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Free Movement of Persons Through the Lenses of ‘Discrimination’ and ‘Restriction’

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The Reach of Free Movement

Abstract

The notions of ‘restriction’ and ‘discrimination’ are the soul and life of EU free movement law. These are the notions that define what is caught within the net of the free movement provisions, as well as the limits that are placed on their scope of application. These concepts are not monolithic but their interpretation is constantly changing and adapting and, together with this, the relationship between them is redefined. This chapter will seek to consider the reach of the provisions governing the free movement of persons, taking as its point of reference the ECJ’s interpretation of the notions of ‘discrimination’ and ‘restriction’ in this context. In particular, it will analyse how the meaning of the above notions has developed through the years and it will explore how the relationship between the two has evolved from originally being one of interdependence to one that is of (almost) complete independence. The chapter will conclude that the main reason behind these developments is the (gradual) attribution to the free movement of persons provisions of a double status of instrumental freedoms and fundamental (citizenship) rights.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Chris Hilson, for instance, has bemoaned the lack of a commonly agreed interpretation of the term ‘discrimination’ (Hilson 1999, pp. 448–451); and Jukka Snell has noted that the definition of the notion of ‘restriction’ has ‘varied both in time and among the freedoms’ (Snell 2011, p. 554). Morano-Foadi and de Vries have noted that ‘The “scope of application” of the Treaties, mentioned in Article 18 TFEU, has not been explicitly defined and contracts or expands depending on the interpretation provided by the CJEU’ (Morano-Foadi and de Vries 2012, p. 22).

  2. 2.

    de Búrca 2002, p. 195.

  3. 3.

    Roth 2002; Poiares Maduro 2002.

  4. 4.

    See Barnard 2001; Enchelmaier 2007, pp. 146–156; Tryfonidou 2010. Snell, however, is of the view that convergence between the free movement of goods and persons is not desirable—see Snell 2004.

  5. 5.

    The free movement of persons provisions are Articles 45, 49, and 56 TFEU, which govern the (cross-border) rights of economic actors and which, together with the free movement of goods and the free movement of capital provisions, will be referred to as ‘the market freedoms’; and Article 21 TFEU, which is one of the citizenship provisions of the Treaty, and has always been considered lex generalis in relation to the other free movement of persons provisions. Articles 45, 49 and 56 TFEU will, also, be referred to in this chapter as ‘the economic free movement of persons provisions’, when there is a need to distinguish them from Article 21 TFEU. Finally, the general phrase ‘free movement provisions’ will be used to refer to the market freedoms plus Article 21 TFEU; whilst ‘EU free movement law’ should be taken to refer to the law governing the interpretation of the free movement provisions.

  6. 6.

    See, for instance, Articles 34, 35, and 63 TFEU referring to ‘restrictions’, and Article 45 TFEU referring to ‘discrimination’.

  7. 7.

    Article 49 TFEU explicitly mentions ‘restrictions’ on the freedom of establishment but it also makes reference to ‘discrimination’, albeit without using the exact term; Article 56 TFEU refers to ‘restrictions’, whilst Article 57 TFEU places the emphasis on discrimination on the grounds of nationality.

  8. 8.

    Opinion of AG Cosmas in Case C-378/97, Wijsenbeek, ECLI:EU:C:1999:144, para 82.

  9. 9.

    More 1999, p. 518.

  10. 10.

    Chalmers 1994, p. 397.

  11. 11.

    For a discussion as to how direct discrimination should be distinguished from indirect discrimination see the Opinion of AG Sharpston in Case C-73/08, Bressol, ECLI:EU:C:2009:396, paras 43–57.

  12. 12.

    Case 33/74, Van Binsbergen, ECLI:EU:C:1974:131; Case C-288/89, Gouda, ECLI:EU:C:1991:323. For comments see Roth 2002, p. 5.

  13. 13.

