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Part of the book series: ASSER International Sports Law Series ((ASSER))

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Abstract

This chapter focuses on the amount of compensation to be paid by a player or a club as a result of a unilateral breach of contract . In the event that the contract has been terminated by one of the parties without just cause, i.e. without a valid reason, the party in breach is obliged to pay compensation in accordance with Article 17 para 1 of the RSTP. The party who is in breach of the contract without just cause is obliged to pay compensation irrespective of whether the breach took place during or after the Protected Period. The situation will be discussed in which compensation must be paid by the club to the player due to a breach of contract without just cause by the club. The situation will also be discussed whereby compensation must be paid by the player to the club due to a breach of contract without just cause by the player.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    FIFA Commentary, explanation Article 17 RSTP under 1 sub 1, p. 47.

  2. 2.

    RSTP, edition 2005, Article 17 para 1.

  3. 3.

    DRC 2 November 2007, no. 117623.

  4. 4.

    DRC 30 November 2007, no. 117294. See also CAS 2006/A/1100, award of 15 November 2006. As a side-note, in the latter case the CAS also recalled that a person cannot be compelled to remain in a particular employment. A player who breaches an employment contract without just cause may be liable for damages or even have a sanction imposed based on Article 17 of the RSTP, but is not subject to an injunction to remain with his employer.

  5. 5.

    Wild 2011, pp. 107–142.

  6. 6.

    PSC 19 March 2013, no. 0313992.

  7. 7.

    PSC 30 January 2012, no. 01120974. Generally this means that claims for “damages relating to the specificity of sport” will be rejected by the PSC. See the PSC decision of 30 January 2012, no. 01120974. It was also decided by the CAS that Article 17 of the RSTP is only applicable to the relationship “player-club”. See CAS 2004/A/741 Mr. Jörg Berger v. Bursaspor Kulübü, award of 4 August 2005, and CAS 2008/A/1464 and 1467 Futebol Clube do Porto v. Jacobus Adriaanse, award of 3 December 2008. In the latter case, the CAS Panel referred to Article 1 of the FIFA RSPT which states that the RSTP concerns “players”, not “coaches”. Moreover, the CAS Panel noted that the FIFA Statutes no longer contain the provision which appeared in Article 33.4 of their 2001 version which equated coaches with players. According to the Panel, Article 22 makes clear that FIFA has competence to hear disputes between coaches and clubs, which is precisely the competence exercised by the Single Judge, but that does not mean that substantive rules applicable to players, also apply to coaches. Article 17 para 4 of the RSTP even literally uses the term “Professional” (another indication that it can only concern “players”). In an unpublished PSC case of 30 January 2012, the PSC confirmed that Article 17 of the RSTP only applies to contractual disputes between players and clubs. In this respect, the PSC referred to the “nulla poena sine lege” principle, which provides that someone cannot be punished for doing something that is not prohibited by law. See also CAS 2010/A/2319 Hans Dieter Schmidt v. Kumasi Asante Kotoko FC, award of 11 January 2012.

  8. 8.

    CAS 2004/A/691 FC Barcelona SAD v. Manchester United FC, award of 9 February 2005.

  9. 9.

    Article 17 does not apply under all circumstances as follows from CAS 2014/A/3626, Carmela Enrique Valencia Chaverra v. Ulsan Hyundai Football Club, award of 23 April 2015. In this case, the Panel decided that the provisions set forth in the RSTP, and Article 17 in particular, are not directly applicable, as they provide for some criteria on the calculation of damages only in the event that a contract is terminated due to a breach by one of the parties.

  10. 10.

    In general, the DRC will not take clauses into account where there is lack of reciprocity. See the DRC decision of 7 February 2014, no. 0214233, where the DRC pointed out that the clause in the contract on which the club’s claim was founded, was not to be taken into consideration due to its lack of reciprocity. See also DRC 4 October 2013, no. 10131238.

  11. 11.

    DRC 10 June 2004, no. 64133.

  12. 12.

    DRC 15 May 2011, no. 5111860.

  13. 13.

    See CAS 2013/A/3411 Al Gharafa S.C. & Mark Bresciano v. Al Nasr S.C. & FIFA, award of 9 May 2014. In this case there was discussion whether or not the contract provided the player with the right to unilaterally terminate the contract. The CAS Panel decided that the clause was not a buy-out clause but constituted a liquidated damages clause. See also the DRC decision itself, DRC 4 October 2013, no. 10131238. In this case, the Chamber emphasized that the relevant provision did not establish a right for the player to terminate the contract for a specific, clearly predetermined amount but only seeks to determine the minimum amount of compensation due if of breach by the player. Furthermore, the amount in question remains open in respect of its maximum. The DRC had no other option than to consider that the player had no contractually stipulated right to prematurely terminate the contract. Therefore, he had terminated the contract without just cause. What’s interesting to note is that it was also decided that the clause was not enforceable as it lacked reciprocal character since it only provided for the financial consequences of a contractual breach by the player and not by the club. See also CAS 2009/A/1909 RCD Mallorca SAD v. FIFA UMM Salal SC, award of 25 January 2010, from which award it follows that a liquidated damages clause does not entitle a party to terminate the contract, but refers to the damages to be paid if a party decides to unilaterally terminate the contract without just cause. With reference to Swiss law, liquidated damages clauses can be reduced if they are excessive. See for example, TAS 2006/A/1082-1104 Real Valladolid CF SAD v. Diego Barreto Cáceres & Club Cerre Porteno, award of 19 January 2007 and CAS 2005/A/902 & 903 Mexès & AS Roma v. AJ Auxerre, award of 5 December 2005. See also CAS 2010/A/2202 Konyaspor Club Association v. J., award of 9 May 2011, which case dealt with a reduction of the liquidated damages clause. In case CAS 2013/A/3419 Maritimo da Madeira v. Futebol SAD v. Clube Atlético Mineiro, award of 14 November 2014, the CAS Panel considered that the clause concerned contained all the necessary elements required under Swiss law to establish a penalty clause. The CAS emphasized that a penalty clause can be defined as an accessory provision whereby the debtor promises an agreed penalty to the creditor if the debtor does not perform or improperly performs a defined obligation. See also CAS 2014/A/3640 Vladimir Mukhanov v. FC Aktobe, award of 28 January 2015.

  14. 14.

