Abstract
This part concludes the qualitative assessment of the effectiveness of the money-laundering offence by looking at legal role-players’ opinion and perception of the law. Issues that have emerged through the documental analysis are further discussed with experts and legal role-players. The interviews focus particularly on the size of the phenomenon of money laundering in Germany, on the legal framework’s technical appropriateness, on the conflicting interests, and finally, on the interviewees’ perceived (symbolic) effectiveness of the policy. Due to the fact that the enforcement of the money-laundering offence is strongly linked to other preventive and repressive measures, interviews consider also respondents’ opinion and perception on related regulations. Given the transnational nature of money laundering and of the anti-money laundering regulations, this part, whilst focusing on a national legal system, re-opens the perspective onto the global level. Some of the challenges faced at this global level to tackle money laundering, in fact, have an impact on the domestic dimension. At the same time, issues that are raised in the national context can be further theorised in a wider context.
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Notes
- 1.
Among others, see ‘OECD: Deutschland ist Geldwäsche-Paradies’ in Deutsche Wirtschafts Nachrichten, 18.01.13; Dick W, Germany, a safe haven for money laundering. Deutsche Welle, 30/10/2012; Rimpel K, Geldwäsche-Paradies Deutschland. Nummer acht unter den Steueroasen. Tz-online, 07/11/2013; Ramthum C, OECD: Deutschland versagt im Kampf gegen Geldwäsche. Wirtschaftswoche, 26/04/2014; Deutsche Presse Agentur, Steueroase Deutschland ist Eldorado für Geldwäsche. Handelsblatt, 07/11/2013; ‘Deutschland ein “Eldorado für Geldwäsche”?’ In Deutsche Welle, 07.11.2013; Netzwerk Steuergerechtigkeit, Deutschland ist ein Eldorado für Geldwäsche In Frankfurter Allgemein, 07.11.2013.
- 2.
The statement was recalled in various sources; among them a judges association in Hamburg (Hamburgerische Richterverein) invited the senior prosecutor to give a speech and quoted the statement in the report of the meeting. See Kaufmann 2011, p. 45.
- 3.
Henn et al. 2013, pp. 4–6.
- 4.
Interview with author 2014.
- 5.
Ibid.
- 6.
Ibid.
- 7.
Ibid.
- 8.
Ibid.
- 9.
Ibid.
- 10.
Ibid.
- 11.
Ibid.
- 12.
Ibid.
- 13.
Ibid.
- 14.
Ibid.
- 15.
Ibid.
- 16.
Ibid.
- 17.
Fiedler is deputy head of the federation of German Police Officers.
- 18.
Interview with author 2014.
- 19.
FATF 2014, p. 25. This has prevented the assessors formulating a judgement on the implementation of specific provisions relating to money laundering. In particular, comprehensive annual statistics were missing or not available, or both, in relation to, for instance, sanctions imposed for convictions pursuant to Article 261 of the GCC to legal persons; the value of transactions associated with STRs; the provisional measures applied. Already in 2010, the FATF assessors observed that ‘Nevertheless, given the high value of forfeitures and confiscations, assessors have no reason to doubt the authorities’ claim that provisional measures were being applied in Germany. There is the possibility, however, that the use of provisional measures could be improved to help increase the level of assets confiscated and forfeited compared to the total claim made by the State for confiscation and forfeiture. FATF 2010, p. 85.
- 20.
Interview with author 2014. ‘Organised crime is the planned violation of the law for profit or to acquire power, which offences are each, or together, of a major significance, and are carried out by more than two participants who co-operate within a division of labour for a long or undetermined time span using (a) commercial or commercial-like structures, or (b) violence or other means of intimidation, or (c) influence on politics, media, public administration, justice and the legitimate economy’ BKA, 1999, translation of Levi 1998, p. 335.
- 21.
Interview with author 2014.
- 22.
