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Judicial Responses to Pre-Trial Procedural Violations in International Criminal Proceedings pp 105–180Cite as

Judicial Responses to Pre-Trial Procedural Violations in the Netherlands

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Part of the book series: International Criminal Justice Series ((ICJS,volume 16))

Abstract

This chapter sets out the law and practice with respect to the question of how to address procedural violations committed in the pre-trial phase of criminal proceedings in the Netherlands. It does so by means of an overview of the consequences that the judge may attach to such procedural violations. Consideration is given to the extent to which the determination of whether to attach legal consequences to established procedural violations entails the exercise of judgement, whereby the judge has due regard to the particular circumstances of the case, i.e. the extent to which it should be discretionary in nature (which may be contrasted to an approach whereby the judicial response is more or less automatic), and also to how courts respond to procedural violations committed in an international context. The examination in this chapter is not limited to a description of the relevant law and practice, however; it also includes a description of the (possible) theoretical accounts thereof, as well as an evaluation of the law and practice in light of such accounts.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Of course, the answer to the question of how to address pre-trial procedural violations encompasses more than just the judicial response within the criminal trial to such violations. After all, the question implies that such violations could be addressed outside of the criminal trial. It is beyond the scope of this book to explore in any meaningful way other (possible) mechanisms for addressing such violations, and the choice to limit the legal framework to the judicial response to pre-trial procedural violations may be justified on the basis that that response will invariably shed light on the broader question of how to address procedural violations committed in the pre-trial phase of criminal proceedings. Thus, a restrictive response within the criminal trial suggests that such violations should be dealt with elsewhere than in the criminal trial, i.e. through other mechanisms.

  2. 2.

    Article 1 of the Dutch Criminal Code enshrines the principle of legality for substantive criminal law.

  3. 3.

    See WvSv, AL Melai/MS Groenhuijsen ea, Article 1 Sv, aant 8 (online, last updated 1 June 2000).

  4. 4.

    See Cleiren, in T&C Strafvordering 2015, Article 1 Sv, aant 11 (online, last updated 1 July 2015).

  5. 5.

    Calls have been made to incorporate the right to a fair trial into the Dutch Constitution. See e.g. Leeuw 2013.

  6. 6.

    See Article 120 Dutch Constitution.

  7. 7.

    See Article 94 Dutch Constitution.

  8. 8.

    In the Netherlands, lawyers, legal scholars and other persons who hold a law degree and have (specialist) knowledge and/or experience of the criminal justice system may be appointed as ‘deputy judges’ (rechter-plaatsvervangers).

  9. 9.

    Haazen 2007, 6 and 9.

  10. 10.

    Ibid., 9.

  11. 11.

    The procedural consequence of an invalid summons is nullity. A summons may be declared null and void if it has not been served properly or if the indictment contained therein is not sufficiently clear.

  12. 12.

    The court is not competent to try the case when the case falls within the jurisdiction of another court’s jurisdiction.

  13. 13.

    The prosecution may be declared inadmissible due to, for example, lapse of time (see Articles 70‒73 of the Dutch Criminal Code), the principle of ne bis in idem (see Article 68 of the Dutch Criminal Code) or the death of the accused.

  14. 14.

    The proceedings may be suspended on account of an accused’s mental disorder. See Article 16 CCP.

  15. 15.

    If not, the court must acquit the accused pursuant to Article 352(1) CCP.

  16. 16.

    An act does not constitute a statutory criminal offence if it cannot be qualified, i.e. it does not fall within the definition of the alleged criminal offence, or if the act, despite falling within the definition of the alleged criminal offence, is not wrongful on account of a successful claim of justification. If the act does not constitute a statutory criminal offence, the court must discharge the accused of further prosecution (ontslaan van alle rechtsvervolging) pursuant to Article 352(2) CCP. Only where ‘unlawfulness’ (wederrechtelijkheid) is a constitutive part of the offence (bestanddeel) will a successful claim of ‘justification’ lead to an acquittal.

  17. 17.

    An accused is not criminally liable if he or she can successfully claim ‘excuse’. If the accused is not criminally liable, the court must discharge the accused of further prosecution pursuant to Article 352(2) CCP. Only where ‘culpability’ (verwijtbaarheid) is a constitutive part of the offence will a successful claim of ‘excuse’ lead to an acquittal.

  18. 18.

    See e.g. Mevis 1995, 253.

  19. 19.

    In the literature this has been advanced as an argument against the exclusion of evidence. See in this regard Embregts 2003, 110‒111.

  20. 20.

    See e.g. Koopmans 2001; Van Woensel 2004, 146‒147; Y Buruma in his annotation to HR 30 March 2004, ECLI:NL:HR:2004:AM2533, NJ 2004/376; Blom 2008, 2011; Keulen and Knigge 2010, 523; Borgers 2012; and Corstens and Borgers 2014, 817 (Corstens and Borgers refer to both the rechtsstaatgedachte and the constitutional perspective to reflect this notion).

  21. 21.

    See e.g. Koopmans 2001, 887; Y Buruma in his annotation to HR 30 March 2004, ECLI:NL:HR:2004:AM2533, NJ 2004/376; Blom 2008, 124; 2011, 14; and Borgers 2012, 260.

  22. 22.

    See Kuiper 2014, 73‒82.

  23. 23.

    See Borgers 2012, 260‒262.

  24. 24.

    See HR 19 February 2013, ECLI:NL:HR:2013:BY5322, NJ 2013/308 m.nt. BF Keulen. This did not go unnoticed in the literature: see e.g. BF Keulen in his annotation to HR 19 February 2013, ECLI:NL:HR:2013:BY5322, NJ 2013/308; and Schalken 2013.

  25. 25.

    See HR 30 March 2004, ECLI:NL:HR:2004:AM2533, r.o. 3.6.4, NJ 2004/376 m.nt. Y Buruma. For a discussion of the distinction between unreliable and unlawfully obtained evidence (and of the fact that this distinction has proven difficult to draw in practice), see Dubelaar 2009, 101‒114.

  26. 26.

    See e.g. Mevis 1995; Cleiren and Mevis 1996; and Blom 2002.

  27. 27.

    See Baaijens-van Geloven (2004, 355), referring to, among others, Krikke 1983; De Jong 1985; Groenhuijsen 1996; and Blom 2002.

  28. 28.

    See n 12 and accompanying text.

  29. 29.

    Cleiren and Mevis 1996, 189. See also Schalken 1989, 7‒9.

  30. 30.

    Cleiren and Mevis 1996, 189. This requirement, they argue, is emphasized in Article 1 CCP. See also Schalken 1989, 7‒9.

  31. 31.

    Those norms are not limited to those explicitly provided for by statute but also include unwritten norms, i.e. the norms that dictate how the powers provided for by statute should properly be exercised, such as the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity. See Cleiren and Mevis 1996, 189.

  32. 32.

    Cleiren and Mevis 1996, 190. See also Mevis 1995, 257‒258.

  33. 33.

    Although it should be noted here that the CCP does not provide for any rights as such; rather it expressly confers on the public authorities powers in order to investigate and prosecute crime, thereby also stipulating the conditions under which such powers may be exercised, from which individual rights may be inferred.

  34. 34.

    Cleiren and Mevis 1996, 190‒192. See also Baaijens-van Geloven 2004, 358 n 68.

    Thus, they point to the danger that the question of whether the public authorities have acted unlawfully will not solely be dependent on the violation of objective law.

  35. 35.

    Cleiren and Mevis 1996, 192. Accordingly, Cleiren and Mevis are, as a matter of principle, opposed to the application of the Schutz-norm (in particular, the second component thereof), which is discussed in more detail below (see in particular n 93, 94 and 103‒107 and accompanying text). See also Schalken 1989, 8‒11. Similarly, Buruma and Blom observe that the (strict) application of the Schutz-norm in an approach based on the notion that the authorities must also abide by the law is illogical. See Y Buruma in his annotation to HR 30 March 2004, ECLI:NL:HR:2004:AM2533, NJ 2004/376, and Blom 2008, 125. See also Borgers 2012, 265; and Kuiper 2014, 269 and 284‒285, in this regard.

    By contrast, Cleiren and Mevis do not take issue with the practice of courts of refraining from attaching legal consequences to unlawfulness on the part of the police or the public prosecutor in the pre-trial phase of criminal proceedings on the basis that, in the circumstances, the accused has not suffered (actual ) prejudice. In their view, such application is not inconsistent with what they argue to be the nature of unlawfulness.

  36. 36.

    Embregts argues that courts should, when addressing unlawfulness on the part of the police or the public prosecutor in the pre-trial phase of criminal proceedings, emphasize the failure of the authorities to observe fundamental rights (see Embregts 2003, 320‒331). See, similarly, Van Woensel 2004, 147, 156‒160 and 171. For a discussion of this approach, see n 98–108 and accompanying text.

  37. 37.

    Cleiren and Mevis 1996, 191.

  38. 38.

    Ibid., 191.

  39. 39.

