Subjectivity Reflected in the Common Law Tradition

Steer, Cassandra

doi:10.1007/978-94-6265-171-5_6

Subjectivity Reflected in the Common Law Tradition

Cassandra Steer⁵

Chapter
First Online: 28 February 2017

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Part of the book series: International Criminal Justice Series ((ICJS,volume 9))

Abstract

This chapter undertakes the first part of the comparative study in this book, focusing on collective and leadership liability in the common law tradition. First a historical picture is painted of the horizontal approach to legal and political authority in this tradition, and why this tends towards a criminal trial that has lay decision makers and judges whose task it is to act as umpires between two competing versions of the truth. These factors influence the way in which liability has developed as a simplified system, which accessible to those lay juries, and which preferences a just policy outcome in each individual case over systemic consistency. This is one of the reasons why a functionally unitary system has typically emerged in the common law tradition. As a corollary of this, there is a heavy emphasis on subjectivity, or the shared will of those implicated in collective crimes, rather than on the actual contribution made by any individual. Illustrative of this are the comparisons made between the systems of liability in the USA and Canada. In the US, this subjectivity is particulary evident in the unique development of conspiracy as a mode of liability, with far-reaching consequences for extended liability, where a member of a collective commits crimes that go beyond the original agreement. In Canada, no such mode of liability exists, and there is rather a trend to limit extended or constructed liability, due to the notion of ‘fundamental principles of justice’ in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. There are lessons to be learned from both these jurisdictions in terms of leadership liability for mass atrocity, especially when comparing the policy reasons behind the development of modes of liability.

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Notes

1.
Glenn 2010, p. 242.
2.
Leflar 1971, p. 320; Glenn 2010, p. 243.
3.
Milsom 2003, p. 8.
4.
Glenn 2010, p. 244.
5.
Glenn 2010, p. 247.
6.
Lempert 2008, p. 403; Milsom 2003, p. 9; Glenn 2010, p. 257.
7.
Fukuyama 2011, p. 256.
8.
Fukuyama 2011, p. 257.
9.
Leflar 1971, p. 323; Glenn 2010, p. 252.
10.
Damaška 1984, p. 104; Glenn 2010, p. 257.
11.
Glenn 2010, p. 260.
12.
See Sect. 7.5.4 on objectivity as reflected in the civil law tradition.
13.
Fletcher 2011, p. 181.
14.
Fletcher 2011, p. 180.
15.
Damaška 1984.
16.
Damaška 1984, pp. 24–25.
17.
Duncan v Louisiana 1968, p. 149.
18.
Criminal Code 1985, s. 495(2)(c); Statistics Canada 2010.
19.
Criminal Code 1985, s. 471.
20.
Statistics Canada 2010, providing data on adult criminal court statistics most recently for 2010–2011.
21.
Damaška 1984, p. 24.
22.
Cunningham 2006, p. 775.
23.
Damaška 1984, p. 65.
24.
Damaška 1984, p. 119.
25.
Damaška 1984, p. 104.
26.
Cunningham 2006, p. 748.
27.
Cunningham 2006, p. 749; Glenn 2010, p. 17.
28.
Cunningham 2006, p. 750.
29.
Cunningham 2006, p. 758.
30.
Cunningham 2006, p. 759.
31.
Cunningham 2006, p. 770.
32.
Cunningham 2006, p. 773.
33.
Watson 1983, p. 1125; Glenn 2010, p. 263.
34.
Roach 2012, p. 21; Glenn 2010, p. 267.
35.
Glenn 2010, p. 269.
36.
Blackstone Commentaries, cited in Kadish et al. 2007, p. 590.
37.
Kadish et al. 2007, p. 590; Manning and Sankoff 2009, pp. 246–247.
38.
Garner 2009, p. 16.
39.
Blackstone Commentaries, cited in Kadish et al. 2007, p. 590.
40.
For the definition of ‘accessory’ liability as derivative liability, see Sect. 5.3.6.3.
41.
van Sliedregt 2012, p. 112.
42.
This is due in large part to the formulation of solicitation as an inchoate crime in the Model Penal Code § 5.02. Many states have otherwise criminalised solicitation of specific offences such as prostitution or murder, Dressler et al. 2001, p. 421.