    See, for instance, the case-law interpreting Article 7(2) of Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1612/68 on freedom of movement for workers within the Community, O.J. L 257/2 (1968) (which has, now, been replaced by (the identical) Article 7(2) of Council and Parliament Regulation (EU) No. 492/2011 on freedom of movement for workers within the Union, O.J. L 41/1 (2011)): Case 32/75, Cristini, ECLI:EU:C:1975:120; Case 63/76, Inzirillo, ECLI:EU:C:1976:192; Case 94/84, Deak, ECLI:EU:C:1985:264; Case 152/82, Forcheri, ECLI:EU:C:1983:205; Case 261/83, Castelli, ECLI:EU:C:1984:280; Case 157/84, Frascogna, ECLI:EU:C:1985:243. For an authoritative analysis of this case law see O’Keeffe 1985.

  14. 14.

    See, for instance, Case C-109/04, Kranemann, ECLI:EU:C:2005:187; Case C-18/95, Terhoeve, ECLI:EU:C:1999:22; Case C-76/05, Schwarz, ECLI:EU:C:2007:492. For an interesting discussion see Bernard 1996, pp. 85–89; Szydlo 2010, pp. 760–762; Wollenschläger 2011, p. 26.

  15. 15.

    See, for instance, Case C-224/98, D’Hoop, ECLI:EU:C:2002:432; Case C-224/02, Pusa, ECLI:EU:C:2004:273; Case C-221/07, Zablocka-Weyhermüller, ECLI:EU:C:2008:681.

  16. 16.

    Case 98/86, Mathot, ECLI:EU:C:1987:89; Case 44/84, Hurd v Jones, ECLI:EU:C:1986:2; Joined Cases C-29-35/94, Aubertin and Others, ECLI:EU:C:1995:39. For an analysis of reverse discrimination see Tryfonidou 2009a.

  17. 17.

    See Opinion of AG Fennelly in Case C-190/98, Graf, ECLI:EU:C:1999:423, para 23. For commentary see Sibony 2012, especially pp. 340–341.

  18. 18.

    This has been made clear in a long line of case-law, most prominently in Case 175/78, Saunders ECLI:EU:C:1979:88, and has recently been confirmed in Case C-212/06, Walloon (Flemish care insurance scheme), ECLI:EU:C:2008:178. For an analysis of these requirements see Tryfonidou 2009b, pp. 1592–1595.

  19. 19.

    See, for instance, the submissions of the UK and Irish governments in Case C-200/02, Zhu and Chen, ECLI:EU:C:2004:639. Moreover, it has recently been confirmed by the Court in its judgment in Case C-434/09, McCarthy, ECLI:EU:C:2011:277.

  20. 20.

    For an analysis of this see Tryfonidou 2009a, Chapter 2.

  21. 21.

    This was stated explicitly by the Court as late as in 1987 in Case C-221/85, Commission v Belgium, ECLI:EU:C:1987:81.

  22. 22.

    Opinion of AG Lenz in Case C-415/93, Bosman, ECLI:EU:C:1995:293, para 192.

  23. 23.

    See, for instance, the Opinion of AG Lenz in Case C-221/85, Commission v Belgium, ECLI:EU:C:1986:456.

  24. 24.

    See, for instance, Case C-205/84, Commission v Germany, ECLI:EU:C:1986:463. For an analysis of these cases see the Opinion of AG Lenz in Case C-415/93, Bosman, ECLI:EU:C:1995:293, paras 166–192.

  25. 25.

    Case C-76/90, Säger, ECLI:EU:C:1991:331, para 12.

  26. 26.

    Toner 2004, p. 277.

  27. 27.

    Case C-275/92, Schindler, ECLI:EU:C:1994:119.

  28. 28.

    Though, it should be noted that on the facts of the case the prohibition was applied in a situation which involved the free movement of services as such, instead of the free movement of persons.

  29. 29.

    This was confirmed in Case C-384/93, Alpine Investments, ECLI:EU:C:1995:126 which, again, involved the free movement of services as such, and in Case C-60/00, Carpenter, ECLI:EU:C:2002:434, which involved the free movement of a service-provider.

  30. 30.

    Case C-415/93, Bosman, ECLI:EU:C:1995:463.

  31. 31.

    Case C-55/94, Gebhard, ECLI:EU:C:1995:411.

  32. 32.

    For a more detailed analysis of the notion of cross-border specificity and, more specifically, for its (non-)application in these (and other) cases see Tryfonidou 2016, pp. 15–17 and 91–109, respectively.

  33. 33.

    See, for instance, Case C-378/97, Wijsenbeek, ECLI:EU:C:1999:439.

