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Between Shifts and Continuum in Cooperation: The International Securities Regulatory Regime and its Gradual Evolution

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Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 2017

Part of the book series: Netherlands Yearbook of International Law ((NYIL,volume 48))

Abstract

The gradual reform of the international financial architecture has markedly accelerated as a result of the global financial crisis (GFC). This chapter discusses structural developments at the international level regarding the regulation of securities markets as one of the sectors of financial regulation. It examines the changing dynamics shaping the international securities regulatory regime and how post-crisis developments are affecting its governance and policy-making processes, highlighting both shifts and continuum in cooperation. The focus is on the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) as the recognised global standard-setter for securities regulation and the leading policy forum for securities regulators. Throughout the past decade, the Organisation, comprising governmental regulatory bodies from some 115 jurisdictions, including those of the G-20, has endorsed two subsequent strategic direction reviews. It has undergone important institutional reforms and is working intensively with the G-20 and the Financial Stability Board (FSB) on the global regulatory agenda. The chapter’s original analysis and discussion of how IOSCO currently fares against some selected governance norms proposed in the scholarly literature suggests that institutional inclusiveness and regime effectiveness are complementary and potentially reinforcing. However, it also shows that clarity of function and sharp focus are other necessary elements for regime effectiveness.

Monique Egli Costi is an independent scholar and Research Affiliate of The New Zealand Centre of International Economic Law (NZCIEL). Research was undertaken as a Visiting Scholar at the Victoria University of Wellington Law School, with an early version presented by invitation of the Australian and New Zealand Society of International Law at the 5th International Four Societies Conference (American Society of International Law, Australian and New Zealand Society of International Law, Canadian Council on International Law, and Japanese Society of International Law) entitled ‘Experts, Networks and International Law’, at the Australian National University in Canberra, on 1–2 July 2014.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    For a recent overview of IOSCO’s institutional evolution and characteristics, see e.g. Egli Costi 2014.

  2. 2.

    Brummer 2010, at 627.

  3. 3.

    See Brummer 2011, at 273–274.

  4. 4.

    See Buckley 2016, at 244.

  5. 5.

    See Brummer 2011, at 280.

  6. 6.

    Ibid., at 280.

  7. 7.

    See e.g. IOSCO, Media Release: Global securities regulators adopt new principles and increase focus on systemic risk, IOSCO/MR/10/2010, 10 June 2010; IMF (2014) Review of the Financial Sector Assessment Program: Further Adaptation to the Post-Crisis Era, September 2014, http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2014/081814.pdf, accessed 28 November 2017, at 7 (para 1) and 16 (para 23). For the latest version of the IOSCO Principles, see IOSCO, Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation, IOSCOPD561, May 2017.

  8. 8.

    Zaring 2005, at 549.

  9. 9.

    Ibid., at 585–589.

  10. 10.

    Zaring 2012, at 692.

  11. 11.

    Zaring 2005, at 571.

  12. 12.

    Verdier 2013, at 1434.

  13. 13.

    Zaring 2005, at 569–571. See also Brummer 2011, at 307–308.

  14. 14.

    Zaring 2005, at 571. See also Scholte 2013, at 139 (in respect of the FSB, G-20 network, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), and IOSCO); Brummer 2011, at 278 (in respect of the BCBS).

  15. 15.

    Zaring 2005, at 572. See also Brummer 2011, at 307–308.

  16. 16.

    Brummer 2011, at 325, notes the beginning of some structural changes to the global financial architecture for addressing some legitimacy concerns.

  17. 17.

    See Porter 1993, at 38–40; Porter 2002, at 58–59.

  18. 18.

    See Porter 1993, at 128. See also Kempthorne 2013, at 125, noting that members of the IOSCO Technical Committee in the late 1990s were aware of the Organisation’s reputation in the financial system (with reference to Neoh, Prada, and Pado-Schioppa).

  19. 19.

    Kempthorne 2013, at 60, referring to Porter 1993.

  20. 20.

    Ibid., at 126–128, with reference to Andrew Procter.

  21. 21.

    Porter 2002, at 61.

  22. 22.

    Reference to integration with regulators beyond the G-10 pertains to the BCBS rather than IOSCO. See Slaughter 2004, at 42: ‘Under the auspices of the BIS [Bank of International Settlements] the central-bank governors of the G-10 countries created the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in 1974. It is now composed of the representatives of thirteen central banks that regulate the world’s largest banking markets.’ By contrast, IOSCO developed independently from the BIS system; it arose from a 1983 decision of an inter-American regional association (created in 1974) to transform itself into a global cooperative body, and its General Secretariat, initially in Montreal, is now in Madrid (see e.g. Kempthorne 2013, at 95–96 and 22 respectively).

  23. 23.

    Porter 2002, at 62, see also at 62–67.

  24. 24.

    See e.g. Kempthorne 2013.

  25. 25.

    See IOSCO, A Resolution of the Presidents’ Committee on IOSCO Adoption of the Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation Passed by the Presidents’ Committee, IOSCORES16, September 1998; IOSCO, Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation, IOSCOPD82, September 1998.

  26. 26.

    See IOSCO, Final Communiqué of the XXVIIIth Annual Conference of the International Organization of Securities Commissions, IOSCONEWS61, 14–17 October 2003; IOSCO, Press Release: IOSCO Adopts Instrument to Enhance Securities Regulation Worldwide, IOSCONEWS60, 16 October 2003; IOSCO, Methodology for Assessing Implementation of the IOSCO Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation, IOSCOPD155, October 2003.

  27. 27.

    See IOSCO, Methodology for Assessing Implementation of the IOSCO Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation, 2003, at 1–8, in particular at 1; IOSCO, Methodology for Assessing Implementation of the IOSCO Principles of Securities Regulation, IOSCOPD359, September 2011, revised August 2013, at 8 and 15; IOSCO, Methodology for Assessing Implementation of the IOSCO Principles of Securities Regulation, IOSCOPD562, May 2017, at 8 and 15. See also The World Bank and IMF 2005, at 143–149.

  28. 28.

    See e.g. The World Bank and IMF 2005, at 140 and 143–149; IMF (2014) A Macrofinancial Approach to Supervisory Standards Assessments, 18 August 2014, https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2014/081814a.pdf, accessed 28 November 2017, at 12, footnote 10; IOSCO Emerging Markets Committee, Impact On and Responses of Emerging Markets to the Financial Crisis, Final Report, IOSCOPD307, September 2009, para 36.

  29. 29.

    See IOSCO, Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Consultation, Cooperation and the Exchange of Information, IOSCOPD386, May 2002, revised May 2012.

  30. 30.

    IOSCO, Media Release: IOSCO approves the enhanced standard for cross-border enforcement cooperation, IOSCO/MR/07/2017, 31 March 2017, at 2.

  31. 31.

    Ibid., at 2.

  32. 32.

    Zaring 2015, at 177.

  33. 33.

    Ibid., at 180.

  34. 34.

    See e.g. Verdier 2013, at 1459–1463.

  35. 35.

    See e.g. Lastra and Wood 2010, at 543–545 and 544, footnote 47 referring to White 2009, at 16.