43.
Criminal Code 1985, s. 21.
44.
Garner 2009, p. 16.
45.
Cited in Ashworth 2011, p. 539.
46.
Glenn 2010, p. 263.
47.
LaFave 1986, p. 2.
48.
Kadish et al. 2007, p. 534.
49.
Fletcher 2000, p. 406.
50.
Dressler et al. 2001, p. 31.
51.
Lynch 2003, p. 223.
52.
Lynch 2003, p. 224.
53.
For the distinction between a normative and descriptive understanding of the principle of culpability, see Sect. 5.3.5. See further Fletcher 2007, p. 308.
54.
Kadish 1980, p. 10; Fletcher 2000, p. 400.
55.
It should be noted that there are some constitutional limitations on the allowance of presumptions or permissive inferences as proof of the required mental state beyond reasonable doubt; Kadish et al. 2007, p. 220.
56.
The old common law crime definitions tended to distinguish between ‘intentionally’ on the one hand, and ‘recklessly’ or ‘negligently’ on the other hand, however this terminology was inconsistent across time and across different state jurisdictions, and led to confusion. See Dressler et al. 2001, p. 121.
57.
MPC 1962, § 2.02(2)(a).
58.
MPC 1962, § 2.02(2)(b).
59.
Fletcher 2000, p. 443.
60.
Dressler et al. 2001, p. 121.
61.
MPC 1962, § 2.02(2)(c).
62.
MPC 1962, § 2.02(2)(d), empahsis added.
63.
Fletcher 2000, p. 442.
64.
According to the federal law statute 18 USC § 3. See also Garner 2009, under ‘accessory after the fact’, p. 16.
65.
Kadish et al. 2007, p. 590.
66.
Wiesberg 2000, p. 222.
67.
Wiesberg 2000, p. 220.
68.
Dressler et al. 2001, pp. 473–475.
69.
Kadish et al. 2007, p. 590.
70.
Kadish et al. 2007, p. 591.
71.
This is the sentencing-oriented approach associated with a functionally unitary system , as described in Sect. 5.3.1. See further Vogel 2002, p. 159.
72.
For the full text of the MPC articles on liability, see Appendix A.2.
73.
American Law Institute 1985, p. 299.
74.
Lynch 2003, p. 222.
75.
MPC 1962, § 2.06(1).
76.
MPC 1962, § 2.06(2)(a).
77.
MPC 1962, § 2.06(2)(c).
78.
MPC 1962 § 2.06(3)(a)(i) and (ii) respectively. Under (iii), an ommission where there is a legal duty to prevent the commission of an offense also falls under complicity.
79.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota found that attaching vicarious liability to the owner of a restaurant for the illegal sale of alcohol to a minor by one of his employees would have far-reaching unjust consequences for the restaurant owner. It should be noted that he neither had any awareness of the actions of his employee, nor did he in any way implicitly ratify them. State v Guminga 1986.
80.
State v Akers 1979.
81.
Garner 2009, p. 18, under ‘accomplice’.
82.
MPC 1962, § 2.06 (1).
83.
Dressler et al. 2001, p. 466.
84.
Prettyman 1996, p. 1018.
85.
Dressler et al. 2001, p. 467.
86.
Kadish et al. 2007, p. 590.
87.
MPC 1962, § 2.06(7). For a long time, differences between justifications and excuses in this respect were disregarded in the common law. Thus even if the physical perpetrator could make a claim to a justification defence, this did not necessarily flow down as a defence for an accomplice. Once again, the presence of a lay jury, and the absence of any requirement for giving reasons for an acquittal, leads to the conflation of these two different types of defences and their consequences for an accomplice. However there does seem to appear to be a distinction made in judge’s instructions in more recent case law. Fletcher 2000, pp. 652, 634.
88.
Croy 1985.
89.
Dressler et al. 2001, p. 466; Kadish et al. 2007, p. 589.
90.
State v Hayes 1891.
91.
Backun v United States 1940, p. 637.
92.
United States v Peoni 1938, p. 402; For an analysis of this formulation and its subsequent application in case law, see Wiesberg 2000, p. 236.
93.
American Law Institute 1985, p. 310.
94.