    Ibid., 191. Thus, both Buruma and Blom note that, from the rule of law perspective, the imposition of sanctions for procedural violations is a way to respond to improper conduct on the part public authorities ‘as such’ (als zodanig), i.e. on its own and without more. See Y Buruma in his annotation to HR 30 March 2004, ECLI:NL:HR:2004:AM2533, NJ 2004/376; Blom 2008, 124; and 2011, 14. See also Mevis 1995, 255‒256.

  40. 40.

    Cleiren and Mevis 1996, 193‒194 and 204. See also Van Leijen 1994, 236‒241.

  41. 41.

    Cleiren and Mevis 1996, 194 and 199. See also Blom 2008, 125.

  42. 42.

    ‘Individual’ here is used to denote the distinction between the legal protection of the citizen to have been drawn into the criminal process from improper interference by the public authorities charged with the investigation and prosecution of crime and that of the general public from crime. See in this regard Van der Meij 2008, 61‒62; and 2010, 21.

  43. 43.

    See e.g. Groenhuijsen and Knigge 2001, 15‒16; Crijns and Van der Meij 2005, 51‒57; Van der Meij 2008, 61; 2010, 20‒21; and Keulen and Knigge 2010, 2. However, Brants, Mevis, Prakken and Reijntjes take issue with this description of the aim of criminal procedure. In their view, it opens the door to instrumentalism. See Brants et al. 2003, 26. It should not, however, be assumed that all those to adopt this description of the aim of criminal procedure advocate instrumentalism.

  44. 44.

    For a comprehensive breakdown of the central aim of Dutch criminal procedure, see Crijns and Van der Meij 2005, 51‒55. See also Van der Meij 2010, 20‒21. According to Crijns and Van der Meij (Ibid., 55‒56), both the central aim and two further aims flow from the passage in the explanatory memorandum (memorie van toelichting) to the 1926 Code of Criminal Procedure to identify the aim(s) of criminal procedure: the conviction of the guilty and the protection of the innocent from wrongful prosecution and conviction.

  45. 45.

    Cleiren and Mevis 1996, 195.

  46. 46.

    See e.g. Mevis et al. 2001, 47.

  47. 47.

    Cleiren and Mevis 1996, 197.

  48. 48.

    Ibid., 95–197. See, similarly, Blom 2002, 1054‒1055; and Peters 1973, 249. Peters argues that where the authorities have failed to observe the ‘rules of the game’, the most effective way to deal with such failure is to respond within the ‘game’. Thus, Peters rejects what in the English literature has been termed the ‘separation thesis’. The ‘separation thesis’ is addressed in Chap. 4.

  49. 49.

    Mevis 1995, 258.

  50. 50.

    Ibid., 255.

  51. 51.

    If in the course of the criminal investigation the public authorities violate a statutory procedural norm that governs the exercise of (coercive) power, it might be said that they disrupt the balance envisaged by the legislator; that the exercise of power becomes unbalanced on account of the individual legal protection envisaged by the legislator not being accorded due weight. The exclusion of evidence, then, might redress that imbalance, by now allowing the goal of individual legal protection to prevail (rather than the goal of truth-finding, which may be assumed to have prevailed when the public authorities failed to observe the norms that (also) exist in order protect the citizen to have been drawn into the criminal process from improper interference by the public authorities charged with the investigation and prosecution of crime). See Peters 1973, 248; and Van Leijen 1994, 234. See also Schalken 1989, 8.

  52. 52.

    Van Leijen 1994, 236, in particular.

  53. 53.

    Ibid., 236, in particular. See also Mevis 1995, 252, n 2. This issue is addressed further below, in Sect. 3.5. Similarly, proponents of the vindicatory rationale in respect of the US exclusionary rule argue that that rule is ‘part and parcel’ of the Fourth Amendment, rather than a judicially created remedy that is subject to judicial limitation. See e.g. Baldiga 1983; and Bloom and Dewey 2011, 38‒51.

    Ashworth and Redmayne make a similar argument in respect of (violations of) the English rules on the destruction on DNA profiles. See Ashworth and Redmayne 2010, 359‒360.

  54. 54.

    See e.g. Van Leijen 1994, 241; Mevis 1995, 256; Cleiren and Mevis 1996, 191‒192; and Blom 2002, 1055.

  55. 55.

    Cleiren and Mevis 1996, 196. See also Blom 2002, 1055.

  56. 56.

    See n 11‒17 and accompanying text.

  57. 57.

    Cleiren and Mevis 1996, 200‒201 and 205.

  58. 58.

    See also Van Leijen 1994, for a methodical construction of the argument for exclusion.

  59. 59.

    See e.g. Peters 1973, 236‒253; Embregts 2003, 188‒189; and Blom 2008, 124‒125.

  60. 60.

    See e.g. Y Buruma in his annotation to HR 30 March 2004, ECLI:NL:HR:2004:AM2533, NJ 2004/376; Baaijens-van Geloven 2004, 354‒356; Blom 2008, 124‒125; 2011, 14; Corstens and Borgers 2014, 817‒818; and Borgers 2012, 260.

  61. 61.

    The prevention argument is also known as the ‘effectivity argument’ (het effectiviteitsargument). See Embregts 2003, 105; and Kuiper 2014, 44. Blom and Borgers both use this term (effectivity), rather than prevention: Blom 2002, 1053; and Borgers 2012, 260.

  62. 62.

    This last argument is frequently omitted from the list. See e.g. Blom 2002, 1053; Keulen and Knigge 2010, 523‒524 (although they do note the importance of preserving the credibility of the criminal justice system in a more general sense); Blom 2011, 14; Borgers 2012, 260; BF Keulen in his annotation to HR 19 February 2013, ECLI:NL:HR:2013:BY5322, NJ 2013/308; and Corstens and Borgers 2014, 817‒818. See also n 72 and 73 and accompanying text.

  63. 63.

    See e.g. Embregts 2003, 104‒107, 189.

  64. 64.

    Blom 2002, 1053.

  65. 65.

    See e.g. Krikke 1983, 276. See similarly Peters 1973, 249, where he refers to ‘sanctions that turn unlawful action into invalid action’. See also n 52 and accompanying text.

  66. 66.

    Embregts 2003, 106.

  67. 67.

    By contrast, if the right to have been impinged on is the right to a fair trial, the exclusion of evidence (pursuant to the entitlement of all citizens to observance by the authorities of the norms that bind them) may well coincide with that which is necessary in order to repair the violation of such right.

  68. 68.

    See in this regard Chap. 2, n 291–295 and accompanying text.

  69. 69.

    See e.g. Blom 2002, 1053; and Corstens and Borgers 2014, 817.

  70. 70.

    Corstens and Borgers 2014, 817.

  71. 71.

    T Schalken in his annotation to HR 9 September 2014, ECLI:NL:HR:2014:2650, NJ 2014/420.

  72. 72.

    Embregts deals with this argument under the demonstration argument. See Embregts 2003, 106.

  73. 73.

    Jörg 1989, 658. See, similarly, Schalken 1981, 80 and T Schalken in his annotation to HR 9 September 2014, ECLI:NL:HR:2014:2650, NJ 2014/420. See, however, Kuiper 2014, 45 and 75, where the author argues that the integrity argument lacks force on account of the fact that the integrity of the criminal justice system is just as dependent on that system’s ability to convict an accused on the basis of reliable evidence.

  74. 74.

    Blom 2002, 1053. Similarly Embregts argues that in the Dutch ‘constitutional state’ (de rechtsstaat) the principle of legality demands that unlawful conduct on the part of public authorities be sanctioned. See Embregts 2003, 156.

  75. 75.

    Blom 2002, 1053. See also Blom 2008, 124‒125.

  76. 76.

    See e.g. Baaijens-van Geloven 2004, 356; and Corstens and Borgers 2014, 817‒818.

  77. 77.

    See e.g. Embregts 2003, 156 and 183; and Van Woensel 2004, 147.

  78. 78.

    There are many similarities between Cleiren and Mevis’ argument for exclusion and Ashworth’s protective principle, set out in Chap. 4.

  79. 79.

    Jörg 1989, 659. By contrast Baaijens-van Geloven and Van Woensel identify this as an argument. See Baaijens-van Geloven 2004, 355; and Van Woensel 2004, 149.

  80. 80.

    Embregts 2003, 108‒109. Similarly, Schalken argues that when the authorities do not abide by the norms that bind them, such norms become blurred. See Schalken 1981, 79.

  81. 81.

    See HR 19 February 2013, ECLI:NL:HR:2013:BY5322, NJ 2013/308 m.nt. BF Keulen.

  82. 82.

    HR 19 February 2013, ECLI:NL:HR:2013:BY5322, r.o. 2.4.5 and 2.4.6, NJ 2013/308 m.nt. BF Keulen.

  83. 83.

    See e.g. BF Keulen in his annotation to HR 19 February 2013, ECLI:NL:HR:2013:BY5322, NJ 2013/308 and T Schalken in his annotation to HR 9 September 2014, ECLI:NL:HR:2014:2650, NJ 2014/420.

  84. 84.

    Borgers 2012, 260. See also Corstens and Borgers 2014, 820.

  85. 85.

    See Kuiper 2009, 38. See also Borgers 2012, 265.

  86. 86.

    Perhaps this is what Borgers means when he refers to herstel, as opposed to compensation: Borgers 2012, 260). In this regard see also Corstens and Borgers 2014, 820.