  36. 36.

    See Underhill 2015, at 464–466.

  37. 37.

    See Nachane 2016, at 64–66; Elson 2015.

  38. 38.

    See e.g. Jabłecki 2016.

  39. 39.

    See e.g. Lastra and Wood 2010, at 550; Buckley 2016, at 270, referring to Stiglitz.

  40. 40.

    See Black 2012, at 5, para 1.06; Verdier 2013, at 1437–1456.

  41. 41.

    See Christensen et al. 2016, at 2885–2886.

  42. 42.

    See e.g. Jabłecki 2016; Siklos 2013, at 23.

  43. 43.

    See e.g. Jabłecki 2016, at 287–288; Elson 2015; Bordo 2008; Lastra and Wood 2010, at 537–538.

  44. 44.

    See IOSCO, Open Letter published before the G-20 Heads of State meeting of 15 November 2008 in Washington DC, IOSCOPD282, 12 November 2008; IOSCO (2009) Annual Report 2008, https://www.iosco.org/annual_reports/annual_report_2008/pdf/annualReport2008.pdf, accessed 15 January 2018, at 6 (Report from the Chairman of the Executive Committee Jane Diplock AO).

  45. 45.

    See e.g. IOSCO, Media Release: IOSCO Technical Committee launches Task Forces to support G-20 aims, IOSCO/MR/019/2008, 25 November 2008; IOSCO, Emerging Markets Committee Letter bringing the attention of the chairmanship of the G-20 Leaders Summit of 2 April 2009 in London on some emerging markets perspectives on the impact of the ongoing crisis, IOSCONEWS155, 26 March 2009.

  46. 46.

    See e.g. IOSCO, Media Release: Final Communiqué: 33rd Annual Conference of the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), IOSCO/MR/008/2008, 29 May 2008, e.g. in respect of the IOSCO Task Force on Subprime Crisis’ report; IOSCO (2011) Annual Report 2010, https://www.iosco.org/annual_reports/2010/pdf/annualReport.pdf, accessed 29 November 2017, at 12 (Report from the Chairman of the Technical Committee Hans Hoogervorst).

  47. 47.

    See IOSCO, Open Letter published before the G-20 Heads of State meeting of 15 November 2008 in Washington DC, 2008; IOSCO (2009) Annual Report 2008, at 6 (Report from the Chairman of the Executive Committee Jane Diplock AO).

  48. 48.

    See G-20 Leaders (2008) Declaration of the Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy: Action Plan to Implement Principles for Reform, Washington, 15 November 2008, http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/g20_leaders_declaration_washington_2008.pdf, accessed 18 January 2018, at 2; G-20 Leaders (2009) Declaration on Strengthening the Financial System, London Summit, 2 April 2009, http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/london_summit_declaration_on_str_financial_system.pdf, accessed 18 January 2018, at 1; IOSCO (2009) Annual Report 2008, at 19 (Report from the Secretary General Greg Tanzer).

  49. 49.

    See IOSCO, Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation, IOSCOPD323, June 2010.

  50. 50.

    See IOSCO, Media Release: Global securities regulators adopt new principles and increase focus on systemic risk, 2010; IOSCO, Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation, 2010; IOSCO, Resolution of the Presidents Committee on delegation of powers to Executive Committee to approve the IOSCO Methodology, IOSCORES31, April 2011; IOSCO, Methodology for Assessing Implementation of the IOSCO Principles of Securities Regulation, 2011, revised 2013.

  51. 51.

    See IOSCO, Presidents Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions Resolution on IOSCO Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation and Methodology for Assessing Implementation of the IOSCO Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation, Resolution 2/2017, IOSCORES63, May 2017.

  52. 52.

    See e.g. Avgouleas 2013; Verdier 2013, at 1406; Garicano and Lastra 2010, at 619–620.

  53. 53.

    See Langevoort 2010, at 801, noting his agreement with views expressed by Brummer, Karmel, and to some extent Pan.

  54. 54.

    See e.g. Davies 2010, at 187; Porter 2011, in particular at 179–180; Sheng 2010, at 198 and 200. For a more recent perspective, see e.g. Nachane 2016.

  55. 55.

    Mügge and Stellinga 2010, at 322, see also at 324–325.

  56. 56.

    See e.g. Verdier 2013, at 1406; Sheng 2010, at 196.

  57. 57.

    Ahdieh 2015, at 76–77 and footnote 7, citing works by Brummer, Turk, and Verdier.

  58. 58.

    Ahdieh 2015, at 93–95, see also at 98–100.

  59. 59.

    See Buckley 2016, in particular at 244–245, 254 and 270–271.

  60. 60.

    Sheng 2010, at 199. See also Nachane 2016.

  61. 61.

    See e.g. Kirshner 2016, at 27.

  62. 62.

    See Baker 2010, at 658.

  63. 63.

    Brummer 2011, at 275. See also Nachane 2016, at 86–89.

  64. 64.

    See IOSCO, Presidents Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions Resolution on IOSCO’s Mission, Goals and Priorities, IOSCORES26, July 2010; IOSCO, Presidents Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions Resolution on IOSCO Bylaws: Comparison of current wording with proposed new wording, IOSCORES28, July 2010.

  65. 65.

    See e.g. Ahdieh 2015, at 76.

  66. 66.

    Slaughter 2004, at 14.

  67. 67.

    Zaring 1998, at 286, footnote 27.

  68. 68.

    Slaughter 2004, at 29.

  69. 69.

    Baker 2009, at 210, citing Slaughter 2004, at 29.

  70. 70.

    Slaughter 2004, at 29.

  71. 71.

    Ibid., at 38.

  72. 72.

    According to Kingsbury, Krisch and Stewart, GAL can be defined ‘as comprising the mechanisms, principles, practices, and supporting social understandings that promote or otherwise affect the accountability of global administrative bodies, in particular by ensuring they meet adequate standards of transparency, participation, reasoned decision, and legality, and by providing effective review of the rules and decisions they make’ (Kingsbury et al. 2005, at 17).

  73. 73.

    See Kingsbury et al. 2005, at 17: ‘much of global governance can be understood and analyzed as administrative action: rulemaking, administrative adjudication between competing interests, and other forms of regulatory and administrative decision and management.’ Slaughter recognises the efforts of GAL scholars but appears sceptical of the concept (see Slaughter 2004, at 241).

  74. 74.

    Kingsbury et al. 2005, at 20.

  75. 75.

    Ibid., at 29.

  76. 76.

    Informal international lawmaking (IN-LAW) has been defined as ‘Cross-border cooperation between public authorities, with or without the participation of private actors and/or international organizations, in a forum other than a traditional international organization (process informality), and/or as between actors other than traditional diplomatic actors (such as regulators or agencies) (actor informality), and/or which does not result in a formal treaty or traditional source of international law (output informality)’ (Pauwelyn 2012, at 21–22). For an explanation of how IN-LAW compares with GAL and other scholarly work, see Pauwelyn 2012, at 31–32.

  77. 77.

    See Duquet et al. 2014.