Dressler et al. 2001, p. 475.
95.
Dressler et al. 2001, p. 477.
96.
Hicks 1893.
97.
Hicks 1893.
98.
State v Gladstone 1970; State v McKeown 1979; State v Wilson 1981.
99.
There is also a narrow possibility for complicity by omission. Some courts have been willing to define a failure to act or intervene in a crime as accomplice liability, see in which a father not only stood by while his son raped a young woman in his house, but he also told her he could not help her when she screamed for him to stop his son, State v Davis 1989; see also Stanciel 1992, in which a mother was convicted as an accomplice to her boyfriend who beat her 3 year old daughter to death, for failure to protect her child. However the MPC requires a legal duty to act before such accomplice liability by omission is punishable, MPC 1962, § 2.06(3)(a)(iii).
100.
Prettyman 1996, p. 1020.
101.
People v Luparello 1987; citing Croy 1985.
102.
Concurring opinion Weiner J., People v Luparello 1987.
103.
Prettyman 1996.
104.
Prettyman 1996; Roy 1995.
105.
Roy 1995, p. 1105; Dressler et al. 2001, p. 483.
106.
Dressler et al. 2001, p. 484.
107.
Dressler et al. 2001, p. 484; Comment to § 2.06, American Law Institute 1985, p. 312, note 42.
108.
Comment to § 2.06, American Law Institute 1985, p. 312, note 42.
109.
People v Stamp 1969.
110.
Fletcher 1981, p. 427.
111.
For a full discussion of these debates, see Sect. 8.2.
112.
Harvard Note 1959, p. 923. This academic ‘note’ is considered an authoritative treatise on the law of conspiracy in the US which, even if somewhat dated, still serves as a background text for understanding conspiracy in American jurisprudence. See further Tigar 1986, p. 127.
113.
Harvard Note 1959, p. 922, citing an American case from 1842.
114.
LaFave 1986, p. 454.
115.
Fletcher 2000, p. 222.
116.
Ashworth 2009, p. 448.
117.
Ashworth 2009, p. 449.
118.
Ashworth 2009, p. 448; Harvard Note 1959, p. 923.
119.
Morrison v. California 1934, p. 92.
120.
Comment on § 5.03 American Law Institute 1985, p. 393.
121.
Dressler et al. 2001, p. 449.
122.
Justice Jackson’s expression in his critical analysis of the ever-expanding doctrine, in Harrison v the United States 1925.
123.
Harvard Note 1959.
124.
State v. Carbone 1952.
125.
Harvard Note 1959, p. 923.
126.
The United States v Feola 1975, p. 694.
127.
Dressler et al. 2001, p. 433.
128.
Jimenez Recio 2003, p. 274, citing Salinas v United States, 522 U.S. 52, 65 (1997).
129.
Harvard Note 1959, p. 928; Dressler et al. 2001, p. 433.
130.
Krulewitch 1949.
131.
Harrison v the United States 1925.
132.
MPC 1962, § 1.07(1)(b); Comment to § 1.07, American Law Institute 1985, p. 109.
133.
Dressler et al. 2001, p. 432; Kadish et al. 2007, p. 664.
134.
Krulewitch 1949; Katyal 2003.
135.
Dressler et al. 2001, p. 435.
136.
Pilsbury 2009, p. 339.
137.
Kadish et al. 2007, p. 668.
138.
Krulewitch 1949, p. 445.
139.
State v. Carbone 1952, p. 574; See Harvard Note 1959, p. 926.
140.
Krulewitch 1949, p. 445.
141.
MPC 1962, § 5.03; American Law Institute 1985, p. 97; Fletcher 2000, p. 221.
142.
Interstate Circuit, Inc. 1939.
143.
United States v. James 1976.
144.
In fact he had been arrested on unrelated immigration charges prior to the September 11 attacks, and the conspiracy charges came later. United States v. Moussaoui 2006; Kadish et al. 2007, p. 692.
145.
A notable exception is the questionable result in Griffin v. State 1970, in which a motorist was loudly protesting the traffic violation for which a police officer had stopped him. A crowd gathered and when the officer attempted to arrest Griffin, Griffin pushed him to the ground and members of the crowd began to assault the officer. The defendant was convicted for conspiring to commit assault, but it remains unclear whether there was any tacit agreement between the individuals rather than a spontaneous ‘mob mentality’ response amounting to mere parallel action. See Ohlin 2011, p. 44.
