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The Paradigm of Terrorism: State-Centric and Cosmopolitan Approaches in Some Current Efforts Towards Its Criminalisation

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Defining International Terrorism

Part of the book series: International Criminal Justice Series ((ICJS,volume 15))

Abstract

Just as it was shown with the crime of aggression, defining terrorism for the purposes of international criminal justice raises concerns that closely relate to the ‘State sovereignty v cosmopolitanism’ debate. These concerns are not only limited to strictly definitional questions but also extend to the modalities of prosecution. Construing a definition for the crime of international terrorism would mean that there has to be a proper forum for its prosecution. A suggestion that the ICC could constitute such a forum is being made in this chapter, on both a legal and pragmatic basis. However, current efforts to criminalise terrorism or terrorism-related conduct have been affected at times by both of the international law theories under examination: Security Council anti-terrorist Resolutions placed their emphasis on how to entrench and protect the sovereign interests of the US that suffered the attack of 9/11, prioritising thus State sovereignty interests over cosmopolitan purposes, whereas the Special Tribunal of Lebanon (STL) issued a quite bold pro-cosmopolitan decision that a customary law definition for terrorism exists, at least in time of peace. The General Assembly (GA) effort to draft a universal definition for terrorism seems to be so far the only example that, despite its being pro-cosmopolitan, takes into account State concerns regarding the issue of defining terrorism in a quite balanced way with its cosmopolitan aspirations. Though it still remains to be seen whether the GA negotiations will come to fruition, it seems that the most workable way to substantially develop international law in the field of terrorism, is to attempt a balance between State concerns and cosmopolitan ideas in the process of its criminalisation and definition to the maximum extent possible.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Resolution RC/Res.6, Annex I, Amendments to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court on the Crime of Aggression (11 June 2010) (Kampala Resolution ) Article 8bis.

  2. 2.

    Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened for signature 17 July 1998, 2187 UNTS 90 (entered into force 1 July 2002) UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (Rome Statute).

  3. 3.

    Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, opened for signature 16 December 1970, 860 UNTS 105 (entered into force 14 October 1971); Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, opened for signature 23 September 1971, 974 UNTS 177 (entered into force 26 January 1973); Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, opened for signature 14 December 1973, 1035 UNTS 167 (entered into force 20 February 1977); International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, opened for signature 17 November 1979, 1316 UNTS 205 (entered into force 3 June 1983); Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, opened for signature 26 October 1979, 1456 UNTS 246 (entered into force 8 February 1987); Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, opened for signature 24 February 1988, 1589 UNTS 474 (entered into force 6 August 1989); Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, opened for signature 10 March 1988, 1678 UNTS 201 (entered into force 1 March 1992); Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms located on the Continental Shelf, opened for signature 10 March 1988, 1678 UNTS 304 (entered into force 1 March 1992); International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, opened for signature 9 December 1999, 2178 UNTS 197 (entered into force 10 April 2002) (Financing of Terrorism Convention ); International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, opened for signature 15 December 1997, 2149 UNTS 256 (entered into force 23 March 2001) (Terrorist Bombings Convention); International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, opened for signature 15 April 2005, UN Doc. A/RES/59/290 (entered into force 7 July 2007).

  4. 4.

    Londras 2010, p. 177.

  5. 5.

    For the distinction between international crimes stricto sensu and treaty-based crimes see Introduction, text to note 33.

  6. 6.

    STL, Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, Homicide, Perpetration, Cumulative Charging, 16 February 2011, Case No. STL-11-01/1 (STL Decision ).

  7. 7.

    The first draft on a Comprehensive Convention was presented by India. See UNGA Sixth Committee 2000, Annex II (Indian proposal).

  8. 8.

    Boister 2009, p. 360.

  9. 9.

    Convention for the Creation of an International Criminal Court, opened for signature 16 November 1937, League of Nations Official Journal Special Supplement No. 156.

  10. 10.

    Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, opened for signature 16 November 1937, 19 League of Nations Official Journal 23.

  11. 11.

    Maogoto 2009, p. 22.

  12. 12.

    Sailer 1999, p. 325.

  13. 13.

    Convention for the Punishment and Prevention of Terrorism, above n. 10, Article 1(1).

