Organizing for Conventional and Unconventional Warfare

Abstract

Unconventional crises have gained the upper hand in today’s international security environment. The numbers of Special Operations Forces (SOF) that most Western militaries have at their disposal do deal with these types of crises are limited; therefore regular troops are increasingly used to fill the gap. This article applies theory on differentiation and integration to offer an organizational perspective on the security and safety risks of the new reality of converging military task domains. History has shown that the misuse of conventional or unconventional forces may result in failing security strategies and, at the same time, may seriously jeopardize the lives of the soldiers actively involved in a mission. The article makes clear that establishing integrating units, taking a middle position between SOF and regular forces, could be beneficial. Yet, real progress depends on two additional measures. First, countries need to improve their strategic-political knowledge base on the ins and outs of unconventional warfare through liaison positions and standing committees, in order to task the proper military units for deployment. Second, specialized training programs and facilities have to be developed to serve as an organizational coordination mechanism to better incorporate basic unconventional warfare practices into the operational repertoire of a large proportion of regular forces.