  87. 87.

    Borgers 2012, 260. See also Corstens and Borgers 2014, 820.

  88. 88.

    See Corstens and Borgers 2014, 817. See also Kuiper 2014, 45, referring to the ‘compensation argument’ (het compensatieargument) in this regard. Accordingly, this approach should be distinguished from an approach to the question of how to address unlawfulness on the part of the police or the public prosecutor in the pre-trial phase of criminal proceedings based on what has been called the ‘protective principle’, in which the exclusion of evidence is the primary remedy. See e.g. Ashworth 1977. The protective principle is addressed in Chap. 4. Similarly, it should be distinguished from the approach advocated by Embregts. See n 98‒108 and accompanying text.

  89. 89.

    See e.g. Borgers 2012, 260; and Corstens and Borgers 2014, 820.

  90. 90.

    See Y Buruma in his annotation to HR 30 March 2004, ECLI:NL:HR:2004:AM2533, NJ 2004/376. See also Blom 2008, 125.

  91. 91.

    In any case, a number of authors have observed that the application of the Schutz-norm in an approach to unlawfulness on the part of the police or the public prosecutor in the pre-trial phase of criminal proceedings that seeks to safeguard the rights of the accused, i.e. protect his or her subjective rights, is logical: see e.g. Y Buruma in his annotation to HR 30 March 2004, ECLI:NL:HR:2004:AM2533, NJ 2004/376; Blom 2008, 125 and 133; and Kuiper 2014, 269.

  92. 92.

    See Doorenbos 1990.

  93. 93.

    See e.g. Embregts 2003, 124–132. The second component of the Schutz-norm is comparable to the standing requirement in the US. See Embregts, ibid., and Kuiper 2014, 270‒274.

  94. 94.

    See Doorenbos 1990.

  95. 95.

    For such objectives, see n 42‒44 and accompanying text.

  96. 96.

    In Chap. 2.

  97. 97.

    This is not to say that it is inappropriate for judges in criminal proceedings to attach legal consequences to such violations; however, it is questionable whether it should do so on the basis of the right to an effective remedy.

  98. 98.

    Embregts 2003, 320‒331. See, similarly, Van Woensel 2004, 147 and 156‒160.

  99. 99.

    See e.g. Cleiren and Mevis 1996.

  100. 100.

    Embregts 2003, 322‒333.

  101. 101.

    Ibid., 188‒189. These goals are set out above: see n 6172 and accompanying text.

  102. 102.

    Embregts 2003, 183‒184, 188‒189.

  103. 103.

    Ibid., 124‒132, 155‒156, 189 and 343. See however Cleiren and Mevis 1996, 191‒192. See also n 35 and accompanying text.

  104. 104.

    Embregts 2003, 155‒156. Van Woensel also advocates an approach to unlawfulness on the part of the police or the public prosecutor in the pre-trial phase of criminal proceedings whereby the nature of unlawfulness is sought in the violation of fundamental rights. However, unlike Embregts she explicitly argues against a strict application of the Schutz-norm , ultimately arguing for a ‘shift in emphasis’ from the Schutz-norm to a ‘fundamental rights’ perspective. See Van Woensel 2004, 158‒160 and 171.

  105. 105.

    Embregts 2003, 155.

  106. 106.

    See similarly Schalken 1989, 9; and Mevis et al. 2001, 49.

    Here it is worth recalling Cleiren and Mevis’ objection to an approach to unlawfulness on the part of the police or the public prosecutor in the pre-trial phase of criminal proceedings that seeks the nature of unlawfulness in the violation of fundamental rights: the danger that conduct on the part of public authorities will only be deemed unlawful if this particular accused’s rights have been violated. See n 34–36 and accompanying text.

  107. 107.

    Embregts 2003, 344.

  108. 108.

    Presumably, at least, it is not the latter (strict) application that she has in mind.

  109. 109.

    See n 91–95 and accompanying text.

  110. 110.

    It first did so in its leading decision of 30 March 2004. See HR 30 March 2004, ECLI:NL:HR:2004:AM2533, r.o. 3.5, NJ 2004/376 m.nt. Y Buruma. The Court confirmed this line of case law in its second leading decision on Article 359a of the CCP (specifically, on the exclusion of evidence on account of the manner in which was obtained) of 19 February 2013. See HR 19 February 2013, ECLI:NL:HR:2013:BY5322, r.o. 2.4.1, NJ 2013/308 m.nt. BF Keulen.

  111. 111.

    See Y Buruma in his annotation to HR 30 March 2004, ECLI:NL:HR:2004:AM2533, NJ 2004/376.

  112. 112.

    See n 91–94 and accompanying text.

  113. 113.

    See Sect. 3.5.

  114. 114.

    See n 85 and accompanying text.

  115. 115.

    See in particular Kuiper 2014, 73‒82.

  116. 116.

    HR 19 February 2013, ECLI:NL:HR:2013:BY5322, r.o. 2.4.4, NJ 2013/308 m.nt. BF Keulen. In doing so it did not, however, point to the need to protect (retrospectively) other rights. However, this is not surprising. In this case, the Supreme Court identified the proper rationales for excluding properly obtained evidence. It has not yet done the same for e.g. sentence reduction, which is arguably the most obvious choice for the (retrospective) protection of substantive rights such as the right to privacy , while bearing in mind that it is questionable how appropriate a place the criminal trial is to remedy violations of substantive rights.

  117. 117.

    Kuiper 2014, 77.

  118. 118.

    For Dutch literature in this regard, see Ölçer 2008, in particular 32–36.

  119. 119.

    See Kuiper 2014, 73.

  120. 120.

    See in this regard Chap. 2.

  121. 121.

    See in this regard n 91–94 and accompanying text.

  122. 122.

    See Borgers 2012, 260; and Corstens and Borgers 2014, 820.

  123. 123.

    Borgers 2012, 260 n 14.

  124. 124.

    See Borgers 2012, 261; and Corstens and Borgers 2014, 820.

  125. 125.

    Ibid.

  126. 126.

    See n 228 and 234–235 and accompanying text.

  127. 127.

    HR 19 February 2013, ECLI:NL:HR:2013:BY5322, r.o. 2.4.5 and 2.4.6, NJ 2013/308 m.nt. BF Keulen.

  128. 128.

    See n 151‒157 and accompanying text.

  129. 129.

    In Sect. 3.5.

  130. 130.

    This was cited by the ‘Moons-Commission’ (see in this regard n 132 and accompanying text) as the reason for conducting research into the way in which violations are addressed in criminal proceedings. See Corstens 1993 (incorporating the Moons-Commission’s findings), 9 and 12.

  131. 131.

    See Corstens 1993, e.g. 12 and 24, and Kamerstukken II 1993/94, 23075, 3, pp. 1 and 5 (explanatory memorandum).

  132. 132.

    In other words, the Moons-Commission’s conclusions regarding the way in which procedural violations should be addressed in criminal proceedings were adopted by the Dutch Government (see Kamerstukken II 1993/94, 23075, 3, p. 5 (explanatory memorandum), save in a number of respects. First, unlike the Moons-Commission, the Dutch Government limited the scope of application of Article 359a CCP to the procedural violations committed in the investigative phase. Second, unlike the Moons-Commission, the Dutch Government was of the view that the judicial responses enumerated in the first paragraph of that provision could only be applied by the court of its own motion and not upon request of the defence or upon application of the public prosecutor. See Kamerstukken II 1993/94, 23075, 3, p. 24 (explanatory memorandum).

  133. 133.

    This legal consequence was first recognized by the Supreme Court in HR 26 June 1962, NJ 1962/470 m.nt. W Pompe. It took another 16 years for the Supreme Court to affirm its earlier decision (in HR 18 April 1978, ECLI:NL:HR:1978:AC6236, NJ 1978/365 m.nt. ThW van Veen.

  134. 134.

    The Supreme Court first recognized that a declaration that the prosecution is inadmissible could be an appropriate response to unlawfulness in the investigative phase of criminal proceedings in HR 12 December 1978, ECLI:NL:HR:1978:AC2751, NJ 1979/142 m.nt. GE Mulder. Later it was (also) applied in respect of violations of the right to trial within a reasonable time within the meaning of Article 6 ECHR. See e.g. HR 23 September 1980, ECLI:NL:HR:1980:AC6987, NJ 1981/116 m.nt. GE Mulder.

  135. 135.

    This response was introduced as an alternative to a declaration that the prosecution is inadmissible in respect of violations of the right to trial within a reasonable time. See HR 7 April 1987, ECLI:NL:HR:1987:AB9733, NJ 1987/587 m.nt. ThW van Veen.

  136. 136.

    Corstens 1993, 23–24; Kamerstukken II 1993/94, 23075, 3, p. 45 (explanatory memorandum).

  137. 137.

    Ibid., 23‒24; p. 5.

  138. 138.

    Ibid., 24; pp. 5 and 25. The possible implications of this position are discussed below, in Sect. 3.5.

  139. 139.

    Ibid., 17, 24 and 53; p. 25.

  140. 140.

    Ibid., 53; p. 25.

  141. 141.

    Ibid., 53; p. 25.