146.
United States v. Garcia 1998.
147.
Such as that found in Interstate Circuit, Inc. 1939.
148.
United States v. Garcia 1998, pp. 1245–1246.
149.
Rex v. Murphy 1837, p. 508.
150.
Kadish et al. 2007, p. 693.
151.
18 USC § 371.
152.
§ 5.03(5) MPC 1962.
153.
Pilsbury 2009, p. 344.
154.
Harvard Note 1959, p. 946.
155.
Harvard Note 1959, p. 946.
156.
Fletcher 2000, p. 224.
157.
Pilsbury 2009, p. 349.
158.
People v. Lauria 1967, p. 471.
159.
United States v. Falcone 1940.
160.
Direct Sales Co. v. United States 1943.
161.
It may also be of importance for some procedural issues such as to which hearsay evidence may or may not be accepted against a co-conspirator, the jurisdictional question of locus delicti, and, as discussed above, the question whether a conspiracy with respect to an individual defendant has been corroborated by an overt act of another person who is part of that same conspiracy. Dressler et al. 2001, p. 454.
162.
See Chap. 8 on modes of liability in the international tribunals.
163.
In the leading case it was found that the facts did not support the charge of a single conspiracy, however the notion of a ‘wheel conspiracy’ has since become a conceptual reference. Kotteakos v. United States 1946; Dressler et al. 2001, p. 454.
164.
Roach 2012, p. 106.
165.
United States v. Bruno 1939.
166.
Harvard Note 1959, p. 934.
167.
Harvard Note 1959, p. 934.
168.
See Sect. 8.6.
169.
Dressler et al. 2001, p. 493.
170.
American Law Institute 1985, Comment to § 5.03, p. 387.
171.
Pinkerton 1946.
172.
Pinkerton 1946, p. 642.
173.
Pinkerton 1946, p. 651.
174.
Pinkerton 1946, p. 647.
175.
Pinkerton 1946, p. 648.
176.
State v. Bridges 1993.
177.
United States v. Alvarez 1985.
178.
The facts did not support such an exclusion for the appellants in Alvarez, but the rule is now accepted, based also on cases cited by the court: Government of Virgin Islands v. Dowling, 633 F.2d 660, (3rd. Cir. 1980) and Park v. Huff, 506 F.2d 849, (5th Cir. 1975). See also State v Walton 1993.
179.
Justice Routledege, partial dissent Pinkerton 1946, p. 650.
180.
State v. Nevarez 2005, p. 1158; see also American Law Institute 1985, p. 307, comment to § 2.06.
181.
People v. McGee 1979, pp. 1181–1182.
182.
Bolden v. State 2005; Kadish et al. 2007, p. 683.
183.
For discussion on the similarities, and more importantly on the ways in which conspiracy as a domestic mode of liability has influenced the development of JCE on the international plane, see Sect. 8.6.
184.
American Law Institute 1985, p. 426.
185.
Kadish et al. 2007, p. 683.
186.
Fletcher 2000, p. 219.
187.
See Ohlin 2007, p. 160.
188.
Hamdan 2006.
189.
Hamdan 2006, p. 40.
190.
Yamashita 1946-02-04.
191.
Ex Parte Quirin 1942.
192.
Hamdan 2006, 47.
193.
Justice Thomas, dissenting opinion Hamdan 2006, p. 12.
194.
Curry 2006, p. 653.
195.
For a discussion of the importance of fair labelling , see further Sect. 10.4.
196.
Oderkerk 2001, p. 317.
197.
Canadian Charter 1985.
198.
Fletcher 2007, p. 101.
199.
Ashworth 2011, p. 450.
200.
Lafontaine 2012, pp. 23, 28, 32.
201.
s. 91(27) of the Constitution Act of 1867 establishes sole jurisdiction of federal Parliament over criminal law.
202.
Criminal Code 1985.
203.
Manning and Sankoff 2009, p. 6.
204.
Manning and Sankoff 2009, p. 22.
205.