    See also CAS 2009/A/1909 RCD Mallorca SAD v. FIFA UMM Salal SC, award of 25 January 2015 and CAS 2011/A/2356 SS Lazio S.p.A. v. CA Vélez Sarsfield & FIFA, award of 28 September 2011. See also CAS 2013/A/3417 FC Metz v. NK Nafta Lendava, award of 13 August 2014. From this case it follows that, according to jurisprudence of the CAS, a buy-out clause included in an employment agreement of a professional football player is a clause that determines in advance the amount to be paid by a party if of breach and/or unilateral premature termination of the employment relationship.

  15. 15.

    DRC 7 February 2014, no. 0214233. See also DRC 15 March 2013, no. 03131032. In the latter case, the Chamber firstly focused on Article 9 of the contract, which stipulated that “if of breach of contract by the player, the latter shall pay the club the sum of USD 800,000”. In this regard, the Chamber took into account that such clause appeared to be unilateral and to the benefit of the respondent only. In view of such a unilateral character of the pertinent contractual clause the members of the Chamber concluded that Article 9 of the employment contract could not be taken into consideration. The Chamber also concluded that clause 8 of the contract did not clearly indicate the value and, therefore, could not be taken into consideration.

  16. 16.

    In an unpublished case of 21 May 2015, the DRC highlighted that compensation clauses may be freely entered into by the contractual parties and may be considered acceptable, in the event that the pertinent clause meets certain criteria such as proportionality, reasonableness and reciprocity. In the said case the DRC focused its attention on clause 7 of the first contract which read “the party terminating the contract with no just cause shall pay the other party a penalty equivalent to 50 % of the remainder of the contract” and came to the conclusion that the clause was reasonable and reciprocal as it granted both contractual parties the possibility to request for its application if of termination of the contract without just cause by the counterparty. The clause was proportional as it provided as compensation 50 % of the residual value of the contract at the time of termination.

  17. 17.

    FIFA Commentary, explanation Article 17 RSTP under 1, sub 2, p. 47.

  18. 18.

    See CAS 2007/A/1358 FC Pyunik Yerevan v. L., AFC Rapid Bucaresti & FIFA, award of 26 May 2008. Special reference can be made to the case CAS 2013/A/3089 FK Senica, A.S. v. Vladimir Vukajlovic & FIFA, award of 30 August 2013, in which case it was decided by the CAS that the compensation resulting from the termination of a contract without just cause was to be calculated keeping in mind the specificity of sport, i.e. the specific nature of sport and also the specific sporting circumstances of the case. In the said case the Sole Arbitrator concluded that a tacit agreement of termination between the parties had taken place, which released the player his obligations to train with the club’s team to look for a new club and, in return, the club would no longer have to pay the player’s salary. As a result it was decided that in these circumstances, where neither the player nor the club were interested any longer in maintaining their labour relationship and taking the principle of the specificity of sport into account, no compensation had to be awarded to the player. The purpose of Article 17 of the RSTP is basically nothing more than to reinforce contractual stability, i.e. to strengthen the principle of pacta sunt servanda in the world of international football, by acting as a deterrent against unilateral contractual breaches and terminations, whether they are breaches committed by a club or by a player (CAS 2008/A/1519-1520, para 80, with further references to: CAS 2005/A/876, p. 17: “[…] it is plain from the text of the FIFA Regulations that they are designed to further ‘contractual stability’ […]”; CAS 2007/A/1358, para 90; CAS 2007/A/1359, para 92: “[…] the ultimate rationale of this provision of the FIFA Regulations is to support and foster contractual stability […]”; confirmed in CAS 2008/A/1568, para 6.37).

  19. 19.

    For example, in the event that a CAS Panel is not entirely convinced that the replacement costs have fully compensated a club for the loss it has suffered. See CAS 2007/A/1298 Wigan Athletic FC v. Heart of Midlothian and CAS 2007/A/1299 Heart of Midlothian v. Webster & Wigan Athletic FC and CAS 2007/A/1300 Webster v. Heart of Midlothian, award of 30 January 2008; CAS 2008/A/1519 FC Shakthar Donetsk (Ukraine) v. Mr. Matuzalem Francelino da Silva (Brazil) & Real Zaragoza SAD (Spain) & FIFA and CAS 2008/A/1520 Mr. Matuzalem Francelino da Silva (Brazil & Real Zaragoza SAD (Spain) v. FC Shakthar Donetsk (Ukraine) & FIFA, award of 19 May 2009; CAS 2010/A/2145 Sevilla FC SAD v. Udinese Calcio S.p.A., CAS 2010/A/2146 Morgan de Sanctis v. Udinese Calcio S.p.A. and CAS 2010-A-2147 Udinese Calcio S.p.A. v. Morgan de Sanctis/Sevilla FC SAD, award of 28 February 2011. See also CAS 2013/A/3089 FK Senica, A.S. v. Vladimir Vukajlovic & FIFA, award of 30 August 2013. This was also mentioned in the case before the CAS between Al Gharafa & Bresciano and Al Nasr of 9 May 2014. In the latter case, the CAS Panel agreed with the CAS case law that the “specificity of sport” must not be considered as an additional head of compensation, nor a criterion allowing to decide in ex aequo et bono, but a correcting factor which allows the CAS Panel to take into consideration other objective elements which are not envisaged under the other criteria as mentioned in Article 17 of the RSTP. See CAS 2013/A/3411 Al Gharafa S.C. & Mark Bresciano v. Al Nasr S.C. & FIFA, award of 9 May 2014. See also CAS 2014/A/3684 Leandro da Silva v. Sport Lisboa e Benfica and CAS 2014/A/369 Sport Lisboa e Benvfica v. Leandro da Silva, award of 16 September 2015. In the latter case, the CAS Panel assessed whether the objective amount of damages was just and fair or whether this amount should be reduced or increased in light of the “specificity of sport”.

  20. 20.

