Abstract
The conflict between the four freedoms and national regulation is not merely about colliding interests but also of colliding values and thus has, potentially, constitutional implications. The conflict has often been phrased as one between national sovereignty and European integration, but is far more than this. It is about marked liberalism and market regulation, the latter constituting the very fundament upon which the European welfare states rest. In settling conflicts between the two constitutional orders—the ordo-liberal and the welfare-state constitutions—the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) applies the proportionality principle. However, the proportionality principle is arguably of such a discretionary character that one could question its legal credentials. The discretionary character of the proportionality principle thus threatens to undermine the legitimacy of the Court and, in turn, the legitimacy of the European legal order. In this chapter, the author discusses the invocation of the “consistent and systematic manner” criterion. Has it contributed to the formalization of the proportionality analysis, and thus decreased its discretionary character? Does it secure the legitimacy for the Court’s proportionality analysis and its corresponding market liberalizing effects? In answering these questions, the point of departure is taken in the gambling case saga.
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Notes
- 1.
Case C-438/05, Viking, ECLI:EU:C:2007:772; Case C-341/05, Laval un Partneri, ECLI:EU:C:2007:809; Case C-346/06, Rüffert, ECLI:EU:C:2008:189.
- 2.
For the academic debate see, Joerges 2009.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
Case C-243/01, Gambelli, ECLI:EU:C:2003:597, para 67.
- 6.
There are a number of cases, which may illustrate the Court’s application of the various sub-tests of the proportionality principle. In the literature case C-331/88, Fedesa and Others, ECLI:EU:C:1990:391 (suitability test and strictu sensu test); Case 104/75, de Peijper, ECLI:EU:C:1976:67 (necessity) are often mentioned, see for example Tridimas 2006 Chapters. 3–5; Craig 2006, pp. 655–715; de Búrca 1993, pp. 105–150.
- 7.
Dworkin 1977, Chapter 4; Hart 1994, p. 136 ff. The so-called Hart-Dworkin debate concerns the question as to how the judges should go about when deciding a case where there is no rule of law, which may be applied to solve a case at hand. According to Hart, the judges must in these cases act as “deputy legislators” and fill the “legal gap” in the way he believes the legislator would. According to Dworkin there really are no “legal gaps” since judges are bound to solve these cases according to the non-positivist concept of “arguments of principle.”
- 8.
One could argue that most of the early cases in which the Court established the autonomous EU legal system as in case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos, ECLI:EU:C:1963:1 and case 6/64 Costa v ENEL, ECLI:EU:C:1964:66, etc., where all so-called hard cases.
- 9.
Ref. the principle of practical concordance in Schwarze 2006, p. 690.
- 10.
Dworkin 1977, Chapter 4.
- 11.
The connection between the liberal political theory of John Rawls, as for example elaborated on in his “A theory of Justice” and “Political liberalism” Dworkin’s liberal theory of law, as elaborated on in his “Taking rights seriously” is obvious.
- 12.
Harbo 2015.
- 13.
With a pragmatic concept of law, I mean legal positivism, legal institutionalism, legal realism, although clearly there are some major differences between the three. The better tag for them would probably be non-normative.
- 14.
Hart 1994, 274.
- 15.
Op cit. C-243/01, Gambelli, ECLI:EU:C:2003:597, para 6.
- 16.
Ibid. (my italics).
- 17.
Ibid., para 69 (my italics).
- 18.
C-212/97, Centros, ECLI:EU:C:1999:126, para 22.
- 19.
Case 138/78, Stoelting v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas, ECLI:EU:C:1979:46, para 7 of the Advocate General’s opinion; Case C-133/93, Crispoltoni II, ECLI:EU:C:1994:364.
- 20.
Case 40/82, Commission v. UK, ECLI:EU:C:1984:33.
- 21.
Case C-124/97, Läärä, ECLI:EU:C:1999:435.
- 22.
Ibid., para 37 (my italics). The paragraph continues: “Limited authorisation of such games on an exclusive basis, which has the advantage of confining the desire to gamble and the exploitation of gambling within controlled channels, of preventing the risk of fraud or crime in the context of such exploitation, and of using the resulting profits for public interest purposes, likewise falls within the ambit of those objectives.” In later cases the Court has reviewed the consistency of gambling monopolies, see case C-42/07, Liga Portuguesa, ECLI:EU:C:2009:519, which concerned the granting of an exclusive rights to operate games of chance via the internet to the operator, Santa Casa, the Court while upholding the restrictive measure referred explicitly to the consistency and systematic manner-criterion, paras 59–61 (norm) para 67 (application of the norm on the facts).
- 23.
For a similar deferent approach see Case C-275/92, Schindler, ECLI:EU:C:1994:119, para 61: “In those circumstances, it is for [the Member States] to assess not only whether it is necessary to restrict the activities of lotteries but also whether they should be prohibited, provided that those restrictions are not discriminatory.”
- 24.
Case C-67/98, Zenatti, ECLI:EU:C:1999:514, para 36.
- 25.
Op. cit. Gambelli, para 69.
