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The International Criminal Court Reparations Scheme – A Yardstick for Hybrid Tribunals?

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The International Criminal Court in Turbulent Times

Part of the book series: International Criminal Justice Series ((ICJS,volume 23))

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Abstract

The chapter explores whether the ICC’s specific nature as a permanent international criminal court with a plurality of stakeholder States can provide an example solution for reparations regimes of future international(ised) criminal justice solutions, or whether other concepts should (also) be considered.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    For the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia UNSC 1993; for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda UNSC 1994 (together: UN ad hoc Tribunals).

  2. 2.

    Their jurisdiction entailed war crimes, crimes against humanity and the crime of genocide.

  3. 3.

    General information on the ICC is available at https://www.icc-cpi.int. Accessed 7 January 2019.

  4. 4.

    See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened for signature 17 July 1998, 2187 UNTS 3 (entered into force 1 July 2002) (Rome Statute), preambular para 4.

  5. 5.

    Donat-Cattin 2016, marginal nos 3 et seq.

  6. 6.

    See Statute of the Extraordinary African Chambers within the courts of Senegal created to prosecute international crimes committed in Chad between 7 June 1982 and 1 December 1990 (unofficial translation of the French original) (EAC Statute), Articles 14 (victim participation), 27, 28 (reparations regime including the establishment of a trust fund ). https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/09/02/statute-extraordinary-african-chambers. Accessed 7 January 2019; EAC, Ministère Public c. Hissein Habré , Jugement, 30 Mai 2016 ( Habré ). http://www.chambresafricaines.org/pdf/Jugement_complet.pdf. Accessed 7 January 2019.

  7. 7.

    In fact, in mid March 2019 the Philippines ’ withdrawal from the Rome Statute will come into effect pursuant to Article 127(1) of the Rome Statute, leaving the number of ICC State Parties at 122.

  8. 8.

    ICC, The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on victims’ participation, 18 January 2008, ICC-01/04-01/06-1119, para 98.

  9. 9.

    Ibid., para 85; ICC, The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Judgment on the appeals of the Prosecutor and the Defence against Trial Chamber I’s Decision on Victims’ Participation of 18 January 2008, 11 July 2008, ICC-01/04-01/06-1432 (Lubanga Appeal Decision), para 97; The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Order on the Organisation of Common Legal Representation of Victims, 22 July 2009, ICC-01/04-01/07-1328, para 10(a); Decision on the modalities of victim participation at trial, 22 January 2010, ICC-01/04-01/07-1788-tENG, para 57; The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Decision on common legal representation of victims for the purpose of trial, 10 November 2010, ICC-01/05-01/08-1005, para 9(a).

  10. 10.

    The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Judgment on the Appeal of Mr Katanga Against the Decision of Trial Chamber II of 22 January 2010 Entitled ‘Decision on the Modalities of Victim Participation at Trial’, 16 July 2010, ICC-01/04-01/07-2288 (Katanga and Ngudjolo Appeal Decision), para 39. This general principle is premised on Article 66(2) of the Statute which provides that ‘[t]he onus is on the Prosecutor [and not (also) victims’ representatives] to prove the guilt of the accused’. This interpretation is further supported by the disclosure regime established in Rules 76 to 84 of the ICC Rules, which as the Appeals Chamber has noted is ‘directed towards the parties and not victims’, Lubanga Appeal, above n 9, para 93, confirmed in Katanga and Ngudjolo Appeal Decision, above n 10, para 74.

  11. 11.

    Rome Statute, above n 4, Article 75(2).

  12. 12.

    See on the general subdivision of the reparations stage in phases: ICC, Joint Report of the Court and the Trust Fund for Victims on foreseeable administrative and operational cost implications of reparations, CBF/30/8, 2018, referred to in ICC-ASP/17/5, Annex IX (on file with the author).

  13. 13.

    ICC ASP, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 97(2) (ICC Rules). https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/pids/legal-texts/rulesprocedureevidenceeng.pdf. Accessed 7 January 2019; see also the similar provision in Rule 168 of the KSC Rules of Procedure and Evidence Before the Kosovo Specialist Chambers, (KSC Rules). https://www.scp-ks.org/en/documents/rules-procedure-and-evidence-kosovo-specialist-chambers-including-rules-procedure. Accessed 7 January 2019. The ICC provision also obliges the chamber to invite observations from the convicted person, victims or their legal representatives, and other interested persons or States (‘shall invite, as appropriate’). The KSC merely speaks of ‘may invite’ (emphasis added).

  14. 14.

    Rome Statute, above n 4, Article 75(3).

  15. 15.

