margin of discretion, in which context in principle different approaches would be legitimately possible.” (own translation)
61.
Oxera 2011, p. 15.
62.
Brattle 2007, p. 3.
63.
Schlössels and Zijlstra 2010, p. 161.
64.
As the CBB has considered in the case discussed below on the right to having a gas connection. See CBB 22 April 2014, ECLI:NL:CBB:2014:134.
65.
See, in this regard, Crespo and Lavrijssen 2013.
66.
An exception to the prohibition of discrimination can only be made if an actual objective distinction can be made between the different situations. See, in this regard, Case C-17/02 VEMW and others [2005] ECLI:EU:C:2005:362, para 48. See also para 36 of Directive 2009/72/EC where the principle of cost reflectiveness is referred to. The European directives are grounded in the assumption that network tariffs should reflect the costs (fixed and variable costs along plus a reasonable return on investment).
67.
CBB 2 August 2002, ECLI:NL:CBB:2002:AE6773.
68.
Article 27 Electricity Act 1998.
1. 1.
  The joined network operators send the director of the service a proposal concerning the tariff structures that lists the method of calculating the tariff for which users will be connected to a network, the tariff for which the transportation of electricity, including the feeding in, the consumption and transit of electricity, for the users will be carried out and of the tariff for which the system services will be conducted and the energy balance will be maintained. (…)
2. 3.
  The tariffs the network operators of the national high voltage network charge for maintaining the energy balance are objective, transparent, non-discriminatory and reflective of the costs. (own translation)
69.
Article 36 Electricity Act 1998.

“1. The director of the service establishes the tariff structures and conditions while taking into account:

The proposal of the joined operators as referred to in Articles 27, 31 or 32 and the results of the consultation, referred to in Article 33, first paragraph, the importance of the secure, sustainable, efficient and environmentally sound functioning of energy supply, the importance of the promotion of the development of trade on the electricity market, the importance of promoting efficient operation of users and the importance of good quality of service provision by network operators.” (own translation).
70.
Article 3.5.1. Tariff Code provides as follows: for producers with means of production that are connected to a network on EHS_ or HS_ level “a nationwide uniform producers transport tariff applies (LUP).” (own translation).
71.
CBB 2 August 2002, ECLI:NL:CBB:2002:AE6773, para 6.1 and Lavrijssen et al. 2014, p. 56.
72.
CBB 11 February 2005, ECLI:NL:CBB:2005:AS7083.
73.
See preceding footnotes.
74.
Article 29 Electricity Act 1998.
1. 1.
  The tariff at which the transport of electricity will be carried out for the user, relates to the consumption of electricity by a user, regardless of the place of generation of the electricity and the connection where the electricity has been brought into the Dutch net, or the feeding in of electricity by a user, regardless of the place of receiving electricity.
2. 2.
  The tariff, as referred to in the first paragraph, is charged to every user with a connection to a network that is administered by a network operator. The tariffs for the consumption of electricity can vary for the different users, depending on the voltage level of the network from which the electricity is taken, and the tariffs for the feeding in of electricity can vary for different users, depending on the voltage level of the network the electricity is fed into. (own translation)
75.
Lavrijssen et al. 2014, p. 57.
76.
Directive 2003/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 96/92/EC (OJ 2003, L176/37).
77.
See consideration 18 of Directive 2003/54/EC.
78.
Lavrijssen et al. 2014, p. 59.
79.
CBB 11 February 2005, ECLI:NL:CBB:2005:AS7083, paras 6.4–6.6.
80.
CBB 11 December 2011, ECLI:NL:CBB:2011:BU7936.
81.
CBB 11 December 2011, ECLI:NL:CBB:2011:BU7936, para 4.4.1.
82.
Article 41b provides as follows:
1. 1.
  Every network operator every year sends, prior to 1 October, a proposal to the board of directors of the competition authority with the tariffs that the operator will apply at most for exercising the tasks referred to in Article 16, para 1, taking into account:
  1. a.
