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The Security Council Referral Power Under Article 13(b) Rome Statute

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The International Criminal Court at the Mercy of Powerful States

Part of the book series: International Criminal Justice Series ((ICJS,volume 13))

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Abstract

This chapter is the first of three chapters which apply the elaborated framework of legal neo-colonialism to the Rome Statute. It focuses on the role of the Security Council as a triggering source within the jurisdiction of the ICC, a role defined in Article 13(b) RS. It is assessed whether this provision fosters an unjustified (neo-colonial) asymmetry in the enforcement of the Rome Statute, by granting immunity for nationals of certain non-party states from ICC prosecution. First, the power of the P-5 of the Security Council to veto referral resolutions, which allows these states to protect themselves and friendly states from being referred to the Court under this provision, is put to scrutiny (de facto immunity). Second, the scope Article 13(b) RS is analysed to evaluate whether the Council can tailor referral resolutions in personal terms by granting immunity to nationals of certain non-party states from ICC prosecution (de jure immunity). To answer these questions, the chapter first sheds light on the drafting history of Article 13(b) RS (Sect. 10.2), followed by a legal interpretation of the provision (Sect. 10.3). Analyses of the referral resolutions concerning the situations in Darfur and Libya complement the analytical part (Sects. 10.4 and 10.5). The chapter concludes with incorporating the findings regarding Article 13(b) RS into the previously elaborated understanding of legal neo-colonialism (Sect. 10.6).

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Article 13(b) RS provides that the Court can exercise jurisdiction if ‘[a] situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been committed is referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations’.

  2. 2.

    Articles 13(a) and (c) RS.

  3. 3.

    See infra Sect. 10.2.

  4. 4.

    Article 24(1) UNC.

  5. 5.

    See supra Chap. 7, Sect. 7.2.3.2.

  6. 6.

    See ‘Referral of Syria to International Criminal Court Fails as Negative Votes Prevent Security Council from Adopting Draft Resolution’ (Press Release, 22 May 2014) UN Doc SC/11407.

  7. 7.

    SC Verbatim Record (22 May 2014) UN Doc S/PV/7180, p. 4 (emphasis added).

  8. 8.

    SC Verbatim Record (31 March 2005) UN Doc S/PV/5158, p. 12 (emphasis added).

  9. 9.

    SC Res 1593 (31 Mach 2005) UN Doc S/RES/1593 , para 6.

  10. 10.

    See infra Sect. 10.5.

  11. 11.

    See supra Chap. 6, Sect. 6.2.

  12. 12.

    The ILC is a body which was formally established by the GA of the UN in 1947 ‘for the purpose of encouraging the progressive development of international law and its codification’ (GA Res 174 (II) (21 November 1947)).

  13. 13.

    See GA Res 44/39 (4 December 1989) UN Doc A/RES/44/39 para 1; (GA Res 45/41 (28 November 1990) UN Doc A/RES/45/41, para 3); (GA Res 46/54 (9 December 1991) UN Doc A/RES/46/54, para 3).

  14. 14.

    See GA Res 47/33 (25 November 1992) UN Doc A/RES/47/33, para 6; and GA Res 48/31 (9 December 1993) UN Doc A/RES/48/31. The work of the ICL on the establishment of a permanent international criminal court is well documented in the annual reports of the ILC since 1990 (ILC. ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 42nd Session’ (1 May–20 July 1990) UN Doc A/45/10, paras 93–157; ILC. ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 43rd Session’ (29 April–19 July 1991) UN Doc A/46/10, paras 106–140, ILC. ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 44th Session’ (4 May–24 July 1992) UN Doc A/47/10 Annex (pp. 58ff.); ILC. ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 45th Session’ (3 May–23 July 1993) UN Doc A/48/10, paras 21–100).

  15. 15.

    See ILC. ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 42nd Session’ (1 May–20 July 1990) UN Doc A/45/10, paras 136f.; and ILC. ‘Eighth Report on the Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind’ (1990) UN Doc A/CN.4/430 and Add.1, para 89.

  16. 16.

    See Commentary to the Preamble in the 1994 ILC Draft Statute, ILC. ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 46th Session [hereinafter ILC Draft Statute]’ (2 May–22 July 1994) UN Doc A/49/10, p. 27.

  17. 17.

    See also, Olásolo 2005, p. 172.

  18. 18.

    A more in-depth discussion on this issue is provided in ILC. ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 43rd Session’ (29 April–19 July 1991) UN Doc A/46/10, paras 141ff. and 153–165; and ILC. ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 44th Session’ (4 May–24 July 1992) UN Doc A/47/10, paras 81ff.

  19. 19.

    ILC. ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 43rd Session’ (29 April–19 July 1991) UN Doc A/46/10, para 154.

  20. 20.

    See ILC. ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 45th Session’ (3 May–23 July 1993) UN Doc A/48/10, pp. 109, 112.

  21. 21.

    See ILC Draft Statute, supra note 16, pp. 20–73.

  22. 22.

    Ibid., pp. 43f. (emphasis added).

  23. 23.

    Ibid., p. 44.

  24. 24.

    Ibid., p. 44.

  25. 25.

    Ibid., p. 44 (emphasis added).

  26. 26.

    GA Res 49/53 (9 December 1994) UN Doc A/RES/49/53, para 2.

  27. 27.

    GA. ‘Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court’ (1995) UN Doc A/50/22, para 121.

  28. 28.

    ILC Draft Statute, supra note 16, p. 44.

  29. 29.

