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Spanish Security Forces, Anti-terrorism and the Internal and External Security of Spain, 1959–1992

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NL ARMS Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies 2016

Part of the book series: NL ARMS ((NLARMS))

Abstract

There is a consensus in current literature and among Western European secret services that transnational organized crime, terrorism and human trafficking increased after 1989. These transnational threats make the distinction between internal and external security for European states increasingly difficult to maintain. These threats—especially transnational terrorism—are not new phenomena. Starting out from the beneficial advice to tackle terrorism on a case-by-case basis, this article analyzes the roles and transformation of the Spanish security forces in counterterrorism against Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) during the years 1959–1992. During these years of transformation from dictatorship to democracy and its subsequent consolidation, the Spanish governments were confronted with an internal security issue with important external security dimensions. From this tentative case study can be concluded that the Spanish governments and security forces became more effective once they comprehensively approached ETA as a transnational organization. The gradual demilitarization of the Spanish security forces formed an integral and important part of this process. This article also emphasizes that a state fighting transnational terrorism needs intensive international cooperation and can play a decisive role in its anti-terrorism policies and programs. Moreover, this study may demonstrate that the merger of internal and external security of Spain and the shifting roles of its security forces occurred in response to transnational terrorism already before 1989.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The first meeting of the TREVI-group was held in Rome near the Trevi-fountain and initiated by the Dutch director-general of police A J Fonteijn (the Dutch word for ‘fountain’), Monar 2008, p. 209; Bigo 2000, p. 320; Lutterbeck 2005, p. 232; Easton et al. 2010, p. 5.

  2. 2.

    Lutterbeck 2005, p. 233; Other signals of militarization are the employment of the police on a 24-h basis, the military status of its personnel, its heavy military armament. Shifting roles are also reflected in a changing numerical balance between armed and police forces, Lutterbeck 2013, pp. 9–10.

  3. 3.

    Gerwarth and Haupt 2007, p. 275; Anderson 2011, pp. 192–193.

  4. 4.

    Citations and perspectives of Olmeda 2007, p. 161.

  5. 5.

    Jaime Jimenez and Reinares 1998; Dominguez Iribarren 1998; Jaime Jimenez 2002; Van Dongen 2014; For a current overview of the literature on ETA, Buesa and Baumert 2013, p. 318, n. 3; See also the concise, but older historiographical overview of Dominguez Iribarren 1998, pp. 9–12.

  6. 6.

    During the years 1939–1943 200,000 Spaniards died in the regime’s prisons and camps, Encarnacion 2007, p. 962; Jaime Jimenez 2002, pp. 78–79.

  7. 7.

    Jaime Jimenez 2002, pp. 78, 81–82.

  8. 8.

    Jaime Jimenez 2002, pp. 80–82.

  9. 9.

    Van Dongen 2014, p. 178.

  10. 10.

    As ETA’s first attacks Dominguez Iribarren counts several bombs in Bilbao, Vitoria and Santander in 1959 and a bomb attack in a stadium in 1960, Dominguez Iribarren 1998, p. 222; Other authors mark as ETA’s first attack an attempt to derail a train of Franco supporters in 1961, All these attacks did not cause alarm, Tusell 2007, pp. 226–227; Van Dongen 2014, pp. 175–176.

  11. 11.

    Van Dongen 2014, pp. 184, 202.

  12. 12.

    Van Dongen 2014, p. 175.

  13. 13.

    Dominguez Iribarren 1998, p. 93.

  14. 14.

    Barton 2009, p. 257; Douglass and Zulaika 1990, p. 246; ETA m performed 743 attacks and killed 247 victims compared to 132 attacks and 13 victims by ETA pm between 1978 and 1981, Dominguez Iribarren 1998, p. 220.

  15. 15.

    Jaime Jimenez 2002, pp. 25, 26, 82–84.

  16. 16.

    Woodworth 2004, p. 171; Encarnacion 2007, pp. 954, 961.

  17. 17.