    The principle that costs are awarded to the tariff carriers for the services that give rise to these costs, (…)” (own translation)
83.
CBB 11 December 2011, ECLI:NL:CBB:2011:BU7936, para 4.4.3.
84.
CBB 2 July 2013, ECLI:NL:CBB:2013:52, paras 3.1 and 3.2.
85.
See Footnote 74.
86.
CBB 17 October 2013, ECLI:NL:CBB:2013:204, paras 3.4.1–3.4.4.
87.
CBB 17 October 2013, ECLI:NL:CBB:2013:204.
88.
CBB 17 October 2013, ECLI:NL:CBB:2013:204.
89.
See e.g. consideration 16 of the preamble of Directive 2009/72/EC, which provides that tariffs should not be discriminatory and should be reflective of the costs.
90.
Article 81 Gas Act provides as follows: (…)
The discount to promote efficient business operation has as amongst others as goal to make sure that the network operator can in any case not attain higher returns than what would be usual in the economy and the promotion of equality in the efficiency of network operators.
91.
See also Article 41a para 1a of the Electricity Act 1998: “the discount to promote efficient business operation” (own translation).
92.
CBB 23 April 2013, ECLI:NL:CBB:2013:CA1052.
93.
CBB 13 February 2014, ECLI:NL:CBB:2014:50; CBB 13 February 2014, ECLI:NL:CBB:2014:46. See also Sauter’s case note for CBB 13 February 2014, ECLI:NL:CBB:2014:50, AB 2014/227.
94.
Lavrijssen et al. 2014, p. 60. See in this context also Articles 36 and 37 of Directive 2009/72/EC and Articles 40 and 41 Directive 2009/73/EC.
95.
CBB 22 April 2014, ECLI:NL:CBB:2014:134.
96.
Article 12b, first paragraph, section f Gas Act.
1. 1.
  With due consideration of the rules referred to in Article 12 and the net codes provided in Article 6 of Regulation 715/2009 the joined network operators send a proposal to the Authority Consumers and Market for the conditions applied to users regarding: (…)
  1. f.
    The zoning of the network operators for exercising the task, referred to in Article 10, para 6, whereby certain areas can be excepted if the area is located in a district with a heat network, as meant in Article 1, section c, of the Heat Act or will be located in such an area or if it is an area where the network operator cannot have a functioning gas transportation network, nor maintain or develop one under economic conditions (own translation).
97.
Article 12f, first paragraph, Gas Act.
1. 1.
  The Authority for Consumers and Markets establishes the tariff structures and conditions in due regard of:
  1. a.
    the proposal of the joined network operators as referred to in Articles 12a, 12b or 12c and the results of consultation, as provided in Article 12d;
  2. b.
    the importance of secure, sustainable, efficient and environmentally sound functioning of gas provision;
  3. c.
    the importance of the advancement of trade on the gas market;
  4. d.
    the importance of the promotion of efficient operation of network users;
  5. e.
    the importance of good quality service provision of network operators, and
  6. f.
    the importance of the objective, transparent and non-discriminatory balancing of the national gas transportation network, in a manner that reflects the costs;
  7. g.
    the rules referred to in Article 12;
  8. h.
    Regulation 715/2009;
  9. i.
    the Directive (own translation).
98.
Article 12b, first paragraph, under f Gas Act.
99.
CBB 22 April 2014, ECLI:NL:CBB:2014:134, para 3.2.1.
100.
See the comparable cases for national and regional network operators respectively. CBB 5 March 2014, ECLI:NL:CBB:2015:44 and CBB 5 March 2014, ECLI:NL:CBB:2015:45.
101.
See Sauter’s case note for the abovementioned cases, AB Bestuursrechtspraak 5 June 2015.
102.
Article 82 Gas Act.
1. 1.
  In contrast to Article 80, the tariffs for exercising the tasks by the network operators of the national gas transportation network, referred to in Articles 10 and 10a, first paragraph, section b, c, d and e, as well as the tariffs for services needed for transportation are established in accordance with this Article.