    Article 15bis(6) RS: ‘Where the Prosecutor concludes that there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation in respect of a crime of aggression, he or she shall first ascertain whether the Security Council has made a determination of an act of aggression committed by the State concerned. The Prosecutor shall notify the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the situation before the Court, including any relevant information and documents’.

  30. 30.

    See ILC Draft Statute, supra note 16, p. 45.

  31. 31.

    See infra Chap. 11, Sect. 11.2.1.

  32. 32.

    GA Res 50/46 (11 December 1995) UN Doc A/RES/50/46 para 2. Resolutions dealing with the interim reports of the PrepCom were issued by the General Assembly between 1996 and 1998 (see GA Res 51/207 (17 December 1996) UN Doc A/RES/51/207; and GA Res 52/160 (15 December 1997) UN Doc A/RES/52/160).

  33. 33.

    ‘Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court [hereinafter PrepComDraft Statute]’ (14 April 1998) UN Doc A/Conf.183/2/Add.1. A chronology of events is provided in Benedetti and Washburn 1999, p. 6.

  34. 34.

    See Benedetti and Washburn 1999.

  35. 35.

    See ibid., p. 25.

  36. 36.

    See ibid., pp. 3f.

  37. 37.

    Ibid., p. 4.

  38. 38.

    The first session took place from 25 March–12 April 1996.

  39. 39.

    See ‘Summary of the Proceedings of the Preparatory Committee during the Period 25 March–12 April 1996’ (7 May 1996) UN Doc A/AC.249/1, paras 147–152. The varying positions of the states involved can be retraced in the protocols of the 16th–18th meetings (see ‘Role of the Security Council in Triggering Prosecution Discussed in Preparatory Committee for International Criminal Court’ (4 April 1996) L/2776; ‘Conflict between Security Council Powers, International Court, Discussed in Preparatory Committee’ (4 April 1996) L/2777; and ‘Preparatory Committee on International Criminal Court Discusses Power to be Given Prosecutor’ (4 April 1996) L/2778)).

  40. 40.

    See ‘Summary of the Proceedings of the Preparatory Committee during the Period 25 March–12 April 1996’ (7 May 1996) UN Doc A/AC.249/1, para 149.

  41. 41.

    Ibid., para 150.

  42. 42.

    Ibid., paras 149–152.

  43. 43.

    See Article 21(1)(a) of the consolidated draft text (‘Decisions Taken by the Preparatory Committee at its Session Held from 4 to 15 August 1997’ (14 August 1997) UN Doc A/AC.249/1997/L.8/Rev.1, p. 3).

  44. 44.

    ‘Role of the Security Council in Triggering Prosecution Discussed in Preparatory Committee for International Criminal Court’ (4 April 1996) L/2776.

  45. 45.

    In this regard, it was decided that a proposal submitted by the U.K. in the sixth session of the PrepCom on the trigger-mechanism would ‘be included in documents to be transmitted to the Rome Conference and placed under the appropriate articles in the draft statute’ (see ‘Netherlands Reiterates Offer to Host Seat of International Criminal Court’ (Press Release, 1 April 1998) L/2860, pp. 3f.).

  46. 46.

    PrepComDraft Statute, supra note 33, p. 30.

  47. 47.

    Benedetti and Washburn 1999, in particular pp. 21ff.

  48. 48.

    Ibid. In a similar vein, Hall 1998, p. 125.

  49. 49.

    See, e.g., Amnesty International . ‘The International Criminal Court: Making the Right Choices—Part I’ (1997). https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/ior40/001/1997/en/. Accessed 12 November 2016, p. 109; Human Rights Watch. ‘Commentary for the August 1997 Preparatory Committee Meeting on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court’ (1997). http://www.iccnow.org/documents/HRWCommentary.pdf. Accessed 12 November 2016, p. 8; International Peace Bureau. ‘International Criminal Court—A Briefing Paper Analysis of Issues and Recommendations for Action’ (1997). http://www.iccnow.org/documents/AnalysisICCbyIPB.pdf. Accessed 12 November 2016, pp. 3f.; and Lawyers Committee for Human Rights. ‘The International Criminal Court Trigger Mechanism and the Need for and Independent Prosecutor: A position paper of the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights’ (1997) http://www.iccnow.org/documents/LCHRTriggerMechanism.pdf Accessed 12 November 2016, p. 6.

  50. 50.

    This position was likewise adopted by many states. Having the SC as an exclusive triggering source was widely considered unacceptable (see Amnesty International , supra note 49, pp. 107ff.).

  51. 51.

    Ibid., p. 109.

  52. 52.

    Ibid., p. 109. On the ‘selectivity claim’ in relation to these tribunals, see supra Chap. 9, Sect. 9.2.3.2.

  53. 53.