To use Dalla Chiesa’s words, especially in recent times there has been a growing ‘mythology’ surrounding the economic side of organised crime, in relation to the volume of profits deriving from illegal businesses reinvested in the legal economic circle. See Dalla Chiesa 2012, p. 11. The author highlights the importance of discerning grounded studies on the economic dimension of the Mafia from exaggerated theories that emphasize the volume of the Mafia business.
- 23.
Interview with author 2014.
- 24.
Ibid.
- 25.
Ibid.
- 26.
Ibid.
- 27.
Ibid.
- 28.
Ibid.
- 29.
Ibid.
- 30.
Ibid.
- 31.
Ibid.
- 32.
Unger et al. 2014, pp. 217–218.
- 33.
Ibid.
- 34.
Interview with author 2014.
- 35.
Ibid.
- 36.
According to the authors, the fact that the big banking sector attracts money launderers was particularly evident after the Arab Spring, when it was revealed that almost all political leaders and/or their relatives have had financial relations with Germany. See Henn et al. 2013, pp. 5, 7.
- 37.
FATF 2010, p. 9.
- 38.
Savona and Riccardi 2015, p. 37.
- 39.
Ibid.
- 40.
The respondent actually confirms in this way the theory that links the size of the legitimate economy to the size of the illegitimate economy. Interview with author 2014.
- 41.
Interview with author 2014.
- 42.
Ibid.
- 43.
Ibid.
- 44.
Ibid.
- 45.
Ibid.
- 46.
Ibid.
- 47.
Germany is listed the 10th position out of 168 countries assessed by the Transparency International. See Transparency International 2015.
- 48.
According to the authors, the fact that the big banking sector attracts money launderers was particularly evident after the Arab spring, when it was revealed that almost all political leaders and/or their relatives have had financial relations with Germany. Henn et al. 2013, pp. 5, 7.
- 49.
FATF, MER 2010, p. 9. The assessors report: ‘the excellence of the prosecutors from the public prosecution offices of the German Bundesländer, of the judges at the courts and the lawyers within the Ministry of Justice, their remarkable knowledge of the law, and their dedication to the responsibility that they have been entrusted with, confirms the solid foundation upon which the German system is established’. FATF 2010, p. 115.
- 50.
Hoeneß, President of Bayern Munich football team, was convicted on 13 March 2014 for tax evasion committed on speculative business in Switzerland. Rehle M, Hoeneß spekulierte Mithilfe mehrerer Banken. Die Zeit online, 26/03/2014.
- 51.
- 52.
In the meantime, on 23 March 2017 the German Parliament agreed on a law (Drucksache 18/9525) that introduces a non-conviction based type of confiscation measure (selbständige Einziehung) under article 76 a, para 4 of the GCC. The law allows a sort of reversal of the burden of proof in the context of organized crime and terrorism cases. See BT-Drucks 18/9525, pp. 14, 58.
- 53.
Interview with author 2014. Scarpinato has already been interviewed in 2011 and heard by different sources in Germany about the presence of organised crime and the consequent need for legal reforms. The prosecutor advocated specifically for the introduction of the crime of participation in a criminal organisation, a broader use of telephone tapping instruments and the reversal of the burden of proof. See Bund Deutscher Kriminalbeamter, Interview mit Generalstaatsanwalt Roberto Scarpinato. Blickpunkt 4, Kölner Stadt Anzeiger, 11/10/2012; Meyer U, Mafia-Jäger warnt in Hamburg vor sizilianischen Verhältnissen. Hamburger Abendblatt, 27/09/2011; Lüke U, Tagung in Köln über das organisierte Verbrechen. General Anzeiger Bonn, 15/10/2012; Stoldt T-R, Wie stark ist die Mafia in Nordrhein-Westfalen? Die Welt, 20/10/2012; Kreikenbaum U, Die Mafia kann relativ frei arbeiten. Kölner-stadt Anzeiger, 10/09/2015.
- 54.
Judge Scarpinato is famous for having also stated, indeed: ‘Es ist erstaunlich, dass in Deutschland die Angst vor dem Staat größer ist, als die vor der Mafia’. English translation: It is astonishing that in Germany the fear of the State is greater than the fear of the Mafia. See Kaufmann 2011, p. 45.