2. 2.
  For each of the tasks of the network operators of the national gas transport network, referred to in the first paragraph, the Board of the competition authority determines the method of regulation, for a period of minimally three and maximum five years, after consultation with the joint network operators and with organizations representing parties in the gas market and taking into account the importance of the efficiency of business operation and the promotion of the most efficient quality of the operation of these tasks, as well as the importance of a secure energy supply, sustainability and a reasonable return on investment.
103.
See Article 13, para 1 of Regulation 715/2009: “Tariffs, or the methodologies used to calculate them, applied by the transmission system operators and approved by the regulatory authorities pursuant to Article 41(6) of Directive 2009/73/EC, as well as tariffs published pursuant to Article 32(1) of that Directive, shall be transparent, take into account the need for system integrity and its improvement and reflect the actual costs incurred, insofar as such costs correspond to those of an efficient and structurally comparable network operator and are transparent, whilst including an appropriate return on investments, and, where appropriate, taking account of the benchmarking of tariffs by the regulatory authorities. The tariffs applied by transmission system operators, or the methods used for calculating tariffs that have been agreed upon by the regulatory authorities in accordance with Article 41, para 6, of Directive 2009/73/EC, as well as the tariffs that are published pursuant Article 32, para 1, of that Directive, are transparent, take into due regard the need for system integrity and the promotion thereof and reflect the actual costs. Tariffs, or the methodologies used to calculate them, shall be applied in a non-discriminatory manner” (own translation).
104.
CBB 5 March 2015, ECLI:NL:CBB:2015:44, para 3.3.2. The administrative loop (bestuurlijke lus) enables the administrative judge to request the responsible public body to correct certain irregularities within the administrative decision-making procedure with regard to defects in the motivation of the administrative decision. The responsible public body can issue a new administrative decision or elaborate on its motivation for the already issued administrative decision. Backes et al. 2014.
105.
W. Sauter, case note on CBB 5 March 2015, ECLI:NL:CBB:2015:45.
106.
CBB 5 March 2015, ECLI:NL:CBB:2015:44, para 6.1.
107.
CBB 5 March 2015, ECLI:NL:CBB:2015:45, para 1.5.4.
108.
Another example of this is the interlocutory judgment between the ACM and TenneT, CBB 11 August 2015, ECLI:NL:CBB:2015:272, para 2.5. Here, the ACM was awarded the discretion to either rectify the issues, or take a different decision in line with the guidance provided in the judgment.
109.
See also Lavrijssen et al. 2016.
110.
In landmark case Maxis and Praxis, the administrative court rules that courts should limit themselves to a restrained control of the use of administrative discretionary powers of the executive power. Dutch Council of State 9 May 1996, ECLI:NL:RVS:1996:ZF2153.
111.
See § 3.1 for an overview of three types of discretion in Dutch administrative law.
112.
De Waard 2016.
113.
Lavrijssen et al. 2014, p. 62.
114.
See for example, Van den Berge 2017a, pp. 98–99 and Van den Berge 2017b, pp. 203–234.
115.
Hirsch Ballin 2015, pp. 42–43. See also de Poorter and Capkurt 2017, pp. 84–95; Lavrijssen et al. 2016, pp. 142–161; Voermans 2017. Barkhuysen 2015; Verhey 2015; Schuurmans 2015, pp. 19–20. See also the conclusion of Advocate-General R. Widdershoven written for the Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Dutch Council of State on the scope and intensity of exceptive review of generally binding regulations in the Netherlands, ECLI:NL:RVS:2017:3557, accessed via https://www.raadvanstate.nl/uitspraken/zoeken-in-uitspraken/tekst-uitspraak.html?id=93494.
116.
Hirsch Ballin 2015, pp. 33–34.
117.
Schlössels and Zijlstra 2010, p. 165.
118.
Dutch Council of State 2017, p. 61.
119.