    ‘Summary Record of the 2nd Plenary Meeting’ (15 June 1998) UN Doc A/CONF.183/SR.2, paras 10 (Australia), 21 (Norway), 38 (U.K. ), 46 (Japan), 55 (Sweden), 64 (Canada), 76 (Egypt), 84 (Republic of Korea), 90 (Slovenia); ‘Summary Record of the 3rd Plenary Meeting’ (16 June 1998) UN Doc A/CONF.183/SR.3, paras 45 (Brazil), 53 (Lithuania), 60 (Romania), 75 (Costa Rica), 89 (Armenia); ‘Summary Record of the 4th Plenary Meeting’ (16 June 1998) UN Doc A/CONF.183/SR.4, paras 45 (Macedonia), 54 (Sierra Leone), 57 (Namibia), 66 (Chile); ‘Summary Record of the 5th Plenary Meeting’ (17 June 1998) UN Doc A/CONF.183/SR.5, paras 3 (Italy), 7 (United Arab Emirates), 37 (Poland), 47 (Estonia), 60 (U.S.); ‘Summary Record of the 6th Plenary Meeting’ (17 June 1998) UN Doc A/CONF.183/SR.6, paras 5 (Belgium ), 17 (Ireland), 53 (Netherlands), 69 (Luxembourg), 96 (Gabon), 102 (Argentina); ‘Summary Record of the 7th Plenary Meeting’ (18 June 1998) UN Doc A/CONF.183/SR.7, paras 13 (Turkey ), 34 (Madagascar), 38 (Switzerland), 66 (Qatar), 70 (Oman); ‘Summary Record of the 8th Plenary Meeting’ (18 June 1998) UN Doc A/CONF.183/SR.8, paras 4 (Denmark), 9 (Jordan), 12 (Georgia ), 21 (Russia ), 32 (Haiti), 47 (Bahrain), 50 (Congo), 66 (Botswana).

  54. 54.

    The countries are allocated to the regions of the world by reference to the UN statistics division (this classification is available at: http://millenniumindicators.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm. Accessed 12 November 2016).

  55. 55.

    These issues are discussed in infra Chap. 11, Sect. 11.2.

  56. 56.

    Summary Record of the 3rd Plenary Meeting, supra note 53, paras 92f. (Pakistan); Summary Record of the 4th Plenary Meeting, supra note 53, para 51 (India ); Summary Record of the 6th Plenary Meeting, supra note 53, paras 80f. (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya); Summary Record of the 7th Plenary Meeting, supra note 53, para 87 (Nigeria); Summary Record of the 8th Plenary Meeting, supra note 53, para 36 (Yemen).

  57. 57.

    Summary Record of the 4th Plenary Meeting, supra note 53, para 51.

  58. 58.

    See ‘Committee of the Whole , Summary Record of the 6th Meeting’ (18 June 1998) UN Doc A/CONF.183/C.1/SR6; ‘Committee of the Whole, Summary Record of the 7th Meeting’ (19 June 1998) UN Doc A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.7; ‘Committee of the Whole, Summary Record of the 8th Meeting’ (19 June 1998) UN Doc A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.8; ‘Committee of the Whole, Summary Record of the 9th Meeting’ (22 June 1998) UN Doc A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.9; ‘Committee of the Whole, Summary Record of the 10th Meeting’ (22 June 1998) UN Doc A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.10; and ‘Committee of the Whole, Summary Record of the 11th Meeting’ (22 June 1998) UN Doc A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.11.

  59. 59.

    Committee of the Whole , Summary Record of the 7th Meeting, supra note 58, para 68 (Sweden); Committee of the Whole, Summary Record of the 8th Meeting, supra note 58, paras 11 (Spain), 26 (Slovakia); Committee of the Whole, Summary Record of the 9th Meeting, supra note 58, paras 34 (Egypt), 54 (Senegal ); Committee of the Whole, Summary Record of the 10th Meeting, supra note 58, para 60 (Norway); Committee of the Whole, Summary Record of the 11th Meeting, supra note 58, para 2 (Trinidad and Tobago).

  60. 60.

    See Committee of the Whole , Summary Record of the 9th Meeting, supra note 58, para 113 (Israel); Committee of the Whole, Summary Record of the 10th Meeting, supra note 58, paras 78 (Chile), 87 (Brazil); Committee of the Whole, Summary Record of the 11th Meeting, supra note 58, para 5 (United Arab Emirates).

  61. 61.

    ‘Committee of the Whole , Discussion Paper Bureau’ (6 July 1998) UN Doc A/CONF.183/C.1/L.53, p. 10.

  62. 62.

    ‘Committee of the Whole , Bureau Proposal ’ (10 July 1998) UN Doc A/CONF.183/C.1/L.59, p. 8f.

  63. 63.

    See infra Chap. 11, Sect. 11.2.3.

  64. 64.

    ‘Committee of the Whole , Proposal Submitted by India Concerning the Bureau Proposal ’ (15 July 1998) UN Doc A/CONF.183/C.1/L.79.

  65. 65.

    On the acceptance of these crimes by the international community, see supra Chap. 6.

  66. 66.

    See supra Chap. 7, Sect. 7.2.3.2.

  67. 67.

    See infra Chap 11, Sect. 11.2.

  68. 68.

    Committee of the Whole , Summary Record of the 10th Meeting, supra note 58, para 85.

  69. 69.

    See also, Olásolo 2005, p. 91.

  70. 70.

    Emphasis added.

  71. 71.

    See Schabas 2010, p. 300.

  72. 72.

    Resolution regarding the situation in Darfur, SC Res 1593 (31 Mach 2005) UN Doc S/RES/1593 ; and resolution regarding the situation in Libya , SC Res 1970 (26 February 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1970.

  73. 73.

    Article 24(1) RS.

  74. 74.

    Article 17(1) Negotiated Relationship Agreement between the International Criminal Court and the United Nations (4 October 2004, 2283 UNTS 195, Entry into Force 4 October 2004) [hereinafter Relationship Agreement ]; Article 45 Rules of Procedure and Evidence (22 September 2002, ICC-ASP/1/3 (Part.II.A)) [hereinafter RPE].

  75. 75.

    See Olásolo 2005, p. 92.

  76. 76.