  78. 78.

    van Ham et al. 2014, at 3 (referring to a conceptual framework developed by van Ham).

  79. 79.

    See e.g. Egli Costi 2014, at 206, and 206, footnote 42.

  80. 80.

    For instance, Kenneth Anderson offers a critical review of Slaughter 2004 (see Anderson 2005). Although Anderson does not support her vision promoting a world order centred on ‘disaggregated’ states (at 1311–1312), he does not dispute the existence of government networks nor their possible usefulness, at least insofar as horizontal networks are concerned (e.g. at 1278) including, as Slaughter classified, IOSCO (at 1275). Anderson also does not appear to dispute Slaughter’s proposed governance norms, but critiques either the degree to which they should be relied on or their lack of precision: he deplores her book’s ‘enthusiasm for “positive comity”’ (at 1296, footnote 67) and argues that she fails to define the conditions that should attach to network membership for achieving ‘deliberative equality’ (at 1296, footnote 67), leading to possibly absurd results in extreme cases.

  81. 81.

    IOSCO (2015) Annual Report 2014, https://www.iosco.org/annual_reports/2014/pdf/annualReport2014.pdf, accessed 28 November 2017, at 64 (General Information).

  82. 82.

    See IOSCO, By-Laws: Section 2 – 1996 Reform of By-Laws – Explanatory Memorandum (‘1996 By-Laws Reform’), https://www.iosco.org/library/by_laws/pdf/IOSCO-By-Laws-Section-2-English.pdf, accessed 28 November 2017, at 1 (introductory statements, including in respect of the organisational review and the By-Laws reform). The By-Laws consist of the following set of documents, all available online: IOSCO, By-Laws: Section 1 – By-Laws of IOSCO (‘IOSCO By-Laws’), https://www.iosco.org/library/by_laws/pdf/IOSCO-By-Laws-Section-1-English.pdf, accessed 28 November 2017; 1996 By-Laws Reform; IOSCO, By-Laws: Appendix 2 – Members of IOSCO; IOSCO, By-Laws: Appendix 3 – Proposal Presented to Presidents Committee in 2011 Explaining the Changes to the By-Laws to Reflect Changes in Structure (‘2011 Proposal Explaining By-Laws Changes’), https://www.iosco.org/library/by_laws/pdf/IOSCO-By-Laws-Appendix-3-English.pdf, accessed 18 January 2018; IOSCO, By-Laws: Appendix 4 – Voting Arrangements Under By-Laws 28.1 and 28.2, https://www.iosco.org/library/by_laws/pdf/IOSCO-By-Laws-Appendix-4-English.pdf, accessed 18 January 2018.

  83. 83.

    See D Marsh (1986) Planned Reforms Sharpen IASC [International Association of Securities Commissions] Regulatory Teeth, Financial Times, 17 July 1986. It should be mentioned that in 1984, members decided to transform the Inter-American Association of Securities Commissions and Similar Organizations into a global body and accordingly change its name to International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) (see Porter 1993, at 176, footnote 2). In the years following this change, however, news articles from the time suggest the Organization was often referred to as International Association of Securities Commissions (IASC), perhaps because this more closely aligned to its original designation, or perhaps confusing it with the International Accounting Standards Committee.

  84. 84.

    See e.g. IOSCO (2016) Annual Report 2015, https://www.iosco.org/annual_reports/2015/pdf/CompleteAnnualReport2015.pdf, accessed 28 November 2017, at 68 (General Information).

  85. 85.

    See IOSCO, Resolution of the Presidents Committee on Amendment to IOSCO’s By-Laws with regard to supranational bodies being eligible for associate membership and for affiliate members to attend the Presidents Committee, IOSCORES37, May 2012 (introducing new by-law 30.1).

  86. 86.

    See IOSCO By-Laws, by-law 30.

  87. 87.

    See IOSCO By-Laws, by-law 27; 1996 By-Laws Reform, at 3.

  88. 88.

    See IOSCO, Resolution of the Presidents’ Committee on Amendment to IOSCO's By-Laws regarding Membership and Voting Rights, Resolution 4/2013, IOSCORES48, September 2013. For the criteria previously applying, see e.g. IOSCO (2012) Annual Report 2011, https://www.iosco.org/annual_reports/2011/pdf/annualReport.pdf, accessed 28 November 2017, at 52–53 (General Information).

  89. 89.

    See IOSCO By-Laws, by-law 6 (new wording) as per IOSCO, Resolution of the Presidents’ Committee on Amendment to IOSCO's By-Laws regarding Membership and Voting Rights, 2013, at 1, para 1.

  90. 90.

    See 1996 By-Laws Reform, at 4 (in respect of derivatives regulators).

  91. 91.

    See IOSCO, Resolution of the Presidents Committee on the International Benchmark for Enforcement Related Cooperation and Exchange of Information, IOSCORES24, 6 April 2005.

  92. 92.

    This is the case for instance of the securities regulatory agencies of the Canadian provinces of Alberta and British Columbia, as well as the United States Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), Japan’s Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries and Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry. Compare list of ordinary and associate members in IOSCO (2014) Annual Report 2013, https://www.iosco.org/annual_reports/2013/pdf/annualReport2013.pdf, accessed 28 November 2017, at 64–66 (IOSCO Members), with list of associate members in IOSCO (2005) Annual Report 2004, https://www.iosco.org/annual_reports/annual_report_2004/docs/index1.html, accessed 29 November 2017, at 40 (Appendix III: List of IOSCO Members).

  93. 93.

    See IOSCO By-Laws, by-law 8.2 (new wording) as per IOSCO, Resolution of the Presidents’ Committee on Amendment to IOSCO’s By-Laws regarding Membership and Voting Rights, 2013, at 2, para 3.

  94. 94.

    Compare list of associate members in IOSCO (2014) Annual Report 2013, at 66 (IOSCO Members), with list of affiliate international organisations in IOSCO (2005) Annual Report 2004, at 43 (Appendix III: List of IOSCO Members).

  95. 95.

    See list of associate members in IOSCO (2014) Annual Report 2013, at 66 (IOSCO Members); IOSCO, Media Statement: Final Update: 34th Annual Conference of the International Organization of Securities Commissions, IOSCO/MS/06/2009, 11 June 2009 (admission of European Commission as affiliate member).

  96. 96.

    See IOSCO, Resolution of the Presidents’ Committee on Amendment to IOSCO’s By-Laws regarding Membership and Voting Rights, 2013, at 1, para 1, and in particular at para 1 note. Compare with IOSCO, Resolution of the Presidents Committee on the International Benchmark for Enforcement Related Cooperation and Exchange of Information, 2005.

  97. 97.

    Compare IOSCO By-Laws, by-law 9.1 with e.g. IOSCO (2012) Annual Report 2011, at 53 (General Information) (regarding affiliate membership).

  98. 98.

    See IOSCO By-Laws, by-law 27 (new wording) as per IOSCO, Resolution of the Presidents' Committee on Amendment to IOSCO’s By-Laws regarding Membership and Voting Rights, 2013, at 2, para 6.

  99. 99.