    See DRC 4 April 2007, no. 47936, DRC 2 November 2007, no. 117623 and DRC 10 December 2009, no. 129641. See also CAS 2008/A/1519 FC Shakthar Donetsk (Ukraine) v. Mr. Matuzalem Francelino da Silva (Brazil) & Real Zaragoza SAD (Spain) & FIFA and CAS 2008/A/1520 Mr. Matuzalem Francelino da Silva (Brazil & Real Zaragoza SAD (Spain) v. FC Shakthar Donetsk (Ukraine) & FIFA, award of 19 May 2009, and CAS 2010/A/2145 Sevilla FC SAD v. Udinese Calcio S.p.A., CAS 2010/A/2146 Morgan de Sanctis v. Udinese Calcio S.p.A. and CAS 2010-A-2147 Udinese Calcio S.p.A. v. Morgan de Sanctis/Sevilla FC SAD, award of 28 February 2011. Due to the fact that the former club Udinese had not been able to demonstrate the exact value of the player’s services, the Panel in De Sanctis did not apply the same calculation as in Matuzalem and therefore applied a different calculation method in order to determine the appropriate amount of compensation. The CAS used “the value of the replacement costs” in the De Sanctis case and the CAS Panel in the Matuzalem case used “the estimated value of the player”.

  21. 21.

    DRC 2 November 2007, no. 117623.

  22. 22.

    Also, the CAS decided in the Matuzalem case that pursuant to Article 17 of the RSTP the amount of fees and expenses paid or incurred by the former club, and in particular those expenses incurred to obtain the services of the player, is an additional objective element that must be taken in consideration. Article 17 para 1 requires those expenses to be amortized over the whole term of the contract. In the present matter, the DRC had recognized the fee paid by Shakhtar Donetsk to the club Brescia, i.e. EUR 8,000,000 as being such an expense. The CAS agreed and also shared the calculation made in the appealed decision according to which such fee had to be amortized in accordance with Article 17 over a period of 5 years, i.e. the entire contract period. Therefore, the non-amortized part of the transfer fee was equal to 2/5 of EUR 8,000,000 i.e. EUR 3,200,000. See CAS 2008/A/1519 FC Shakthar Donetsk (Ukraine) v. Mr. Matuzalem Francelino da Silva (Brazil) & Real Zaragoza SAD (Spain) & FIFA and CAS 2008/A/1520 Mr. Matuzalem Francelino da Silva (Brazil & Real Zaragoza SAD (Spain) v. FC Shakthar Donetsk (Ukraine) & FIFA, award of 19 May 2009.

  23. 23.

    In the appeal procedure before the CAS, the CAS stated that it was argued before the DRC that the initial fees paid to Juventus should have been amortized over the entire period that the player was under contract with it. In the DRC decision, it was decided that the fees paid to Juventus had been amortized over the first 5 years of the player’s time with Udinese. However, Udinese did not appeal the DRC’s decision with regard to the unamortized fees and expenses. See CAS 2010/A/2145 Sevilla FC SAD v. Udinese Calcio S.p.A., CAS 2010/A/2146 Morgan de Sanctis v. Udinese Calcio S.p.A. and CAS 2010-A-2147 Udinese Calcio S.p.A. v. Morgan de Sanctis/ Sevilla FC SAD, award of 28 February 2011.

  24. 24.

    Although the CAS Panel in Matuzalem answered this question by stating it was an open issue whether the breach within a Protected Period may also be taken into account when assessing the compensation due. In my opinion, we should take into account that a breach within the Protected Period can increase the amount of compensation. Vice versa, this would mean that if a breach takes place outside the Protected Period, not only will no sporting sanctions will be imposed, but the amount of compensation should also be reduced comparatively. If the facts and circumstances of two cases are completely the same, aside from the fact that in the one case the breach takes place within and in the other, outside the Protected Period, the outcome regarding the amount of compensation must be different. The CAS Panel in Matuzalem decided that the compensation should not be increased due to the fact the breach took place outside the Protected Period. See para 167 of the CAS award. See CAS 2008/A/1519 FC Shakthar Donetsk (Ukraine) v. Mr. Matuzalem Francelino da Silva (Brazil) & Real Zaragoza SAD (Spain) & FIFA and CAS 2008/A/1520 Mr. Matuzalem Francelino da Silva (Brazil & Real Zaragoza SAD (Spain) v. FC Shakthar Donetsk (Ukraine) & FIFA, award of 19 May 2009.

  25. 25.

    DRC 7 September 2011, no. 9111901.

  26. 26.

    DRC 13 October 2010, no. 10102536.

  27. 27.

    DRC 22 June 2007, no. 67675. From CAS 2013/A/3374 Al Ahli Club v. David Anthony O’Leary, award of 4 July 2014, it can be derived that a request for reduction of the compensation must be rejected in the event of contributory negligence of an employee, if any, cannot lead to the reduction of the damages owed to that employee under Swiss law.

  28. 28.

    DRC 2 November 2007, no. 117623. This was also decided in the Mexès case; see CAS 2005/A/902 and 903 Mexès & AS Roma v. AJ Auxerre, award of 5 December 2005, N. 118, where it was decided that payments to agents can be considered as being part of the costs incurred by a club in order to obtain the services of a player. However, in the DRC case of De Sanctis, the committee noted that Udinese had paid an amount of EUR 60,000 to an agent on signature of the contract at the basis of the present dispute and that this amount had not been fully amortized as a direct consequence of the breach of contract committed. Regarding the agent’s fees paid in connection with the conclusion of the previous employment contracts, the DRC unanimously decided that these costs should not be taken into account when establishing the compensation.

  29. 29.

    DRC 10 December 2009, no. 129641.

  30. 30.

    In the appeal procedure these claims were not made to the CAS Panel by the Italian club. See CAS 2010/A/2145 Sevilla FC SAD v. Udinese Calcio S.p.A., CAS 2010/A/2146 Morgan de Sanctis v. Udinese Calcio S.p.A. and CAS 2010-A-2147 Udinese Calcio S.p.A. v. Morgan de Sanctis/Sevilla FC SAD, award of 28 February 2011. Although it will be difficult to demonstrate any entitlement to compensation as “missing profit coming from stadium ticket revenues” and/or “image damages towards the sponsors” and it is not clear whether these costs can be claimed, we must take into account that this might be possible if the claiming club demonstrates the existence of such damages and proves the existence of a link between the said damages and the breach of contract committed by the player. For example, and as indicated by the CAS Panel in Matuzalem, if the club has to pay a penalty to a sponsor due to the termination, the club might demonstrate the damage. Even the CAS Panel gave a slight opening in order to claim commercial losses. Although the CAS Panel in Webster was of the opinion that the claim of Hearts related to sporting and commercial losses had to be rejected, it might be that the aforementioned losses could be claimed if Hearts had demonstrated the causality of the termination and the existence of the damage.

  31. 31.

    DRC 18 December 2012, no. 12121204.

  32. 32.

