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Jus Cogens as a Social Construct Without Pedigree

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Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 2015

Part of the book series: Netherlands Yearbook of International Law ((NYIL,volume 46))

Abstract

This chapter revisits the mainstream foundational nonchalance witnessed in the international legal scholarship relating to jus cogens whereby the practice of courts and tribunals often suffice, for most international lawyers, to compensate a disinterest in the pedigree of jus cogens. The purpose of this chapter is accordingly to depict how international lawyers, by virtue of a series of avoidance-techniques, leave one of their most fundamental doctrines ungrounded without feeling any need to anchor it more firmly in the system of thoughts of international law. Whether such a pedigreelessness actually constitutes a sign of maturity of international legal argumentation, or a theoretical ailment, is not a question that is discussed here. The description of the argumentative constructions to which international lawyers resort in relation to jus cogens to avoid the question of its pedigree is sufficient to illustrate the light treatment generally reserved to the making of the main doctrines of international law and their mystical origin.

Professor of Public International Law, University of Manchester; Professor of International Legal Theory, University of Amsterdam; and Director of the Manchester International Law Centre (MILC). The author wishes to thank Julia Wdowin for her assistance.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Compare with the idea of ‘Nomos’ developed by Cover 1983, at 4–5.

  2. 2.

    On the socialisation of international lawyers, see d’Aspremont 2015a, at 1–32.

  3. 3.

    In the same vein, see Dupuy 2002, at 271; Hameed 2014, at 55; and Zemanek 2011, at 409.

  4. 4.

    Early 2015, a quick search in the catalogue of the Peace Palace Library on the entry ‘jus cogens’ generates not less than 239 hits and ‘peremptory norm’ 52 hits.

  5. 5.

    See Sect. 4.2.2 below.

  6. 6.

    The expression is famously from Franck. See Franck 1995, at 6.

  7. 7.

    For a recent account, see Saul 2014, at 26–54; Cannizzaro 2014, at 261–270; Verhoeven 2008a, at 234–239; and Focarelli 2008, at 429–459.

  8. 8.

    See, e.g., International Law Commission, Fragmentation of international law: difficulties arising from the diversification and expansion of international law, Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, 58th session, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.682, 13 April 2006; Meron 2003, at 202; and O’Connell 2012, at 79.

  9. 9.

    Danilenko 1991, at 43.

  10. 10.

    On international law as an argumentative practice made of foundational doctrines and argumentative techniques, see d’Aspremont 2015a.

  11. 11.

    See the seminal (short) article by Verdross 1937.

  12. 12.

    For an early rejection of the notion, see Guggenheim 1953, at 57–58; Schwarzenberger 1965, at 212–214; Lachs 1980, at 203.

  13. 13.

    For two famous outright rejections, see Glennon 2006, at 529–536. See also D’Amato 1990, at 1–6. For a critique of Glennon’s argument, see Verhoeven 2008a, at 229. For an overview of some of the deniers’ arguments, see Gomez Robledo 1981, at 69–87; Kolb 2015; and Zemanek 2011, at 405–409.

  14. 14.

    Weil 1983, at 423. In the same vein, Combacau has claimed that jus cogens is an ‘intruder’ (‘intrus’). Combacau 1986, at 102.

  15. 15.

    Weil 1983, at 424.

  16. 16.

    Sur 2012, at 197; and Weisburd 1995, at 21.

  17. 17.

    Koskenniemi 2005b, at 122. See the remarks of Dupuy 2005, at 131.

  18. 18.

    For criticisms of the foundationlessness of the notion, see D’Amato 1990, at 1–6. For a sketch of the way in which foundationalessness manifests itself in contemporary legal scholarship, see Sect. 4.3.

  19. 19.

    Koskenniemi 2005b, at 122 and 116.

  20. 20.

    Ibid.

  21. 21.

    It has long been demonstrated that disciplines can thrive—and thus deploy their modes of production of authoritative narratives—in the absence of any well-known and solid premise. In other words, the idea that premises of scientific reasoning must be known for scholarly conclusions to be plausible and authoritative in a given discipline has long been rebutted. It could even be said that foundationlessness is probably the fate of most disciplines, as authoritative and plausible arguments can be produced in the absence of known or shared premises. On this point see Nagel 1961, at 43. See also the comments of Polanyi 1967, at 533–545.