    ICC Rules, above n 13, Rule 97(1). For relevant jurisprudence in this regard, see the reparations orders in Lubanga, Katanga and Al Mahdi and relevant decisions of the Appeals Chamber on appeals in all three cases (an Appeals Chamber decision on the appeal against the Lubanga reparations order still outstanding at the time of writing (May 2019)).

  16. 16.

    Ibid., Rule 91.

  17. 17.

    This admission procedure may generate a residual amount of litigation where the convict challenges the admission decision of new reparation applicants. See the litigation mechanism as outlined in ICC, The Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, Reparations Order, 17 August 2017, ICC-01/12-01/15-236. For Lubanga, see The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Trial Chamber II, Rectificatif de la «Décision fixant le montant des réparations auxquelles Thomas Lubanga Dyilo est tenu», ICC-01/04-01/06-3379-Red-Corr, 21 December 2017, paras 293 et seq., referring also to its Decision of 13 July 2017, ICC-01/04-01/06-3338-tENG, para 11.

  18. 18.

    Rome Statute, above n 4, Article 79(1) (emphasis added).

  19. 19.

    ICC ASP, Establishment of a fund for the benefit of victims of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court, and of the families of such victims, 9 September 2002, Resolution ICC-ASP/1/Res.6.

  20. 20.

    ICC ASP, Regulations of the Trust Fund for Victims, Resolution, Resolution ICC-ASP/4/Res.3 (ICC Regulations), Regulation 50(a). https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/0CE5967F-EADC-44C9-8CCA-7A7E9AC89C30/140126/ICCASP432Res3_English.pdf. Accessed 7 January 2019.

  21. 21.

    Pursuant to ICC Rules, above n 13, Rule 98(2)-(4).

  22. 22.

    ICC Regulations, above n 20, Regulation 50(b).

  23. 23.

    This is in particular – but not necessarily – so when ‘the number of the victims and the scope, forms and modalities of reparations makes a collective award more appropriate.’ Rome Statute, above n 4, Article 75(2); ICC Rules, above n 13, Rule 98(3).

  24. 24.

    ICC Regulations, above n 20, Regulations 43-44. When drafting an implementation plan, the Trust Fund takes into account, inter alia, ‘the nature of the crimes, the particular injuries to the victims and the nature of the evidence to support such injuries, as well as the size and location of the beneficiary group’; the plan also outlines the suggested methods for implementation, ibid., Regulations 54, 55, 69.

  25. 25.

    The STL was established by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1757 of 30 May 2007 following an Agreement between the United Nations and the Lebanese Republic pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1664 (2006) of 29 March 2006; see UNSC 2007 as well as UNSC, Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon , Attachment to Resolution 1757, UN Doc. S/RES/1757 (STL Statute). https://www.stl-tsl.org/en/documents/statute-of-the-tribunal/223-statute-of-the-special-tribunal-for-lebanon. Accessed 7 January 2019.

  26. 26.

    The STL applies provisions of the Lebanese Criminal Code, including the prosecution and punishment of acts of terrorism and crimes and offences against life and personal integrity.

  27. 27.

    STL Statute, above n 25, Article 25.

  28. 28.

    Ibid., Article 25(3). For the purpose of reparations in national proceedings, ibid., Article 25(4) is to be considered as final and binding for national authorities. See also STL, Rules of Procedures and Evidence (STL Rules), Rule 86(G). https://www.stl-tsl.org/images/RPE/20140403_STL-BD-2009-01-Rev-6-Corr-1_EN.pdf. Accessed 7 January 2019.

  29. 29.

    The ECCC were established through an agreement between the Cambodian government and the United Nations, to try the most responsible perpetrators for alleged crimes committed between 17 April 1975 and 6 January 1979 during the leadership of the Khmer Rouge in Democratic Kampuchea. See the tribunal’s official website: https://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/introduction-eccc. Accessed 7 January 2019; see also Ambach 2006.

  30. 30.

    Pursuant to ECCC, Internal Rules (ECCC Internal Rules), Rule 23quinquies. https://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/document/legal/internal-rules. Accessed 7 January 2019, such collective and moral reparations need to ‘acknowledge the harm suffered by Civil Parties as a result of the commission of the crimes for which an Accused is convicted and … provide benefits to the Civil Parties which address this harm.’ See Ibid., Rules 23(b), 23quinquies(1) and (2).

  31. 31.

    Ibid., Rule 23quinquies(2).

  32. 32.

    Ibid., Rule 23(11), (12); see also ECCC, The Prosecutor v. KAING Guek Eav, Direction on Proceedings Relevant to Reparations and on the Filing of Final Written Submissions, 27 August 2009, Case No. 001/18-07-2007-ECCC/TC, E-159. See also ECCC Internal Rules, above n 30, Rule 101(6)(g).

  33. 33.

    ECCC Internal Rules, above n 30, Rule 12bis(4).