    Relationship Agreement , supra note 74.

  77. 77.

    Olásolo 2005, pp. 91f.

  78. 78.

    Articles 53(2) RS and 105(1) and 106(1) RPE.

  79. 79.

    Articles 53(3)(a) RS and 107 RPE.

  80. 80.

    GA. ‘Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court’ (1995) UN Doc A/50/22, para 120.

  81. 81.

    Article 39 UNC.

  82. 82.

    Krisch 2012a, p. 1295, para 47.

  83. 83.

    Ibid., para 47.

  84. 84.

    Article 41 UNC reads as follows: ‘The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.’

  85. 85.

    Krisch 2012b, p. 1311, para 12. In a similar vein, The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic a/k/a ‘Dule’ (IT-94-1-AR72), Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, para 35.

  86. 86.

    ILC Draft Statute, supra note 16, p. 44.

  87. 87.

    PrepCom Draft Statute, supra note 33, Article 6 (at 30).

  88. 88.

    See Schabas 2010, pp. 297f.

  89. 89.

    See ‘Committee of the Whole , Bureau Proposal ’ (10 July 1998) UN Doc A/CONF.183/C.1/L.59, p. 9.

  90. 90.

    See Committee of the Whole , Summary Record of the 7th Meeting, supra note 58, para 68 (Sweden); Committee of the Whole, Summary Record of the 8th Meeting, supra note 58, paras 11 (Spain), 26 (Slovakia); Committee of the Whole, Summary Record of the 9th Meeting, supra note 58, paras 34 (Egypt), 54 (Senegal ); Committee of the Whole, Summary Record of the 10th Meeting, supra note 58, para 60 (Norway); Committee of the Whole, Summary Record of the 11th Meeting, supra note 58, para 2 (Trinidad and Tobago). In a similar vein, GA. ‘Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court’ (1995) UN Doc A/50/22, para 120; and Gowlland-Debbas 1998, pp. 102f.

  91. 91.

    See, among others, Kirsch and Robinson 2002, pp. 625, 632; Sarooshi 2004, pp. 96ff.; and Cryer 2006, p. 212.

  92. 92.

    See Cryer 2006, p. 212; and Kirsch and D. Robinson 2002, p. 625.

  93. 93.

    Amnesty International . ‘The International Criminal Court: Making the Right Choices—Part V: Recommendations to the Diplomatic Conference’ (1998). https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/IOR40/010/1998/en/. Accessed 12 November 2016, p. 33.

  94. 94.

    Nsereko 2016, p. 838.

  95. 95.

    Article 1 of the ICTY Statute defines the jurisdiction of the ICTY in the following terms: ‘The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991 in accordance with the provisions of the present Statute.’

  96. 96.

    ‘Prosecutor receives referral of situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo’ (Press Release, 19 April 2004) ICC-OTP -20040419.

  97. 97.

    ‘Prosecutor receives referral concerning Central African Republic’ (Press Release, 7 January 2005) ICC-OTP -20050107.

  98. 98.

    ‘Referral Letter from the Government of Mali to the Prosecutor of the ICC’ (13 July 2012). https://www.legal-tools.org/en/browse/record/06f0bf/. Accessed 12 November 2016. However, at least implicitly, it appears that the Malian government, by mainly listing crimes targeting assets of the government in the referral letter, tries to push the prosecutor towards prosecution of the rebel forces (see ibid.).

  99. 99.

    See ‘President of Uganda Refers Situation Concerning the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) to the ICC’ (Press Release, 29 January 2004) ICC-20040129.

  100. 100.

    Situation in Uganda (ICC-02/04-01/05), Decision to Convene a Status Conference on the Investigation in the Situation in Uganda in Relation to the Application of Article 53, 2 December 2005, para 5 (emphasis added).

  101. 101.

    Ibid., para 5.

  102. 102.

    Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (ICC-01/04), Decision on the Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of VPRS 1, VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4, VPRS 5 and VPRS 6, 17 January 2006, para 65 (emphasis added).

  103. 103.

    The Prosecutor v. Callixte Mbarushimana (ICC-01/04-01/10), Decision on the “Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the Court”, 26 October 2011, para 27 (emphasis added).

  104. 104.

    Article 16 RS reads as follows: ‘No investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under this Statute for a period of 12 months after the Security Council, in a resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, has requested the Court to that effect; that request may be renewed by the Council under the same conditions’. On Article 16 RS, infra Chap. 11.

  105. 105.

    See ibid., Sect. 11.3.2.

  106. 106.

    Scheffer 2001, p. 90 (emphasis added).

  107. 107.

    Article 1 RS reads as follows: ‘The jurisdiction and functioning of the court shall be governed by the provisions of this Statute’.

  108. 108.

    See Sarooshi 2004, p. 98; Cryer 2006, pp. 213f.; and Schabas 2010, p. 299.

  109. 109.

    See Talmon 2005, pp. 185f.

  110. 110.

    See also, infra Sect. 10.6.3.

  111. 111.

    See Articles 1, 19(1) and 21(1)(a) RS.

  112. 112.

    In a similar vein, The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09), Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, 4 March 2009, para 45.

  113. 113.

    See Oosthuizen 1999, p. 319.

  114. 114.

    Ibid., p. 320.

  115. 115.

    Ibid., p. 322.

  116. 116.