    Cerdan and Rubio 2004, pp. 29–33, 110, 119.

  18. 18.

    Jaime Jimenez and Reinares 1998, pp. 175–176; Jaime Jimenez 2002, pp. 25–26; Barton 2009, pp. 260–262.

  19. 19.

    Implementation of points of the organic law on defence was postponed until the Organic Law of Forces and Corps of Security (LOFCS) of 1986 paved the way under a PSOE civilian Luis Roldan that occupied the post of Director General, Jaime Jimenez and Reinares 1998, pp. 173, 176, 177; Jaime Jimenez 2002, pp. 84–88.

  20. 20.

    Jaime Jimenez 2002, pp. 25, 90, 91.

  21. 21.

    The Corps also professionalized its expertise in explosive devices Departamento Central de Desactivacion de Artefactos Explosivos (DECEDEX) in 1979 and the Escuela de Tecnicos Especialistas Desactivacion de Artefactos Explosivos Guardia Civil (TEDAX-GC) in 1982, Dominguez Iribarren 1998, pp. 223, 259; Clavero 2015, pp. 155, 211; Jaime Jimenez 2002, p. 94.

  22. 22.

    Jaime Jimenez 2002, pp. 26, 27, 92, 93; Van Dongen 2014, pp. 190, 192.

  23. 23.

    After ETA pm had received a heavy blow in operation Lobo in 1975, it tried to pursue the mobilization of the Basque masses and it created in September 1976 a new party, the Euskal Iraultzarako Alderdia (EIA), Alonso 2011, pp. 698–699; Van Dongen 2014, p. 205; In 1977 the special commandos of ETA pm (Bereziak), that had survived Operation Lobo joined ETA m, Dominguez Iribarren 1998, p. 40.

  24. 24.

    Clark 1984, p. 253; Douglass and Zulaika 1990, p. 247; Van Dongen 2014, p. 178.

  25. 25.

    Jaime Jimenez 2002, p. 91; Van Dongen 2014, pp. 180–181; Dominguez Iribarren 1998; pp. 197–200, 208–213; On the supporters and organizations around ETA see, Buesa and Baumert 2013; Heiberg 2007, pp. 30–36.

  26. 26.

    Dominguez Iribarren 1998, pp. 223, 259.

  27. 27.

    Jaime Jimenez 2002, pp. 88–89.

  28. 28.

    Bernecker 1998, pp. 75–76, 80; The state’s intelligence service Centro Superior de Informacion de la Defensa (CESID), which replaced the SECED in 1976, played an important role in disabling other plans for coups in 1982 and 1985, Tusell 2007, pp. 309–310; Jaime Jimenez 2002, p. 91.

  29. 29.

    Laws by decree, examples see Jaime Jimenez 2002, pp. 231–237; The juridicial changes in 1980, see Jaime Jimenez 2002, pp. 237–239; Van Dongen 2014, p. 192.

  30. 30.

    The MULC was led by commissary Manuel Ballesteros of the CSP and former head of the Comisaría General de Información (CGI), Encarnacion 2007, p. 962; Jaime Jimenez 2002, pp. 27–28, 95–96; Clavero 2015, pp. 19, 31.

  31. 31.

    Van Dongen 2014, p. 199.

  32. 32.

    Douglass and Zulaika 1990, p. 247.

  33. 33.

    Woodworth 2004, p. 171.

  34. 34.

    Jaime Jimenez 2002, p. 99.

  35. 35.

    Jaime Jimenez 2002, pp. 109–110.

  36. 36.

    Jaime Jimenez 2002, p. 30; Reinares 2003, p. 61.

  37. 37.

    Jaime Jimenez 2002, pp. 103–104, 109–110; Reinares 2003, pp. 66–67.

  38. 38.

    In January 1987 a part of this antiterrorist Law became automatically outdated, and the remnant was withdrawn in November 1987. This relaxation might also have appeased the moderate nationalist Basque parties for the Pact of Ajuria-Enea, Jaime Jimenez 2002, pp. 28–30, 245–247, 253; Van Dongen 2014, pp. 197–198.

