Skip to main content

Winning Without Killing: The Case for Targeted Sanctions

  • Chapter
  • First Online:

Part of the book series: NL ARMS ((NLARMS))

Abstract

Sanctions are a frequently employed diplomatic instrument to exert influence. However, it is also a relatively poorly understood instrument that, while seductive because it seems easy to employ and relatively risk-free, is also criticized for lack of effectiveness. In particular in the past decade UN sanctions have undergone a significant development. The chapter presents how sanctions changed from their classical and comprehensive form to a more recent targeted version. Whereas comprehensive sanctions aimed at whole states, today the targets of sanctions are mostly individuals, entities and specific economic sectors. The situations in which sanctions have been used and adapted to achieve foreign policy objectives with the simultaneous objective to reduce their humanitarian impact has grown overtime, for instance by including the utilization of sanctions in post-conflict contexts. Especially, the objective of this chapter is to review the opportunities and challenges that characterize targeted sanctions in order to provide recommendations on how to enhance their effectiveness. The argument of the chapter is that targeted sanctions are more demanding in terms of knowledge and maintenance compared to comprehensive sanctions. If the international community, or individual states, wish to rely effectively on this foreign policy instrument, then ways to acquire more information about targeted societies and threats that are to be countered as well as the creation of institutional capacity to monitor and enforce sanctions is key to making sanctions useful.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

Buying options

Chapter
USD   29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD   49.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Hardcover Book
USD   64.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Learn about institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    Tsebelis 1990.

  2. 2.

    United Nations 1945.

  3. 3.

    Cortright and Lopez 1995.

  4. 4.

    Baldwin 1985.

  5. 5.

    Drezner 1999.

  6. 6.

    Hufbauer et al. 1990.

  7. 7.

    Pape 1997.

  8. 8.

    Naturally, the academic debate was richer, but the practitioners’ view was dominated by the slight effectiveness of sanctions. For different ways to assess the success of sanctions, see Lindsay 1986; Barber 1979; Nincic and Wallensteen 1983.

  9. 9.

    Galtung 1967.

  10. 10.

    Mueller and Mueller 1999; Naylor 2001; Weiss and All 1997.

  11. 11.

    Clawson 1993; Hoskin 1997.

  12. 12.

    Gibbon 1999.

  13. 13.

    Ali and Iqbal 1999; Alnasrawi 2001.

  14. 14.

    The Financial Times 1995.

  15. 15.

    United Nations 1997.

  16. 16.

    Von Braunmühl and Kulessa 1995.

  17. 17.

    Shraga and Zacklin 1994; Schabas 2006.

  18. 18.

    Sunga 1992.

  19. 19.

    United Nations 1999.

  20. 20.

    Wallensteen and Staibano 2005.

  21. 21.

    Hudson 2007.

  22. 22.

    Cortright and Lopez 2002.

  23. 23.

    Biersteker 2009.

  24. 24.

    Cortright et al. 2002: 2.

  25. 25.

    Biersteker 2009.

  26. 26.

    Fouley 1923, p. 71.

  27. 27.

    Giumelli 2011.

  28. 28.

    There are examples, for instance the use of force employed to arrest Laurent Gbagbo in Cote d’Ivoire, see Simonen 2012.

  29. 29.

    Coherently with the literature on sanctions, senders are the actors that impose sanctions and targets are the actors that are sanctioned.

  30. 30.

    Giumelli 2015.

  31. 31.

    Kadi v. Council of the European Union 2005.

  32. 32.

    Giumelli and Levi 2016.

References

  • Ali MM, Iqbal SH (1999) Sanctions and Childhood Mortality in Iraq. The Lancet 355(9218):1851–1857

    Google Scholar 

  • Alnasrawi A (2001) Iraq: economic sanctions and consequences, 1990–2000. Third World Quarterly 22(2):205–218

    Google Scholar 

  • Baldwin DA (1985) Economic statecraft. Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ

    Google Scholar 

  • Barber J (1979) Economic Sanctions as a Policy Instrument. International Affairs 55(3):367–384

    Google Scholar 

  • Biersteker TJ (2009) Targeted sanctions and individual human rights. International Journal 65(1):99–117

    Google Scholar 

  • Clawson P (1993) How has Saddam Hussein Survived? Economic Sanctions, 1990–93. INSS McNair Papers, Institute for National Strategic Studies, Washington DC

    Google Scholar 

  • Cortright D, Lopez GA (1995) Economic Sanctions: Panacea or Peace building in a Post-Cold War World? Westview Press, Boulder CO

    Google Scholar 

  • Cortright D, Lopez GA (eds) (2002) Smart Sanctions: Toward Effective and Humane Sanctions Reform. Rowman and Littlefield, Lanham MD

    Google Scholar 

  • Cortright D, Lopez GA, Gerber L (2002) Sanctions and the search for security: challenges to UN action. L. Rienner Publishers, Boulder CO