    See, among others, Schweigman 2001, pp. 265–267; Malanczuk 1999, p. 98; Akande 1997, pp. 336ff.; and Oosthuizen 1999, p. 322. The opposite view is taken by L. Condorelli and S. Villalpando who note that ‘the Court shall determine whether the Security Council had the power to invoke Chapter VII and thus whether it has preliminarily determined the existence of a threat to peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression as provided for in Article 39’ (Condorelli and Villalpando 2002, p. 641).

  117. 117.

    Akande 1997, p. 338.

  118. 118.

    Malanczuk 1999, p. 98.

  119. 119.

    The Prosecutor v. Joseph Kanyabashi (ICTR -96-15-T), Decision on the Defence Motion on Jurisdiction, 18 June 1997, para 20.

  120. 120.

    See Krisch 2012a, p. 1275, para 4.; and The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic , supra note 85, para 32.

  121. 121.

    Schabas 2010, p. 333.

  122. 122.

    Ibid., p. 298.

  123. 123.

    Ibid., pp. 298f.

  124. 124.

    Articles 15(3) and 18(1) RS and Articles 29 and 30 Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor (entry into Force 23 April 2009, ICC-BD/05-01-09). See also, supra Chap. 9, Sect. 9.1.4.

  125. 125.

    Akande 1997, p. 339. In a similar vein, Gowlland-Debbas 1998, pp. 105ff.

  126. 126.

    The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic , supra note 85, para 29.

  127. 127.

    See Condorelli and Villalpando 2002, pp. 641f.

  128. 128.

    The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic , supra note 85, para 39.

  129. 129.

    See infra Sect. 10.6.2.

  130. 130.

    See infra Chap. 11, Sects. 11.4.2.1 and 11.6.3.

  131. 131.

    Russia , during the 29th meeting of the Committee of the Whole at the Rome Conference , expressed the belief that the Charter would prevail in such circumstances (‘Committee of the Whole, Summary Record of the 29th Meeting’ (9 July 1998) UN Doc A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.29, para 116).

  132. 132.

    See, among others, Stahn 2003, p. 99; and Talmon 2005, p. 185.

  133. 133.

    See Cryer 2006, pp. 213f.; and Happold 2006, p. 233.

  134. 134.

    See Cryer 2006, pp. 213f.

  135. 135.

    SC Res 1593 (31 Mach 2005) UN Doc S/RES/1593 .

  136. 136.

    SC Res 1970 (26 February 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1970.

  137. 137.

    See de Waal 2008, p. 29; O’Fahey 2006, p. 27. On the history of the Sudan , Flint and de Waal 2008.

  138. 138.

    A detailed analysis of the Janjaweed can be found in Flint and de Waal 2008, pp. 33–71.

  139. 139.

    Ibid., pp. 116–150.

  140. 140.

    See ibid., pp. 242–267. On the recent development in the Darfur region, see, e.g., Human Rights Watch. ‘World Report 2011’ (2011). https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2011. Accessed 12 November 2016, pp. 182–184; Human Rights Watch. ‘World Report 2012’ (2012). https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2012. Accessed 12 November 2016, pp. 180–185; Human Rights Watch. ‘World Report 2013’ (2013). https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2013. Accessed 12 November 2016, pp. 174–178; Amnesty International . ‘10 Years on: Violations Remain Widespread in Darfur’ (2013). http://www.amnestyusa.org/sites/default/files/darfur_brief_-_10_years_on.pdf. Accessed 25 June 2015; Human Rights Watch. ‘World Report 2014’ (2014). https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2014. Accessed 12 November 2016, pp. 182–187; and Human Rights Watch. ‘World Report 2015’ (2015). https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2015. Accessed 12 November 2016, pp. 508–513.

  141. 141.

    See Flint and de Waal 2008, pp. 173ff. The AMIS was eventually integrated into the hybrid mission between the African Union and the United Nations in Darfur pursuant to SC resolution 1769 on 31 July 2007 (UNAMID) (SC Res 1769 (31 July 2007) UN Doc S/RES/1769). For more information on the UNAMID, Flint and de Waal 2008, pp. 67–273.

  142. 142.

    SC Res 1564 (18 September 2004) UN Doc S/RES/1564, para 12.

  143. 143.

    United Nations Secretary-General . ‘Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General (Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1564 of 18 September 2004) [hereinafter ICID Report]’ (25 January 2005), para 630.

  144. 144.

    See Flint and de Waal 2008, pp. 179–183; and R. Hamilton. ‘Inside Colin Powell’s Decision to Declare Genocide in Darfur’ The Atlantic (17 August 2011). http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/08/inside-colin-powells-decision-to-declare-genocide-in-darfur/243560/. Accessed 12 November 2016.

  145. 145.

    ICID Report, supra note 143, para 640.

  146. 146.

    Ibid., paras 640ff.

  147. 147.

    Ibid., paras 647f.

  148. 148.

    Ibid., para 645.

  149. 149.

    Ibid. para 584. See also, SC Res 1564 (18 September 2004) UN Doc S/RES/1564, preambular para 14.

  150. 150.

    ICID Report, supra note 143, para 572.

  151. 151.

    Ibid., para 569.

  152. 152.

    S/RES/1593 (2005), para 1.

  153. 153.

    Situation in Darfur, Sudan (ICC-02/05-2), Decision by the Prosecutor to Initiate an Investigation, 01 June 2005.

  154. 154.

    The Prosecutor v. Ahmad Muhammad Harun (‘Ahmad Harun’) and Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al Rahman (‘Ali Kushayb’) (ICC-02/05-01/07), Decision on the Prosecution Application under 58(7) of the Statute, 27 April 2007; The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09), Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, 04 March 2009/ The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09), Second Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, 12 July 2010; and The Prosecutor v. Abdel Raheem Muhammad Hussein (ICC-02/05-01/12), Public Redacted Version of “Decision on the Prosecution’s Application under Article 58”, 4 March 2009.