- 55.
Interview with author 2014.
- 56.
Ibid.
- 57.
The provision excludes criminal liability for those who participated in the predicate offences, out of the cases in which the offenders put in circulation the objects deriving from the offences, in order to conceal their illegitimate origin, under Article 261(9) 2 GCC. Article 1, BGBI. 2015 I, p. 2025.
- 58.
The principle derives from the application of Articles 1(1) and 2(1) of the German constitution (Grundgesetz, GG) on criminal proceedings. Article 1(1) GG states that Die Würde des Menschen ist unantastbar. Sie zu achten und zu schützen ist Verpflichtung aller staatlichen Gewalt (Human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all state authority); Article 2(1) GG declares that Jeder hat das Recht auf die freie Entfaltung seiner Persönlichkeit, soweit er nicht die Rechte anderer verletzt und nicht gegen die verfassungsmäßige Ordnung oder das Sittengesetz verstößt (Every person shall have the right to free development of his personality insofar as he does not violate the rights of others or offend the constitutional order or the moral law).
- 59.
Interview with author 2014.
- 60.
Ibid.
- 61.
‘The investigation reaches the conclusion that self-laundering must remain exempt from separate punishment. The text is based on an expert report, which was commissioned by the Federal Ministry of Justice of the Federal Republic of Germany. It was prompted mainly by the FATF’s ‘Mutual Evaluation Report on Germany of 19 February 2010’. See Schröder 2013.
- 62.
Interview with author 2014.
- 63.
Ibid.
- 64.
Ibid.
- 65.
Ibid.
- 66.
The opinion of the Ministry of Finance in respect of the need to change § 261 of GCC and the deficits in legal practice with respect to the grounds excluding liability under § 261(9)(2) relating to self money laundering VII A 3-VK 5160/06/0002:005, 2013, p. 1 (unpublished).
- 67.
Interview with author 2014.
- 68.
The Fourth Anti-Money Laundering Directive under Article 3 lists a number of predicate crimes that have to be included by Member States.
- 69.
Interview with author 2014.
- 70.
Opinion expressly stated by Parliament. Confiscation should have impeded the proceeds of crime constituting the ‘operating capital’ (Betriebskapital) for the commission of further offences. See BT-Drucks 12/2720, p. 2.
- 71.
Interview with author 2014.
- 72.
Ibid.
- 73.
Ibid.
- 74.
BT-Drucks 12/3533, 1992, p. 11.
- 75.
FATF 2010, p. 85.
- 76.
Under European law a beneficial owner is ‘any natural person(s) who ultimately owns or controls the customer and/or the natural person(s) on whose behalf a transaction or activity is being conducted and includes at least’ a series of natural persons. Article 3 of the Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Directive 2006/70/EC, OJ L 141, 5.6.2015, p. 73–117. (a) in the case of corporate entities: (i) the natural person(s) who ultimately owns or controls a legal entity through direct or indirect ownership of a sufficient percentage of the shares or voting rights or ownership interest in that entity, including through bearer shareholdings, or through control via other means, other than a company listed on a regulated market that is subject to disclosure requirements consistent with Union law or subject to equivalent international standards which ensure adequate transparency of ownership information. A shareholding of 25% plus one share or an ownership interest of more than 25% in the customer held by a natural person shall be an indication of direct ownership. A shareholding of 25% plus one share or an ownership interest of more than 25% in the customer held by a corporate entity, which is under the control of a natural person(s), or by multiple corporate entities, which are under the control of the same natural person(s), shall be an indication of indirect ownership. This applies without prejudice to the right of Member States to decide that a lower percentage may be an indication of ownership or control. Control through other means may be determined, inter alia, in accordance with the criteria in Article 22(1)–(5) of Directive 2013/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on the annual financial statements, consolidated financial statements and related reports of certain types of undertakings, amending Directive 2006/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC Text with EEA relevance; (ii) if, after having exhausted all possible means and provided there are no grounds for suspicion, no person under point (i) is identified, or if there is any doubt that the person(s) identified are the beneficial owner(s), the natural person(s) who hold the position of senior managing official(s), the obliged entities shall keep records of the actions taken in order to identify the beneficial ownership under point (i) and this point; (b) in the case of trusts: (i) the settlor; (ii) the trustee(s); (iii) the protector, if any; (iv) the beneficiaries, or where the individuals benefiting from the legal arrangement or entity have yet to be determined, the class of persons in whose main interest the legal arrangement or entity is set up or operates; (v) any other natural person exercising ultimate control over the trust by means of direct or indirect ownership or by other means; (c) in the case of legal entities such as foundations, and legal arrangements similar to trusts, the natural person(s) holding equivalent or similar positions to those referred to in point (b).