  39. 39.

    Douglas and Zulaika 1990, p. 251; The dispersal policy led in 1989 to imprisoned Etarras spread over Spain far from the Basque Country and resulted in more reintegration under Gonzalez between 1989 and 1995; Aznar abandoned the reintegration program in 2002, Van Dongen 2014, pp. 211–214.

  40. 40.

    Jaime Jimenez 2002, p. 97.

  41. 41.

    Since 1985 the commando Madrid placed car bombs on the routes of military personnel and civil guards. In 1986 it committed 22 assassinations. In July 1986, three members of the commando Madrid were detained, that led to more detentions, although three members succeeded to flee; In total ETA killed 37 victims in 1985 and 40 in 1986, which counted 148 and 128 attacks, Dominguez Iribarren 1998, pp. 223, 259; Jaime Jimenez 2002, pp. 91–92, 97, 108–109; Oneto 2014; Van Dongen 2014, p. 185, 195, 202.

  42. 42.

    French antiterrorist actions in the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s were led by two principles. First, the French government regarded domestic terrorism as subversive crime to be combated with law enforcement and preventive police infiltration, surveillance and research. Second, the French government regarded neutrality towards international terrorism, mainly of non-state actors and states in the Middle East, on the condition they did not aim at French interests or deviate French policy. This sanctuary doctrine required silent communication with terrorist movements, secrecy and refrained from international cooperation against terrorism. The doctrine became eroded in the 1980s by an increasing number of terrorist groups that targeted France, and by leaks to the press, which started to influence public opinion and judges. However, the French government did not fully abandon its doctrine and governed dealings with ETA. After series of counterraids by the French Recherche Action Information Dissuassion (RAID) and the arrest of its leader in 1988 Iparretarak seemed to be dismantled, Wieviorka 1991, pp. 158–161.

  43. 43.

    Woodworth 2004, p. 173.

  44. 44.

    In the second half of the 1990s the leak of secret documents of the CESID led to court trials on the GAL operations. These became associated with Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez, and especially Interior Minister Jose Barrionuevo and former Interior Minister Rafael Vera of the Suárez administration, Woodworth 2001, pp. 46–47, 76–77; Woodworth 2004, p. 173; Wieviorka 1991, p. 172; Encarnacion 2007, p. 964; Llera and Leonisio 2015, pp. 146–147; Van Dongen 2014, p. 191.

  45. 45.

    A first sign of it came already in 1984: three ETA militants were handed over to Spain, Wieviorka 1991, pp. 163–164, 168–169; Cettina 2003, pp. 80, 82–83.

  46. 46.

    Jaime Jimenez 2002, pp. 100, 103, 105–107; Van Dongen 2014, pp. 194–195.

  47. 47.

    Dominguez Iribarren 1998, p. 223; Jaime Jimenez 2002, p. 32.

  48. 48.

    Between 1982 and 1989 the part of CSP/CNP in arrests, and arrests leading to imprisonment, declined from 70 to 30 % and 70 to 9 % respectively. Guardia Civil in 1989 arrested more than 60 % of all suspected terrorists, and 58 % arrests that went to prison. Meanwhile, during this same year, the Ertzaintza arrested 8 people, of which 6 entered in prison. Thus, the role of the Ertzaintza increased as it became more involved in the fight against terrorism. This was also a result of the Interior Minister’s decision to place a civilian of the Guardia Civil at the command of The Secretaria de Estado para la Seguridad, that diminished the CNP’s competences, Jaime Jimenez 2002, p. 112.

  49. 49.

    Van Dongen 2014, pp. 200–201.

  50. 50.

    Dominguez Iribarren 1998, p. 259; Woodworth 2004, pp. 172–175; Van Dongen 2014, pp. 215–217.

  51. 51.

    Van Dongen 2014, pp. 186, 217.

  52. 52.