  14. 14.

    Saul 2006, p. 82.

  15. 15.

    UNGA 1987; UNGA 1994; Terrorist Bombings Convention, above n. 3; Financing of Terrorism Convention , above n. 3; UNSC 1999 (‘on the responsibility of the Security Council in the maintenance of international peace and security’); UNSC 2001a (‘Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts ’); UNSC 2001b (‘Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts’).

  16. 16.

    UNGA 1987.

  17. 17.

    Financing of Terrorism Convention , above n. 3, Articles 2(1a) and 2(1b).

  18. 18.

    Schabas 2011, p. 10.

  19. 19.

    Boister 2009, p. 343.

  20. 20.

    UNGA 1989.

  21. 21.

    Boister 2009, p. 345.

  22. 22.

    Rubin 2002, pp. 66–67.

  23. 23.

    Boister 2009, p. 348. However, the treaty-based nature does not always distinguish an international crime stricto sensu from a transnational offence, such as is the case of the crime of genocide which was regulated firstly by the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, opened for signature 9 December 1948, 78 UNTS 277 (entered into force 12 January 1951).

  24. 24.

    Ambos and Timmermann 2014, p. 24.

  25. 25.

    UNGA 1995a, b.

  26. 26.

    Ibid., paras 38 and 41.

  27. 27.

    Rome Statute, above n. 2, Articles 86–102.

  28. 28.

    UNGA 1995a, b.

  29. 29.

    For a thorough discussion on the deliberations of the terms ‘unwillingness ’ and ‘inability ’ for the purposes of the Rome Statute see Holmes 1999.

  30. 30.

    Creegan 2010–2011, pp. 262–266.

  31. 31.

    Ibid., p. 266.

  32. 32.

    Note 2002, pp. 1220–21.

  33. 33.

    Creegan 2010–2011, p. 264.

  34. 34.

    Ibid.

  35. 35.

    Morris 2004, p. 478.

  36. 36.

    Creegan 2010–2011, p. 265.

  37. 37.

    Mégret and Samson 2013, p. 587 giving the example of the Pol Pot trial where the violations of due process rights were such so as to signify that there was no genuine intention to really prosecute him.

  38. 38.

    Rome Statute, above n. 2, Article 17(2a).

  39. 39.

    Mégret and Samson 2013, p. 573.

  40. 40.

    Rome Statute, above n. 2, Article 17(1a). Outside a terrorism context, the case of ICC, Prosecutor v Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, Case No. ICC-01/11-01/11 gave rise to a debate on whether domestic due process violations, especially against an accused for whom the ICC has issued an arrest warrant, should constitute a ground of admissibility (Mégret and Samson 2013, p. 572). The case was admitted before the ICC but the Decision on the Admissibility of the Case Against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, Case No. ICC-01/11-01 Pre-Trial Chamber I, 31 May 2013, paras 206–208, does not make any reference to human rights considerations, although it holds that the admissibility was based in part on issues relating to Libya’s failure to take custody of the accused. While there is a strong line of arguments against this ‘due process thesis’ (Heller 2006, p. 255), Mégret argues that in such cases, the ICC’s role is not to assess whether human rights violations have occurred but whether ‘something that can recognizably be described as trial’ has occurred (Mégret and Samson 2013, p. 586). More generally about Rome Statute’s safeguards concerning due process protection see Fry 2012, p. 35.

  41. 41.

    Morris 2004, p. 478.

  42. 42.

    Boister 1998, p. 38.

  43. 43.

    Ibid.

  44. 44.

    ‘Trinidad and Tobago and Colombia both indicated that an ICC would present an attractive third alternative to extradition or prosecution’ (Ibid.).

  45. 45.

    Ibid. This tendency is illustrated in the Lockerbie case, where the US insisted the suspects be extradited either to the US or the UK and refused Libya’s offer for the establishment of an international tribunal to try them. See Dugard 1997, p. 334.

  46. 46.

    Indicatively, see International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, above n. 3, Article 10; Financing of Terrorism Convention , above n. 3, Article 9(2); Terrorist Bombings Convention, above n. 3, Article 9; International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, above n. 3, Article 11(1).

  47. 47.