- 77.
Given the most recent developments in European law, soon there will be a European central register of beneficial owners of companies. The details of this novelty are explained in Part II. On the current debate about the introduction of a public register, see among others Meinzer 2016.
- 78.
Interview with author 2014.
- 79.
Henn et al. 2013, pp. 33–40.
- 80.
A report commissioned by the EU Commission on the effectiveness of asset recovery mechanism states that the Federal Financial Services Supervisory Authority (BaFin) has access to a database for basic data of account details of naturalised persons and legal entities in Germany, which is made available on request to law enforcement authorities in the process of investigation. Irvin and Levi 2009, p. 51.
- 81.
Interview with author 2014.
- 82.
Ibid.
- 83.
For example, according to a report published by the Global Agenda Council on Organized Crime, the use of complex cross-border schemes of corporate vehicles with a ‘Chinese box’ structure to conceal identities and hide illegal proceeds is considered to be an ‘enabler’ of money laundering. Organised crime enablers include ‘the individuals, mechanism and facilities used for primarily legal purposes that are adapted for criminal objectives. They play an important role in facilitating organized crime activities, whether intentionally or inadvertently, increasing its benefits and scale, and predominantly reducing its risks’. According to the report, the hiding of the offenders’ identity behind the veil of beneficial ownerships, in particular, is essential for providing an appearance of legality and thus avoiding prosecution and confiscation. See Global Agenda Council on Organised Crime 2012, p. 15.
- 84.
FATF 2010, p. 146. Yet according to a study commissioned by the European Commission in 2009 approximately 15 Member States agreed that the European definition of beneficial owner is clear and not too wide. However, the definition is only clear in the case of simple corporate structures or companies; where multi-level holding structures are concerned, the notion is still vague. See Deloitte 2009, pp. 66–67.
- 85.
- 86.
Henn et al. 2013, pp. 33–40.
- 87.
Interview with author 2014.
- 88.
See Part II, Sect. 2.2.5
- 89.
Interview with author 2014.
- 90.
Ibid.
- 91.
Article 12 of the United Nations Declaration on Human rights (1948): No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.
- 92.
For example, politically persecuted individuals can use secrecy to secure their assets from being confiscated by authoritarian regimes. Secrecy can also be in the interest of the family. For instance, the original purpose of trusts (financial tools which provide secrecy) was to promote the protection of spouses who are unable to look after their own affairs.
- 93.
The veil of secrecy can be a bar to investigations, thus a guarantee of impunity. For example, secrecy has been used by corrupt dictators around the world to conceal stolen assets. See Baker 2005, p. 238.
- 94.
Global Agenda Council on Organised Crime 2012, p. 8.
- 95.
Interview with author 2014.
- 96.
Ibid.
- 97.
Ibid.
- 98.
Ibid.
- 99.
Ibid.
- 100.
Ibid.
- 101.
Ibid.
- 102.
Ibid.
- 103.
Oswald 1997, p. 208.
- 104.
Interview with author 2014.
- 105.
Ibid.
- 106.
Oswald 1997, p. 149.
- 107.
Interview with author 2014.
- 108.