    See IOSCO By-Laws, by-laws 22, 55, 59 and 60; IOSCO (2015) Annual Report 2014, at 65 (General Information).

  100. 100.

    IOSCO (2016) Annual Report 2015, at 69 (General Information).

  101. 101.

    IOSCO By-Laws, by-law 26.

  102. 102.

    See ibid., by-laws 26(a), 35 and 36.1–4(d).

  103. 103.

    See ibid., by-law 26(d).

  104. 104.

    See ibid., by-laws 26(e) and 77.

  105. 105.

    See ibid., by-laws 22, 26(c) and 40.2(e).

  106. 106.

    See ibid., by-law 40.2(a).

  107. 107.

    See ibid., by-law 40.2(i).

  108. 108.

    See ibid., by-laws 40.2(h) and 77–78 (IOSCO Board involvement in imposing sanctions), 40.2(e) and 56–58 (IOSCO Board involvement in recognition of regional committees).

  109. 109.

    See ibid., by-laws 26(a) and 36.1.

  110. 110.

    Ibid., by-law 40.1.

  111. 111.

    See ibid., by-law 40.2(g); IOSCO (2011) Appendix to Proposal to Presidents Committee By-Laws Reflecting Proposed Amendments (‘By-Laws 2011’), April 2011, https://www.iosco.org/library/resolutions/pdf/IOSCORES33.pdf, accessed 16 January 2018, by-law 40.2(h).

  112. 112.

    See IOSCO By-Laws, by-law 40.2(b); By-Laws 2011, by-law 40.2(b).

  113. 113.

    See IOSCO By-Laws, by-law 40.2(d).

  114. 114.

    See ibid., by-law 40.2(f).

  115. 115.

    See ibid., by-law 24.

  116. 116.

    See By-Laws 2011, by-law 32.1 (as then worded).

  117. 117.

    See IOSCO By-Laws, by-law 32.1 (new wording) introduced by IOSCO, Resolution of the Presidents’ Committee on Amendment to IOSCO’s By-Laws regarding the Presidents’ Committee, Resolution 2/2013, IOSCORES46, September 2013, at 1, para 1; compare with By-Laws 2011, by-law 32.1 (as then worded).

  118. 118.

    See IOSCO By-Laws, by-law 33.1 (previously numbered 33).

  119. 119.

    See ibid., by-law 33.2, introduced by IOSCO, Resolution of the Presidents’ Committee on Amendment to IOSCO’s By-Laws regarding the Presidents’ Committee, 2013, at 1, para 3.

  120. 120.

    See IOSCO, Resolution of the Presidents’ Committee on Amendment to IOSCO’s By-Laws regarding the Presidents’ Committee, 2013, at 1, para 5; IOSCO By-Laws, by-law 35.

  121. 121.

    The president of any applicant for ordinary membership in IOSCO must sign a declaration confirming its acceptance of the By-Laws and Resolutions of the Presidents Committee to date. See IOSCO By-Laws, by-law 11(c).

  122. 122.

    Compare amended IOSCO By-Laws, by-laws 14, 26 and 40.2 as per IOSCO, Resolution of the Presidents’ Committee on Amendment to IOSCO’s By-Laws regarding the Admission of New Members, Resolution 1/2013, IOSCORES45, September 2013, with By-Laws 2011, by-laws 14, 26 and 40.2 (as then worded).

  123. 123.

    See IOSCO, Resolution of the Presidents’ Committee on Amendment to IOSCO’s By-Laws regarding the Presidents’ Committee, 2013, at 1, para 4 (deleting part of by-law 34).

  124. 124.

    See Scholte 2013.

  125. 125.

    See 1996 By-Laws Reform, at 6.

  126. 126.

    2011 Proposal Explaining By-Laws Changes, at 2.

  127. 127.

    IOSCO (2015) Annual Report 2014, at 20 (Activities of IOSCO’s Policy Committees in the Year).

  128. 128.

    IOSCO (2016) Annual Report 2015, at 68 (General Information).

  129. 129.

    Slaughter 2004, at 227–228.

  130. 130.

    2011 Proposal Explaining By-Laws Changes, at 2.

  131. 131.

    See Hawes 1987, at 258 and 263; Porter 1993, at 120; Wolff 1995, at 401.

  132. 132.

    See Slaughter 2004, at 227.

  133. 133.

    Black 2012, at 32, para 1.76.

  134. 134.

    See e.g. Germain 2009, at 683; Sheng 2010, at 196.

  135. 135.

    See e.g. IOSCO, Emerging Markets Committee Letter bringing the attention of the chairmanship of the G-20 Leaders Summit of 2 April 2009 in London on some emerging markets perspectives on the impact of the ongoing crisis, 2009. See also Helleiner and Porter 2010, at 161.

  136. 136.

    See e.g. Underhill 1995; Grant and Keohane 2005, especially at 38–39; Helleiner and Porter 2010.

  137. 137.

    See Underhill 2007; Helleiner and Porter 2010, at 161.

  138. 138.

    See Sheng 2010, at 197.

  139. 139.

    See IOSCO, Resolution of the Presidents Committee on transitional arrangements for the IOSCO Board, IOSCORES29, April 2011, para 6; IOSCO, Media Release: IOSCO confirmed as the Key Global Reference Point for Securities Regulation, IOSCO/MR/35/2013, 18 September 2013, at 9.

  140. 140.

    See 1996 By-Laws Reform, at 5 (in respect of Part 3 of the By-Laws pertaining to the structure of the Organisation).

  141. 141.

    Ibid., at 9.

  142. 142.

    Ibid.

  143. 143.

    See By-Laws 2011, by-law 17, compared with 1996 By-Laws Reform, at 5–6 (in respect of then ‘Section’ or by-law 17).

  144. 144.

    IOSCO, Resolution of the Presidents Committee on transitional arrangements for the IOSCO Board, 2011.

  145. 145.

    Ibid., para 1; IOSCO, Resolution of the Presidents’ Committee on the composition of the IOSCO Board, Resolution 5/2013, IOSCORES49, September 2013; IOSCO, Resolution of the Presidents’ Committee on the composition of the IOSCO Board, Resolution 5/2013 as amended by Resolution 2/2015, IOSCORES58, June 2015.

  146. 146.

    See IOSCO By-Laws, by-laws 36.1–4 (pertaining to circulation of, and voting on, resolutions if necessary); 1996 By-Laws Reform, at 8 (in respect of ‘Section’ or by-law 36.1 pertaining to required notice for substantial resolutions).

  147. 147.

    IOSCO, Resolution of the Presidents’ Committee on the composition of the IOSCO Board, 2013, at 1, para 1; IOSCO, Resolution of the Presidents’ Committee on the composition of the IOSCO Board, 2015, at 1, para 1.

  148. 148.

    IOSCO, Presidents Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions Resolution on IOSCO Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Consultation and Cooperation and the Exchange of Information, IOSCORES36, May 2012. See also IOSCO, Presidents Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions Resolution on IOSCO Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Consultation and Cooperation and the Exchange of Information, Resolution 6/2013, IOSCORES50, September 2013; IOSCO, Presidents Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions Resolution on the IOSCO Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Consultation and Cooperation and the Exchange of Information, Resolution 1/2014, IOSCORES53, October 2014.