Enacted as part of the Constitution Act 1982, c. 11 (UK), by the United Kingdom Parliament, which entrenched the Charter in the constitution.
206.
s. 52(1) Constitution Act provides that the Constitution, including the Charter, is the supreme law of the land, and that any law inconsistent with it is of no force or effect.
207.
Sections 8 through 14 of the Charter list procedural rights such as the right to be free of arbitrary arrest or search and seizure, the right to a fair trial , the rules of nemo tenitur, ne bis in idem and others.
208.
Roach 2004, p. 54.
209.
Reference re Motor Vehicle Act 1985, p. 498.
210.
Reference re Motor Vehicle Act 1985, p. 498.
211.
Roach 2012, p. 163; Manning and Sankoff 2009, p. 148; Stuart et al 2012, p. 6.
212.
Reference re Motor Vehicle Act 1985, p. 503.
213.
Criminal Code 1985, s. 473 For various offences the accused may choose to waive this right and be tried by a judge only.
214.
Less than 10 % of all criminal charges end in a jury trial. See Statistics Canada 2010, providing data on adult criminal court statistics most recently for 2010–2011.
215.
Roach 2012, p. 22; Stuart 2007, p. 66.
216.
The Motor Vehicles Act created a regulatory offence for driving a vehicle while the person is prohibited from driving or has had their licence suspended, whether or not the driver knew of the prohibition or suspension. Reference re Motor Vehicle Act 1985.
217.
The Court thereby created the possibility to strike down legislation that it finds is not in accordance with unstated ‘principles of fundamental justice’, even if it does not violate any specific provision of the Charter: Manning and Sankoff 2009, p. 64.
218.
This follows the wording of the Supreme Court in a case decided before the enactment of the Charter, which nonetheless concerned the same issue: Sault Ste Marie 1978.
219.
Roach 2012, p. 163; Manning and Sankoff 2009, p. 148.
220.
The Law Reform Commission itself existed temporarily from 1971 to 1993 and from 1997 to 2006, with many successful law reform projects. However the project to review the Criminal Code was never completed. See Bailey 2009. See also Roach 2012, p. 7.
221.
Creighton 1993.
222.
Roach 2012, p. 165; Stuart 2007, p. 219.
223.
Manning and Sankoff 2009, p. 162.
224.
In the Criminal Code there are some offences which stipulate knowledge as the required mental state, such as defamatory libel, which requires that the accused knows the information is false, see s. 300 Criminal Code 1985. However many offences which do not include any required mental state have been interpreted as requiring knowledge of the circumstances, such as possession of narcotics. For example s. 4 Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, (S.C. 1996) c. 19, see Manning and Sankoff 2009, p. 178.
225.
Manning and Sankoff 2009, p. 180.
226.
Sansregret 1985.
227.
Manning and Sankoff 2009, p. 174.
228.
Manning and Sankoff 2009, pp. 152, 186.
229.
Ashworth 2009, p. 186; Healy 1993, p. 266.
230.
Healy 1993, p. 266.
231.
Stuart et al 2012, p. 361.
232.
Fletcher 2007, p. 101.
233.
Paciocco 2014, p. 11.
234.
Sault Ste Marie 1978; Confirmed in Théroux 1993. This presumptive principle was the basis of a controversial decision in 1980, where a defendant accused of rape was acquitted because he argued that he honestly believed the victim was consenting, despite the fact that there was serious doubt as to whether this was a ‘reasonable belief’ in the circumstances. The Criminal Code was later modified to reject this defence of mistaken belief, unless the defendant can prove having taken reasonable steps to ascertain whether the complainant was in fact consenting. See Pappajohn 1980; see also Criminal Code 1985, s. 273.2.
235.
Reference re Motor Vehicle Act 1985.
236.
Vaillancourt 1987, para 652.
237.
Vaillancourt 1987, para 653.
238.
Martineau 1990; Logan 1990.
239.
Manning and Sankoff 2009, p. 161; Paciocco 2014, p. 12; Roach 2012, p. 71.
240.
Paciocco 2014, p. 12.
241.
Wholesale Travel 1991; Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical 1992.
242.
De Sousa 1992.
243.
A similar conclusion was drawn in 1993, with respect to the offence of dangerous driving, for which the standard was determined to be ‘a marked departure from the standard of care of a reasonable person’; Hundal 1993, p. 884.