  34. 34.

    Case C-55/94, Gebhard, ECLI:EU:C:1995:411, para 37; Case C-285/01, Burbaud, ECLI:EU:C:2003:432, para 95; Case C-442/02, CaixaBank, ECLI:EU:C:2004:586, para 11.

  35. 35.

    Case C-384/93, Alpine Investments, ECLI:EU:C:1995:126, para 38; Case C-415/93, Bosman, ECLI:EU:C:1995:463, para 103. For more on the notion of market access see Snell 2010; Davies 2010; and Sibony 2012.

  36. 36.

    In this chapter, the broader notion of ‘restriction’ will be used, which should be taken to include all these synonyms.

  37. 37.

    Joined Cases C-267 & 268/91, Keck and Mithouard, ECLI:EU:C:1993:905.

  38. 38.

    It should be noted that although the Court has in a number of cases employed what academics call the notion of remoteness, a precise remoteness test has never been articulated by the Court. However, this appears to be, in essence, a question of causation which seeks to exclude from the ambit of the free movement of persons provisions measures which do not appear to be a cause of the contested restriction. The most widely-cited example of a case in this context where the Court found that the situation was too remote is Case C-190/98, Graf, ECLI:EU:C:2000:49. For an analysis of the various filtering mechanisms employed by the Court in its free movement case-law see Horsley 2012 (focusing on the free movement of goods); Tryfonidou 2016, pp. 173–192.

  39. 39.

    Opinion of AG Jacobs in Case C-384/93, Alpine Investments, ECLI:EU:C:1995:15, para 47. See, also, in the same vein, the Opinion of the same AG in Case C-412/93, Leclerc-Siplec, ECLI:EU:C:1994:393, in relation to the delimitation of the scope of Article 34 TFEU.

  40. 40.

    Kochenov and Plender 2012, p. 370.

  41. 41.

    Article 20(2) TFEU provides, inter alia, that ‘Citizens of the Union shall enjoy the rights and be subject to the duties provided for in the Treaties’. For an analysis of this argument see Tryfonidou 2010.

  42. 42.

    Case C-138/02, Collins, ECLI:EU:C:2004:172.

  43. 43.

    Case C-200/02, Zhu and Chen, ECLI:EU:C:2004:639.

  44. 44.

    Council Directive (EEC) No. 90/364 on the right of residence, O.J. L 180/26 (1990); repealed and replaced by Parliament and Council Directive (EC) No. 2004/38 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, O.J. L 158/77 (2004).

  45. 45.

    Case C-148/02, Garcia Avello, ECLI:EU:C:2003:539.

  46. 46.

    Which concerned two dual Member State nationals who, likewise, had not moved between Member States.

  47. 47.

    Case C-148/02, Garcia Avello, ECLI:EU:C:2003:539, paras 37–38.

  48. 48.

    The Court provided a somewhat different reading of Garcia Avello in Case C-434/09, McCarthy, ECLI:EU:C:2011:277, noting that the reason for finding a breach of Articles 18 and 20 TFEU was that the discriminatory treatment suffered on the facts of the case could lead to potential restrictions on free movement. However, as I argued elsewhere, this does not appear to be a correct reading of the case—see Tryfonidou 2012, pp. 516–518.

  49. 49.

    See, inter alia, Case C-152/03, Ritter-Coulais, ECLI:EU:C:2006:123; Case C-470/04, N, ECLI:EU:C:2006:525; Case C-527/06, Renneberg, ECLI:EU:C:2008:566; Case C-379/11, Caves Krier Frères, ECLI:EU:C:2012:798; Case C-87/13, X, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2459.

  50. 50.

    Case C-112/91, Werner, ECLI:EU:C:1993:27.

  51. 51.

    This is obvious from Case C-544/07, Rüffler, ECLI:EU:C:2009:258, where the facts were quite similar to those in the Ritter-Coulais group of cases but because the applicant was not economically active at the time that the movement was exercised, the situation did not fall within the scope of the economic free movement of persons provisions.

  52. 52.

    For a more detailed analysis of this case-law and—especially—the rationale behind it see Tryfonidou 2016, pp. 88–91, 111–112, 159, 166–173.

  53. 53.