Ibid.
- 109.
Unger et al. 2013, p. 21.
- 110.
Ibid.
- 111.
The German Parliament, after eleven years, ratified UNCAC, so that it came into force on 12 December 2014, see BGBI 2015 II, p. 140. A specific delay in implementing the Third Directive was encountered in many states; however, this was not linked to the quality of the directive but rather to internal matters. Unger et al. 2014, pp. 144–145.
- 112.
Interview with author 2014.
- 113.
Ibid.
- 114.
Article 170(2) Conclusion of the Investigation Proceedings of the German Code of Criminal procedure: In all other cases the public prosecution office shall terminate the proceedings. The public prosecutor shall notify the accused thereof if he was examined as such or a warrant of arrest was issued against him; the same shall apply if he requested such notice or if there is a particular interest in the notification.
- 115.
Interview with author 2014.
- 116.
Ibid.
- 117.
Ibid.
- 118.
On the most recent developments, see Footnote 52.
- 119.
The institute proposed would be similar to the one regulated by Article 935 BGB, Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, which regulates the ‘No good faith acquisition of lost property’. Interview with author 2014.
- 120.
Interview with author 2014.
- 121.
Ibid.
- 122.
Ibid.
- 123.
Ibid.
- 124.
Ibid.
- 125.
Ibid.
- 126.
Ibid.
- 127.
Ibid.
- 128.
Unger et al. 2014, pp. 240–241.
- 129.
Proceeds of crime are usually considered properties deriving from the commission of a criminal offence; for example, money obtained from drug smuggling is ab initio criminal. Monies deriving from tax evasion, are, instead, lawfully earned, but may become tainted, for example, when not declared or when retained due to fraudulent tax deductions. This has raised criticism, on the basis that the proceeds of tax evasion are different in nature from profits of conventional criminality; yet, even though the underlying conduct which generates the proceeds may be legal, it is the retention of the money that should be paid over as tax which constitutes the criminal conduct. It might be argued that proceeds of crime are monies ‘derived from or obtained, directly or indirectly, through the commission of an offence’ (Article 2 of UNCAC), and therefore monies retained are not included. However, it is the evasion of taxes that generates the illicit profits. It can be, thus, argued that those profits derive from an offence. Another controversial issue is related to tax evasion committed abroad. The traditional approach is, in fact, that countries are not supposed to enforce other countries’ revenue laws. Some jurisdictions, therefore, do not consider tax offences predicate crimes if committed abroad.
- 130.
This was, for instance, revealed through the questionnaires submitted to credit institutions by Oswald in which employees lamented the fact that they were not able to discern proceeds of predicate offences from money laundering from capital flight. See Oswald 1997, p. 144.
- 131.
Pieth 1993, pp. 102 ss.
- 132.
- 133.
Interview with author 2014.
- 134.
Henn et al. 2013.
- 135.
Interview with author 2014.
- 136.
Ibid.
- 137.
Ibid.
- 138.
Ibid.
- 139.
Ibid.
- 140.
Ibid.
- 141.
Ibid.
- 142.
Ibid.
- 143.
Ibid.
- 144.
- 145.
Interview with author 2014.
- 146.
Ibid.
- 147.
Ibid.
- 148.
Ibid.
- 149.
Ibid.
- 150.
Ibid.
- 151.
Ibid.
- 152.
Ibid.
- 153.
Ibid.
- 154.
Ibid.
- 155.
Ibid.
- 156.
Ibid.
- 157.
Ibid.
- 158.
Ibid.
- 159.
See for example Andreas and Nadelmann 2006. For a more complete overview on the literature, see Part II.
- 160.
BT-Drucks 12/989, p. 21.
- 161.
See Part II, Sect. 2.3
- 162.
Interview with author 2014.
- 163.
Ibid.
- 164.
Ibid.
- 165.
Ibid.
- 166.
Ibid.
- 167.
Ibid.
- 168.
Ibid.
- 169.
Ibid.
- 170.