  142. 142.

    Ibid., 53; p. 25.

  143. 143.

    Ibid., 24 and 53; p. 25.

  144. 144.

    Ibid., 53; p. 25.

  145. 145.

    The Moons-Commission did not consider it to be the task of the legislator to do so. See Corstens 1993, 54‒55.

  146. 146.

    Stb. 1996, 522.

  147. 147.

    Author’s own translation.

  148. 148.

    HR 30 March 2004, ECLI:NL:HR:2004:AM2533, r.o. 3.6.1, NJ 2004/376 m.nt. Y Buruma. This also follows from the wording of Article 359a CCP.

  149. 149.

    Ibid.

  150. 150.

    HR 19 February 2013, ECLI:NL:HR:2013:BY5322, r.o. 2.4.1, NJ 2013/308 m.nt. BF Keulen.

  151. 151.

    HR 30 March 2004, ECLI:NL:HR:2004:AM2533, r.o. 3.4.2, NJ 2004/376 m.nt. Y Buruma. Regarding the general requirement that the violation be committed in the course of the preliminary investigation see also the text of Article 359a of the CCP.

  152. 152.

    HR 8 July 2008, ECLI:NL:HR:2008:BC5973, NJ 2009/440 m.nt. Y Buruma.

  153. 153.

    HR 27 September 2011, ECLI:NL:HR:2011:BQ3765, NJ 2011/557 m.nt. TM Schalken.

  154. 154.

    HR 5 September 2006, ECLI:NL:HR:2006:AV4122, NJ 2007/336, m.nt. TM Schalken.

  155. 155.

    This line of case law has been criticized in the literature. See e.g. Buruma and Schalken in their annotations to HR 8 July 2008, ECLI:NL:HR:2008:BC5973, NJ 2009/440 and HR 27 September 2011, ECLI:NL:HR:2011:BQ3765, NJ 2011/557, respectively.

  156. 156.

    Hof Den Haag 21 March 2014. http://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2014:1007. Accessed 1 March 2017.

  157. 157.

    See e.g. HR 18 March 2003, r.o. 3.5.1, ECLI:NL:HR:2003:AF4321, NJ 2003/527.

  158. 158.

    HR 30 March 2004, ECLI:NL:HR:2004:AM2533, r.o. 3.4.2, NJ 2004/376 m.nt. Y Buruma. This rule, the purpose of which is to ensure that the closed system of legal remedies (gesloten stelsel van rechtsmiddelen) provided for in the CCP is not interfered with, has been criticized in the literature. See e.g. AH Klip in his annotation to HR 13 June 2006, ECLI:NL:HR:2006:AV6195, NJ 2006/623, PAM Mevis in his annotation to HR 21 November 2006, ECLI:NL:HR:2006:AY9673, NJ 2007/233 and TM Schalken in his annotation to HR 24 April 2007, ECLI:NL:HR:2007:AZ8411, NJ 2008/145.

  159. 159.

    HR 30 March 2004, ECLI:NL:HR:2004:AM2533, r.o. 3.4.3, NJ 2004/376 m.nt. Y Buruma.

    Kuiper observes that the procedural violation need not actually be repaired; the fact that the violation is reparable may suffice. See Kuiper 2014, 208.

    Schalken laments that the concept of reparation has been unduly expanded. See TM Schalken in his annotation to HR 6 January 2015, ECLI:NL:HR:2015:4, NJ 2015/109.

  160. 160.

    See e.g. Keulen and Knigge 2010, 522; Kuiper 2014, 210, and TM Schalken in his annotation to HR 6 January 2015, ECLI:NL:HR:2015:4, NJ 2015/109.

  161. 161.

    See e.g. HR 1 July 2003, ECLI:NL:HR:2003:AF9417, NJ 2003/695 m.nt. PAM Mevis.

  162. 162.

    An example is Article 268 CCP.

  163. 163.

    It will be seen below that even when it does not, it may nevertheless lead to one of the consequences enumerated in Article 359a(1) CCP.

  164. 164.

    HR 30 March 2004, ECLI:NL:HR:2004:AM2533, r.o. 3.5, NJ 2004/376 m.nt. Y Buruma.

  165. 165.

    Some authors read the Schutz-norm into the first factor of Article 359a(2) CCP, i.e. the interest that the violated provision purports to protect (see e.g. Borgers 2012, 270, and Corstens and Borgers 2014, 826). Indeed, there does appear to be overlap between the first component of the Schutz-norm and ‘the interest that the violated provision purports to protect’. For a discussion of the relationship between the Schutz-norm and this factor, see Kuiper 2014, 327‒328.

  166. 166.

    HR 12 January 1999, ECLI:NL:HR:1999:ZD1402, NJ 1999/290.

  167. 167.

    Under “Discretion and Balancing”.

  168. 168.

    HR 30 March 2004, ECLI:NL:HR:2004:AM2533, r.o. 3.6.2, NJ 2004/376 m.nt. Y Buruma, and HR 19 February 2013, ECLI:NL:HR:2013:BY5322, r.o. 2.4.1, NJ 2013/308 m.nt. BF Keulen. This opens the door to other facts and circumstances than those explicitly provided for in Article 359a(2) CCP being taken into account.

  169. 169.

    HR 30 March 2004, ECLI:NL:HR:2004:AM2533, r.o. 3.6.2, NJ 2004/376 m.nt. Y Buruma.

  170. 170.

    HR 19 February 2013, ECLI:NL:HR:2013:BY5322, NJ 2013/308 m.nt. BF Keulen.

  171. 171.

    Kuiper 2014, 605. See also 53–54.

  172. 172.

    See HR 30 March 2004, ECLI:NL:HR:2004:AM2533, r.o. 3.7, NJ 2004/376 m.nt. Y Buruma; HR 19 February 2013, ECLI:NL:HR:2013:BY5322, r.o. 2.4.1, NJ 2013/308 m.nt. BF Keulen; and HR 22 September 2015, ECLI:NL:HR:2015:2775, r.o. 2.5, NJB 2015/1741. For an example of a case in which the lower court’s ruling was overturned by the Supreme Court on account of it not having been properly reasoned, see HR 9 April 2013, ECLI:NL:HR:2013:BX4439, NJ 2013/309 m.nt. BF Keulen.

  173. 173.

    See Kuiper 2014, 306 and 324‒325.

  174. 174.

    HR 30 March 2004, ECLI:NL:HR:2004:AM2533, r.o. 3.7, NJ 2004/376 m.nt. Y Buruma. For an example of a case in which the application was not properly motivated, see HR 6 January 2015, ECLI:NL:HR:2015:4, NJ 2015/109 m.nt. TM Schalken.

  175. 175.

    HR 30 March 2004, ECLI:NL:HR:2004:AM2533, r.o. 3.7, NJ 2004/376 m.nt. Y Buruma. Ölçer is highly critical in this regard. See Ölçer 2008, 517‒518.

  176. 176.

    HR 30 March 2004, ECLI:NL:HR:2004:AM2533, r.o. 3.6.1, NJ 2004/376 m.nt. Y Buruma.

  177. 177.

    HR 4 January 2011, ECLI:NL:HR:2011:BM6673, r.o. 3.5, NJ 2012/145 m.nt. MJ Borgers.

  178. 178.

    In addition, the appellate court’s decision to simply issue a declaration that a procedural violation had occurred appears to have been justified on the basis of the second statutory factor, i.e. the seriousness of the violation . In other words, it seemed to argue that the violation was not particularly serious, also on the basis the space directly behind the door to have been opened unlawfully was empty, that is, did not contain any items of significance from the perspective of the right to privacy , so that the privacy violation ‘did not go beyond opening the cupboard’. See HR 4 January 2011, ECLI:NL:HR:2011:BM6673, r.o. 2.3, NJ 2012/145 m.nt. MJ Borgers, where the appellate court’s findings are set out.

  179. 179.

    See e.g. Buruma 2008; Kuiper 2009, 47; Borgers 2012, 265; and Blom 2015.

  180. 180.

    In this regard, the concern voiced by a number of commentators at the time of the introduction of Article 359a CCP (see e.g. Van Leijen 1994, 239‒240; and Mevis 1995, 259‒260) and since its enactment (see e.g. Blom 2002, 1054‒1055; and Embregts 2003, 183‒184) that sentence reduction would be granted instead of excluding the evidence obtained improperly has not manifested. Nevertheless, the concern that the exclusion of evidence would no longer be the inevitable response to unlawfulness on the part of the police or the public prosecutor in the pre-trial phase of criminal proceedings clearly has.

  181. 181.

    HR 30 March 2004, ECLI:NL:HR:2004:AM2533, r.o. 3.6.2, NJ 2004/376 m.nt. Y Buruma. See also n 169 and accompanying text. See in this regard also Kuiper 2014, 324.

  182. 182.

    See Article 359a(1)(a) CCP.

  183. 183.

    HR 30 March 2004, ECLI:NL:HR:2004:AM2533, r.o. 3.6.3, NJ 2004/376 m.nt. Y Buruma.

  184. 184.

    Kuiper 2009, 46 and 53; and Kuiper 2014, 568‒569 and 573. See also MJ Borgers in his annotation to HR 30 March 2010, ECLI:NL:HR:2010:BK4173, NJ 2011/603 and Borgers 2012, 264.