  149. 149.

    See IOSCO By-Laws, Part 12 comprising by-laws 77–80 (pertaining to sanctions); 1996 By-Laws Reform, at 14.

  150. 150.

    Sheng 2010, at 199.

  151. 151.

    See IOSCO, Resolution of the Presidents’ Committee on the composition of the IOSCO Board, 2013, at 1, para 2; IOSCO, Resolution of the Presidents’ Committee on the composition of the IOSCO Board, 2015, at 2, para 2.

  152. 152.

    For the composition of the Executive Committee from 1996 to 2012, see 1996 By-Laws Reform, at 5 (as concerns then ‘Section 17’ of IOSCO By-Laws).

  153. 153.

    See IOSCO, Resolution of the Presidents’ Committee on the composition of the IOSCO Board, 2015, at 1 (para 2) and 2 (para 2); IOSCO, Resolution of the Presidents Committee on transitional arrangements for the IOSCO Board, 2011, para 1.

  154. 154.

    See IOSCO, Resolution of the Presidents’ Committee on the composition of the IOSCO Board, 2015, in particular at 1 (para 2) and 2 (paras 2–3) (reflecting amendments to the IOSCO Board composition effective since the 2016 annual meeting).

  155. 155.

    Of the 34 IOSCO Board members in 2016–2018, 18 (or 53% of the IOSCO Board membership) had been Technical Committee members. Compare: IOSCO, Media Release: Ashley Alder appointed Chair of the New IOSCO Board, IOSCO/MR/11/2016, 12 May 2016, at 2–4; IOSCO, Media Release: IOSCO Technical Committee launches Task Forces to support G-20 aims, 2008, Notes for Editors.

  156. 156.

    IOSCO, Resolution of the Presidents Committee on transitional arrangements for the IOSCO Board, 2011.

  157. 157.

    IOSCO, Resolution of the Presidents’ Committee on the composition of the IOSCO Board, 2013, para 2.

  158. 158.

    With one exception, the list of members nominated to the IOSCO Board coincides with the list of former Technical Committee members. Compare: IOSCO, Resolution of the Presidents’ Committee on the composition of the IOSCO Board, 2013, at 3 or IOSCO, Resolution of the Presidents’ Committee on the composition of the IOSCO Board, 2015, Annex A, at 4; IOSCO, Media Release: IOSCO Technical Committee invites Brazil, China and India to join its Membership, IOSCO/MR/002/2009, 19 February 2009.

  159. 159.

    IOSCO, Resolution of the Presidents’ Committee on the composition of the IOSCO Board, 2013, at 2, para 4; IOSCO, Resolution of the Presidents’ Committee on the composition of the IOSCO Board, 2015, at 2, para 4.

  160. 160.

    IOSCO, Resolution of the Presidents’ Committee on the composition of the IOSCO Board, 2013.

  161. 161.

    See IOSCO By-Laws, by-laws 25 and 37.1; 1996 By-Laws Reform, at 7 (in relation to ‘Section 25’ i.e. by-law 25).

  162. 162.

    A comparison of the composition of the IOSCO Board in 2016–2018 with the 2014–2016 period reveals that four of the 16 elected (or non-nominated) positions changed. Compare: IOSCO, Media Release: Ashley Alder appointed Chair of the New IOSCO Board, 2016, at 2–4; IOSCO, Media Release: Greg Medcraft of ASIC re-elected IOSCO Board Chair, IOSCO/MR/32/2014, 2 October 2014.

  163. 163.

    In 2014 and in 2016, the IOSCO Board elected or nominated as its chair the head of a member agency nominated to the IOSCO Board (see IOSCO, Media Release: Greg Medcraft of ASIC re-elected IOSCO Board Chair, 2014; IOSCO, Media Release: Ashley Alder appointed Chair of the New IOSCO Board, 2016, at 2–4).

  164. 164.

    See e.g. Slaughter 2004, at 228–229.

  165. 165.

    Sheng 2010, at 193.

  166. 166.

    1996 By-Laws Reform, at 8 (in respect of then ‘Section’ or by-law 39 pertaining to the Executive Committee).

  167. 167.

    Ibid., at 5–6 (in respect of then ‘Sections’ or by-laws 17 and 29).

  168. 168.

    See IOSCO, Presidents Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions Resolution on IOSCO’s Mission, Goals and Priorities, 2010; IOSCO, Presidents Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions Resolution on IOSCO Bylaws: Comparison of current wording with proposed new wording, 2010.

  169. 169.

    Ibid.

  170. 170.

    See 1996 By-Laws Reform, at 5 (in respect of the structure of the Organisation) and 10 (in respect of the regional committees more generally).

  171. 171.

    See Porter 1993, at 176, footnote 2.

  172. 172.

    See IOSCO, Resolution of the Presidents Committee on transitional arrangements for the IOSCO Board, 2011, para 2; IOSCO, Resolution of the Presidents’ Committee on the composition of the IOSCO Board, 2013, at 1, para 2; IOSCO, Resolution of the Presidents’ Committee on the composition of the IOSCO Board, 2015, at 1 (para 2) and 2 (paras 2–3) (reflecting amendments to the IOSCO Board composition effective since the 2016 annual meeting). Compare with: 1996 By-Laws Reform, at 5 (in respect of then ‘Section’ or by-law 17).

  173. 173.

    See 1996 By-Laws Reform, at 5–6 (as concerns then ‘Section’ or by-law 17).

  174. 174.

    IOSCO (2016) Annual Report 2015, at 44 (Report from the Chair of the Africa/Middle-East Regional Committee (AMERC) Mounir Gwarzo).

  175. 175.

    See IOSCO, Media Release: IOSCO plays a key role in responding to global securities markets’ challenges, IOSCO/MR/02/2016, 22 February 2016, at 5.

  176. 176.

    See IOSCO, Presidents Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions Resolution to amend the IOSCO By-laws to include Arabic as an official language of the Organization, Resolution 1/2016, IOSCORES59, August 2016.

  177. 177.

    See IOSCO (2016) Annual Report 2015, at 48 (Report from the Chair of the Asia-Pacific Regional Committee (APRC) Ashley Alder).

  178. 178.

    Ibid.

  179. 179.

    See ibid., at 69 (General Information).

  180. 180.

    See IOSCO, Resolution of the Presidents Committee on transitional arrangements for the IOSCO Board, 2011, para 2.

  181. 181.

    See IOSCO, Resolution of the Presidents’ Committee on the composition of the IOSCO Board, 2013, at 1, para 2.

  182. 182.

    IOSCO, Resolution of the Presidents’ Committee on the composition of the IOSCO Board, 2015, at 1 (para 2) and 2 (para 2).

  183. 183.

    See IOSCO, Resolution of the Presidents’ Committee on the composition of the IOSCO Board, 2013, at 2, para 7.

  184. 184.

    IOSCO, Resolution of the Presidents’ Committee on the composition of the IOSCO Board, 2015, at 3, para 7.