    The conclusion with regard to the replacement costs is that it might be possible to claim these costs as part of the compensation in the meaning of Article 17, for example, if parties agree to it contractually. However, if parties have not agreed to it contractually, we see that the club claiming replacement costs as part of the amount of compensation, can still be entitled to claim replacement costs if it can demonstrate this. Firstly, it must demonstrate that the new player was a substitution of the player to be replaced. In that respect the club must prove that the players play in more or less the same position on the pitch. Furthermore, the club also has to demonstrate that the new player had to join the team because of the unilateral termination by the replaced player. Secondly, the club must demonstrate that there is a necessary link between the amount of the transfer fee paid for the new player and the premature termination by the replaced player. In that respect, the club must prove and demonstrate that there is a logical nexus between the replacement costs and the breach of the employment contract.

  33. 33.

    DRC 10 December 2009, no. 129641. In the appeal procedure before the CAS, the Panel referred to the Matuzalem and El-Hadary case, in which the Panels felt there was possibly a loss of a transfer fee, if the injured party could demonstrate that the club missed a transfer fee. However, none of the parties produced any evidence of any offers made or pending for the player De Sanctis. Udinese did produce the details of 3 other international goalkeepers that had transferred between clubs over the previous couple of years; however, this was not taken by the panel as evidence of any loss suffered by Udinese in relation to this player, more background information to be used in assessing the specificity of sport criterion below. As such, as no party advanced any submissions under this criterion, the Panel did not use it as part of assessing the compensation due to Udinese. The loss of a transfer fee was awarded in El-Hadary, where the new and the old club had been directly negotiating a fee at the time of the breach. It appeared to the Panel that, as a consequence of the premature termination of the player’s employment contract, Al-Ahly was deprived of the opportunity to obtain a transfer fee of USD 600,000. See para 221 of the El-Hadary case. The CAS noted in the El-Hadary case that, differently from other CAS cases, the amount which FC Sion was willing to pay as a transfer fee, i.e. FC Sion being the club to which the player wanted to transfer to. Therefore, according to the CAS, Al-Ahly had an evident opportunity to obtain a certain fee by trading the services of the player to the Swiss club, but this opportunity was frustrated by the unjustified departure of the player. For the CAS, it may be concluded that in future cases the loss of a possible transfer fee can be considered as compensable damage head if the usual conditions are met, i.e. in particular if between the breach or the unjustified termination of the agreement and the lost opportunity to realize a certain profit there is a necessary logical nexus. It is of crucial importance that the transfer failed (i.e. the club eventually missed the transfer fee) because of the unjustified departure of the player to another club. In other words, this logical nexus must be demonstrated by the club. See CAS 2009/A/1881 Essam El-Hadary v. FIFA & Al-Ahly Sporting Club, award of 1 June 2010.

  34. 34.

    DRC 16 April 2009, no. 491101. See also DRC 7 November 2011, nos. 411438 and 411430, DRC 26 November 2004, no. 11475, and DRC 13 October 2010, no. 10101596. See also DRC 15 March 2013, no. 03132656, DRC 30 August 2013, no. 08132676, and DRC 29 November 2013, no. 1113766.

  35. 35.

    See TAS 2008/O/1643 Vladimir Gusev c. Olympus sarl, award of 15 June 2009. See also TAS 2007/A/1267. See also TAS 2015/A/3871 Sergio Sebastián Ariosa Moreira c. Club Olimpia and TAS 2015/A/3882 Club Olimpia c. Sergio Sebastián Ariosa Moreira, award of 29 July 2015 and CAS 2013/A/3260 Grêmio Foot-ball Porto Alegrense v. Maximiliano Gastón López, award of 4 March 2014. In the latter case the claim for moral damages was not accepted.

  36. 36.

    DRC 27 May 2014, no. 05142461. See also DRC 21 May 2015, no. 0515606.

  37. 37.

    The DRC will not take into account clauses where there is lack of reciprocity. See the DRC decision of 7 February 2014, no. 0214233, in which case the DRC pointed out that the clause in the contract on which the club’s claim was founded, was not to be taken into consideration due to its lack of reciprocity.

  38. 38.

    DRC 10 June 2004, no. 64133.

  39. 39.

    DRC 23 January 2013, no. 0113797. See also DRC 12 January 2006, no. 16828.

  40. 40.

    Reference can also be made to DRC 15 March 2013, no. 03131032, and DRC 28 August 2014, no. 0814677.

  41. 41.

    DRC 16 October 2014, no. 10143024.

  42. 42.

    DRC 28 June 2013, no. 06131375. See also CAS 2014/A/3626, Carmela Enrique Valencia Chaverra v. Ulsan Hyundai Football Club, award of 23 April 2015.

  43. 43.

    DRC 25 April 2013, no. 04132387. See also DRC 17 August 2012, no. 8122047, DRC 18 December 2012, no. 12122375, DRC 28 June 2013, no. 06132458 and DRC 28 March 2014, no. 03143127. This also follows from the DRC case of 17 May 2013, no. 05132419 and DRC 13 December 2013, no. 12131045. Relevant CAS cases are CAS 2010/O/2132 Shakhtar Donetsk v. Ilson Pereira Dias Junior, award of 28 September 2011 and CAS 2013/A/3109 FC Steaua Bucuresti v. Rafal Grzelak, award of 24 October 2013. In the latter case it was decided by CAS that the amount due by a player under a disciplinary sanction can be set-off against the amount due to this player under an employment contract if the following principles and conditions are met: (a) reciprocity of claims; (b) similarity of the performances; (c) due setting-off counterclaim; (d) opportunity to claim the setting-off counterclaim in court; (e) absence of reasons of prohibition; and (f) declaration or expression of set-off.

  44. 44.

    Reference can also be made to awards of the CAS as well, such as the case before CAS 2014/A/3573 Damian Alejandro Manso v. Al Ittihad Club, award of 29 January 2015, from which it follows that the CAS is entitled to adjust the amount due as a result of the behaviour of a player. Also, in the case before CAS 2005/A/893 Bruno Metsu v. Al-Ain Sports Club, award of 16 February 2006, the CAS did not award the player the maximum possible compensation, but adjusted it. According to these decisions, it is up to the court to determine the financial compensation due according to the circumstances, as well as the degree of fault of the parties concerned. Special reference can also be made to CAS 2013/A/3089 FK Senica, A.S. v. Vladimir Vukajlovic & FIFA, award of 30 August 2013, in which case it was decided by the CAS that compensation resulting from the termination of a contract without just cause was to be calculated keeping in mind the specificity of sport, i.e. the specific nature of sport and also the specific sporting circumstances. In the said case the Sole Arbitrator concluded that a tacit agreement of termination between the parties had taken place, by means of which the player was released of his obligations to train with the club’s team in order to look for a new club and, in return, the club would no longer have to pay the player’s salary. As a result, it was decided in these circumstances, that where neither the player nor the club were interested any longer in maintaining their labour relationship and taking the principle of the specificity of sport into account, no compensation had to be awarded to the player.