  185. 185.

    See n 165 and accompanying text.

  186. 186.

    See Kamerstukken II 1993/94, 23075, 3, p. 25 (explanatory memorandum). In HR 16 December 2003, ECLI:NL:HR:2003:AN7635, the Supreme Court determined at para 3.4 that prejudice to defence rights does not constitute prejudice within the meaning of Article 359a(1)(a). For literature in this regard, see Kuiper 2009, 55; and 2014, 574‒575.

    Nevertheless, in a recent ruling the Supreme Court held that sentence reduction would be an appropriate response to a violation of the right to legal assistance during questioning, where the accused’s right to legal assistance prior to questioning has been observed. See HR 22 December 2015, ECLI:NL:HR:2015:3608, r.o. 6.4.2, NJ 2016/52 m.nt. AH Klip.

  187. 187.

    See e.g. Kuiper 2009, 56; and 2014, 575. See also Borgers 2012, 265. See e.g. HR 25 June 2002, ECLI:NL:HR:2002:AD9204, NJ 2002/625 m.nt. TM Schalken, in which the Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeal’s decision to grant sentence reduction on account of an unlawful search of the suspect’s clothing. See also HR 21 March 2000, r.o. 3.6. http://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:HR:2000:AA5254. Accessed 1 March 2017.

  188. 188.

    See e.g. Kuiper 2009, 54‒56; and 2014, 573‒576.

  189. 189.

    See n 276 and accompanying text.

  190. 190.

    Unlike the requirement of causal connection in the context of the exclusion of evidence, which does potentially raise difficult questions.

  191. 191.

    See Ter Haar and Meijer 2011, 62. In practice, however, this line may be difficult to draw.

  192. 192.

    HR 30 March 2004, ECLI:NL:HR:2004:AM2533, r.o. 3.6.3, NJ 2004/376 m.nt. Y Buruma.

  193. 193.

    See similarly Borgers 2012, 264, and Borgers in his annotation to HR 30 March 2010, ECLI:NL:HR:2010:BK4173, NJ 2011/603.

  194. 194.

    See Kuiper 2009, 53‒57; and 2014, 575‒576.

  195. 195.

    Ibid., 573; 53‒54. See also Borgers in his annotation to HR 30 March 2010, ECLI:NL:HR:2010:BK4173, NJ 2011/603.

  196. 196.

    See Article 359a(1)(b) CCP.

  197. 197.

    HR 30 March 2004, ECLI:NL:HR:2004:AM2533, r.o. 3.6.4, NJ 2004/376 m.nt. Y Buruma. This is repeated in HR 19 February 2013, ECLI:NL:HR:2013:BY5322, r.o. 2.4.2, NJ 2013/308 m.nt. BF Keulen.

  198. 198.

    Ibid., r.o. 3.6.4; r.o. 2.4.2.

  199. 199.

    HR 30 March 2004, ECLI:NL:HR:2004:AM2533, r.o. 3.6.4, NJ 2004/376 m.nt. Y Buruma.

  200. 200.

    See also Kuiper in this regard. Kuiper 2014, 501‒520.

  201. 201.

    Kamerstukken II 1993/94, 23075, 3, p. 25–26 (explanatory memorandum).

  202. 202.

    HR 16 September 2014, ECLI:NL:HR:2014:2670, r.o. 4.4, NJ 2014/461 m.nt. TM Schalken, and HR 16 September 2014, ECLI:NL:HR:2014:2749, r.o. 2.5.1, NJ 2014/462 m.nt. TM Schalken.

  203. 203.

    HR 17 September 2013, ECLI:NL:HR:2013:BZ9992, r.o. 3.3, NJ 2014/91 m.nt. TM Schalken; HR 13 November 2012, ECLI:NL:HR:2012:BW9338, r.o. 2.7.7, NJ 2013/413 m.nt. MJ Borgers; and HR 30 June 2009, ECLI:NL:HR:2009:BH3079, r.o. 2.7.3, NJ 2009/349 m.nt. TM Schalken.

  204. 204.

    Kuiper 2014, 519.

  205. 205.

    Or, as Schalken puts it, the Supreme Court ‘only likes freshly picked fruit, not fruit that is already lying on the ground’. See Schalken in his annotation to HR 16 September 2014, ECLI:NL:HR:2014:2670, NJ 2014/461 and HR 16 September 2014, ECLI:NL:HR:2014:2749, NJ 2014/462.

  206. 206.

    Kuiper 2014, 519.

  207. 207.

    See e.g. HR 7 July 2009, ECLI:NL:HR:2009:BH8889, r.o. 4.5, NJ 2009/399, and HR 5 October 2010, ECLI:NL:HR:2010:BL5629, r.o. 4.4.1, NJ 2011/169 m.nt. TM Schalken.

  208. 208.

    HR 19 February 2013, ECLI:NL:HR:2013:BY5322, r.o. 2.4.2, NJ 2013/308 m.nt. BF Keulen.

  209. 209.

    Ibid., r.o. 2.4.4.

    According to Kuiper, the scope of this exclusionary rule is, to a large extent, ‘in the hands of the ECtHR’ as the highest authority to interpret this provision. See Kuiper 2014, 521.

  210. 210.

    It is worth noting here that Article 6 ECHR has direct effect in the Dutch legal order, so that it is questionable whether allegations that the procedural violation in question threatens to undermine the right to a fair trial would be (and certainly whether they should be) subject to the regime of Article 359a CCP in its entirety, i.e. whether the procedural violation in question would need to be considered one within the meaning of Article 359a CCP. See in this regard n 151–162 and accompanying text, and also the text accompanying n 316–328.

  211. 211.

    HR 30 June 2009, ECLI:NL:HR:2009:BH3079, NJ 2009/349 m.nt. TM Schalken. See also Salduz v Turkey App no 36391/02 (ECtHR, 27 November 2008). However, in a recent ruling the Supreme Court held that sentence reduction would be an appropriate response to a violation of the right to legal assistance during questioning, where the accused’s right to legal assistance prior to questioning has otherwise been observed. See HR 22 December 2015, ECLI:NL:HR:2015:3608, r.o. 6.4.2, NJ 2016/52 m.nt. AH Klip.

  212. 212.

    HR 28 March 2006, ECLI:NL:HR:2006:AU5471, NJ 2007/38 m.nt. TM Schalken.

  213. 213.

    Allan v UK App no 48539/99 (ECtHR, 5 November 2002).

  214. 214.

    Kuiper 2014, 522.

  215. 215.

    See in this regard Chap. 2, n 36, 77 and 129 and accompanying text.

  216. 216.

    HR 19 February 2013, ECLI:NL:HR:2013:BY5322, r.o. 2.4.5, NJ 2013/308 m.nt. BF Keulen.

  217. 217.

    See also BF Keulen in his annotation to HR 19 February 2013, ECLI:NL:HR:2013:BY5322, NJ 2013/308 and T Schalken in his annotation to HR 9 September 2014, ECLI:NL:HR:2014:2650, NJ 2014/420.

  218. 218.

    See HR 29 May 2007, ECLI:NL:HR:2007:AZ8795, NJ 2008/14 m.nt. JM Reijntjes.

  219. 219.

    Kuiper 2014, 537‒540.

  220. 220.

    HR 12 January 1999, ECLI:NL:HR:1999:ZD1402, NJ 1999/290.

  221. 221.

    HR 2 October 2007, ECLI:NL:HR:2007:BA5632, NJ 2008/374 m.nt. J Legemaate.

  222. 222.

    HR 19 February 2013, ECLI:NL:HR:2013:BY5322, r.o. 2.4.5, NJ 2013/308 m.nt. BF Keulen.

  223. 223.

    Kuiper 2014, 543 and 545.

  224. 224.

    Ibid., 544‒545.

  225. 225.

    It may be considered to constitute ‘additional’ balancing because it goes beyond that which may be presumed to underlie a finding that the unlawfulness in question amounts to a very intrusive breach of a fundamental right of the accused.

  226. 226.

    See Kuiper 2014, 546.

  227. 227.

    HR 19 February 2013, ECLI:NL:HR:2013:BY5322, r.o. 2.4.5, NJ 2013/308 m.nt. BF Keulen.

  228. 228.

    Kuiper 2014, 545.

  229. 229.

    Ibid., 546‒547.

  230. 230.

    HR 19 February 2013, ECLI:NL:HR:2013:BY5322, r.o. 2.4.6, NJ 2013/308 m.nt. BF Keulen.

  231. 231.

    Ibid., r.o. 2.4.6.

  232. 232.

    Ibid., r.o. 2.4.6.

  233. 233.

    Ibid., r.o. 2.4.6.

  234. 234.

    See n 222 and accompanying text.

  235. 235.

    HR 19 February 2013, ECLI:NL:HR:2013:BY5322, r.o. 2.4.6, NJ 2013/308 m.nt. BF Keulen.

  236. 236.

    Kuiper 2014, 548 and 551.

  237. 237.

    Hof Amsterdam 21 December 2015, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2015:5307.

  238. 238.