    As explained elsewhere, however, a literal and/or teleological approach to the interpretation of the economic free movement of persons provisions does not justify such a reading and, hence, this right can only stem from these provisions if they are read together with Article 21 TFEU—see Tryfonidou 2016, pp. 171–172.

  54. 54.

    For a discussion of the issue of whether the free movement provisions can be seen as sources of ‘fundamental rights’ see Spaventa 2007; Krenn 2012, p. 191; Wollenschläger 2011, p. 16; De Vries 2013, pp. 83–86; De Cecco 2014; Tryfonidou 2016.

  55. 55.

    Shaw 2011, p. 584.

  56. 56.

    (n. 13) above.

  57. 57.

    Case 293/83, Gravier, ECLI:EU:C:1985:69; Case 24/86, Blaizot, ECLI:EU:C:1988:43.

  58. 58.

    Case 186/87, Cowan, ECLI:EU:C:1989:47.

  59. 59.

    Eeckhout 2002, p. 961; Prechal and de Vries 2009, pp. 16–17. As explained by Wilsher, in this line of case-law the Court appears to have embraced ‘status equivalence’ as its basis for a finding of discrimination, which is based on the assumption that migrant Union citizens and, in particular, their status as ‘denizens’ entitles them to be treated as of equivalent status to nationals of the host State—see Wilsher 2008, pp. 8–9.

  60. 60.

    Case 32/75, Cristini, ECLI:EU:C:1975:120.

  61. 61.

    Case 186/87, Cowan, ECLI:EU:C:1989:47. For a more recent case where exactly the same approach was followed see Case C-164/07, Wood, ECLI:EU:C:2008:321.

  62. 62.

    O’Leary 2009, note 47; Schrauwen 2000, p. 782; Reich and Harbacevica 2009, p. 616.

  63. 63.

    According to Tridimas, ‘The rationale which underlies Cowan is that the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality extends to situations which are not related to the exercise of economic rights strictly understood’—Tridimas 2006, p. 124.

  64. 64.

    See, also, the comments in Weatherill 1989, pp. 565–568.

  65. 65.

    Case C-274/96, Bickel and Franz, ECLI:EU:C:1998:563.

  66. 66.

    See, inter alia, Case C-209/03, Bidar, ECLI:EU:C:2005:169; Case C-524/06, Huber, ECLI:EU:C:2008:724; Case C-103/08, Gottwald, ECLI:EU:C:2009:597. Note that in cases where the applicant had not exercised any of the rights stemming from Article 21 TFEU, the Court read Article 18 TFEU together with Article 20 TFEU, in order to find a violation of EU law—see, for instance, Case 186/87, Cowan, ECLI:EU:C:1989:47.

  67. 67.

    See the preamble to both of these Regulations.

  68. 68.

    Joined Cases C-92 & 326/92, Phil Collins, ECLI:EU:C:1993:847, para 34.

  69. 69.

    In another group of cases where the contested measure did not relate to the exercise of free movement but rather gave rise to nationality discrimination against economic actors who were exercising an economic activity across borders, the Court merely used Article 18 TFEU in its judgment and noted explicitly that it was not necessary to connect it with any of the (economic) free movement provisions. See, inter alia, Joined Cases C-92 & 326/92, Phil Collins, ECLI:EU:C:1993:847, para 27; Case C-43/95, Data-Delecta, ECLI:EU:C:1996:357, para 14.

  70. 70.

    As AG Jacobs pointed out in para 24 of his Opinion in Case C-168/91, Konstantinidis, ECLI:EU:C:1992:504, ‘Community law does not regard the migrant worker (or the self-employed migrant) purely as an economic agent and a factor of production entitled to the same salary and working conditions as nationals of the host State; it regards him as a human being who is entitled to live in that State “in freedom and dignity” … and to be spared any difference in treatment that would render his life less comfortable, physically or psychologically, than the lives of the native population’. Emphasis added.

  71. 71.

    AG Opinion in Case C-274/96, Bickel and Franz, ECLI:EU:C:1998:115, para 19.

  72. 72.

    For a similar view see Krenn 2012, p. 185. For an argument that a rights-based paradigm of EU citizenship is only now emerging (in particular, from 2010 onwards, following the Court’s judgment in Case C-135/08, Rottmann, ECLI:EU:C:2010:104), see Kochenov and Plender 2012.