  155. 155.

    In The Prosecutor v. Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain, the opening of the trial has been vacated and another arrest warrant has been issued to ensure the defendant’s presence at trial (The Prosecutor v. Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain (ICC-02/05-03/09 OA 5), Judgment on the Appeal of Mr Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain against Trial Chamber IV’s Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest, 3 March 2015). In the case The Prosecutor v. Bahar Idriss Abu Garda, the PTC decided not to confirm charges on 8 February 2010 (The Prosecutor v. Bahar Idriss Abu Garda (ICC-02/05-02/09), Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 8 February 2010, para 232). In the case The Prosecutor v. Saleh Mohammed Jerbo Jamus, proceedings were terminated on 4 October 2013 after receiving information pointing to his death (The Prosecutor v. Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain and Saleh Mohammed Jerbo Jamus (ICC-02/05-03/09), Public Redacted Decision Terminating the Proceedings against Mr Jerbo, 4 October 2013).

  156. 156.

    S/RES/1593 (2005), para 1.

  157. 157.

    The countries abstaining were Algeria , Brazil, China and the U.S. (see ‘Security Council Refers Situation in Darfur, Sudan , to Prosecutor of International Criminal Court’ (Press Release, 31 March 2005) UN Doc SC/8351).

  158. 158.

    Emphasis in the original.

  159. 159.

    For a comprehensive assessment of resolution 1593 , Cryer 2006; Happold 2006; and Condorelli and Ciampi 2005, pp. 590–599.

  160. 160.

    Emphasis in the original.

  161. 161.

    Emphasis in the original.

  162. 162.

    On this possibility, see Cryer 2006, p. 209; and Condorelli and Ciampi 2005, p. 596.

  163. 163.

    Resolution 1593 not only affects the jurisdiction of the ICC, but also rules that other than the contributing states are excluded from exercising universal jurisdiction over these persons. Such a ruling obviously raises different problems under international law. Instead of many, see Condorelli and Ciampi 2005, pp. 596f.

  164. 164.

    SC Res 1422 (12 July 2002) UN Doc S/RES/1422 , para 1.

  165. 165.

    SC Res 1487 (12 June 2003) UN Doc S/RES/1487 , para 1.

  166. 166.

    SC Res 1497 (1 August 2003) UN Doc S/RES/1497, para 7.

  167. 167.

    On these resolutions, see infra Chap. 11, Sects. 11.4.2 and 11.4.3.

  168. 168.

    See, in particular, infra Chap. 11, Sect. 11.4.4.

  169. 169.

    Emphasis in the original.

  170. 170.

    SC Verbatim Record (31 March 2005) UN Doc S/PV/5158, 6. See also, Condorelli and Ciampi 2005, pp. 597f.; Happold 2006, p. 231.

  171. 171.

    In a similar vein, Happold 2006, pp. 231ff.; Condorelli and Ciampi 2005, pp. 594ff.; and Cryer 2006, pp. 210ff.

  172. 172.

    See supra Sect. 10.3.2.

  173. 173.

    See supra Sect. 10.3.3.

  174. 174.

    Article 1 RS.

  175. 175.

    The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09), Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, 4 March 2009, para 45.

  176. 176.

    See Cryer 2006, p 214.

  177. 177.

    See ibid., p. 214.

  178. 178.

    Ibid., p. 214.

  179. 179.

    SC Verbatim Record (31 March 2005) UN Doc S/PV/5158, 3 (emphasis added).

  180. 180.

    See supra Chap. 7, Sect. 7.2.3.1.

  181. 181.

    UN Doc S/RES/1970, para 4.

  182. 182.

    In preambular para 2 of resolution 1970 , the SC ‘[deplored] the gross and systematic violation of human rights, including the repression of peaceful demonstrators, expressing deep concern at the deaths of civilians, and rejecting unequivocally the incitement to hostility and violence against the civilian population made from the highest level of the Libyan government’ (emphasis in the original).

  183. 183.

    On the period between 2003 and 2011 see Vandewalle 2012, pp. 173–209.

  184. 184.

    See ibid.; and Amnesty International . ‘The Battle for Libya ’ (2011). https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/MDE19/025/2011/en/. Accessed 12 November 2016, pp. 14f.

  185. 185.

    See Vandewalle 2012, p. 204; Amnesty International , supra note 184, p. 16.

  186. 186.

    Ibid., p. 16.

  187. 187.

    See ibid., p. 17.

  188. 188.

    Ibid., p. 17.

  189. 189.

    S/RES/1970 (2011).

  190. 190.

    HRC Res S-15/1 (25 February 2011) UN Doc A/HRC/S-15/1, para 11.

  191. 191.

    SC Res 1973 (17 March 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1973, para 6.

  192. 192.

    Ibid., para 4.

  193. 193.

    See Anonymous. ‘Libya : US, UK and France attack Gaddafi forces’ BBC (20 March 2011). http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12796972. Accessed 12 November 2016.

  194. 194.

    See Mačák and Zamir 2012, pp. 416f.

  195. 195.

    See Human Rights Council . ‘Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya [hereinafter Report of the ICIL ]’ (8 March 2012) UN Doc A/HRC/19/68, Annex 1, paras 93–95; and Mačák and Zamir 2012, pp. 418ff.