    HR 1 November 2016, ECLI:NL:HR:2016:2454, r.o. 3.4, thereby confirming its earlier judgment in HR 21 November 2006, ECLI:NL:HR:2006:AY9670, NJ 2006/653.

  239. 239.

    Kamerstukken II 1993/94, 23075, 3, p. 26 (explanatory memorandum).

  240. 240.

    That is, it results in a judgment within the meaning of Article 349(1) in conjunction with Article 138 CCP.

  241. 241.

    HR 30 March 2004, ECLI:NL:HR:2004:AM2533, r.o. 3.6.5, NJ 2004/376 m.nt. Y Buruma.

  242. 242.

    See HR 19 December 1995, ECLI:NL:HR:1995:ZD0328, r.o. 5.2, NJ 1996/249 m.nt. TM Schalken.

  243. 243.

    In addition, the prosecution may be declared inadmissible on grounds wholly unconcerned with the propriety of the investigation. See n 13 and accompanying text.

  244. 244.

    HR 1 June 1999, ECLI:NL:HR:1999:ZD1143, r.o. 3.8, NJ 1999/567 m.nt. TM Schalken.

  245. 245.

    Keulen and Knigge 2010, 543.

  246. 246.

    Kuiper 2014, 389‒390.

  247. 247.

    HR 13 December 2011, ECLI:NL:HR:2011:BT2173, r.o. 4.2, NJ 2012/299 m.nt. JM Reijntjes.

  248. 248.

    See e.g. Knigge 2003; Borgers 2012, 263‒264; Corstens and Kuiper 2013, 125; and Kuiper 2014, 367‒370.

  249. 249.

    See e.g. Knigge 2003, 193; Corstens and Kuiper 2013, 133; and Kuiper 2014, 368.

  250. 250.

    Corstens and Kuiper 2013, 133‒134; and Kuiper 2014, 370‒371. That ‘ensuring observance by the public authorities of the norms that bind them’ might be a (separate) ground for declaring the prosecution inadmissible is derived from the requirement that the public authorities must have committed serious violations of principles of proper administration of justice, either intentionally or by gross negligence.

  251. 251.

    See e.g. HR 29 June 2010, ECLI:NL:HR:2010:BL0656, r.o. 3.5, NJ 2010/442 m.nt. TM Schalken, and HR 7 February 2012, r.o. 2.4, ECLI:NL:HR:2012:BU6784, NJB 2012/539. See also TM Schalken in his annotation to that case, Borgers 2012, 263; Corstens and Kuiper 2013, 139; and Kuiper 2014, 405.

  252. 252.

    See e.g. HR 18 February 1997, ECLI:NL:HR:1997:ZD0643, r.o. 6.3, NJ 1997/484 m.nt. JM Reijntjes. In that case the defence had argued on appeal in cassation before the Supreme Court that the Court of Appeal had erred in rejecting the application for a declaration that the prosecution was inadmissible on account of it not having been shown that the public prosecutor had purposely prejudiced the defendant’s fair trial rights. The defence argued that ‘purpose’, i.e. intent need not be shown for such a declaration and that gross negligence suffices. However, the Supreme Court, in finding that the Court of Appeal had indeed erred as regards the rejection of the application, said nothing of the prosecutor’s culpability, focusing instead of the Court of Appeal’s failure to respond to an important aspect of the defence’s argument regarding the prejudice caused to the defendant’s fair trial rights. See also Kuiper 2014, 379 and 403.

  253. 253.

    See e.g. Knigge 2003, 194; and Kuiper 2014, 368.

  254. 254.

    See Kuiper 2014, 382.

  255. 255.

    HR 18 February 1997, ECLI:NL:HR:1997:ZD0643, r.o. 6.3, NJ 1997/484 m.nt. JM Reijntjes.

  256. 256.

    HR 20 October 1998, ECLI:NL:HR:1998:ZD1309, NJ 1999/122. See also HR 14 January 2003, ECLI:NL:HR:2003:AE9038, NJ 2003/288 m.nt. Y Buruma.

  257. 257.

    See also Keulen and Knigge 2010, 543.

  258. 258.

    See e.g. HR 12 February 2008, ECLI:NL:HR:2008:BC3496, NJ 2008/248 m.nt. TM Schalken and HR 5 January 2016, ECLI:NL:HR:2016:9, NJ 2016/153 m.nt. F Vellinga-Schootstra.

  259. 259.

    HR 8 July 2008, ECLI:NL:HR:2008:BC5973, NJ 2009/440 m.nt. Y Buruma.

  260. 260.

    In Chap. 1, ‘balancing ’ was defined as an approach to the question of how to address pre-trial procedural violations whereby the court (also) takes into account factors that seemingly have nothing to do with that which warranted the court’s attention in the first place, and which militate against a (potentially) far-reaching response thereto.

  261. 261.

    See n 140 and accompanying text.

  262. 262.

    HR 22 September 1998, ECLI:NL:HR:1998:ZD1277, r.o. 4.4, NJ 1999/104 m.nt. J de Hullu. It is worth noting the cautious language of the Supreme Court in this regard; it does not speak of an obligation on the part of the court to do so, but the power or the opportunity to do so. The Dutch text reads as follows: ‘De wetgever heeft de rechter aldus uitdrukkelijk in de gelegenheid gesteld binnen het wettelijke kader de sancties op vormverzuimen af te stemmen op de omstandigheden van het geval.’

  263. 263.

    Kuiper 2014, 605. See also 53‒54.

  264. 264.

    While this may appear natural or logical, it need not be the case; more will be said about this issue in Chap. 7.

  265. 265.

    See e.g. Schoep, in T&C Strafvordering 2015, Article 359a Sv, aant 3 (online, last updated 1 July 2015).

  266. 266.

    See Kuiper 2014, 328.

  267. 267.

    Ibid., 327‒328. Accordingly, Kuiper distinguishes between the first statutory factor, the interest that the violated provision purports to protect, and the Schutz-norm . See, by contrast, Borgers 2012, 270; Corstens and Borgers 2014, 826‒827; and Schoep, in: T&C Strafvordering 2015, Article 359a Sv, aant 3 (online, last updated 1 July 2015).

  268. 268.

    HR 30 March 2004, ECLI:NL:HR:2004:AM2533, r.o. 3.5, NJ 2004/376 m.nt. Y Buruma.

  269. 269.

    See e.g. Kuiper 2014, 331‒335.

  270. 270.

    HR 19 February 2013, ECLI:NL:HR:2013:BY5322, r.o. 2.7.4, NJ 2013/308 m.nt. BF Keulen. See also Keulen in his annotation to this judgment, referring to HR 19 June 2001, ECLI:NL:HR:2001:AB2202, NJ 2001/574 m.nt. JM Reijntjes, in order to demonstrate that the Supreme Court has previously pointed to the good faith of the public authorities as a factor militating against the exclusion of evidence. According to Keulen, that (earlier) case differs from the present one, since in the present case the bad faith of the authority to have issued the warrant was beyond dispute.

  271. 271.

    HR 19 February 2013, ECLI:NL:HR:2013:BY5322, r.o. 2.7.5, NJ 2013/308 m.nt. BF Keulen.

    In addition, Borgers has suggested that in determining the seriousness of the violation the court should, arguably, also take into account any efforts already undertaken to address the violation, e.g. further investigation into the matters, apologies, financial compensation, disciplinary proceedings etc. See Borgers 2012, 270‒271.

  272. 272.

    Kamerstukken II 1993/94, 23075, 3, p. 26 (explanatory memorandum).

  273. 273.

    See also Kuiper 2014, 340.

  274. 274.

    See in this regard Kooijmans 2011, 1102‒1103. For sentence reduction the requirement of concrete prejudice for the accused is explicit. For exclusion it is not, but it can be inferred from the case law.

  275. 275.

    Kuiper 2014, 341.

  276. 276.

    HR 4 January 2011, ECLI:NL:HR:2011:BM6673, r.o. 3.2.2, NJ 2012/145 m.nt. MJ Borgers, and HR 19 February 2013, ECLI:NL:HR:2013:BY5322, r.o. 2.4.1, NJ 2013/308 m.nt. BF Keulen.

  277. 277.

    HR 3 July 2012, ECLI:NL:HR:2012:BV1800, r.o. 2.9, NJB 2012/1772.

  278. 278.

    TM Schalken in his annotation to HR 6 January 2015, ECLI:NL:HR:2015:4, NJ 2015/109.

  279. 279.

    Kooijmans 2011, 1105‒1108. Kuiper also points to the (potentially) far-reaching implications of the Supreme Court’s finding. See Kuiper 2014, 341 and 575.

  280. 280.

    HR 30 March 2004, ECLI:NL:HR:2004:AM2533, r.o. 3.5 (emphasis added), NJ 2004/376 m.nt. Y Buruma.

  281. 281.

    See also Kuiper 2014, 341‒343.

  282. 282.

    See e.g. HR 20 October 1998, ECLI:NL:HR:1998:ZD1309, NJ 1999/122 and HR 14 January 2003, ECLI:NL:HR:2003:AE9038, NJ 2003/288.

  283. 283.

    Kuiper 2014, 524.

  284. 284.

    See n 282 and accompanying text.