  73. 73.

    Skouris 2006, p. 227.

  74. 74.

    Case 48/75, Royer, ECLI:EU:C:1976:57 (workers); Case 2/74, Reyners, ECLI:EU:C: 1974:68 (establishment); Case 33/74, Van Binsbergen, ECLI:EU:C:1974:131 (services).

  75. 75.

    Case C-168/91, Konstantinidis, ECLI:EU:C:1993:115, para 12. See to the same effect Case 197/84, Steinhauser, ECLI:EU:C:1985:260, para 14.

  76. 76.

    Case C-415/93, Bosman, ECLI:EU:C:1995:463, paras 95–96.

  77. 77.

    See, inter alia, Case C-49/89, Corsica Ferries, ECLI:EU:C:1989:649, para 8; Case C-169/98, Commission v France, ECLI:EU:C:2000:85, para 46.

  78. 78.

    See, inter alia, Case 152/82, Forcheri, ECLI:EU:C:1983:205, para 11.

  79. 79.

    Case 222/86, Heylens, ECLI:EU:C:1987:442, para 14; Case C-415/93, Bosman, ECLI:EU:C:1995:463, para 129.

  80. 80.

    Council and Parliament Regulation (EU) No. 492/2011 on freedom of movement for workers within the Union, O.J. L 41/1 (2011).

  81. 81.

    For a similar view see AG Cosmas in Case C-378/97, Wijsenbeek, ECLI:EU:C:1999:144, para 82. See, also, Johnson and O’Keeffe 1994, p. 1314.

  82. 82.

    AG Cosmas in Case C-378/97, Wijsenbeek, ECLI:EU:C:1999:144, para 84.

  83. 83.

    Kochenov 2011, p. 13.

  84. 84.

    For a fuller analysis of this argument see Tryfonidou 2016.

  85. 85.

    Opinion of AG Lenz in Case C-415/93, Bosman, ECLI:EU:C:1995:293, para 203. For a similar view see Snell 2004, p. 49: ‘When a fundamental right has been impaired, it is of no consequence that rights of home state nationals have also been encroached upon’. To borrow terminology used by de Vries, by expanding the scope of application of the free movement of persons provisions to cover genuinely non-discriminatory rules, the Court appears to have signified that the free movement provisions no longer ‘primarily serve transnational integration’ but, rather, ‘supranational legitimisation’. As de Vries has explained, ‘Supranational legitimisation entails that the four freedoms intend “to complement the national and supranational protection of the individual by fundamental rights and service the purpose of general liberalisation”, whereas transnational integration implies that the four freedoms merely serve gaps of protection in cross-border transactions’—de Vries 2013, p. 85.

  86. 86.

    Opinion of AG Tesauro in Joined Cases C-46 & 48/93, Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame, ECLI:EU:C:1995:407, para 79.

  87. 87.

    Goudappel 2010, p. 55.

  88. 88.

    Goudappel 2010, p. 55.

  89. 89.

    Case C-138/02, Collins, ECLI:EU:C:2004:172.

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Acknowledgements

This is an abridged and updated version of Tryfonidou A (2014) The Notions of ‘Restriction’ and ‘Discrimination’ in the Context of the Free Movement of Persons Provisions: From a Relationship of Interdependence to One of (Almost Complete) Independence. Yearbook of European Law 33: 385–416. I would like to thank Tarjei Bekkedal and Luca Pantaleo for their comments on an earlier draft of this chapter.

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  1. School of Law, University of Reading, Whiteknights Road, Earley, Reading, RG6 7BA, UK

    Alina Tryfonidou

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  1. Alina Tryfonidou
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Correspondence to Alina Tryfonidou .

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  1. Faculty of Law, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway

    Mads Andenas

  2. Faculty of Law, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway

    Tarjei Bekkedal

  3. Faculty of Public Management, Law and Safety, The Hague University of Applied Sciences, The Hague, The Netherlands

    Luca Pantaleo

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Tryfonidou, A. (2017). Free Movement of Persons Through the Lenses of ‘Discrimination’ and ‘Restriction’. In: Andenas, M., Bekkedal, T., Pantaleo, L. (eds) The Reach of Free Movement. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-195-1_3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-195-1_3

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