  196. 196.

    Anonymous. ‘“We answered the call”—the end of Operation Unified Protector’ (31 October 2011). http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_80435.htm. Accessed 12 November 2016.

  197. 197.

    Anonymous. ‘ICC Prosecutor to open an investigation in Libya ’ (2 March 2011). http://reliefweb.int/report/libya/icc-prosecutor-open-investigation-libya. Accessed 12 November 2016.

  198. 198.

    The Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah AL-Senussi (ICC-01/11-01/11 OA6), Judgement on the Appeal of Mr Abdullah Al-Senussi against the Decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber I of 11 October 2013 entitled “Decision on the Admissibility of the Case against Abdullah Al Senussi”, 24 July 2014.

  199. 199.

    The admissibility of the case The Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi (ICC-01/11-01/11) was confirmed by the Appeals Chamber on 21 May 2014 (The Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi (ICC-01/11-01/11 OA 4), Judgment on the Appeal of Libya against the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 31 May 2013 Entitled “Decision on the Admissibility of the Case against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi” , 21 May 2014).

  200. 200.

    See SC. ‘Eleventh Report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to the UN Security Council Pursuant to UNSCR 1970 (2011)’ (26 May 2016). https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/otp_report_lib_26052016-eng.pdf. Accessed 12 November 2016, paras 3f.

  201. 201.

    SC Verbatim Record (26 February 2011) UN Doc S/PV/6491, 8.

  202. 202.

    Emphasis in the original.

  203. 203.

    See Report of the ICIL , supra note 195.

  204. 204.

    Stahn 2012, p. 328.

  205. 205.

    See supra Sect. 10.4.3.

  206. 206.

    S/RES/1970 (2011), preambular para 16.

  207. 207.

    Ibid.

  208. 208.

    Ibid., para 6.

  209. 209.

    Stahn 2012, p. 326.

  210. 210.

    S/RES/1970 (2011), preambular para 12.

  211. 211.

    See M. Kersten ‘Could Justice Be Deferred for Peace in Libya ?’ (07 March 2011). http://justiceinconflict.org/2011/03/07/could-justice-be-deferred-for-peace-in-libya/. Accessed 9 June 2015.

  212. 212.

    See, in particular, infra Chap. 11, Sect. 11.4.4.

  213. 213.

    SC. ‘Statement of Louis Moreno-Ocampo on the Situation in Libya , Pursuant to UNSCR 1970 (2011)’ (2 November 2011). https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/3FD60A16-9BE7-4BD3-A12D-65D93E96B455/283927/StatementICCProsecutorLibyaReporttoUNSC021113.pdf. Accessed 12 November 2016, para 18 (emphasis added).

  214. 214.

    S/RES/1970 (2011), para 6.

  215. 215.

    On Article 16 RS, see infra Chap. 11.

  216. 216.

    However, the prosecutor, we recall, had already clarified the scope of the term ‘situation’ in the context of the (self-referred) situation in Uganda , where it announced that investigations and prosecutions by the ICC might go beyond elements of the LRA (see Situation in Uganda (ICC-02/04-01/05), Decision to Convene a Status Conference on the Investigation in the Situation in Uganda in Relation to the Application of Article 53, 2 December 2005, para 5).

  217. 217.

    Article 24 UNC. See also, supra Sect. 10.2.

  218. 218.

    See supra Chap. 6, Sect. 6.4.

  219. 219.

    See The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic , supra note 85, para 36. See also, supra Sect. 10.2.

  220. 220.

    See among others Simpson 1997, p. 8; Amnesty International , supra note 49, pp. 107ff.; Scharf 1995, p. 170.

  221. 221.

    See supra Chap. 9, Sect. 9.2.3.2.

  222. 222.

    S/RES/1593 (2005), para 7; S/RES/1970 (2011), para 8. For a discussion of the legality of this provision, Cryer 2006, pp. 206ff.

  223. 223.

    It was indicated previously that although Article 13(b) RS in principle also allows the SC to become active with regard to situations in states parties to the RS, it is more likely that it will only refer Chapter VII situations in non-party states to the ICC (see supra Chap. 7, Sect. 7.2.2).

  224. 224.

    See supra Chap. 9, Sect. 9.1.4.

  225. 225.

    S/RES/1593 (2005), preambular para 1 (emphasis in the original). On the findings of the Commission of Inquiry, supra Sect. 10.4.3.

  226. 226.

    S/RES/1970 (2011), preambular paras 2, 6 (emphasis in the original).

  227. 227.

    See Article 23 UNC.

  228. 228.

    See Article 27(3) UNC. On the exercise of collective structural power see also, infra Chap. 11, Sect. 11.6.2.

  229. 229.

    See supra Chap. 7, Sect. 7.2.3.2.

  230. 230.

    See supra Chap. 6, Sect. 6.4.

  231. 231.

    See supra Chap. 3, Sect. 3.2, supra Chap. 4, Sect. 4.3.2 and supra Chap. 9, Sect. 9.1.4.

  232. 232.

    See supra Chap. 7, Sect. 7.1.

  233. 233.

    Anonymous. ‘Aide: Obama Won’t Prosecute Bush Officials’ CBS News (20 April 2009). http://www.cbsnews.com/news/aide-obama-wont-prosecute-bush-officials/. Accessed 12 November 2016. Marcella David has noted in a similar vein: ‘The American track record on judging whether the actions of its military in combat settings constitute war crimes or crimes against humanity does not inspire confidence in its impartiality and fairness. American courts have demonstrated willingness to defer to military judgment on matters implicating security’ (David 1999, p. 388).