    Bassiouni and Wise 1995, p. 3.

  48. 48.

    Sailer 1999, p. 326.

  49. 49.

    The ICC has already faced obstacles in having alleged offenders extradited, not the least because of political interventions. An indicative example is the recent failure of South Africa, being a State Party to the Rome Statute, to extradite Omar Al Bashir to the ICC despite the South African High Court’s decision that he shall not leave the country until the ICC’s request for extradition has been examined. See ICC Press Release 2015. However, at least in principle, States Parties are under obligation to cooperate fully with the ICC, including the execution of arrest warrants, in order to bring international offenders to justice. (Rome Statute, above n. 2, Articles 86–102).

  50. 50.

    Sailer 1999, p. 327.

  51. 51.

    Fitsanakis 2013.

  52. 52.

    Sailer 1999, pp. 327–329. A similar example that can be cited is the refusal of Afghanistan to extradite Osama Bin Laden before the 2001 bombing of Afghanistan and after the UNSC 1999 which set out sanctions to be imposed if Afghanistan refused Bin Laden’s extradition .

  53. 53.

    Norberg 2010, p. 13.

  54. 54.

    Ibid., p. 14.

  55. 55.

    BBC 2011. One cannot help but notice the irony on the part of the US, which denies extradition of a terrorist suspect on grounds of human rights considerations.

  56. 56.

    Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 Pub L No. 107-56, 115 Stat 271 (USA PATRIOT).

  57. 57.

    ICC Office of the Prosecutor 2003, p. 5.

  58. 58.

    See Schloenhardt 2004, where he argues that the ICC ‘offers a neutral forum to try offenders that are not extradited because too many countries are seeking jurisdiction, or because a country remains too fearful its nationals or other alleged offenders may face biased trials in a foreign jurisdiction’.

  59. 59.

    Boister 1998, pp. 33–34.

  60. 60.

    Council Framework Decision on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States (2002/584/JHA), opened for signature 13 June 2002, OJ L 190 (entered into force 7 August 2002) Article 1.1.

  61. 61.

    See Sliedregt 2007, for a critique on the application of the EAW and its similarities with the classic extradition scheme.

  62. 62.

    Fenelly 2007, p. 522.

  63. 63.

    Sailer 1999, p. 338.

  64. 64.

    The ‘extradite or prosecute’ principle, provided by many anti-terrorist conventions , allows a State with no traditional jurisdictional link over a committed crime, to assume subsidiary jurisdiction on behalf of the competent State. Although this scheme resembles to a model of universal jurisdiction , it still differs in that the ‘extradite or prosecute ’ principle requires the presence and arrest of the alleged perpetrator in the State where prosecution shall take place (Ambos and Timmermann 2014, p. 35; Perera 2014, p. 154). Ambos also argues that the fact that the UNGA Draft Comprehensive Convention, under draft Article 21, provides for the obligation of States to respect territorial sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention, signifies that, at least at present, there is no intention to make terrorism universally prosecutable.

  65. 65.

    However, the Appeals Chamber of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, in the STL Decision , above n. 6, held, controversially, that a customary international crime of transnational terrorism in time of peace exists.

  66. 66.

    For an examination of the differences between international crimes and crimes established by treaty see Ambos and Timmermann 2014. He argues however that an originally treaty-based crime can rise to a ‘true’ international crime by way of customary law (Ambos and Timmermann 2014, p. 25).

  67. 67.

    UNGA 1991, paras 238–250.

  68. 68.

    UNGA 1995a, b, paras 112–118.

  69. 69.

    Boister 1998, p. 27.

  70. 70.

    UNGA 1996a, b, Articles 16–20, including only aggression, genocide , crimes against humanity , crimes against UN personnel and war crimes .

  71. 71.

    UNGA 1993, para 282.

  72. 72.

    Boister 1998, p. 30.

  73. 73.

    Boister 2009, p. 347. For the ICC’s jurisdiction over nationals of States non-Parties see Morris 2000, p. 363; Akande 2003, p. 618.

  74. 74.

    ICTY, Prosecutor v Tadić, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, Case No. ICTY-94-1, para 94. The Article 5 crimes of the Rome Statute meet all the above requirements.

  75. 75.