  45. 45.

    DRC 7 September 2011, no. 9111901.

  46. 46.

    DRC 12 January 2007, no. 17595.

  47. 47.

    DRC 23 February 2007, no. 27835.

  48. 48.

    DRC 27 February 2013, no. 02131190. See also 13 October 2010, no. 10102536.

  49. 49.

    DRC 12 January 2007, no. 17820, and DRC 18 March 2010, no. 310585. From the latter case it follows that while assessing the compensation to be awarded to the player, the DRC took into account that the player did not always fully comply with his obligations deriving from the employment contract. Also, from the DRC decision of 21 February 2006, no. 26332, it follows that the Chamber took into consideration the contributory negligence of the player which led to the termination of the employment contract. See also DRC 28 June 2013, no. 0613151a.

  50. 50.

    DRC 22 June 2007, no. 67675. Aside from this, from CAS 2013/A/3374 Al Ahli Club v. David Anthony O’Leary, award of 4 July 2014, it can be derived that a request for reduction of the compensation must be rejected in the event of contributory negligence of an employee, if any, cannot lead to the reduction of damages owed to that employee under Swiss law.

  51. 51.

    DRC 28 June 2013, no. 0613151a. See also DRC 22 June 2007, no. 67675, in which decision an annex of a termination agreement which was signed by both the player and the club had the following clause: “Upon confirmation by the claimant that he found a new club, the contract … will be terminated pursuant to terms agreed upon in the agreement”. On September 2006, the player informed the club that he had not found a new club and, therefore, wanted to keep playing for the club. The club now maintained that the player had been acting disloyally and that he had mislead the club by intentionally making them sign a termination agreement that differs from the draft that the club had presented to the player, even though the club did not know the agreement had been modified. The Chamber emphasized that a party signing a legal document, without knowing its contents, does so at its own risk. Therefore, the fact that the player had modified the agreement before presenting it to the club for signing, was to be considered as an act of bad faith, but could not constitute just cause for termination of the contract. The DRC maintained that the club had breached the contract without just cause and had to pay compensation. When calculating the compensation due, the Chamber did, however, note that the player had acted in bad faith.

  52. 52.

    DRC 20 July 2012, no. 7121848.

  53. 53.

    DRC 23 February 2007, no. 27835.

  54. 54.

    See also CAS 2014/A/3684 Leandro da Silva v. Sport Lisboa e Benfica and CAS 2014/A/3693 Sport Lisboa e Benvfica v. Leandro da Silva, award of 16 September 2015. From this case it also follows that a player has a general obligation to duly mitigate his damages. The CAS Panel decided not to fully accept the claim of the player because the player took no positive steps to ask the club if and when he should return and merely relied on indirect information provided by his agent. Furthermore, the player purported to accept the termination of the contract without question and took no positive steps to the club. Special reference can also be made to footnote 75 of the FIFA Commentary, p. 47, from which it follows that: “CAS 2004/A/587: with regard to the calculation of compensation for a breach of contract committed by a club, the panel applied Swiss law as the law of the country where the association taking the decision was domiciled (Article R58 of the Code of Sports-related Arbitration), since the parties involved had agreed to submit the dispute to the FIFA Regulations and to the Code of Sports-related Arbitration. The panel applied, in particular, Article 337c para 1 of the Swiss Code of Obligations (CO). Accordingly, the compensation due to the player corresponded to the salary for the remaining duration of the contract, taking into account the player’s obligation to mitigate the damages. The damages caused by the breach of contract consisted of the loss of all benefits, provided they were stipulated in the employment contract. Furthermore, there was also the possibility of awarding additional compensation. This additional compensation may, however, not surpass the amount of six month’s salary (cf. Article 337c para 3 CO). CAS 2005/A/902 & CAS 2005/A/903: with regard to the calculation of compensation for a breach of contract committed by a player, the panel applied Article 337d CO, according to which the player has to reimburse the club for damages suffered through the early termination of the contract. In order to quantify these damages, Article 99 para 3 CO makes direct reference to Article 42ff. CO”.

  55. 55.

    DRC 13 October 2010, no. 10102536.

  56. 56.

    DRC 24 April 2015, no. 04151124.

  57. 57.

    The currency was not mentioned in the decision.

  58. 58.

    CAS 2012/A/3033 A v. FC OFI Crete, award of 28 November 2013. See also CAS 2012-A-2874 Grzegorz Rasiak v. AEL Limassol, award of 31 May 2013.

  59. 59.

    DRC 28 June 2013, no. 06131988.

  60. 60.

    DRC 7 February 2014, no. 02141221.

  61. 61.

    FIFA Commentary, explanation Article 17, p. 47.

  62. 62.

    DRC 2 November 2007, no. 117623. See also CAS 2009/A/1840 PFC Slavia 1913 AD v. Kayseri Erciyesspor Kulübü and CAS 2009/A/1851 Zdravko Ivanov Lazarov v. Kayseri Erciyesspor Kulübü, award of 25 November 2009. In the latter case the Panel also underlined that the joint liability of the new club does not prevent it from claiming reimbursement from the player through a separate claim, if the new club was wrongfully induced by the player to sign.

  63. 63.

    CAS 2013/A/3365 Juventus FC v. Chelsea FC, award of 21 January 2015, and CAS 2013/A/1366 A.S. Livorno Calcio S.p.A. v. Chelsea FC, award of 21 January 2015.

  64. 64.

    RSTP, edition 2005, Article 17 para 2.

  65. 65.

    FIFA Commentary, explanation Article 17 para 1 Subpara 3, p. 47.

  66. 66.

    FIFA Commentary, explanation Article 17, p. 47, footnote 76.

  67. 67.

    DRC 2 November 2007, no. 117623. The clause concerned may in fact be closer to a release clause.

  68. 68.