  285. 285.

    For the distinction between procedural and substantive rights see Strasser 1988, 595‒604.

  286. 286.

    Nor does it appear to include ‘expressive harm’, i.e. the harm that is done when government actors disrespect individual rights, whereby such disrespect sends ‘demeaning messages about human worth’. Starr 2009, 1534‒1535.

  287. 287.

    See e.g. Kuiper 2014, 573‒575.

  288. 288.

    See e.g. Kuiper 2014, 342‒343.

  289. 289.

    HR 25 June 2002, ECLI:NL:HR:2002:AD9204, NJ 2002/625 m.nt. TM Schalken. In its second leading decision on Article 359a CCP the Supreme Court seems to confirm that the seriousness of the offence may be taken into account. See HR 19 February 2013, ECLI:NL:HR:2013:BY5322, r.o. 2.4.5 and 2.4.6, NJ 2013/308 m.nt. BF Keulen, and also n 222 and 233‒234 and accompanying text. See, however, n 228 and accompanying text.

  290. 290.

    As was the case in the case underlying the appeal before the Supreme Court in HR 25 June 2002, ECLI:NL:HR:2002:AD9204, NJ 2002/625 m.nt. TM Schalken.

  291. 291.

    See HR 25 June 2002, ECLI:NL:HR:2002:AD9204, r.o. 3.7, NJ 2002/625 m.nt. TM Schalken, where the Supreme Court refers to Kamerstukken II 1993/94, 23075, 3, p. 25 (explanatory memorandum).

  292. 292.

    See TM Schalken in his annotation to HR 25 June 2002, ECLI:NL:HR:2002:AD9204, NJ 2002/625, para 7.

  293. 293.

    Ibid., para 7.

  294. 294.

    Van Woensel 2004, 153.

  295. 295.

    TM Schalken in his annotation to HR 25 June 2002, ECLI:NL:HR:2002:AD9204, NJ 2002/625, para 7.

  296. 296.

    Ibid., para 7.

  297. 297.

    Van Woensel 2004, 153.

  298. 298.

    Kuiper 2014, 344, referring to Jalloh v Germany App no 54810/00 (ECtHR, 11 July 2006). This case, and the extent to which the public interest in the investigation and prosecution of crime may be taken into account in cases in which unlawfulness in the pre-trial phase is argued to violate Article 6 ECHR , are addressed in Chap. 2.

  299. 299.

    Kuiper 2014, 346.

  300. 300.

    See n 289–291 and accompanying text. The appellate court’s findings in this regard are reproduced in the Supreme Court’s decision at para 3.3.

  301. 301.

    See De Hullu in his annotation to HR 22 September 1998, ECLI:NL:HR:1998:ZD1277, NJ 1999/104. Regarding the requirement of proportionality, see n 4 and accompanying text.

  302. 302.

    See Kuiper 2014, 546.

  303. 303.

    See Chap. 2, n 434–439 and accompanying text.

  304. 304.

    Kooijmans 2011, 1102.

  305. 305.

    See n 274 and accompanying text.

  306. 306.

    It should be recalled that all legal consequences require prejudice for the accused. See n 305 and 274 and accompanying text.

  307. 307.

    For example, the legislative history refers to the need to reduce the attachment of ‘undesirable’ consequences to procedural violations within the criminal trial, and to societal discontent in this regard. See Kamerstukken II 1993/94, 23075, 3, pp. 1 and 5 (explanatory memorandum). See also Kamerstukken II 1993/94, 23075, 6, pp. 3 and 9.

  308. 308.

    See similarly T Schalken in his annotation to HR 9 September 2014, ECLI:NL:HR:2014:2650, NJ 2014/420, para 7; Ölçer 2008, 517; and Brinkhoff 2016.

  309. 309.

    See n 223 and accompanying text.

  310. 310.

    For an overview of the (alleged) costs of exclusion in the American context, see Cameron and Lustiger 1984, 132−142.

  311. 311.

    Kamisar 1987, 6−11.

  312. 312.

    Kamisar 1987, 6.

  313. 313.

    See Kamisar 1987, 9.

  314. 314.

    See Cameron and Lustiger 1984, 145−147.

  315. 315.

    See n 229 and accompanying text.

  316. 316.

    The attachment of legal consequences to unlawful conduct outside of the framework of Article 359a CCP has been criticized in the literature for a variety of reasons. First, it makes it difficult to have a clear view of the circumstances under which the court may attach legal consequences to such conduct (see e.g. Kuiper 2014, 229). Second, it seems to undermine the Supreme Court’s restrictive application of Article 359a CCP (see e.g. TM Schalken in his annotation to HR 17 September 2013, ECLI:NL:HR:2013:BZ9992, NJ 2014/91, para 3). In this regard Schalken argues that the Supreme Court would do best to attach additional and more specific requirements to the judicial response to unlawful conduct not falling within the scope of Article 359a CCP. More generally Borgers raises the question as to why when the Supreme Court, when ruling on cases involving such conduct, already borrows certain elements from Article 359a CCP, it does not simply refer to that provision and declare the framework thereof applicable thereto. See MJ Borgers in his annotation to HR 11 January 2011, ECLI:NL:HR:2011:BN2297, NJ 2012, 297, para 6.

  317. 317.

    See MJ Borgers in his annotation to HR 29 January 2013, ECLI:NL:HR:2013:BY2814, NJ 2013/415, paras 2 and 3.

  318. 318.

    See e.g. HR 18 March 2003, ECLI:NL:HR:2003:AF4321, r.o. 3.5.1, NJ 2003/527.

  319. 319.

    See MJ Borgers in his annotation to HR 29 January 2013, ECLI:NL:HR:2013:BY2814, NJ 2013/415, paras 2 and 3.

  320. 320.

    HR 27 September 2011, ECLI:NL:HR:2011:BQ3765, r.o. 2.5, NJ 2011/557 m.nt. TM Schalken. See also HR 5 September 2006, ECLI:NL:HR:2006:AV4122, r.o. 4.7.2, NJ 2007/336, m.nt. TM Schalken.

  321. 321.

    See n 153‒156 and accompanying text.

  322. 322.

    HR 5 October 2010, ECLI:NL:HR:2010:BL5629, r.o. 4.4.1, NJ 2011/169 m.nt. TM Schalken.

  323. 323.

    HR 31 May 2011, ECLI:NL:HR:2011:BP1179, r.o. 3.7, NJ 2011/412 m.nt. TM Schalken.

  324. 324.

    HR 29 January 2013, ECLI:NL:HR:2013:BY2814, r.o. 2.3.3, NJ 2013/415 m.nt. MJ Borgers.

  325. 325.

    See n 197 and accompanying text.

  326. 326.

    See also MJ Borgers in his annotation to HR 29 January 2013, ECLI:NL:HR:2013:BY2814, NJ 2013/415, para 5, referring to a ‘non-criterion’ in this regard.

  327. 327.

    Ibid., para 6.

  328. 328.

    Kuiper 2014, 228‒238.

  329. 329.

    Other forms of international cooperation in criminal matters include: transfer of criminal proceedings, execution of foreign sentences, recognition of foreign criminal judgements and collection and exchange of information between intelligence and law enforcement services.

  330. 330.

    See n 152 and accompanying text.

  331. 331.

    HR 8 July 2008, ECLI:NL:HR:2008:BC5973, r.o. 3.3, NJ 2009/440 m.nt. Y Buruma.

  332. 332.

    See n 241, 251‒259 and accompanying text.

  333. 333.

    See in this regard Buruma’s annotation to this decision, where he argues that the Court of Appeal was right to nevertheless consider whether a declaration that the prosecution is inadmissible was warranted, and the Supreme Court was right not to interfere, in light of the fact that the conditions of detention raised issues under Article 3 ECHR , thereby referring the ECtHR’s findings in Jalloh v Germany App no 54810/00 (ECtHR, 11 July 2006). However, according to Buruma, the current case could be distinguished, on the basis that while in Jalloh, evidence obtained by the Article 3 violation had been used at trial, in the current case it had not.

  334. 334.

    HR 8 July 2008, ECLI:NL:HR:2008:BC5973, r.o. 3.3, NJ 2009/440 m.nt. Y Buruma.

  335. 335.

    Van Sliedregt and Sjöcrona 2008, 22.

  336. 336.

    Reijntjes et al. 2008, 272‒273.

  337. 337.

    See n 322 and accompanying text.

  338. 338.

    HR 5 October 2010, ECLI:NL:HR:2010:BL5629, NJ 2011/169 m.nt. TM Schalken.

  339. 339.

    Ibid., r.o. 4.3.

  340. 340.

    Ibid., r.o. 4.4.1.

  341. 341.

    Ibid., r.o. 4.4.1.

  342. 342.

    Ibid., r.o. 4.4.1. According to Kuiper, support for this position can be found in the case of Echeverri Rodriguez v Netherlands App no 3286/98 (ECtHR, Decision of 27 June 2000). See Kuiper 2014, 291‒292. This case is addressed in Chap. 2.

  343. 343.