    Google Scholar 

  • Drezner DW (1999) The sanctions paradox: economic statecraft and international relations. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge/New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Foley H (ed) (1923) Woodrow Wilson’s Case for the League of Nations. Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ

    Google Scholar 

  • Galtung J (1967) On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions: With Examples from the Case of Rhodesia. World Politics 19(3):378–416

    Google Scholar 

  • Gibbons ED (1999) Sanctions in Haiti: human rights and democracy under assault. Praeger, Westport CON

    Google Scholar 

  • Giumelli F (2011) Coercing, Constraining and Signalling. Explaining and Understanding UN and EU Sanctions After the Cold War. ECPR Press, Colchester

    Google Scholar 

  • Giumelli F (2015) Understanding United Nations targeted sanctions: an empirical analysis. International Affairs 91(6):1351–1368

    Google Scholar 

  • Giumelli F, Levi G (2016) anzioni: alle imprese europee la multa arriva dagli USA. LaVoce.info (3 June 2016) http://www.lavoce.info/archives/41389/sanzioni-alle-imprese-europee-la-multa-arriva-dagli-usa/ Accessed 14 March 2017

  • Hoskin E (1997) The Humanitarian Impacts of Economic Sanctions and War on Iraq. In: Weiss TG (ed) Political gain and civilian pain: humanitarian impacts of economic sanctions. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Oxford/Lanham MD

    Google Scholar 

  • Hudson A (2007) Not a Great Asset: The UN Security Council’s Counter-Terrorism Regime: Violating Human Rights. Berkeley Journal of International Law 25(2):203–227

    Google Scholar 

  • Hufbauer GC, Schott JJ, Elliot KA (1990) Economic Sanctions Reconsidered. Institute for International Economics, Washington, DC

    Google Scholar 

  • Kadi v. Council of the European Union (2005) ‘Kadi, Yassin Abdullah and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities,’ Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:62005CJ0402&from=EN. Accessed on 14 March 2017

  • Lindsay J (1986) Trade Sanctions as Policy Instruments: A Re-Examination. International Studies Quarterly 30(2):153–173

    Google Scholar 

  • Mueller J, Mueller K (1999) Sanctions of Mass Destruction. Foreign Affairs 78(May/June):43–53

    Google Scholar 

  • Naylor RT (2001) Economic warfare: sanctions, embargo busting, and their human cost. Northeastern University Press, Boston MA

    Google Scholar 

  • Nincic M, Wallensteen P (eds) (1983) Dilemmas of Economic Coercion. Sanctions in World Politics. Praeger, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Pape RA (1997) Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work. International Security 22(2):90–136

    Google Scholar 

  • Schabas W (2006) The UN international criminal tribunals: the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Shraga D, Zacklin R (1994) The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. European Journal of International Law 5(1):360–380

    Google Scholar 

  • Simonen K (2012) Qui s’excuse s’accuse… An Analysis of French Justifications for Intervening in Côte d’Ivoire. International Peacekeeping 19(3):363–376

    Google Scholar 

  • Sunga LS (1992) Individual responsibility in international law for serious human rights violations. Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht/London

    Google Scholar 

  • The Financial Times (1995) Personal View: How to Keep Sanctions in Proportion (18 May 1995)

    Google Scholar 

  • Tsebelis G (1990) Are Sanctions Effective? A Game-Theoretic Analysis. Journal of Conflict Resolution 34(1):3–28

    Google Scholar 

  • United Nations (1945) Charter of the United Nations

    Google Scholar 

  • United Nations (1997) The Relationship Between Economic Sanctions and Respect for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 8. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. UN Doc E/1998/22 (4 December 1997)

    Google Scholar 

  • United Nations (1999) Resolution 1267 (1999). Adopted by the Security Council at its 4051st meeting on 15 October 1999. UN Doc S/RES/1267 (1999)

    Google Scholar 

  • Von Braunmühl C, Kulessa M (1995) The Impact of UN Sanctions on Humanitarian Assistance Activities. A Report on a Study Commissioned by the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs. Gesellschaft für Communication Management Interkultur Training, Berlin

    Google Scholar 

  • Wallensteen P, Staibano C (eds) (2005) International Sanctions: Between Words and Wars in the Global System. Frank Cass, London/New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Weiss TG, All E (1997) Political gain and civilian pain: humanitarian impacts of economic sanctions. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Oxford/Lanham MD

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Francesco Giumelli .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2017 T.M.C. Asser Press and the authors

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Giumelli, F. (2017). Winning Without Killing: The Case for Targeted Sanctions. In: Ducheine, P., Osinga, F. (eds) Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies 2017. NL ARMS. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-189-0_6

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-189-0_6

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-6265-188-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-6265-189-0

  • eBook Packages: Law and CriminologyLaw and Criminology (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics