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Governing in the Shadow of Bosman: A Principal-Agent Perspective on Sports Governance and the EU

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The Legacy of Bosman

Part of the book series: ASSER International Sports Law Series ((ASSER))

Abstract

This contribution investigates the EU’s (potential) role in sports governance by building upon insights from the Principal-Agent model. Highlighting the influence of Bosman, it explores the limitations and opportunities of the EU’s power in relation to sports governing bodies (SGBs). Two EU bodies, the Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Commission, are conceptualised as principals and SGBs are conceptualised as agents. It shows that the EU is able to use the shadow of Bosman to influence the behaviour of SGBs because these bodies fear the costs of the ultimate EU sanction: a second Bosman case. However, drawing from the literature on the EU as a market power, this contribution demonstrates that several factors negatively influence the credible occurrence and magnitude of sanctions, limiting the EU’s capacity to influence SGBs’ behaviour. Moreover, it shows how SGBs are able to diminish the shadow of Bosman through a variety of strategies. The chapter concludes by offering concrete policy advice, indicating that there is certainly room for a more ambitious EU sports policy- devised and supported by the Member States—directed at SGBs.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Geeraert and Drieskens 2015; Geeraert 2016; Geeraert and Drieskens, forthcoming.

  2. 2.

    This contribution considers as SGBs the private associations that hold a monopoly on regulating sport competition at an international (i.e. global or continental) level. A crucial factor is that such organisations produce sports rules that have an effect within the EU’s internal market. Thus, in principle, sport organisations that are not SGBs sensu stricto (because they do not govern a single sport), such as the International Olympic Committee or the World Anti-Doping Agency, also fall within the scope of this definition.

  3. 3.

    Geeraert and Drieskens 2015; Geeraert 2016; Geeraert and Drieskens, forthcoming.

  4. 4.

    Kooiman 1993, p. 3.

  5. 5.

    Dahl 1957, p. 202.

  6. 6.

    Damro 2012.

  7. 7.

    Ross 1973, p. 134.

  8. 8.

    March and Olsen 1984, p. 738.

  9. 9.

    Thus, this contribution assumes that SGBs are rational actors. Research demonstrates that this is the case for FIFA and UEFA, see Geeraert and Drieskens 2015; Geeraert 2016. Yet further research should explore if these assumptions hold true for other SGBs and, thus, succeed in correctly isolating the most important features of EU control, while also expanding our understanding of and leading to new insights into EU control of SGBs.

  10. 10.

    McCubbins and Schwartz 1984; Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991; Pollack 1997; Geeraert and Drieskens 2015.

  11. 11.

    See, e.g. McCubbins and Schwartz 1984; Pollack 1997; Huber and Shipan 2000; Nielson and Tierney 2003.

  12. 12.

    Effectiveness means the extent to which targeted agents deliberately comply in response to these controls.

  13. 13.

    Niemann and Huigens 2011, p. 432; See also Hawkins and Jacoby 2006, p. 212.

  14. 14.

    Borzel 2010; Geeraert and Drieskens 2015.

  15. 15.

    Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991, p. 5.

  16. 16.

    Tallberg 2003, p. 28.

  17. 17.

    Alter 1998.

  18. 18.

    Laffan 1997.

  19. 19.

    Pollack 2003, pp. 35–36, 321.

  20. 20.

    Geeraert et al. 2014.

  21. 21.

    Geeraert and Drieskens 2015; Geeraert and Drieskens, forthcoming.

  22. 22.

    Ibid., pp. 1450–1451.

  23. 23.

    Parrish 2003.

  24. 24.

    McCubbins and Schwartz 1984; McCubbins et al. 1989; Pollack 1997.

  25. 25.

    Calvert et al. 1989, p. 604.

  26. 26.

    Tallberg 2003, p. 137. According to Parrish, ‘the Commission used the ruling to justify greater scrutiny of sporting activity’, see Parrish 2003, p. 9.

  27. 27.

    McCubbins and Schwartz 1984.

  28. 28.

    Parrish 2003, p. 9.

  29. 29.

    Geeraert and Drieskens 2015, p. 1454.

  30. 30.

    Ibid., p. 1455.

  31. 31.

    Scharpf 1994; Héritier and Rhodes 2011.

  32. 32.

    Vermeersch 2009.

  33. 33.

    EU sports policy is devised in interplay between the Commission, the Council and the Parliament. As a result of the EU’s limited sporting competence, the Council ultimately defines the EU’s sports policy. Practice shows that both the Council and the Parliament set out priorities in resolutions and even request policy measures from the Commission.

  34. 34.

    Geeraert 2014.

  35. 35.

    Sharpf 1994; Pollack 1997; Héritier and Rhodes 2011.

  36. 36.

    Geeraert and Drieskens 2015, p. 1456.

  37. 37.

    Calvert et al. 1989, p. 604.

  38. 38.

    McCubbins et al. 1989; Scharpf 1994.

  39. 39.

    Parrish 2003, p. 252.

  40. 40.

    Case 36/74 Walrave and Koch v. Union Cycliste Internationale, ECLI:EU:C:1974:140.

  41. 41.

    Case 13/76 Gaetano Donà v Mario Mantero, ECLI:EU:C:1976:115.

  42. 42.

    Bach and Newman 2007, p. 832.

  43. 43.

    IOC-FIFA Joint Declaration of 11 July 2007, EU white paper on sport: Much work remains to be done. Olympic.org. http://www.olympic.org/content/news/media-resources/manual-news/1999-2009/2007/07/11/ioc-fifa-joint-declaration---eu-white-paper-on-sport-much-work-remains-to-be-done. Accessed 7 July 2015; Infantino 2006.

  44. 44.

    Damro 2012.

  45. 45.

    Drezner 2005.

  46. 46.

    Bach and Newman 2007, p. 831.

  47. 47.

    Ibid., p. 832.

  48. 48.

    Geeraert and Drieskens 2015.

  49. 49.

    Da Conceição-Heldt and Meunier 2014; Fioretos 2010; Quaglia 2014.

  50. 50.

    Da Conceição-Heldt and Meunier 2014, p. 964.

  51. 51.

    Parrish 2003.

  52. 52.

    Tallberg 2003, p. 29.

  53. 53.

    Bach and Newman 2007, p. 832.

  54. 54.

    Niemann and Brand 2008, p. 98; See also Tallberg 2003, p. 137; Here, the Member States thus function as the Commission’s principal, see Geeraert and Drieskens 2015 and Geeraert 2016.

  55. 55.

    Irving 2002; Niemann and Brand 2008.

  56. 56.

    Hawkins and Jacoby 2006; Delreux and Kerremans 2010; Niemann and Huigens 2011; Geeraert and Drieskens 2015.

  57. 57.

    Geeraert and Drieskens 2015.

  58. 58.

    Bouwen 2002, pp. 369–371.

  59. 59.

    García and Weatherill 2012, p. 242; Geeraert and Drieskens 2015.

  60. 60.

    Coen and Richardson 2009.

  61. 61.

    Geeraert and Drieskens 2015, p. 1460.

  62. 62.

    Ibid.

  63. 63.

    Niemann and Brand 2008, p. 98; García and Weatherill 2012, p. 242.

  64. 64.

    Conclusions of the Presidency of the European Council of 7–9 December 2000 (Nice), Annex IV—Declaration on the specific characteristics of sport and its social function in Europe, of which account should be taken in implementing common policies; Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council of 11-12 December 2008, Annex V—European Council Declaration on sport Presidency Conclusions.

  65. 65.

    Parrish 2003, p. 252; Weatherill 2003; Niemann and Brand 2008.

  66. 66.

    Alter 1998; Pollack 2003; Tallberg 2003.

  67. 67.

    Alter 1998.

  68. 68.

    Tallberg 2003, p. 137.

  69. 69.

    Alter 2012, p 84.

  70. 70.

    Geeraert and Drieskens 2015, pp. 1459–1461.

  71. 71.

    Foster 2003; Duval 2015.

  72. 72.

    Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991, p. 27.

  73. 73.

    Irving 2002, p. 220; Holt 2006, p. 116; Geeraert et al. 2014.

  74. 74.

    In Meca-Medina (Case C-519/04 P David Meca-Medina and Igor Majcen v. Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2006:492), the CJEU essentially held that the notion that a rule would have a purely sporting nature or aim does not suffice to automatically exempt it from the scope of the Treaty.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Leuven International and European Studies (LINES), University of Leuven, Parkstraat 45, 3602, 3000, Louvain, Belgium

    Arnout Geeraert

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  1. Arnout Geeraert
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Correspondence to Arnout Geeraert .

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  1. ASSER International Sports Law Centre, T.M.C. Asser Instituut, The Hague, The Netherlands

    Antoine Duval

  2. ASSER International Sports Law Centre, T.M.C. Asser Instituut, The Hague, The Netherlands

    Ben Van Rompuy

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Geeraert, A. (2016). Governing in the Shadow of Bosman: A Principal-Agent Perspective on Sports Governance and the EU. In: Duval, A., Van Rompuy, B. (eds) The Legacy of Bosman. ASSER International Sports Law Series. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-120-3_9

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-120-3_9

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