244.
Healy 1993; Paciocco 2014, p. 13; Thomson 1994, p. 400.
245.
Creighton 1993; Naglik 1993.
246.
Healy 1993, pp. 3, 4; Paciocco 2014.
247.
Healy 1993, p. 2.
248.
Berryman 1990, Part IV.
249.
The old common law distinction of accessory after the fact has maintained a place in the Criminal Code in s. 23, but will not receive attention here. For the full text of the Criminal Code articles on party liability, see the Appendix A.3.
250.
Roach 2013, p. 310.
251.
As affirmed in much case law, see for instance Briscoe 2010, para 13.
252.
Thatcher 1987, p. 690.
253.
However if the prosecution does include a specific mode of liability in the indicitment, the specific elements of that mode must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. See Roach 2013, p. 307.
254.
Chow Bew 1956; Thatcher 1987, p. 655, citing Chow and English common law dating from 1846; see also Roach 2013, p. 309.
255.
Vicarous liability does however apply in the sense of delegating the liability of one actor to another when it comes to corporate liability for the acts or omissions of an organisation’s members. See Bill C-45 2003; Manning and Sankoff 2009, p. 239.
256.
Recall that this was the rule according to Reference re Motor Vehicle Act 1985, which means that smaller administrative offences such as traffic infractions can be based on absolute vicarious liability for the owner of a vehicle, even if the owner was not the offender; see Manning and Sankoff 2009, p. 277.
257.
Manning and Sankoff 2009, p. 247.
258.
Law Reform Commission of Canada 1985, p. 5; cited in Hamilton 2005, para 65.
259.
Recall s. 23.1 Criminal Code 1985.
260.
For these definitions, see Sect. 5.3.6.3.
261.
See for example the arguments made by Judge Fulford in his dissenting opinion, Lubanga Trial Judgment 2012.
262.
In some literature and in some judgments this is still referred to as principal liability, although all this means is that it is the physical perpetrator; Manning and Sankoff 2009, p. 248.
263.
Ball 2011, para 23.
264.
Ball 2011, paras 23–25.
265.
Pickton 2010, para 12.
266.
Hughes 2011.
267.
Roach 2013, p. 312.
268.
Greyeyes 1993, para 26; Briscoe 2010, para 14, citing Greyeyes.
269.
Roach 2012, p. 148.
270.
Roach 2012, p. 124.
271.
Hibbert 1995, para 17; Roach 2012, p. 150; Manning and Sankoff 2009, p. 257.
272.
Roach 2010, para 36.
273.
Briscoe 2010.
274.
Briscoe 2010, para 16.
275.
Because the trial judge had failed to instruct the jury as to the possibility of wilful blindness being sufficient grounds for proving constructed knowledge, the Supreme Court ordered a re-trial: Briscoe 2010, para 25.
276.
Morgan 1993, para 17.
277.
Manning and Sankoff 2009, p. 261.
278.
Jackson 1993; Manning and Sankoff 2009, p. 259; Roach 2013, p. 315.
279.
Manning and Sankoff 2009, p. 260.
280.
See Manning and Sankoff 2009, p. 156, citing Blackstone.
281.
Ashworth 2009, p. 155.
282.
Ashworth 2009, p. 155.
283.
Manning and Sankoff 2009, p. 157.
284.
Ashworth 2009, p. 76.
285.
However there is still the requirement of a subjective mens rea, and constructed liability is limited to crimes which are in the same family as the intended crime. See Ashworth 2009, p. 77.
286.
Mills 2013.
287.
S. 21(1) reads: ‘Where two or more persons form an intention in common to carry out an unlawful purpose and to assist each other therein and any one of them, in carrying out the common purpose, commits an offence, each of them who knew or ought to have known that the commission of the offence would be a probable consequence of carrying out the common purpose is a party to that offence’.
288.
Moore 1973; Roach 2012, p. 154; Manning and Sankoff 2009, p. 265.
289.
Manning and Sankoff 2009, p. 263.
290.
See above, p. 46
291.
See Sect. 8.6.
292.
Logan 1990.
293.
Martineau 1990; Vaillancourt 1987.
294.
Logan 1990, p. 745.
295.
Lamer highlighted the fact that this finding is only applicable in limited cases, since for most crimes there is no constitutional minimum requirement for a subjective mens rea; Logan 1990, p. 741.
296.
Hibbert 1995, p. 1007.
297.
Pacquette 1976; Hibbert 1995, p. 1004.
298.
Simpson 1988.
299.
Logan 1990, p. 747.
300.
Logan 1990, p. 741.
301.
Logan 1990, p. 741.
302.
Jackson 1993, citing Creighton 1993 and De Sousa 1992.
303.
Jackson 1993, p. 585.
304.
Manning and Sankoff 2009, p. 262.
305.
Criminal Code 1985, s. 22(3).
306.
Criminal Code 1985, s. 22(1).
307.
Manning and Sankoff 2009, p. 325.
308.
Glubisz 1979. Note that although this is a provincial Court of Appeal and not a federal one, such case law is considered to be instructive throughout Canada, because the Criminal Code is federally applicable. Manning and Sankoff 2009, p. 16.
309.
Ashworth 2009, p. 448.
310.
O’Brien 1954, p. 669.
311.
Ashworth 2009, p. 450.
312.
Manning and Sankoff 2009, p. 310.
313.
Sheppe 1980; Grewall 2001, para 20. There is authority in England to support the same conclusion there, see Stuart 2007, p. 707.
314.
Ashworth 2009, p. 448; Stuart 2007, p. 683.
315.
Ashworth 2009, p. 449.
316.
Law Commission of the UK 1976 Report on Conspiracy, cited in Ashworth 2009, p. 449.
317.
Criminal Code 1985, s. 645(1). The general provision in the Criminal Code had made it an indictable offence to conspire ‘to effect an unlawful purpose’, but this was repealed in 1985, see Stuart 2007, p. 686.
318.
For instance, conspiracy to commit murder is punishable by a maximum imprisonment term for life, which, according to s. 235(1), is the mandatory sentence for a person convicted of murder: Criminal Code 1985, s. 465(1)(a). As well there are some specific offences listed separately, which include conspiracy as part of their definition, or as an extension of the jurisdictional limits, such as hijacking an aircraft, s. 7(2)(e); offences involving nuclear materials, s. 7(3.3)(a); terrorism offences, s. 7(3.73); and sedition, s. 59(3).
319.
Dynar 1997, para 89.
320.
Dynar 1997, para 87.
321.
Dynar 1997, paras 96, 105.
322.
Ashworth 2009, p. 450; Stuart 2007, p. 707.
323.
Cotroni 1979; Roach 2012, p. 137; Manning and Sankoff 2009, p. 309.
324.
Manning and Sankoff 2009, p. 315, citing a case from the British Columbia Court of Appeals, R. v MacDonald (1963) B.C.J. No. 79, 10 C.C.C. (2d) 488 (B.C.C.A.).
325.
Roach 2012, p. 137.
326.
Cotroni 1979, pp. 17–18.
327.
O’Brien 1954;Dynar 1997.
328.
Manning and Sankoff 2009, p. 316.
329.
Lafontaine 2012, p. 20.
330.
In 1985 the Deschênes Commission of Enquiry was established, and its extensive report 2 years later formed the basis of legislative reform and the prosecutorial basis for pursuing a series of cases. Trapani 2009, p. 11; Lafontaine 2012, p. 25.
331.
Lafontaine 2012, p. 25.
332.
Finta 1994.
333.
Cotler 1997, p. 265; Lafontaine 2012, p. 27; Trapani 2009, p. 14.
334.
At trial the judge had instructed the jury that this could be defined as ‘barbarous cruelty’, ‘brutal’, and ‘not having qualities proper or natural to a human being’; Finta 1994, paras 90–91.
335.
ILC Draft Code of Crimes 1996; Trapani 2009, p. 16; Indeed, the Finta judgment has since been cited by the ICTY was being exceptional to the general understanding of the actus reus requirements for crimes against humanity. See Tadić Appeals Judgment 1999, paras 265–268; Blaškić Trial 2000, para 248; Cotler 1997, p. 262.
336.
Finta 1994, paras 95–97.
337.