  185. 185.

    IOSCO, Resolution of the Presidents’ Committee on Amendment to IOSCO’s By-laws regarding renaming the Emerging Markets Committee as Growth and Emerging Markets (GEM) Committee and the GEM Committee Chair becoming ex-officio Vice-Chairman of the IOSCO Board, Resolution 3/2013, IOSCORES47, September 2013, at 2, para 2 (adding a new sentence to by-law 38).

  186. 186.

    IOSCO, Resolution of the Presidents’ Committee on the composition of the IOSCO Board, 2013, at 2, para 7; IOSCO, Resolution of the Presidents’ Committee on the composition of the IOSCO Board, 2015, at 3, para 7.

  187. 187.

    IOSCO, Resolution of the Presidents’ Committee on the composition of the IOSCO Board, 2013, at 2; IOSCO, Resolution of the Presidents’ Committee on the composition of the IOSCO Board, 2015, at 3.

  188. 188.

    See IOSCO By-Laws, by-law 66 (as re-worded) per IOSCO, Resolution of the Presidents’ Committee on Amendment to IOSCO’s By-Laws regarding Membership and Voting Rights, 2013, at 3, para 9.

  189. 189.

    See e.g. IOSCO (2015) Annual Report 2014, at 14–17 (Report from the Chair of the Affiliate Members Consultative Committee (Formerly known as the SRO Consultative Committee) José Carlos Doherty).

  190. 190.

    See IOSCO By-Laws, by-law 2.

  191. 191.

    See Underhill 1995, at 261 and footnote 40.

  192. 192.

    See list of ordinary members in IOSCO (2016) Annual Report 2015, at 72–74 (IOSCO Members).

  193. 193.

    See IOSCO By-Laws, by-laws 25, 38, 61, 69 and 50.1–3.

  194. 194.

    See ibid., by-laws 39.1, 62.1, 70.1 and 50.1–3.

  195. 195.

    See IOSCO, Resolution of the Presidents’ Committee on the composition of the IOSCO Board, 2015, at 1 (paras 2(d)–(e)) and 2 (paras 2(d)–(e)).

  196. 196.

    See IOSCO By-Laws, by-law 28.1 as per IOSCO, Resolution of the Presidents’ Committee on Amendment to IOSCO’s By-Laws regarding Membership and Voting Rights, 2013, para 7.

  197. 197.

    See IOSCO By-Laws, by-law 28.2 as per ibid., paras 8 and 10.

  198. 198.

    1996 By-Laws Reform, at 2 (in relation to the By-Laws’ Preamble).

  199. 199.

    IOSCO By-Laws, at 2 (Preamble).

  200. 200.

    G Medcraft (2012) Challenges and strategies for IOSCO, Speech by Australian Securities and Investments Commission chair at the International Centre for Financial Regulation, London, 4 September 2012, http://download.asic.gov.au/media/1322953/Challenges-and-strategies-for-IOSCO.pdf?_ga=1.157966457.276339716.1455625019, accessed 4 April 2017, at 5.

  201. 201.

    D Wright (2012) Remarks, Speech by IOSCO Secretary General (in a personal capacity) to The Atlantic Council, Washington, 10 December 2012, http://www.iosco.org/library/speeches/pdf/20121210-Wright-David.pdf, accessed 4 April 2017.

  202. 202.

    IOSCO, Resolution of the Presidents’ Committee on Amendment to IOSCO’s By-Laws regarding Membership and Voting Rights, 2013, at 2, para 6 (new by-law 27). Compare with By-Laws 2011, by-law 27 (as then worded).

  203. 203.

    See e.g. Kempthorne 2013, at 126–130, regarding the development and adoption in 1998 of the IOSCO Principles.

  204. 204.

    Slaughter 2004, at 170. See also Ahdieh 2015.

  205. 205.

    See e.g. R Karmel (1995) Capitalism in Transition—The Role of International Law: Remarks by Roberta Karmel, American Society of International Law, April 5–8 1995, at 111.

  206. 206.

    Slaughter 2004, at 29.

  207. 207.

    Ibid., at 29–30.

  208. 208.

    See IOSCO (2014) Annual Report 2013, at 22.

  209. 209.

    See IOSCO, Media Release: IOSCO welcomes new leadership of IOSCO Board committees, IOSCO/MR/28/2016, 21 November 2016. Compare with IOSCO (2016) Annual Report 2015, at 22–33 (Activities of IOSCO’s Policy Committees in the Year).

  210. 210.

    See IOSCO (2014) Annual Report 2013, at 50 (Report from the Chair of the Assessment Committee Steven Bardy); IOSCO, Assessment Committee Mandate, http://www.iosco.org/about/assessment_committee/pdf/Assessment-Committee-Mandate.pdf, accessed 21 May 2017.

  211. 211.

    See IOSCO, Media Release: IOSCO welcomes new leadership of IOSCO Board committees, 2016, at 2.

  212. 212.

    Kempthorne offers an account of the dynamics at work in the development and adoption of the 1998 IOSCO Principles and 2002 IOSCO MMOU. See Kempthorne 2013, at 116–130 and 88–112 respectively.

  213. 213.

    See IOSCO, A Resolution of the Presidents’ Committee on the IOSCO MOU Passed by the Presidents’ Committee, IOSCORES21, May 2002; IOSCO, Media Statement: Final Update: 35th Annual Conference of the International Organization of Securities Commissions, IOSCO/MS/03/2010, 10 June 2010; IOSCO, Presidents Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions Resolution on IOSCO Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation and Methodology for Assessing Implementation of the IOSCO Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation, 2017.

  214. 214.

    IOSCO, Resolution of the Presidents Committee on delegation of powers to Executive Committee to approve the IOSCO Methodology, 2011.

  215. 215.

    See IOSCO By-Laws, by-law 16.

  216. 216.

    IOSCO, Methodology for Assessing Implementation of the IOSCO Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation, 2003, at 1–2.

  217. 217.

    IOSCO, Methodology for Assessing Implementation of the IOSCO Principles of Securities Regulation, 2017, at 10; IOSCO, Methodology for Assessing Implementation of the IOSCO Principles of Securities Regulation, 2011, revised 2013, at 10.

  218. 218.

    See Kemthorne 2013, at 128–130.

  219. 219.

    See ibid., at 132. For a recent account of the creation of the IOSCO Assessment Methodology endorsed in 2003, see ibid., at 131–145.

  220. 220.

    Davis 2011, at 3.

  221. 221.

    See e.g. Jackson 2015; Verdier 2011.

  222. 222.

    G-20 Leaders (2008) Declaration of the Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy, para 8.

  223. 223.

    Ibid.

  224. 224.

    G Medcraft (2013) Improving the global consistency of financial regulation, Speech by IOSCO Board chair and Australian Securities and Investments Commission chair at the EuroFi High Level Seminar, Dublin, 11 April 2013, http://www.iosco.org/library/speeches/pdf/20130411-Greg-Medcraft.pdf, accessed 4 April 2017, at 2.

  225. 225.

    Ibid., at 3.

  226. 226.

    See D Wright (2012) Hard talk, soft tools: Regulatory interview by IOSCO Secretary General, The Trade, Issue 33, July-September 2012, http://www.iosco.org/library/bulletins/pdf/20121029_Regulatory_Interview_David_Wright.pdf, accessed 4 April 2017, at 91–92.

  227. 227.

    IOSCO (2015) Annual Report 2014, at 32–33 (Activities of IOSCO’s Policy Committees in the Year).

  228. 228.

    IOSCO (2016) Annual Report 2015, at 35 (Activities of IOSCO’s Policy Committees in the Year). IOSCO, IOSCO Task Force on Cross-Border Regulation Final Report, FR23/2015, IOSCOPD507, September 2015.

  229. 229.

    See Van Cauwenberge 2012, in particular at 394–396, paras 13.11–13.15.

  230. 230.

    Ibid., in particular at 392, para 13.03; Cunha 2010. For examples of IOSCO MMOU use made by signatory securities regulators, see e.g. IOSCO, Media Release: The MMoU: Ten years of Enhancing Cross-border Enforcement Cooperation, IOSCO/MR/09/2012, 16 May 2012, in particular at 4–5.

  231. 231.

    IOSCO, Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Consultation, Cooperation and the Exchange of Information, 2002, revised 2012, para 6(a).

  232. 232.

    See IOSCO, Media Release: IOSCO Annual Conference: Building Securities Market Resilience in the Post-Crisis World, IOSCO/MR08//2017, 17 May 2017, at 3. For the list of current IOSCO MMOU signatories, see http://www.iosco.org/about/?subSection=mmou&subSection1=signatories, Accessed 4 April 2017.

  233. 233.

    See IOSCO (2016) Presidents Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions Resolution on the Enhanced Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Consultation and Cooperation and the Exchange of Information, Resolution 2/2016, IOSCRES60, May 2016. See also Van Cauwenberge 2012, at 408–410 paras 13.60–13.66.

  234. 234.

    IOSCO, Media Release: IOSCO continues to address global challenges to securities markets, IOSCO/MR/10/2016, IOSCONEWS426, 11 May 2016, at 1–2.

  235. 235.

    See IOSCO, Presidents Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions Resolution on the Implementation of the Enhanced Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Consultation and Cooperation and the Exchange of Information, Resolution 1/2017, IOSCORES61, March 2017.

  236. 236.

    See e.g. Van Cauwenberge 2012, at 399, para 13.23.

  237. 237.

    See IOSCO, Media Release: IOSCO approves the enhanced standard for cross-border enforcement cooperation, 2017, at 2.

  238. 238.

    See IOSCO, Presidents Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions Resolution on the Implementation of the Enhanced Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Consultation and Cooperation and the Exchange of Information, 2017, para 1(a).

  239. 239.

    Ibid., para 1(b).

  240. 240.

    Ibid., para 1(c).

  241. 241.

    Ibid., para 2.

  242. 242.

    IOSCO, Media Release: IOSCO approves the enhanced standard for cross-border enforcement cooperation, 2017, at 3.

  243. 243.

    Slaughter 2004, at 30.

  244. 244.

    See Verdier 2013, at 1439–1440; Van Cauwenberge 2012, in particular at 392 (para 13.06), 414–423 (paras 13.75–13.103) and 424 (para 13.106).

  245. 245.

    Van Cauwenberge 2012, at 395, para 13.13. Several scholars have analysed the development of the IOSCO MMOU, including Kempthorne who also attempts to explain the strengthening of cooperation standards amongst securities regulators. See Kempthorne 2013, at 88–115.

  246. 246.

    Black 2012, at 5, para 1.06, see also at 8–10, paras 1.13–1.18.

  247. 247.

    IOSCO, Methodology for Assessing Implementation of the IOSCO Principles of Securities Regulation, 2017, at 9; IOSCO, Methodology for Assessing Implementation of the IOSCO Principles of Securities Regulation, 2011, revised 2013, at 9.

  248. 248.

    Ibid.

  249. 249.

    See e.g. Van Cauwenberge 2012, at 398, footnote 28; Kempthorne 2013, at 103–105, also with reference to Tanzer and Brown.

  250. 250.

    See Lim 2015.

  251. 251.

    See PwC (2015) Asian Passports, the coming of age: An overview and its demand, https://www.pwc.com/sg/en/publications/assets/asian-fund-passports.pdf, accessed 3 April 2017, at 5–6 and 11. See also Persaud and Saunders 2012.

  252. 252.

    See Verdier 2011, at 104–106; Godwin and Ramsay 2015, in particular at 237–238, 239 and 242 (article prepared for a conference as part of a funded project).

  253. 253.

    See B Tio (2016) Thailand joins Asia Region Funds Passport, AsianInvestor, 29 June 2016, http://www.asianinvestor.net/article/thailand-joins-asia-region-funds-passport/427377, accessed 3 April 2017.

  254. 254.

    Memorandum of Cooperation on the Establishment and Implementation of the Asia Region Funds Passport, 28 June 2016, http://fundspassport.apec.org/files/2016/04/Asia-Region-Funds-Passport-Memorandum-of-Cooperation.pdf, accessed 3 April 2017, para 4.1.a.

  255. 255.

    Ibid., paras 10.1.a and 10.1.c.

  256. 256.

    Statement of Understanding on the Establishment of the Asia Region Funds Passport, 11 September 2015, http://fundspassport.apec.org/files/2015/09/Signed-Asia-Region-Funds-Passport-Statement-of-Understanding-11-Sept-2015.pdf, accessed 3 April 2017. This was signed by the finance ministers of Australia, Japan, New Zealand, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, and Thailand. It replaced an earlier Statement of Intent dating from 2013: Statement of Intent on the establishment of the Asia Region Funds Passport, signed at Nusa Dua, Bali, Indonesia, 20 September 2013, http://www.apec.org/~/media/Files/Groups/FMP/20130923_ARFP_SOI_Signed.pdf, accessed 27 April 2017.

  257. 257.

    See Godwin and Ramsey 2015, at 237, footnote 6.

  258. 258.

    See Verdier 2011, at 104.

  259. 259.

    See ASEAN, ASEAN Economic Community, http://asean.org/asean-economic-community/, accessed 17 October 2017.

  260. 260.

    See D Shane (2014) ASEAN’s CIS fund passport scheme goes live, Asia Asset Management, 27 August 2014, http://www.asiaasset.com/news/ASEANs_CIS_fund_passport_scheme_goes_live2708.aspx, accessed 3 April 2017. See also A Gabriel (2014) Asean CIS framework launched, The Business Times, 26 August 2014, http://www.businesstimes.com.sg/companies-markets/asean-cis-framework-launched, accessed 4 April 2017.

  261. 261.

    Memorandum of Understanding on Streamlined Authorisation Framework for Cross-Border Public Offers of ASEAN Collective Investment Schemes (see ACMF, Standards of Qualifying CIS, http://www.theacmf.org/ACMF/upload/standards_of_qualifying_cis.pdf, accessed 4 April 2017). See also ACMF (2013) Press Release: ACMF announced the Framework for the cross-border offering of ASEAN CIS, 1 October 2013, http://www.theacmf.org/ACMF/webcontent.php?content_id=00065, accessed 21 May 2017.