    HR 5 October 2010, ECLI:NL:HR:2010:BL5629, r.o. 4.4.1, NJ 2011/169 m.nt. TM Schalken, referring to Khan v UK App no 35394/97 (ECtHR, 12 May 2000) and PG and JH v UK App no 44787/98 (ECtHR, 25 September 2001). These cases are set out in Chap. 2.

  344. 344.

    See also Kuiper 2014, 299.

  345. 345.

    HR 5 October 2010, ECLI:NL:HR:2010:BL5629, r.o. 4.4.2, NJ 2011/169 m.nt. TM Schalken. In this regard it is important to note that pursuant to Article 539a(1) CCP, the powers conferred on public authorities for the purpose of investigating crime may also be exercised outside of the Netherlands.

  346. 346.

    See also Kuiper 2014, 301.

  347. 347.

    HR 5 October 2010, ECLI:NL:HR:2010:BL5629, r.o. 4.4.2, NJ 2011/169 m.nt. TM Schalken.

  348. 348.

    Ibid., r.o. 4.5.

  349. 349.

    TM Schalken in his annotation to HR 5 October 2010, ECLI:NL:HR:2010:BL5629, NJ 2011/169, para 2.

  350. 350.

    HR 5 October 2010, ECLI:NL:HR:2010:BL5629, r.o. 4.6, NJ 2011/169 m.nt. TM Schalken. Presumably, therefore, the criminal court trying the case is required to undertake the balancing exercise prescribed by Article 359a(2) CCP, to be seen to be doing so and to apply the criteria for each legal response.

  351. 351.

    Kuiper 2014, 292.

  352. 352.

    See n 48–50 and accompanying text.

  353. 353.

    See n 52–53 and accompanying text.

  354. 354.

    This fact has been subject to criticism in the literature. See e.g. Van Leijen 1994, 241; and Mevis 1995, 259.

  355. 355.

    See n 49–53 and accompanying text.

  356. 356.

    See Borgers and Kooijmans 2013, 19. They argue that the explanation for the limited scope for responding to unlawfulness on the part of the police or the public prosecutor in the pre-trial phase of criminal proceedings within the criminal trial should not be sought in Article 359a CCP itself, but in the interpretation thereof by the Supreme Court.

  357. 357.

    See Van Leijen 1994, 239‒240. Such an approach whereby sentence reduction is granted instead of excluding the evidence obtained had been advocated in the literature: see e.g. Fokkens 1991. It is (also) worth noting that Article 359a CCP also ‘provides’ for a (mere) declaration that a procedural violation has occurred.

  358. 358.

    See Article 359a(2) CCP.

  359. 359.

    Kuiper 2014, 605. See also 53–54.

  360. 360.

    Van Leijen 1994, 241.

  361. 361.

    See e.g. Baaijens-van Geloven 2004, 358.

  362. 362.

    The ‘location’ of Article 359a within the CCP may also be an acknowledgement that that observance by the public authorities charged with investigating and prosecuting crime of the norms that bind them can be ensured in other ways than through, that is, within, the criminal trial. See in this regard Ölçer 2008, 208.

  363. 363.

    In this regard it should be recalled that the Supreme Court recognizes that unlawfulness on the part of public authorities that does not, strictly speaking, constitute a procedural violation within the meaning of Article 359a of the CCP (including procedural violations committed abroad in the context of international cooperation in criminal matters) may still warrant one of the responses enumerated in the first paragraph of that provision.

  364. 364.

    See HR 30 March 2004, ECLI:NL:HR:2004:AM2533, r.o. 3.5, NJ 2004/376 m.nt. Y Buruma; HR 19 February 2013, ECLI:NL:HR:2013:BY5322, r.o. 2.4.1, NJ 2013/308 m.nt. BF Keulen. See TM Schalken in his annotation to HR 17 September 2013, ECLI:NL:HR:2013:BZ9992, NJ 2014/91, para 5 and T Schalken in his annotation to HR 9 September 2014, ECLI:NL:HR:2014:2650, NJ 2014/420, para 6.

  365. 365.

    See HR 30 March 2004, ECLI:NL:HR:2004:AM2533, r.o. 3.5, NJ 2004/376 m.nt. Y Buruma; HR 19 February 2013, ECLI:NL:HR:2013:BY5322, r.o. 2.4.1, NJ 2013/308 m.nt. BF Keulen.

  366. 366.

    See also Kuiper 2014, 580.

  367. 367.

    See e.g. Borgers and Kooijmans 2013, 35.

  368. 368.

    See n 49–53 and accompanying text.

  369. 369.

    According to Borgers and Kooijmans, this is how Embregts’ scepticism regarding alternatives to the exclusionary rule outside of the criminal trial is to be understood. See Borgers and Kooijmans 2013, 26 n 24, referring to Embregts 2003, 115‒122.

  370. 370.

    See e.g. Buruma 2013b, 14.

  371. 371.

    It should be recalled here that outside of the framework of Article 359a CCP there is room (albeit limited room) to attach legal consequences to unlawful conduct.

  372. 372.

    See e.g. the test for declaring the prosecution inadmissible and, regarding the exclusion of evidence , see HR 30 March 2004, ECLI:NL:HR:2004:AM2533, r.o. 3.5, NJ 2004/376 m.nt. Y Buruma, and HR 19 February 2013, ECLI:NL:HR:2013:BY5322, r.o. 2.4.1 and 2.4.4, NJ 2013/308 m.nt. BF Keulen.

  373. 373.

    See e.g. Kuiper 2009, 52‒53; and 2014, 572.

  374. 374.

    Borgers 2012, 265. It should be noted that Borgers speaks of the protection of the subjective rights of the accused in this article. For the reasons cited above (see n 94‒96 and accompanying text), this is undesirable. Interestingly, he and Kooijmans do not do so in a later piece. See Borgers and Kooijmans 2013, 20.

  375. 375.

    Borgers 2012, 265‒266. See also Blom 2011, 16; and Borgers and Kooijmans 2013, 20‒21.

    According to Kuiper 2014, 209, the primacy accorded by the Supreme Court to ‘repair’ (herstel), whereby the rule in question is nevertheless complied with (and violation of the underlying norm is thereby avoided) also demonstrates that ensuring such observance is not, according to the Supreme Court, the primary focus of Article 359a CCP. After all, such repair does not ‘undo’ the impugned action, it merely prevents the possible (negative) consequences.

  376. 376.

    See in this regard also e.g. Y Buruma in his annotation to HR 30 March 2004, ECLI:NL:HR:2004:AM2533, NJ 2004/376 and TM Schalken in his annotation to HR 3 July 2001, ECLI:NL:HR:2001:AB2732, NJ 2002/8.

  377. 377.

    Borgers 2012, 266. See also Borgers and Kooijmans 2013, 20‒21.

  378. 378.

    Borgers 2012, 265. Regarding the latter, presumably Borgers is referring not only to the general test for exclusion, but also to subsequent case law in which the Supreme Court determined that evidence obtained in violation of Article 8 ECHR need not be excluded so long as the trial as a whole is fair, thereby implying that the yardstick for exclusion is Article 6 ECHR.

  379. 379.

    Borgers and Kooijmans 2013, 19‒21.

  380. 380.

    Ibid., 21. See also Borgers 2012, 265‒266, and n 119 and accompanying text.

  381. 381.

    See in this regard Schalken 2013, 1391 and 1393.

  382. 382.

    In the USA the adoption of the deterrence rationale in respect of the exclusionary rule seems to have gone hand in hand with a more restrictive judicial response within the criminal trial to unlawfulness in the course of a criminal investigation amounting to a violation of the Fourth Amendment. See e.g. Baldiga 1983, 165‒166; and Bloom and Dewey 2011, 38‒51.

  383. 383.

    Buruma 2013a. See also Kuiper 2014, 323‒324.

  384. 384.

    See similarly e.g. Röttgering 2013, 427; and T Schalken in his annotation to HR 9 September 2014, ECLI:NL:HR:2014:2650, NJ 2014/420.

  385. 385.

    See n 119 and accompanying text.

  386. 386.

    Schalken is critical in this regard. He argues that simply because the ECtHR has ‘severed’ the relationship between Article 8 and Article 6 of the ECHR, national courts need not do so; moreover, there are good reasons for not doing so. See T Schalken in his annotation to HR 9 September 2014, ECLI:NL:HR:2014:2650, NJ 2014/420.

  387. 387.

    See e.g. Borgers 2012, 267‒270; Borgers and Kooijmans 2013; and Kuiper 2014, 596‒601.

  388. 388.

    See the outline policy document (contourennota) for the ‘Modernisation of the Code of Criminal Procedure’ project currently being carried out in the Netherlands: Kamerstukken II 2015/16, 29279, 278, pp. 102‒104.

  389. 389.

    See e.g. Borgers 2012, 269; and Borgers and Kooijmans 2013, 25‒29. See however Cleiren and Mevis 1995.

  390. 390.

    See e.g. Samadi 2016.

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  1. Department of Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure, Leiden University, Leiden, The Netherlands

    Kelly Pitcher

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Pitcher, K. (2018). Judicial Responses to Pre-Trial Procedural Violations in the Netherlands. In: Judicial Responses to Pre-Trial Procedural Violations in International Criminal Proceedings. International Criminal Justice Series, vol 16. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-219-4_3

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