See the discussion on the ‘Creigton Quartet’ above; Creighton 1993.
338.
Dissenting Opinion of J La Forest, Finta 1994, para 296; Trapani 2011, p. 17.
339.
s. 4(4) War Crimes Act 2000.
340.
s. 4(2) War Crimes Act 2000.
341.
Zazai No. 1 2005.
342.
Zazai No. 1 2005, para 47.
343.
Zazai No. 2 2005.
344.
Zazai No. 2 2005, para 13, emphasis added.
345.
Thatcher 1987.
346.
Roach 2013, p. 307.
347.
Bayley 2011, p. 57.
348.
Bayley 2011, p. 56.
349.
Bayley 2011, p. 57.
350.
Bayley 2011, p. 58.
351.
Mugasera 2005-06-28; Under Article 1F(a) of the UN Refugee Convention, a person will be denied refugee status if there are serious reasons for considering that they committed a crime against peace, a war crime or a crime against humanity, UN Refugee Convention 1951, Article 1F(a).
352.
Mugasera 2005-06-28, para 58.
353.
Mugasera 2005-06-28, para 64.
354.
Mugasera 2005-06-28, para 82.
355.
Mugasera 2005-06-28, para 136; van der Wilt 2008, p. 244.
356.
Ezekola 2013.
357.
Ezekola 2013, para 14.
358.
Ezekola 2013, para 4.
359.
Ezekola 2013, para 1.
360.
Ezekola 2013, para 44.
361.
Ezekola 2013, paras 22, 35, 48, 51.
362.
Ezekola 2013, paras 7–8.
363.
Ezekola 2013, paras 78, 80.
364.
Stuart 2007, p. vii.
365.
See for example Amara 2010, where a life sentence was justified by the fact that the accused had been the ‘mastermind’ of a terrorist plot.
366.
Manning and Sankoff 2009, p. 324; Roach 2012, p. 161.
367.
Dynar 1997, para 67.
368.
Healy 1993, p. 4.
369.
Kadish 1980, p. 10.
370.
Fletcher 2007, p. 288.
371.
Criminal Code 1985, s. 21(2); Hibbert 1995, p. 1007.
372.
Simpson 1988.
373.
Dynar 1997, para 87; Cotroni 1979, p. 276.
374.
Harvard Note 1959, p. 923.
375.
Pinkerton 1946.
376.
Lesage and Code 2008, p. 16; Stuart 2007, p. 735.
377.
Justice Jackson’s expression in his critical analysis of the ever-expanding doctrine, in Harrison v the United States 1925.
378.
Healy 1993, p. 4.
379.
Creighton 1993; Naglik 1993; Healy 1993.
380.
Ashworth 2009, p. 78; Paciocco 2014, p. 13; Chalmers and Leverick 2008, p. 222.
381.
American Law Institute 1985, p. 310.
382.
Hibbert 1995, para 17; Roach 2012, p. 150; Manning and Sankoff 2009, p. 257; Roach 2010, para 36.
383.
Mills 2013; Manning and Sankoff 2009, p. 157.
384.
Logan 1990, p. 741.
385.
Alternatively, it is also possible to convict a party of a lesser crime than that which the physical perpetrator has committed, as long as that lesser crime is encompassed by the definition of the crime that was actually committed. For example, it would be possible to convict a party of manslaughter if he was party to a collective violent crime where the physical perpetrator was convicted of murder, but the party himself did not intend murder. It has been stated that this maintains an equilibrium between moral culpability and the offence for which the party is finally convicted. See Jackson 1993, p. 585; Creighton 1993; De Sousa 1992, which affirms Creighton.
386.
State v Akers 1979; State v Guminga 1986; Duff 2007, p. 20; Ashworth 2009, p. 149.
387.
Prettyman 1996, p. 1018; Dressler et al. 2001, p. 466.
388.
Curry 2006, p. 653; Dressler et al. 2001, p. 467.
389.
Damaška 1984, p. 104.
390.
Damaška 1984, pp. 65, 119.
391.
Grande 2008, p. 154; Weigend 2003, p. 162.

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Steer, C. (2017). Subjectivity Reflected in the Common Law Tradition. In: Translating Guilt. International Criminal Justice Series, vol 9. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-171-5_6

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