    Ambos and Timmermann 2014, p. 26.

  76. 76.

    Ibid., p. 27.

  77. 77.

    Boister 1998, p. 31.

  78. 78.

    Boister 1998, p. 31.

  79. 79.

    Sailer 1999, p. 330.

  80. 80.

    Up to date, the Parties to the Rome Statute are 124 whereas the number of the Parties to these two treaties is much higher: 169 Parties to the Terrorist Bombings Convention and 187 to the Financing of Terrorism Convention . See United Nations Treaty Collection database.

  81. 81.

    Boister 2003, p. 963.

  82. 82.

    Boister 2009, p. 350.

  83. 83.

    Ibid.

  84. 84.

    Cassese 2004, p. 218.

  85. 85.

    Ibid., p. 224.

  86. 86.

    STL Decision , above n. 6; Saul 2011, p. 677.

  87. 87.

    Wertheim 2003, p. 5; Filippo 2008, p. 561; Much 2006, p. 125.

  88. 88.

    UNSC 2001a, b, 2004.

  89. 89.

    For a list of all international anti-terrorist instruments since 1970, see UN, International Legal Instruments, www.un.org/en/terrorism/instruments.shtml.

  90. 90.

    Nuotio 2006, pp. 1002–1003.

  91. 91.

    For example, the lack of a definition for terrorism in Resolution 1373 permitted Syria to adopt the definition contained in the Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism (opened for signature 22 April 1998), which distinguishes between terrorism and legitimate struggle against foreign occupation (Article 2). The Financing of Terrorism Convention , above n. 3, does not make such a distinction and thus, violent acts regarded as terrorist by the Financing Convention, fell outside the scope of the Syrian definition (Talmon 2005, p. 189). Apparently, this is only one of the interpretative problems created by Security Council Resolutions due to the lack of an international definition for terrorism. For a more elaborative analysis on this issue, see Ibid., pp. 188–192.

  92. 92.

    Saul 2005, p. 142.

  93. 93.

    Ibid.

  94. 94.

    Ibid.

  95. 95.

    Brichambaut 2001, p. 268.

  96. 96.

    ICJ, Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 21 June 1971, ICJ Rep 41.

  97. 97.

    Schachter 1964, pp. 963–964.

  98. 98.

    Ibid., p. 964.

  99. 99.

    UNSC 2001a, para 3.

  100. 100.

    Ibid., Preambular para 4.

  101. 101.

    Ibid., ‘Recognizing the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence in accordance with the Charter…’.

  102. 102.

    Fassbender 2004, pp. 86–87.

  103. 103.

    UNSC 2001a, para 5.

  104. 104.

    Saul 2005, p. 155.

  105. 105.

    Gray 2010, p. 633. In practice, the Security Council usually avoids making pronouncements on the legality of the right to self-defence , with the exception of UNSC 1990, where it openly supported Kuwait’s right to self-defence against Iraq.

  106. 106.

    Cassese argues that the characterisation of the 9/11 attacks as a threat to the peace does not legitimise self-defence because the concept of a threat to the peace differs from that of an armed attack , for which Article 51 of the UN Charter recognises the right to self-defence (Cassese 2001, p. 996); Fassbender 2004, p. 88.

  107. 107.

    Fassbender 2004, p. 88.

  108. 108.

    Gray 2010, p. 626. See also Wilmshurst 2006, pp. 969–971, where it is widely argued that self-defence can be invoked against non-State actors when the State on whose territory they are based, is either unwilling or unable to take action against them.

  109. 109.

    Byers 2002, p. 406. US Secretary of State George Shultz stated in 1986 that ‘[i]t is absurd to argue that international law prohibits us from capturing terrorists in international waters or airspace; from attacking them on the soil of other nations, even for the purpose of rescuing hostages; or from using force against states that support, train, and harbor terrorists or guerrillas’ (in Schultz 1986, p. 206).

  110. 110.

    Byers 2002, p. 407.

  111. 111.

    ICJ, Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America), Merits, 27 June 1986, ICJ Rep 14, para 195.

  112. 112.

    Byers 2002, p. 408.

  113. 113.

    UNSC 1985.

  114. 114.

    Byers 2002, p. 407.