    See also DRC 2 November 2007, no. 117623.

  69. 69.

    DRC 15 February 2008, no. 28533.

  70. 70.

    See also CAS 2010/A/2098 Sevilla FC v. RC Lens, award of 29 November 2011. In this case between the Spanish football club Sevilla FC and the French club RC Lens of 29 November 2010, also known as the Keita case, on 10 July 2007 Lens and Sevilla signed a transfer agreement. The parties agreed in the transfer agreement that in the case of a resale of the player by Sevilla to another club, Lens would be entitled to receive an additional portion of the price to be paid by Sevilla, expressed as a percentage of the capital gain made by Sevilla (the sell on clause) . On 12 July 2007, Sevilla and the player concluded an employment contract. In a letter dated 26 May 2008, the player informed Sevilla of exercising his right to terminate the employment agreement to the Spanish “Real Decreto” 1006/1985. The amount of EUR 14,000,000 specified in the indemnification clause was later received by Sevilla through the offices of the Spanish Liga Nacional de Futbol Professional, which remitted a cheque to Sevilla drawn by the Spanish club FC Barcelona. Lens contacted Sevilla regarding the transfer and claimed the amount due based on the sell on clause. However, Sevilla refused to pay since, according to Sevilla, no agreement had been entered into with Barcelona. Lens lodged a claim before the FIFA PSC, which committee decided that an amount was due to Lens since the release clause should not be interpreted literally. Sevilla appealed before the CAS since it did not agree with the PSC. The CAS had to find out the “real and common intent of the parties” pursuant to the mentioned principles, beyond the literal meaning of the words used, in order to determine the implications of the sell on clause, as well as of any other contractual provision relevant in this arbitration. The CAS Panel decided that the transfer of the player from Sevilla to Barcelona could not be equated to a “sale” of the player as a result of which Sevilla was not obliged to pay any amount to Lens based on the sell on clause.

  71. 71.

    See also CAS 2013/A/3419 Maritimo da Madeira v. Futebol SAD v. Clube Atlético Mineiro, award of 14 November 2014. In this case the CAS Panel considered that a clause contained all the necessary elements required under Swiss law to be established as a penalty clause. A penalty clause can be defined as an accessory provision whereby the debtor promises an agreed penalty to the creditor if the debtor does not perform or improperly performs a defined obligation. Also in this case the CAS Panel stated that a penalty can be excessive and must be reduced. Reference was made to CAS 2011/O/2397, TAS 2011/O/2427 and CAS 2013/A/3205.

  72. 72.

    See for example CAS 2012/A/2847 Hammarby Fotball AB v. Besiktas Futbol Yatirimlari Sanayi ve Ticaret A.S., award of 22 March 2013. The CAS had another approach than the FIFA Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee and examined whether the penalty clause could be considered excessive (in accordance with Swiss law). The CAS Panel considered 4 criteria: (a) the creditor’s interest, (b) the severity of the breach, (c) the debtor’s fault and intentional failure to execute the main obligation and (d) the business experience of the parties. See also CAS 2010/A/2317. Reference was also made to Article 163 of the Swiss Civil Code according to which a penalty clause will be reduced if it is considered to be excessive.

  73. 73.

    From an unpublished DRC decision it follows that “a penalty clause exceeding the amount of 18 % p.a. has to be considered abusive”. See DRC 26 November 2015. This also follows from a decision of the PSC of 15 January 2014, no. 01142777. In the latter case, the Single Judge referred to the content of the penalty clause and, after analysing the relevant provision contained in the transfer agreement, noted that a penalty clause for late payment of 0.05 % per calendar day adds up to an amount of 18.25 % p.a. In this context, the Single Judge recalled the well-established jurisprudence of the PSC according to which a penalty clause exceeding the amount of 18 % p.a. has to be considered abusive. Moreover, the Single Judge determined in this case that the provision in question has to be considered as completely invalid and consequently came to the conclusion that the claimant’s claim for interest in the amount of 0.05 % per calendar day has to be rejected.

  74. 74.

    In a case before the PSC of 28 August 2013, no. 08133007, the Single Judge concluded that the penalty fee contractually agreed by the parties appeared to be disproportionate and should therefore be reduced. In light of the aforegoing and in view of the circumstances of the present matter, the Single Judge held that an amount of EUR 200 per day, which represented one-fifth of the daily penalty requested by the claimant, seemed to be an appropriate and justified penalty in order to compensate the claimant for late payment by the respondent. In this context, the Single Judge underlined that such an amount was also in line with the maximum rate of interest applicable under Swiss law.

  75. 75.

    See DRC 28 September 2006, no. 96391. In this case, The DRC was of the opinion that, under such circumstances, the penalty clause appeared to be completely disproportionate and therefore, the deciding body could legitimately reduce the relevant amount, taking into account the particularities of the specific case. The DRC noted that for the claimant’s failure to return in time from his holidays, according to the employment contract, he had to pay a fine of USD 10,000 per day. Moreover, the club pointed out the application of Article 10 para 5 and Article 17 of the employment contract if the player violated the obligation to resume duty in time. Therefore, the club was of the opinion that it had the right to terminate the contract and demanded compensation from the player in the amount of USD 100,000. In this context, the Chamber stressed that with regard to the monthly income of the claimant, i.e. USD 15,000 for the 2005 season and USD 20,000 for the 2006 season respectively, the penalty imposed by the club on the player was completely disproportionate and could not be accepted. In a case before the DRC of 22 June 2007, the Chamber deemed that the imposition of a fine corresponding to almost 80 % of the monthly salary of a player due to unsuccessful results of a match, cannot be endorsed; DRC 22 June 2007, no. 67736.

  76. 76.

    DRC 16 April 2009, no. 491241.

  77. 77.

