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Abstract

One of the types of mechanisms to be used to revolve a mass dispute, is the collective action. The Dutch collective action procedure is an important example of such type of procedure. In this chapter, the collective action procedure is clarified: who can commence such procedure, what can parties achieve and how can they achieve this (what are the procedural steps).

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Notes

  1. 1.

    In this period, several options were available for starting a collective procedure in a very specific case, such as misleading advertising. For example, see Parliamentary Documents, TK 1991–1992, 22486, nr. 3, pp. 8 et seq.

  2. 2.

    Parliamentary Documents TK 1991–1992, 22486, Official Journal 1994, 391. Last modification can be found in Official Journal 2000, 254.

  3. 3.

    Parliamentary Documents TK 2003–2004, 29414, Official Journal 2005, 380.

  4. 4.

    Parliamentary Documents TK 2008–2009, 31762, no. 1.

  5. 5.

    For an extensive analysis of the Dutch collective action see Frenk 1994, p. 105.

  6. 6.

    Parliamentary Documents TK 1991–1992, 22486, nr. 3, p. 2.

  7. 7.

    In Dutch: Sociaal-Economische Raad.

  8. 8.

    Parliamentary Documents TK 1991–1992, 22486, nr. 3, p. 2.

  9. 9.

    Ibid.

  10. 10.

    Ibid.

  11. 11.

    See Parliamentary Documents TK 1991–1992, 22486, nr. 3, p. 3.

  12. 12.

    The German KapMuG, for example, can be used only in a shareholder or shareholder-related dispute. The collective action is accessible in any kind of civil law dispute.

  13. 13.

    Hereafter, an interest group will mean an interest group that complies with the requirements of Article 3:305a DCC.

  14. 14.

    Article 2:30(1) DCC.

  15. 15.

    See Parliamentary Documents TK 1991–1992, 22486, nr. 3, p. 20.

  16. 16.

    Parliamentary Documents, TK 1993–1994, 22486, nr. 14.

  17. 17.

    Ibid. See also Cornegoor 2009, pp. 24–28 on the requirements for the interest group in collective actions.

  18. 18.

    This requirement is comparable to the US commonality test. It is, however, less strict.

  19. 19.

    District Court of Haarlem, 5 February 2002, JOR 2002, 102. See also: HR 23 December 2005, NJ 2006, 289.

  20. 20.

    See also Article 3:305a(1) DCC.

  21. 21.

    Parliamentary Documents TK 2011–2012, 33126, nr. 3, pp. 4–6, 12. For more information on the 2012 legislative change to the collective action see Klaassen 2013, p. 635; Tzankova et al. 2012, p. 39; De Jong 2011, 2012.

  22. 22.

    In a shareholders’ dispute, it is likely that the various shareholders did not hold the same number of shares in a company, so therefore the amount of damage differs among them. Moreover, the cause of the demonstrable loss can be influenced: for example, by using an intermediary.

  23. 23.

    Victims could use these options to give the interest group the power to claim damages for the victims. Although the claims could still be related to the individuals, they could be brought collectively.

  24. 24.

    Parliamentary Documents TK 1991–1992, 22486, nr. 3, p. 26. See also HR 1 July 1983, NJ 1984, 360 (Staat/LSV) and HR 14 juni 2002, NJ 2003, 689.

  25. 25.

    Parliamentary Documents TK 1991–1992, 22486, nr. 3, pp. 26–27.

  26. 26.

    An interest group can actually represent the victims in a collective action by, for example, starting negotiations for a possible settlement or resolution to the mass dispute. See parliamentary documents 1991–1992, 22486, nr. 3, p. 20 and Sect. 3.4 of this book. See also note (25), Groene Serie Privaatrecht - Vermogensrecht, Article 3:305a DCC in which is stated that there must always be an individual victim whose interest the interest group will have to defend (based on its articles of association).

  27. 27.

    See Article 3:305a(2) DCC.

  28. 28.

    Meijer 2007, p. 752.

  29. 29.

    HR 13 October 2006, RvdW 2006, 942 (Vie d’Or case). See also Cornegoor 2009, pp. 17–21.

  30. 30.

    HR 27 November 2009, LJN: BH 2162 (World Online case).

  31. 31.

    Private investors will probably have less detailed knowledge with respect to investments, that may allow them to avoid large-scale loss on their investment. As a consequence, it is more likely they will be confronted with situations which can be imputed to themselves.

  32. 32.

    HR 26 February 2010, LJN: BK5756 (Plazacasa case).

  33. 33.

    This proposal will be discussed in depth in Sect. 4.5.

  34. 34.

    See Parliamentary Documents II, 2011–2012, 33 126, nr. 3, p. 12.

  35. 35.

    See Parliamentary Documents II, 2011–2012, 33 126, nr. 2, p. 1. See also Parliamentary Documents II, 2011–2012, 33 126, nr. 3, pp. 13–14.

  36. 36.

    See Parliamentary Documents II, 2003–2004, 29414, nr. 3, p. 5.

  37. 37.

    See Parliamentary Documents II, 2003–2004, 29414, nr. 3, pp. 5–6.

  38. 38.

    See Parliamentary Documents II, 33 000 XIII, nr. 14 (motion of 8 November 2011).

  39. 39.

    See Lunsingh Scheurleer 2013, pp. 33–40. See also Van Dam-Lely et al. 2013, pp. 20 et seq.

  40. 40.

    Tzankova et al. 2009, pp. 95–125.

  41. 41.

    For an English summary of the proposal see: http://www.internetconsultatie.nl/motiedijksma/document/1177.

  42. 42.

    See for example the response of a number of large law firms from the Netherlands, accessible (in Dutch) at http://www.internetconsultatie.nl/motiedijksma/reactie/31216/bestand.

  43. 43.

    See for more information on the proposal Arons et al. 2014b; Bosters 2014. See for an insight on the status/usefulness of the collective action Arons et al. 2014a and Van der Velden et al. 2014.

  44. 44.

    See Lemstra et al. 2010, pp. 158 et seq. in which the draft claim code is discussed extensively. The text of the code can be found at http://www.consumentenbond.nl/morello-bestanden/pdf-algemeen-2013/compljuniclaimcodecomm2011.pdf (last accessed 30 January 2017). For an extensive discussion of the claim code see also De Jong 2010, pp. 239–242; Van Doorn 2013, pp. 548–556; Tzankova 2010, p. 137.

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Bosters, T. (2017). Dutch Collective Action. In: Collective Redress and Private International Law in the EU. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-186-9_3

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