  262. 262.

    ACMF (2016) Action Plans 2016–2020 Endorsed by ASEAN Finance Ministers, April 2016, http://www.theacmf.org/ACMF/upload/acmfactionplan2016-2020.pdf, accessed 4 April 2017, at 1. See also Verdier 2011, at 58 and 104–106.

  263. 263.

    See ASEAN, ASEAN Economic Community, http://asean.org/asean-economic-community/, accessed 17 October 2017.

  264. 264.

    See PwC (2015) Asian Passports, the coming of age: An overview and its demand, at 14–15. See also Godwin and Ramsay 2015, at 237.

  265. 265.

    See A Alder (2016) Keynote remarks at Hedge Fund Standards Board Institutional Investor Roundtable by the Chief Executive Officer of the Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission, 22 June 2016, http://www.sfc.hk/web/EN/files/ER/PDF/Speeches/Ashley_20160622.pdf, accessed 27 April 2017, at 2. Alder notes in his address that he was elected Chair of the IOSCO Board earlier in the year (at 5).

  266. 266.

    See Godwin and Ramsay 2015, at 243; PwC (2015) Asian Passports, the coming of age: An overview and its demand, at 5, 8 and 10–13. See also Persaud and Saunders 2012.

  267. 267.

    See D Shane (2014) ASEAN’s CIS fund passport scheme goes live; Godwin and Ramsay 2015, at 237.

  268. 268.

    See R Himino (2016) Regulators’ role in the age of the globalization paradox: Closing remarks by Ryozo Himino, Chairman of the IOSCO Asia Pacific Regional Committee and Vice minister for international affairs of the Financial Services Agency of Japan, at the Launch Event for the EU-Asia Pacific Forum on Financial Regulation, Singapore, 14 October 2016, http://www.iosco.org/library/speeches/pdf/20161014-Ryozo-Himino.pdf, accessed 27 April 2017.

  269. 269.

    Ibid., at 2.

  270. 270.

    Ibid.

  271. 271.

    IOSCO (2016) Annual Report 2015, at 48 (Report from the Chair of the Asia-Pacific Regional Committee (APRC) Ashley Alder).

  272. 272.

    See IOSCO, APRC Roadmap, IOSCOPD481, 23 March 2015.

  273. 273.

    IOSCO (2016) Annual Report 2015, at 48 (Report from the Chair of the Asia-Pacific Regional Committee (APRC) Ashley Alder).

  274. 274.

    See ibid., at 35 (Activities of IOSCO’s Policy Committees in the Year).

  275. 275.

    Ibid.

  276. 276.

    IOSCO, Presidents Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions Resolution On IOSCO’s Strategic Direction from 2016 to 2020 And On Funding the Strategic Direction from 2016 to 2020, Resolution 3/2015, IOSCORES57, June 2015.

  277. 277.

    See IOSCO, Media Release: IOSCO: Meeting the Challenges of a New Financial World, IOSCO/MR/23/2015, 17 June 2015.

  278. 278.

    IOSCO, Presidents Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions Resolution On IOSCO’s Strategic Direction from 2016 to 2020 And On Funding the Strategic Direction from 2016 to 2020, 2015, at 2.

  279. 279.

    See IOSCO Asia-Pacific Regional Committee, Press Release: Asia-Pacific Securities Regulators Reinforce Commitment to Greater Co-operation, IOSCONEWS9, 4 February 2002.

  280. 280.

    IOSCO (2014) Annual Report 2013, at 42–43 (Report from the Chair of the Asia-Pacific Regional Committee (APRC) Ashley Alder); IOSCO (2015) Annual Report 2014, at 43 (Report from the Chair of the Asia-Pacific Regional Committee (APRC) Ashley Alder).

  281. 281.

    See IOSCO (2016) Annual Report 2015, at 48 (Report from the Chair of the Asia-Pacific Regional Committee (APRC) Ashley Alder).

  282. 282.

    See IOSCO, APRC Roadmap, 2015.

  283. 283.

    IOSCO (2016) Annual Report 2015, at 48 (Report from the Chair of the Asia-Pacific Regional Committee (APRC) Ashley Alder).

  284. 284.

    Ibid.

  285. 285.

    Ibid.

  286. 286.

    Ibid., at 49.

  287. 287.

    See IOSCO, Media Release: IOSCO plays a key role in responding to global securities markets’ challenges, 2016, at 3. See also IOSCO (2016) Annual Report 2015, at 19 (Report from the IOSCO Secretary General David Wright).

  288. 288.

    IOSCO, Media Release: IOSCO plays a key role in responding to global securities markets’ challenges, 2016, at 3.

  289. 289.

    IOSCO (2016) Annual Report 2015, at 19 (Report from the IOSCO Secretary General David Wright).

  290. 290.

    See IOSCO, Media Release: IOSCO launches its first Regional Capacity Building Hub in Malaysia, IOSCO/MR/06/2017, 14 March 2017, at 1.

  291. 291.

    Slaughter 2004, at 40.

  292. 292.

    See ibid., at 229.

  293. 293.

    Kahler 2016, at 3.

  294. 294.

    See IOSCO, Resolution of the Presidents’ Committee on IOSCO’s Operational Priorities, IOSCORES23, 6 April 2005; IOSCO, Final Communiqué of the XXXth Annual Conference of the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), IOSCONEWS88, 7 April 2005, at 1–2 (in respect of IOSCO strategic direction).

  295. 295.

    See IOSCO, Impact Assessment Guidelines: IOSCO, IOSCOPD456, July 2011, at 35.

  296. 296.

    See IOSCO, IOSCO’s Strategic Direction 2015 to 2020, FR14/15, IOSCOPD496, May 2015.

  297. 297.

    Porter 1993, at 128.

  298. 298.

    See e.g. IOSCO (2016) Fact Sheet, October 2016, http://www.iosco.org/about/pdf/IOSCO-Fact-Sheet.pdf, accessed 4 April 2017, at 4.

  299. 299.

    Compare IOSCO, Resolution of the Presidents Committee on transitional arrangements for the IOSCO Board, 2011, paras 2 and 6; IOSCO, Resolution of the Presidents’ Committee on the composition of the IOSCO Board, 2013, para 2; IOSCO, Resolution of the Presidents’ Committee on the composition of the IOSCO Board, 2015, para 2.

  300. 300.

    See e.g. The Warwick Commission 2009, at 56.

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  1. The New Zealand Centre of International Economic Law, Wellington, New Zealand

    Monique Egli Costi

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    Denise Prévost

  3. Centre for European Studies, University of Twente, Enschede, The Netherlands

    Ramses A. Wessel

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Egli Costi, M. (2018). Between Shifts and Continuum in Cooperation: The International Securities Regulatory Regime and its Gradual Evolution. In: Amtenbrink, F., Prévost, D., Wessel, R. (eds) Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 2017. Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, vol 48. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-243-9_11

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