    ETA had already been encountering significant financial problems since 1985, Van Dongen 2014, p. 204; Jaime Jimenez 2002, pp. 110–111.

  53. 53.

    El Pais, 30 March 1992; Van Dongen 2014, p. 203.

  54. 54.

    Van Dongen 2014, pp. 181, 188, 201, 204.

  55. 55.

    Alonso 2011, p. 701.

  56. 56.

    It led to Rafael Vera’s resignation, who had designed and implemented the governmental counterterrorism policy in the past decade, Jaime Jimenez 2002, pp. 32–33, 114–115.

  57. 57.

    The tasks of intelligence and operations were attached to the CGI and the CGPJ respectively, according to the renewed adaption of the French model for state security. At a regional level the Unidad Territorial de Informacion (UTI) and the Unidad Territorial Antiterrorista (UTA) clustered intelligence and operational tasks for both the Guardia Civil and national police. The GAIOE functions passed to the CGPJ, manned by national police and Guardia Civil, and the CGI became a general civilian intelligence service, Jaime Jimenez 2002, pp. 115–117; Woodworth 2001, pp. 186, 187; For information on the French model for state security, see Cettina 2003.

  58. 58.

    The Interior Ministry installed the Secretary of State for Security as the main body for coordination and control of the anti-terrorism policy. It held two Directorates for the national police and the Guardia Civil and reunited intelligence and operations organizations under the secretary general’s supervision. Again the Guardia Civil maintained its prominent role in Spain’s anti-terrorism policy as the corps clearly benefited from its new commander, a prominent PP defense politician in the national parliament, to the detriment of the national police, whose commander was a security councilor in Valencia, Jaime Jimenez 2002, pp. 118–119.

  59. 59.

    El Pais, 10 August 1995; Garza 1998, pp. 93, 97; One of the issues was that they diametrically disagreed over the question of amnesty and reintegration of imprisoned ETA assassins, Shepard 2002, p. 63; Jaime Jimenez 2002, p. 33; Van Dongen 2014, pp. 184–185.

  60. 60.

    The Pacto de Lizarra is also called Pacto de Estella, see Reinares 2003, p. 61; Approximately 20 % of ETA actions now targeted journalists, politicians, academics and lawyers, Encarnacion 2007, p. 968; Van Dongen 2014, pp. 187–188, 204.

  61. 61.

    The first move of ETA was a failed attack on the Torre Picasso in Madrid in 1999, 2 years in advance of 9/11, Celso 2006, pp. 130–133; Van Dongen 2014, pp. 216, 219–221.

  62. 62.

    Reinares 2003, p. 63; Van Dongen 2014, pp. 189–191; Barton 2009, p. 268; On the Madrid bombings and its aftermath focuses, Reinares 2009.

  63. 63.

    Alonso 2014, pp. 232–235; Harmon 2012, p. 590; Reinares 2009, pp. 369–370; Van Dongen 2014, pp. 222–223, 226.

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Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Floribert Baudet, Wim Klinkert and an anonymous reviewer for their valuable comments on earlier versions of this chapter.

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    Michiel de Jong

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  1. Faculty of Military Sciences, Netherlands Defence Academy Faculty of Military Sciences, Breda, The Netherlands

    Robert Beeres

  2. Faculty of Military Sciences, Netherlands Defence Academy Faculty of Military Sciences, Breda, The Netherlands

    Gwendolyn Bakx

  3. Faculty of Military Sciences, Netherlands Defence Academy Faculty of Military Sciences, Breda, The Netherlands

    Erik de Waard

  4. Faculty of Military Sciences, Netherlands Defence Academy Faculty of Military Sciences, Breda, The Netherlands

    Sebastiaan Rietjens

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de Jong, M. (2016). Spanish Security Forces, Anti-terrorism and the Internal and External Security of Spain, 1959–1992. In: Beeres, R., Bakx, G., de Waard, E., Rietjens, S. (eds) NL ARMS Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies 2016. NL ARMS. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-135-7_17

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