  34. 34.

    See relevant news clips on the VSS’s website: https://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/organs/victims-support-section. Accessed 7 January 2019.

  35. 35.

    ECCC Internal Rules, above n 30, Rule 23quinquies(3)(b).

  36. 36.

    ECCC, The Prosecutor v. KAING Guek Eav, Judgment, 3 February 2012, Case No. 001/18-07-2007-ECCC/SC, case file F-28, para 643.

  37. 37.

    The KSC were established following an agreement between the President of Kosovo and the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy in 2014; see the Exchange of Letters: https://www.scp-ks.org/en/documents/kosovo-law-ratification-exchange-letters-23-apr-2014. Accessed 7 January 2019; regarding the KSC’s integration into the Kosovo judicial system, see Kosovo, Law on Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutors Office, Law No.05/L-053, Articles 1(2), 3(1) (Kosovo Law). https://www.scp-ks.org/en/documents/law-specialist-chambers-and-specialist-prosecutors-office-3-aug-2015. Accessed 7 January 2019.

  38. 38.

    The temporal/subject-matter jurisdiction relates to allegations reported in Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly 2011.

  39. 39.

    Kosovo Law, above n 37, Article 22(7).

  40. 40.

    Rome Statute, above n 4, Article 75.

  41. 41.

    ECCC Internal Rules, above n 30, Rule 101(6)(g).

  42. 42.

    Kosovo Law, above n 37, Article 44(6), comparable to Rome Statute, above n 4, Article 75(2).

  43. 43.

    Kosovo Law, above n 37, Article 22(8). Pursuant to KSC Rules, above n 13, Rule 168, the chamber may appoint experts to assist in determining the scope of any damage and suggest options of appropriate – individual or collective – reparations; this is similar to the relevant provision of ICC Rules, above n 13, Rule 97(2).

  44. 44.

    Kosovo Law, above n 37, Article 22(3).

  45. 45.

    Ibid., Article 22(7).

  46. 46.

    ‘Where appropriate, the [KSC] may refer the Victims to civil litigation in the other courts of Kosovo’, ibid., Article 22(9); ibid., Article 22(10).

  47. 47.

    Ibid., Article 22(10); KSC Rules, above n 13, Rule 167.

  48. 48.

    The exact temporary scope is between 7 June 1982 and 1 December 1990. See Human Rights Watch 2014.

  49. 49.

    See Habré , above n 6. For further background information, see Human Rights Watch 2016.

  50. 50.

    The EAC Appeals Chamber awarded 82 billion francs CFA (approximately US$154 million) to 7,396 named victims. See Human Rights Watch 2018.

  51. 51.

    EAC Statute, above n 6, Article 27(1).

  52. 52.

    Ibid., Article 28(2).

  53. 53.

    See http://www.cps-rca.cf/en/accueil. Accessed 7 January 2019.

  54. 54.

    Central African Republic, Loi Organique No 15.003 portant creation, organisation et fonctionnement de la cour penale special, 3 June 2015. MINUSCA news, Signature d’un accord relatif à l’opérationnalisation de la Cour pénale spéciale de la RCA, 26 August 2016. https://minusca.unmissions.org/signature-d%E2%80%99un-accord-relatif-%C3%A0-lop%C3%A9rationnalisation-de-la-cour-p%C3%A9nale-sp%C3%A9ciale-de-la-rca. Accessed 7 January 2019.

  55. 55.

    Central African Republic, Loi N°10.002, 6 January 2010, Article 2.

  56. 56.

    Regarding the potential outline of such a trust fund , see infra.

  57. 57.

    STL Statute, above n 25, Article 25(3); STL Rules, above n 28, 2009, Rule 86(G).

  58. 58.

    For the KSC, see KSC Rules, above n 13, Rule 168(1).

  59. 59.

    See ICC ASP 2017 (approving for the AICC’s annual budget 2018 appropriations totalling €147,431,500).

  60. 60.

    See Approved Programme Budget for 2018 of the International Criminal Court, 14 March 2018, ICC-ASP/16/10, table 1, p. 6. The proposed secretarial budget for 2019 is at just over 4 million Euros, see ICC-ASP/17/10.

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  1. International Criminal Court, The Hague, The Netherlands

    Philipp Ambach

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  1. Faculty of Law, Humboldt University of Berlin, Berlin, Germany

    Gerhard Werle

  2. Faculty of Law, University of Potsdam, Potsdam, Germany

    Andreas Zimmermann

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Ambach, P. (2019). The International Criminal Court Reparations Scheme – A Yardstick for Hybrid Tribunals?. In: Werle, G., Zimmermann, A. (eds) The International Criminal Court in Turbulent Times. International Criminal Justice Series, vol 23. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-303-0_8

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