  115. 115.

    Final Document of the XIlth Summit of the Non-aligned Movement, para 159.

  116. 116.

    Reisman 1999, pp. 33–34. In fact, the Security Council attempted to issue a resolution stating that the US attack was a violation of the UN Charter (Ibid.).

  117. 117.

    Gray 2010, p. 630.

  118. 118.

    Ibid., 631.

  119. 119.

    Bianchi 2004, p. 500.

  120. 120.

    Ibid.

  121. 121.

    Byers 2002, p. 401.

  122. 122.

    Bianchi 2002, p. 503.

  123. 123.

    Ibid., p. 498; Talmon 2005; Szasz 2002, pp. 901–904.

  124. 124.

    Hinojosa-Martínez 2014, pp. 626–627.

  125. 125.

    UNSC 2001b, ‘Reaffirming further that such acts, like any act of international terrorism, constitute a threat to international peace and security , [r]eaffirming the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence as recognized by the Charter of the United Nations as reiterated in resolution 1368 (2001) …’.

  126. 126.

    Ibid., preambular para 2. For an elaborate analysis of the CTC ’s work and progress since the adoption of Resolution 1373 see Hinojosa-Martinez 2014.

  127. 127.

    Subedi 2002, p. 160.

  128. 128.

    Fassbender 2004, p. 89.

  129. 129.

    Ibid. See also Byers 2002, p. 402, arguing that ‘[t]he point, therefore, is not that the resolution should (emphasis in the text) be read as authorising the use of force…but that it could (emphasis in the text) provide the US with an at-least-tenable argument whenever and wherever it decides, for political reasons, that force is necessary to “prevent the commission of terrorist acts ”’.

  130. 130.

    Byers 2002, p. 401.

  131. 131.

    Fassbender 2004, p. 91.

  132. 132.

    As happened with the 1986 US bombing against Libya. See text to above n. 116.

  133. 133.

    Gray 2010, p. 630.

  134. 134.

    Ibid.

  135. 135.

    Fassbender 2004, p. 88.

  136. 136.

    Byers 2002, p. 410. Byers further argues that ‘[h]ad the US relied on arguments of Security Council authorisation, invitation or humanitarian intervention, it is unlikely that many States would have objected, but next time it would have been more difficult to act alone or in the absence of such additional conditions’.

  137. 137.

    While the CTC ’s main mandate was to evaluate States’ implementation of Resolution 1373 , it progressively responded to States in a more detailed and stringent manner, as weaknesses in national counter-terrorism law and policy were exposed. At some point, States became uncomfortable with the revelation of their defects and differences with the CTC, and as a result, the publication of State reports was discontinued from 2007 (in Hinojosa-Martinez 2014).

  138. 138.

    Saul 2008, p. 6.

  139. 139.

    Ibid., p. 6.

  140. 140.

    Ibid., p. 6.

  141. 141.

    CTC Chair (Ambassador Jeremy Greenstock) 2002.

  142. 142.

    Saul 2005, p. 160.

  143. 143.

    Saul 2008, p. 6. With respect to human rights violations in the context of countering terrorism, the main areas of concern are: ‘(i) the abusive application of state of emergency laws to presumed terrorists with the consequent denial of fundamental rights, (ii) the enactment of special laws for the investigation and prosecution of terrorism that allow for long preventative or military detentions, inaccessibility to secret information for the detainee’s lawyers, or grave infringements of the right to privacy, and (iii) overtly broad definitions of terrorism or of incitement to terrorism in national legislation as an excuse to restrict freedom of expression, conscience and assembly, or to repress political opposition.’ (Hinojosa-Martinez 2014, p. 636).

  144. 144.

    Krisch 2004, p. 889.

  145. 145.

    UNSC 2001b, ‘Reaffirming further that such acts, like any act of international terrorism, constitute a threat to international peace and security ,…’.

  146. 146.

    Brownlie 1963, p. 356.

  147. 147.

    UNSC 2004, para 3.

  148. 148.

    UN Press Release 2004.

  149. 149.

    Young 2006, p. 45.

  150. 150.

    Ibid., p. 46.

  151. 151.

    Saul 2005, p. 165.

  152. 152.