    In the case of the PSC of 30 January 2012, the claimant club claimed, among other things, an amount of EUR 202,500 as penalty under clause 5 of the agreement it concluded with another club, which corresponded to 15 % of the total outstanding amount. Furthermore, the claimant club claimed default interest over the claimed amounts. With regard to the claimant´s request in the amount of EUR 202,500 as penalty under clause 5 of the agreement, the Single Judge deemed that, as the wording of the said clause was clear and considering the elapsed time since the transfer of the player to club P in July 2008, a penalty corresponding to 15 % of the total outstanding amount was reasonable and proportionate. However, the Single Judge took note that the claimant also requested default interest over the claimed amounts. The Single Judge was keen to emphasize that according to the long-standing and well-established jurisprudence of the PSC in similar cases, a penalty for late payment cannot be requested together with default interest as both requests aim at compensating the creditor for late payment. The Single Judge added that in order to decide which of the 2 should apply, i.e. the penalty or the default interest, the will of the parties as expressed in the relevant agreement also needed to be taken into account. While reiterating that a penalty for late payment has to remain proportionate, the Single Judge held that the respondent should only be requested to pay the amount of penalty provided under clause 5 of the agreement and therefore the additional default interest of 5 % requested by the claimant cannot be granted. The Single Judge decided that the claim of the claimant had to be partially accepted and held that the respondent had to pay to the claimant an amount of EUR 1,350,000 as being the outstanding amount plus the amount of EUR 202,500 as penalty in accordance with the terms established in the agreement. See also CAS 2010/A/2317 SC Fotbal Club Timisoara SA v. FC Slovan Liberec, award of 9 September 2011. See also DRC 25 April 2013, no. 04132387, DRC 17 August 2012, no. 8122047, and DRC 22 June 2007, no. 67725.

  78. 78.

    DRC 31 October 2013, no. 10132980. A disciplinary measure taken by the club can be unjustified if the disciplinary measure was imposed by the club unilaterally without inviting him to a hearing regarding the imposition of such measure and therefore, he could not defend himself. See DRC 28 March 2012, no. 3122945. See also DRC 10 May 2012, no. 5121852. In the latter case, the Chamber also emphasized that the claimant did not appear to have had the possibility to defend himself.

  79. 79.

    See DRC 16 April 2009, no. 491241, and DRC 27 February 2013, no. 0213412. See also TAS 2007/A/1314 Ali Bouabé & Sporting Lokeren Oost-Vlaanderen c. Association Sportive des Forces Armées Royales (ASFAR), award 31 January 2008.

  80. 80.

    DRC 7 February 2014, no. 0214244.

  81. 81.

    FIFA Commentary, explanation Article 15, p. 43.

  82. 82.

    See DRC 1 June 2005, no. 65850, DRC 23 March 2006, no. 631290, and DRC 10 August 2007, no. 871322. CAS 2007/A/1369 O. v. FC Krylia Sovetov Samara, award of 6 March 2008; CAS 2008/A/1696, award of 30 July 2009; CAS 2013/A/3091 FC Nantes v. FIFA & Al Nasr Sports Club, CAS 2013/A/3092 Ismaël Bangoura v. Al Nasr Sports Club & FIFA, CAS 2013/A/3093 Al Nasr Sports Club v. Ismaël Bangoura & FC Nantes, award of 2 July 2013. CAS 2013/A/1307, award of 31 January 2014.

  83. 83.

    CAS 2014/A/3642 Erik Salkic v. Football Union of Russia & Professional Football Club Arsenal, undated award.

  84. 84.

    The player Philippe Mexès was born on 30 March 1982 in Toulouse in France and started playing for the French football club Auxerre at the age of 15. One season later, on 13 May 1998, Mexès signed a youth player’s contract with Auxerre for a period of 5 years. On 20 June 2000, the youth player’s contract was replaced by a professional football player’s contract for a period of 5 years ending at the end of the 2004/05 season. On 15 December 2002 Auxerre and Mexès agreed to prolong the contract by 1 season, thus, ending at the end of the 2005/06 season. On 24 May 2004, the Italian club AS Roma informed Auxerre that it was interested in the player Mexès and intended to make a transfer bid . On 4 June 2004, AS Roma offered Auxerre EUR 4,500,000 for Mexès by telephone. Auxerre told AS Roma that it did not agree to the transfer of Mexès to AS Roma and that Mexès was still under contract with Auxerre until 30 June 2006. On 11 June 2004, Mexès appealed to FIFA, basing the request on Article 42 of the RSTP, 2001 edition. On 12 June 2004, AS Roma and Philippe Mexès signed a contract for 4 seasons from the 2004/05 season until 2007/08. On 8 July 2004, Auxerre asked FIFA to decide on the dispute. By DRC decision of 13 May 2005, Mexès was ordered to pay Auxerre compensation of EUR 8,000,000 according to Article 22 of the RSTP, 2001 edition; DRC 31 August 2004 (not published). In this case, the DRC decided that Mexès unilaterally breached his contract with Auxerre without just cause. Mexès appealed to the CAS against the DRC decision of 31 August 2004; Decision of the CAS of 11 March 2005, no. CAS 2004 A/708/709/713. The CAS confirmed the DRC decision of 31 August 2004. See also DRC 13 May 2005, no. 55503. In this case, the DRC ordered Mexès to pay compensation to Auxerre in the amount of EUR 8,000,000. Mexès appealed to the CAS regarding the DRC decision of 13 May 2005; Award of the CAS of 5 December 2005, CAS 2005/A/902/903. In this case the CAS found the appeal partially admissible and ordered Mexès to pay Auxerre compensation to the amount of EUR 7,000,000. See also DRC 23 June 2005, no. 65503. The DRC decided that a ban should be imposed on AS Roma for 2 registration periods for the inducement of breach of contract. AS Roma appealed to the CAS against the DRC decision of 23 June 2005, no. 65503; Decision of the CAS of 5 December 2005; CAS 2005/A/916. In this latter case the CAS found the appeal partially admissible and ordered a ban on AS Roma for one entire registration period. However, in this case Auxerre had claimed compensation of EUR 18,000,000. Auxerre stated that Mexès received a much higher salary with AS Roma and the club also stated that it had invested a lot in the player Mexès. In its decision of 13 May 2005, the DRC had examined the objective criteria for calculating the compensation as laid down in Article 22 para 1 of the RSTP, 2001 edition. In the process, the DRC took into account the much higher salary that Mexès was earning at AS Roma, and that Auxerre was famous for training its young players. The DRC referred to the fact that Mexès had been trained by Auxerre for 7 years from the age of 15 until the age of 22. According to the DRC, the remaining value of the contract was EUR 2,403,614 and, based on the special circumstances and objective criteria, the DRC finally ordered Mexès to pay Auxerre a total compensation of EUR 8,000,000. In the appeal, the CAS considered as follows. In its decision of 13 May 2005, the CAS was of the opinion that the DRC had not explicitly motivated and calculated why AS Roma should pay compensation of EUR 8,000,000. Therefore, the CAS had to calculate the amount of compensation due. AS Roma offered to pay compensation of EUR 4,500,000. Auxerre refused this offer. At the basis of its calculation was the amount of EUR 2,289,644 for the loss of Auxerre for the period in which Mexès should have played with Auxerre during the 2005/06 season and compensation for not receiving a transfer sum for Mexès fixed at the minimum of EUR 4,500,000. According to the objective criteria, the CAS finally concluded that AS Roma should pay Auxerre a total financial compensation in the amount of EUR 7,000,000; CAS 2005/A/916 AS Roma v. FIFA, award of 5 December 2005.