  22. 22.

    For some historical account of the notion, see Gomez Robledo 1981, at 17–68; Hannikainen 1988, at part I; Suy 1967, at 17; and Criddle and Fox-Decent 2009, at 331. For some historical considerations from a soviet perspective, see Alexidze 1981, at 228–232.

  23. 23.

    For an account of Roman law origins, see Gomez Robledo 1981, at 17–36; and Stephan 2011, at 1081–1096.

  24. 24.

    This is mentioned by Simma 1995, at 51; and Zemanek 2011, at 381.

  25. 25.

    It is probably not coincidence that ‘it was first floated’ in the inter-war period, that is, at a time where moral progressism was dominant in international legal scholarship, a significant number of international lawyers seeking to smear international law as a voluntaristic and state-centric construction in need of reform. See Collins 2014, at 23–49. See also Kennedy 2000, at 335.

  26. 26.

    Oscar Chinn (UK v Belgium), PCIJ, Merits, Judgment of 12 December 1934.

  27. 27.

    Verdross 1937, at 571.

  28. 28.

    On the legislative history, see Gomez Robledo 1981, at 37–68. See also Stephan 2011, at 1081–1096.

  29. 29.

    1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 UNTS 331.

  30. 30.

    Charlesworth and Chinkin 1993, at 64. See also Dupuy 2005, at 134.

  31. 31.

    They sometimes seem to oscillate between a veiled consensualism and a disguised social morality. See Hameed 2014. It is noteworthy that this construction seems to be hanging between consensualism and morality. Indeed, by equating law officials to states, it falls back into a veiled form of consensualism (ibid., at 85–89); by making jus cogens status depend on social morality, it makes jus cogens fall back on naturalism (ibid., at 79).

  32. 32.

    See generally Kolb 2001. For a criticism, see Dupuy 2002, at 281. For a rebuttal of the argument of Dupuy, see Kolb 2015, at esp. introduction.

  33. 33.

    Dupuy 2002.

  34. 34.

    It is interesting to note that the disruption of the systemic character of international law is sometimes what leads scholar to reprove the notion. Weil 1983, at 424–428. See also Combacau 1986, at 102. On this argument, see the critical remarks of Dupuy 2002, at 271.

  35. 35.

    Kolb 2015. Kolb, however, rejects the idea that jus cogens amounts to public policy. He argues that it is a consequence thereof.

  36. 36.

    See generally de Wet 2006a, b; Peters 2012; Cassese 2012, at 123; Peters 2006; and Vidmar 2012. For some critical remarks, see Zemanek 2011, at 398–399.

  37. 37.

    Paulus 2005, at 322.

  38. 38.

    Weatherall 2015b.

  39. 39.

    This is what has been claimed in relation to pacta sunt servanda. See Janis 1988, at 362.

  40. 40.

    For some critical remarks, see Bianchi 2008, at 497.

  41. 41.

    Verdross 1937, at 572.

  42. 42.

    Ruiz Fabri 2012, at 1050.

  43. 43.

    See, e.g., Janis 1988, at 361–362; Dubois 2009; Onuf and Birney 1974; and O’Connell 2012, at 84. As is well known, the inference of jus cogens from natural law already invoked at the Vienna Conference. See, e.g., the statements of the representative of Mexico, Lebanon, Nigeria, Italy, Ecuador, Uruguay, Ivory Coast, Monaco, U.N. Conference on the Law of Treaties, Summary records of the plenary meetings and the Committee of the Whole, 1st session, A/CONF.39/11, 26 March–24 May 1968, at 294, 297, 298, 303, 311, 320, and 324.

  44. 44.

    Bianchi 2008, at 491 and 507 (citing Levi Strauss 1958, at 227–255 and Bourdieu 1976, at 122).

  45. 45.

    It has been claimed that the values vindicated through jus cogens are not properly universal ‘as its development has privileged the experience of men over those of women, and it has provided a protection to men that is not accorded to women’. See Charlesworth and Chinkin 1993, at 65.

  46. 46.

    Koskenniemi 2005b, at 113–125; and Koskenniemi 2012, at 3–13. See also the objections by Dupuy 2005, at 131.