- 26.
Joined cases C-338/04, C-359/04 and C-360/04, Placanica and others, ECLI:EU:C:2007:133.
- 27.
Ibid., para 55: “(…) viewed from that perspective, it is possible that a policy of controlled expansion in the betting and gaming sector may be entirely consistent with the objective of drawing players away from clandestine betting and gaming—and, as such, activities which are prohibited—to activities which are authorized and regulated (…) authorized operators must represent a reliable, but at the same time attractive, alternative to a prohibited activity” and that “[T]his may as such necessitate the offer of an extensive range of games, advertising on a certain scale and the use of new distribution techniques.”
- 28.
Case C-169/07, Hartlauer, ECLI:EU:C:2009:141, para 55 (my italics).
- 29.
Ibid., para 61.
- 30.
Case C-500/06, Corporación Dermoestética, ECLI:EU:C:2008:421, paras 39 and 40 (my italics).
- 31.
Joined cases C-171/07 and C-171/07, Apothekerkammer des Saarlandes et al., ECLI:EU:C:2009:316.
- 32.
Ibid., para 37.
- 33.
Ibid., para 42.
- 34.
Ibid., paras 43–50.
- 35.
Ibid., para 58.
- 36.
The phrase “run counter to” is applied synonymously with inconsistency in the EFTA-Courts case E-3/06 Ladbrokes, para 51.
- 37.
The German version reads: “die Kohärenz,” and the Danish version: “sammenheng,” the latter closer to the notion of coherence, in the meaning of connection, context or unity, than contradiction.
- 38.
The German version reads: “Kohärenz, and the Danish version: “sammenheng.”
- 39.
- 40.
E.g. Hertog and Stross 2013; Cremona 2011; Hillion 2008. The Council has recognized the “importance of consistency between internal and external aspects of human rights protection and promotion in the Union framework in terms of enhancing the Union’s credibility in its external relations and leading by example in the area of human rights.” Council of the EU conclusions of May 2014, http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6256-2016-INIT/en/pdf (accessed 30 May 2016).
- 41.
In the German version the word “die Kohärenz” is applied, and in the Danish version once again “sammenheng.”
- 42.
- 43.
Ibid., citing Casolari 2012.
- 44.
The Oxford English Dictionary defines coherence as the “action of fact of sticking together” or a “harmonious connection to the several parts of a discourse, system etc., so that the whole hangs together.” Consistency is “the quality, state or fact of being consistent.”
- 45.
AG Maduro’s Opinion in joined cases C-570/07 and C-571/07, Blanco Pérez and Chao Gómez, ECLI:EU:C:2010:300, para 21: “The coherence and consistency requirement lays down that the national legislation is appropriate for securing attainment of the objective relied upon only if it genuinely reflects a concern to attain that objective in a consistent and systematic manner.”
- 46.
See references in Hertog and Stross 2013, p. 376.
- 47.
- 48.
- 49.
The distinction gives associations to Robert Alexy’s distinction between legal principles and rules, Alexy 2002, although I will not elaborate on these here.
- 50.
MacCormick 2005, p. 190.
- 51.
Ibid., p. 189.
- 52.
Ibid., p. 190.
- 53.
Dworkin 1998, 243.
- 54.
Case 178/84, Commission v. Germany, ECLI:EU:C:1987:126.
- 55.
In E-3/00—EFTA Surveillance Authority v. The Kingdom of Norway, para 26 (my italics).
- 56.
The application of the proportionality principle in the Kellogg case is deemed to be problematic due to the invocation of the precautionary principle. Invoking the precautionary principle undermines the proportionality assessment since it allows for the substitution of a fact with an assumption. In these cases, it is difficult to assess whether a measure is suitable or necessary to reach the purported aim.
- 57.
Joined cases C-447/08 and C- 448/08, Sjøberg and Gerdin, ECLI:EU:C:2010:415, para 43.
- 58.
Op. cit. Case C-124/97 Läärä; C-42/07, Liga Portuguesa, ECLI:EU:C:2009:519.
- 59.
Op. cit., Case C-438/05 Viking; Case C-341/05 Laval un Partneri; Case C-346/06 Rüffert.
- 60.
The four freedoms may also be conceptualised as Dworkian arguments of policy, in so much as they securing the political (some would even say moral) aim of European integration.
- 61.
- 62.
Case C-258/08, Ladbrokes Betting & Gaming, ECLI:EU:C:2010:308.
- 63.
Ibid., para 21 (my italics).
- 64.
Ibid., para 25 (my italics).
- 65.
Ibid., para 26 (my italics).
- 66.
Ibid., para 30 (my italics).
- 67.
Ibid., para 31.
- 68.
A similar approach is taken in a later judgment, C-375/14, Laezzia, ECLI:EU:C:2016:60, paras 36–38.
- 69.
Ibid., para 32.
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Harbo, TI. (2017). The Criterion of “Consistent and Systematic Manner” in Free Movement Law. In: Andenas, M., Bekkedal, T., Pantaleo, L. (eds) The Reach of Free Movement. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-195-1_9
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