  85. 85.

    See also CAS 2006/A/1141 M.P. v. FIFA & PFC Krilja Sovetov, award of 29 June 2007; CAS 2007/A/1429 Bayal Sall v. FIFA and IK Start and CAS 2007/A/1442 ASSE Loire v. FIFA and IK Start, award of 25 June 2008; CAS 2008/A/1568 M. & Football Club Wil 1900 v. FIFA & Club PFC Naftex AC Bourgas, award of 24 December 2008; CAS 2008/A/1453 Elkin Soto Jaramillo & FSV Mainz 05 v. CD Once Caldas & FIFA and CAS/A/1469 CD Once Caldas v. FSV Mainz 05 & Elkin Soto Jaramillo, award of 10 July 2008. In the latter cases, a unilateral termination took place within the Protected Period.

  86. 86.

    See CAS 2012/A/3033 A. v. FC OFI Crete, award of 28 November 2013.

  87. 87.

    DRC 4 April 2007, no. 47936.

  88. 88.

    CAS 2007/A/1298 Wigan Athletic FC v. Heart of Midlothian, CAS 2007/A/1299 Heart of Midlothian v. Webster & Wigan Athletic FC and CAS 2007/A/1300 Webster v. Heart of Midlothian, award of 30 January 2008.

  89. 89.

    This decision was issued before the CAS decision of Webster.

  90. 90.

    DRC 2 November 2007, no. 117623.

  91. 91.

    CAS 2008/A/1519 FC Shakthar Donetsk (Ukraine) v. Mr. Matuzalem Francelino da Silva (Brazil) & Real Zaragoza SAD (Spain) & FIFA and CAS 2008/A/1520 Mr. Matuzalem Francelino da Silva (Brazil & Real Zaragoza SAD (Spain) v. FC Shakthar Donetsk (Ukraine) & FIFA, award of 19 May 2009. Matuzalem was not able to pay the amount as was established by the CAS and was finally subject to a ban on a worldwide scale. However, the award with regard to the prohibition of Matuzalem to play was annulled by the Swiss Federal Tribunal. See SFT 4A_558/2011 (27 March 2012, no).

  92. 92.

    In addition, the contract with Sevilla contained a clause stating that if the player De Sanctis sought to terminate the contract with Sevilla before its expiry, then he would be obliged to pay compensation to Sevilla in the amount of EUR 15,000,000.

  93. 93.

    DRC 10 December 2009, no. 129641.

  94. 94.

    CAS 2009/A/1880 FC Sion v. FIFA & Al-Ahly Sporting Club and CAS 2009/A/1881 Essam El-Hadary v. FIFA & Al-Ahly Sporting Club, award of 1 June 2010.

  95. 95.

    It appeared to the Panel that, as a consequence of the premature termination of the player’s employment contract, Al-Ahly was deprived of the opportunity to obtain a transfer fee of USD 600,000. See para 221 of the El-Hadary case.

  96. 96.

    CAS 2009/A/1856 Fenerbahçe Spor Kulübü v. Stephen Appiah and CAS 2009/A/1856 Stephen Appiah v. Fenerbahçe Spor Kulübü, award of 7 June 2010.

  97. 97.

    The CAS Panel also noted that in these kinds of cases, which have different facts from others and will have been through the DRC, a panel has the benefit of hindsight or the benefit of seeing how the breach of contract has actually effected the injured party, as the CAS Panel may be looking at a breach that happened many years ago.

  98. 98.

    Udinese did produce the details of 3 other international goalkeepers that it had transferred between clubs over the previous couple of years; however, this was not taken by the panel as evidence of any loss suffered by Udinese in relation to this player. As such, as no party advanced any submissions under this criterion, the panel did not use it as part of assessing the compensation due to Udinese.

  99. 99.

    Regarding the time remaining under the old contract, the CAS Panel noted that the time remaining under the old contract had to be taken into account when looking at the period for replacement costs, i.e. 3 years of replacement costs, less 3 years of savings made. However, the Panel also noted in that respect, that De Sanctis had concluded 2 out of his 5 years of his employment contract with Udinese. In certain previous cases, such as the Matuzalem case, this was dealt with in the specificity of sport.

  100. 100.

    But also whether it was felt there was any evidence that the player and Sevilla had met before the player handed his notice in, the time he had given to the club, whether he was a “model professional” or not, the fact he was outside the protected period that he felt he followed a “process” set out in Article 17.3 of the RSTP and whether the player felt as Udinese had not offered him a new deal, after 2 years on the 4th contract.

  101. 101.

    CAS 2008/A/1568 M. & Football Club Wil 1900 v. FIFA & Club PFC Naftex AC Bourgas, award of 24 December 2008.

  102. 102.

    In the Bourgas case, the CAS Panel rounded the compensation up—having worked from the remuneration due under the old contract, but then reviewing the increased remuneration the player received at his new clubs. In Matuzalem, the CAS Panel considered Swiss Law as guidance. In the Matuzalem case the CAS Panel awarded additional compensation in the form of an additional indemnity amount equal to six months of the salary under the new club’s contract.

  103. 103.

    CAS 2010/A/2145 Sevilla FC SAD v. Udinese Calcio S.p.A., CAS 2010/A/2146 Morgan de Sanctis v. Udinese Calcio S.p.A. and CAS 2010-A-2147 Udinese Calcio S.p.A. v. Morgan de Sanctis/Sevilla FC SAD, award of 28 February 2011.

  104. 104.

    See CAS 2013/A/3411 Al Gharafa S.C. & Mark Bresciano v. Al Nasr S.C. & FIFA, award of 9 May 2014.

Reference

  • Wild A (2011) CAS and Football: landmark cases. T.M.C Asser Press, The Hague

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de Weger, F. (2016). Compensation. In: The Jurisprudence of the FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber. ASSER International Sports Law Series. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-126-5_9

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