BMF ‘Stellungnahme des BMF zum Änderungsbedarf bei § 261 GCC und Defiziten in der Rechtspraxis aufgrund des Strafausschließungsgrundes des § 261 Abs. 9 S. 2 GCC bei der Selbstgeldwäsche’. VII A 3-VK 5160/06/000:005, 2013, p. 3 (unpublished).
- 171.
Interview with author 2014.
- 172.
Ibid.
- 173.
Ibid.
- 174.
Ibid. If one assumes that the policy was enacted with the function of allowing also the starting of other proceedings, one can infer that the legislation is indeed effective in achieving this effect. The same effect has been studied in relation to criminal law provisions in the field of terrorism. See Hawickhorst 2011.
- 175.
Ibid.
- 176.
For the definition of ‘Zielunabhängige Effizienz’, see Part I, Sect. 1.3
- 177.
Interview with author 2014.
- 178.
Ibid.
- 179.
Ibid.
- 180.
Ibid.
- 181.
Ibid.
- 182.
Ibid.
- 183.
Ibid.
- 184.
FATF 2010, p. 265.
- 185.
Deloitte, European Commission Final Study on the Application of the Anti-Money Laundering Directive, Service Contract ETD/2009/IM/F2/90, 2009, p. 139.
- 186.
FATF 2010, p. 110.
- 187.
Ibid.
- 188.
Council Directive EU/2015/849, OJ L 141/73-115.
- 189.
The BaFin regularly undergoes an assessment. If it is found that improper implementation is widespread and therefore reflects more systemic problems, this would be published in the BaFin annual report.
- 190.
Interview with author 2014.
- 191.
Ibid.
- 192.
Ibid.
- 193.
Oswald 1997, p. 293.
- 194.
Interview with author 2014.
- 195.
Ibid.
- 196.
Ibid.
- 197.
Ibid.
- 198.
Ibid.
- 199.
FATF 2010, p. 64.
- 200.
Ibid.
- 201.
Ibid., p. 116.
- 202.
Ibid., p. 115.
- 203.
Interview with author 2014.
- 204.
Ibid.
- 205.
Ibid.
- 206.
Ibid.
- 207.
Ibid.
- 208.
Ibid.
- 209.
Ibid.
- 210.
Ibid.
- 211.
Ibid.
- 212.
Ibid.
- 213.
See the hypothesis on the potential use of Article 261 of the GCC for investigative purposes described in Part IV.
- 214.
Interview with author 2014. Article 100 of the German Code of Criminal Procedure has given rise to lively debate in Germany because investigations conducted by way of telephone tapping are considered to be too invasive of the personal sphere and thus violate the right to privacy of the individuals.
- 215.
Interview with author 2014.
- 216.
FATF 2010, pp. 105–106.
- 217.
Merton 1983, p. 201.
- 218.
Term used by Münch to describe the phenomenon of innocent private persons’ bank accounts used by offenders to launder money through ‘financial agents’. See Münch T, Bauernopfer. Wie Privatleute zur Geldwäsche missbraucht werden. Sächsische Zeitung, 20/02/2016.
- 219.
The example is described in a report published by Action Aid on ‘aggressive tax avoidance’ carried out by the second biggest brewery in the world, SAB Miller. The multinational corporation, through a system of misinvoicing managed not to pay taxes on the profits made in Ghana, by declaring a profit equivalent to zero. This was shown not to be true by the report that revealed that, while the company based in Ghana registered no profit, the sister companies based in tax havens did. Actually, the Ghanaian company managed to move almost all of its profits to those countries through misinvoicing. This scheme is about tax avoidance and not evasion. Yet, while being perfectly legal, it does not seem very fair. See Action Aid 2012.
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Zoppei, V. (2017). Opinions on the Anti-Money Laundering Regime. The Implementation of the Law from the Perspective of Legal Actors and Experts. In: Anti-money Laundering Law: Socio-legal Perspectives on the Effectiveness of German Practices. International Criminal Justice Series, vol 12. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-180-7_7
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