See also the judgement in case 14/291/, NornNed-kabel, 16 June 2016, ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:264 and see also CBB, 8 December 2016, Rendo et al. versus ACM, ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:374. See CBB, 24 July 2018, case numbers 16/886, 16/887, 16/888, 16/890, 16/905, 16/906, 16/907, 16/908, 16/909, 16/910, 16/911, 16/912, Stedin et al. versus ACM, ECLI:NL:CBB:2018:348, CBB, 24 July 2018, case number 16/902, 16/903, 16/904, TenneT versus ACM, ECLI:NL:CBB:2018:347 and CBB, 24 July 2018, case number 17/409 en 17/410, GTS et al. versus ACM, ECLI:NL:CBB:2018:346.
120.
See also CBB, 12 June 2018, Tarief besluit GTS, ECLI:NL:CBB:2018:283.
121.
Graham 2009, p. 250.
122.
Mak 2012; Kerkmeester 2016.
123.
Lowe et al. 2013, para 3.1.3.
124.
Kerkmeester 2016, p. 90.
125.
This prohibition is currently heavily criticized and debated in the Netherlands: de Poorter and Capkurt 2017; Voermans 2017; Schuurmans 2015; van Male 2016, pp. 127–129; Scheltema 2014, p. 242; Schueler 2015, p. 435; Schuurmans and Voermans 2010, p. 811.
126.
Hirsch Ballin 2015, p. 43.
127.
In doing so, the CBB’s standard of judicial review of regulations would also be in alignment with the standard of review that the Judicial Division of the Dutch Council of State applies while reviewing the (un)lawfulness of administrative regulations via exemptive review. See de Poorter and Capkurt 2017. See also the conclusion of Advocate-General R. Widdershoven written for the Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Dutch Council of State on the scope and intensity of exceptive review of generally binding regulations in the Netherlands. Accessible via https://www.raadvanstate.nl/uitspraken/zoeken-in-uitspraken/tekst-uitspraak.html?id=93494.
128.
See, for a more detailed analysis, Eijkens 2015, p. 48.
129.
Cohen-Eliya and Porat 2011.
130.
Harbo 2010, p. 165.
131.
Harbo 2010, p. 165.
132.
Translation provided by Van Gestel and de Poorter 2016.
133.
Articles 3:2, 3:46 and 3:47 GALA.
134.
Articles 3:46 and 3:47 GALA.
135.
Article 3:2 GALA.
136.
This is also in alignment with the standard of judicial review that the CJEU applies in competition law cases. See ECJ, Case C-12/03 Commission v. Tetra Laval [2005] ECLI:EU:C:2005:87, para 39.
137.
See Case C-269/90, TU München [1991] ECR I-5469, ECLI:EU:C:1991:438, at paras 13 and 14; Case C-525/04 P, Spain v Commission [2007] ECR I-9947, ECLI:EU:C:2007:698, at paras 58 and 59 and Hofmann et al. 2011, pp. 190–204.
138.
Mantzari 2015.
139.
Lavrijssen et al. 2014, p. 62.
140.
Hirsch Ballin 2015, pp. 33–34.
141.
Lavrijssen 2014, p. 225.

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Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands
Saskia Lavrijssen
Leiden University, Leiden, The Netherlands
Fatma Çapkurt

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Department of Public Law and Governance, Tilburg Law School, Tilburg, The Netherlands
Jurgen de Poorter
Department of Public Law and Governance, Tilburg Law School, Tilburg, The Netherlands
Ernst Hirsch Ballin
Law Technology Society and Markets/LAW, Tilburg Law School, Tilburg, The Netherlands
Saskia Lavrijssen

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Lavrijssen, S., Çapkurt, F. (2019). Who Guards the Guardians? Judicial Oversight of the Authority Consumer and Market’s Energy Regulations in the Netherlands. In: de Poorter, J., Hirsch Ballin, E., Lavrijssen, S. (eds) Judicial Review of Administrative Discretion in the Administrative State. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-307-8_8

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-307-8_8
Published: 08 June 2019
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