    STL Decision , above n. 6.

  153. 153.

    Cassese 2006, p. 935. This view is also shared by Londras 2010, pp. 175–176.

  154. 154.

    Filippo 2008, p. 561.

  155. 155.

    Much 2006, p. 125.

  156. 156.

    STL Decision , above n. 6, paras 83 and 85.

  157. 157.

    Ibid., paras 19–20.

  158. 158.

    UNSC 2007.

  159. 159.

    STL Decision , above n. 6, para 13.

  160. 160.

    Ambos 2011, p. 655; Ventura 2011, p. 1041 (arguing that States that negotiate the UNGA Draft Comprehensive Convention might benefit from this ruling).

  161. 161.

    Ambos 2011, p. 675; Saul 2011.

  162. 162.

    Saul 2011, p. 678.

  163. 163.

    STL Decision , above n. 6, paras 85–89.

  164. 164.

    Ibid., paras 45 and 62.

  165. 165.

    Ibid., para 85.

  166. 166.

    Saul 2011, p. 677.

  167. 167.

    STL Decision , above n. 6, para 85.

  168. 168.

    Saul 2011, p. 679.

  169. 169.

    UNSC 2006, para 7.

  170. 170.

    UNSC 2007, Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, Article 2.

  171. 171.

    UNSC 2006, para 7.

  172. 172.

    STL Decision , above n. 6, para 40.

  173. 173.

    Ambos 2011, p. 658.

  174. 174.

    Ibid.

  175. 175.

    STL Decision , above n. 6, para 29.

  176. 176.

    Ibid.

  177. 177.

    Ambos 2011, p. 659.

  178. 178.

    UNSC 2007, Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, preamble para 3.

  179. 179.

    For example, the STL exempted certain penalties from the applicable national law, namely the death penalty and forced labour, considering them too cruel to be applied by an international tribunal. See UNSC 2006, para 22.

  180. 180.

    Ambos 2011, p. 659.

  181. 181.

    Ibid.

  182. 182.

    Ibid.

  183. 183.

    In R v Mohammed Gul, the Court of Appeals of England and Wales issued a decision in line with the STL Decision and accepted that customary law has evolved so as to include an international crime of terrorism in times of peace. See Court of Appeals of England and Wales (Criminal Division) R v Mohammed Gul, Judgment, 22 February 2012, EWCA Crim 280. See also Coco 2013, p. 425.

  184. 184.

    Perera 2014, p. 158.

  185. 185.

    UNGA 1994.

  186. 186.

    UNGA 1996a, b.

  187. 187.

    UNGA 2001b.

  188. 188.

    Hmoud 2006, p. 1035.

  189. 189.

    UNGA 2001a.

  190. 190.

    UNGA Sixth Committee 2001, para 2.

  191. 191.

    UNGA Sixth Committee 2000, Annex II.

  192. 192.

    Ibid., Articles 2 and 18(2) respectively.

  193. 193.

    Hmoud 2006, p. 1033.

  194. 194.

    UNGA Sixth Committee 2000, Annex III, para 30 (Malaysian proposal on behalf of the Organisation of Islamic Countries [OIC] Group). The proposed provision was taken verbatim by the 1999 Convention of the Islamic Conference on Combatting International Terrorism, Article 2.

  195. 195.

    UNGA 2000, Annex II, Article 18(2).

  196. 196.

    UNGA Sixth Committee 2000, Annex III, Article 2.

  197. 197.

    International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976) Article 1 which unequivocally provides for the right to self-determination to all people; 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, opened for signature 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3 (entered into force 7 December 1978) Article 1(4).

  198. 198.

    Subedi 2002, p. 165.

  199. 199.

    Ibid., p. 161.

  200. 200.

    Wood 2014, p. 197. After 9/11 however, self-defence can be invoked against non-State actors if the State where the perpetrators are based is either unwilling or unable to take action against them. See Wilmshurst 2006, pp. 969–971.

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    Stella Margariti

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Margariti, S. (2017). The Paradigm of Terrorism: State-Centric and Cosmopolitan Approaches in Some Current Efforts Towards Its Criminalisation. In: Defining International Terrorism. International Criminal Justice Series, vol 15. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-204-0_5

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