  234. 234.

    See supra Chap. 3, Sect. 3.3 and supra Chap. 9, Sect. 9.2.2.

  235. 235.

    See, exemplarily, Shoemaker and Spanier 1984, pp. 18ff.; and Gasiorowski 1986, p. 59. See also, supra Chap. 9, Sect. 9.2.2.

  236. 236.

    At the time of writing, the ICC has issued arrest warrants against the Sudanese President Al-Bashir (see Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, supra note 154). In addition, the ICC has instituted proceedings against the Kenyan President Kenyatta and Deputy President Ruto (see infra Chap. 11, Sect. 11.5.3). However, as will be shown in the following Chapter, the charges against Kenyatta were withdrawn in early 2015 (The Prosecutor v. Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta (ICC-01/09-02/11), Decision on the Withdrawal of Charges against Mr Kenyatta, 13 March 2015). In addition, the ICC had also accused Muammar Gaddafi . This case file, as we have seen, was closed in November 2011 due to his dead (see supra Sect. 10.5.1). In the context of the Ivory Coast, the ICC has confirmed charges against the former President Laurent Gbagbo (The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo (ICC-02/11-01/11), Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 12 June 2014).

  237. 237.

    See Cryer 2005, p. 211. On the scope of SC powers in general, Talmon 2005.

  238. 238.

    See SC Draft Resolution (22 May 2014) UN Doc S/2014/348.

  239. 239.

    ‘Referral of Syria to International Criminal Court Fails as Negative Votes Prevent Security Council from Adopting Draft Resolution’ (Press Release, 22 May 2014) UN Doc SC/11407.

  240. 240.

    See SC Res 2118 (27 September 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2118, para 21; and SC Res 2209 (6 March 2015) UN Doc S/RES/2209, para 7.

  241. 241.

    SC Res 2139 (22 February 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2139, para 2 (emphasis in the original).

  242. 242.

    Ibid., para 13.

  243. 243.

    SC Verbatim Record (22 May 2014) UN Doc S/PV/7180, p. 4.

  244. 244.

    Ibid., p. 5.

  245. 245.

    See, e.g., Allison 2013, pp. 795–823; and D. Treisman. ‘Why Russia protects Syria ’s Assad ’ CNN (3 February 2012). http://edition.cnn.com/2012/02/02/opinion/treisman-russia-syria. Accessed 12 November 2016.

  246. 246.

    A list of the exercise of veto -power is available at: http://research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick. Accessed 12 November 2016.

  247. 247.

    See ibid. In relation to the situation in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, an Article 13(b) referral was discussed by the members of the SC on two occasions. While most of the members supported a referral, both Russia and China claimed that the situation would not constitute a threat to the international peace and security and that the Council ‘is not the venue for addressing issues of human rights’ (see SC Verbatim Record (10 December 2015) UN Doc S/PV/7575, pp. 2, 19; see also SC Verbatim Record (23 December 2014) UN Doc S/PV/7353, pp. 2, 14.

  248. 248.

    I. Black. ‘Russia and China veto UN move to refer Syria to international criminal court’ The Guardian (22 May 2014). http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/22/russia-china-veto-un-draft-resolution-refer-syria-international-criminal-court. Accessed 12 November 2016. The Draft referral resolution supports this assertion in that the personal scope of the referral appears to be limited in personal terms to Syrian authorities, pro-government militias and non-State armed groups (see paras 1/2 SC Draft Resolution (22 May 2014) UN Doc S/2014/348).

  249. 249.

    See R. Dicker. ‘A Flawed Court in Need of Credibility’ The New York Times (21 May 2012). http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/22/opinion/a-flawed-court-in-need-of-credibility.html?_r=1. Accessed 12 November 2016.

  250. 250.

    See Black, supra note 248.

  251. 251.

    Dicker, supra note 249.

  252. 252.

    See ibid.

  253. 253.

    See, in particular, supra Chap. 9, Sect. 9.2.2.

  254. 254.

    S/RES/1970 (2011).

  255. 255.

    Emphasis in the original.

  256. 256.

    See S/RES/1593 (2005), para 6.

  257. 257.

    See supra Sects. 10.4 and 10.5.

  258. 258.

    Articles 1, 19(1) and 12(1)(a) RS. On the review power of the Court, see, in particular, supra Sect. 10.3.3.

  259. 259.

    See SC Verbatim Record (31 March 2005) UN Doc S/PV/5158, p. 3.

  260. 260.

    See supra Sect. 10.3.2.

  261. 261.

    See ibid.

  262. 262.

    See para 6 of S/RES/1593 (2005) and S/RES/1970 (2011).

  263. 263.

    See infra Chap. 11, Sect. 11.6.4.

  264. 264.

    See Cryer 2006, p. 214.

  265. 265.

    See supra Sect. 10.5.1.

  266. 266.

    SC. ‘Statement of Louis Moreno-Ocampo on the Situation in Libya , Pursuant to UNSCR 1970 (2011)’ (2 November 2011). https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/3FD60A16-9BE7-4BD3-A12D-65D93E96B455/283927/StatementICCProsecutorLibyaReporttoUNSC021113.pdf Accessed 12 November 2016, para 18 (emphasis added).

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Schuerch, R. (2017). The Security Council Referral Power Under Article 13(b) Rome Statute. In: The International Criminal Court at the Mercy of Powerful States. International Criminal Justice Series, vol 13. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-192-0_10

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