  47. 47.

    Because international law seeks the universalisation of certain societal standards and its imposition to the whole community and inevitably suffers from the charge of hegemony, one may wonder whether the charge makes any sense.

  48. 48.

    On the creativity of international lawyers in relation to jus cogens, see generally Linderfalk 2008, at 853–871. See also below section 4.2.2.

  49. 49.

    Dupuy 2002, at 310 (he speaks of ‘révolution inachevée’).

  50. 50.

    Parker and Neylon 1989, at 442.

  51. 51.

    Bianchi 2008, at 491–508.

  52. 52.

    This is the idea of ‘notion à tout faire’ mentioned by Pellet 2006, at 422.

  53. 53.

    Gaja 1981, at 271–316; Barberis 1970, at 19; Verhoeven 2008b, at 133; Paul 1971, at 19; Sztucki 1974, at 73; and Scheuner 1967, at 520. On jus cogens as a non-derogability technique, see Kolb 2001. For a criticism, see Dupuy 2002, at 281. For a rebuttal of the argument of Dupuy, see Kolb forthcoming.

  54. 54.

    These consequences comprise non-recognition, non-assistance, the obligation to cooperate and the non-applicability of circumstances precluded wrongfulness. Gaja 1981, at 290–301; Scobbie 2002, at 1201–1220; Tams and Asteriti 2013; Wyler and Castellanos-Jankiewicz 2014, at 284–311; Wyler 2003, at 105; Crawford 2010, at 405; and Cassese 2010, at 415. For the effects of jus cogens in the law of state responsibility, see Gaja 1981, at 290–316; Hannikainen 1988, at 249 and 301. More specifically on the obligation not to recognise, see Talmon 2006, at 99–126; Christakis 2006; and Pert 2013.

  55. 55.

    Suy 1967, at 75; and Zemanek 2011, at 393.

  56. 56.

    Zemanek 2011, at 394–395.

  57. 57.

    There is abundant scholarship on this question. See, among others, Cannizzaro and Bonafé 2011, at 825–842; Cannizzaro 2011, at 437–440; Cassese 2012, at 161; Giegerich 2006, at 203; Caplan 2003, at 741; Knuchel 2011, at 149. More recently, on the controversy related to the Germany v Italy case, see Vidmar 2013; Verhoeven 2014; Talmon 2012; and Espósito 2013.

  58. 58.

    Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, Arbitration Commission, Opinion No. 1, 1992, 31 ILM 1488, 1495, para 1.

  59. 59.

    Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, Arbitration Commission, Opinion No. 3, 4 July 1992, 31 ILM 1521; Cassese 2012, at 161.

  60. 60.

    Verhoeven 2008a, at 234. This had already been mentioned by Verdross in his seminal article. Verdross 1937, at 577.

  61. 61.

    Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Trial Chamber, Judgment, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, 10 December 1998, para 157. This could be read as providing an obligation for states to eliminate the consequences of acts performed in reliance of provisions in conflict with peremptory norms. For a discussion of such a possible interpretation of the decision of the Trial Chamber, see de Wet 2004, at 98.

  62. 62.

    Cassese 2012, at 162.

  63. 63.

    Prosecutor v. Gbao, SCSL, Appeals Chamber, Decision on Preliminary Motion on the Invalidity of the Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of the Special Court, Case No. SCSL-2004-15-AR72, 25 May 2004, para 10. See also La Cantuta v Peru, IACtHR, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Series C No. 162, 29 November 2006, para 157.

  64. 64.

    Bassiouni 1996, at 63; and Orakhelashvili 2006, at 288–317. See also Almonacid-Arellano v Chile, IACtHR, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Series C No. 154, 26 September 2006, para 153; German Bundersverfassungsgericht, 2nd Senate, 1290/99, Order of 12 December 2000, para 17; Prosecutor v. Furundzija, paras 155–156.

  65. 65.

    Goiburu et al . v Paraguay, IACtHR, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Series C No. 153, 22 September 2006, para 132.

  66. 66.

    Orakhelashvili 2006, at 223–238; and Cassese 2012, at 162.

  67. 67.

    See Article 139(3) of the Swiss Constitution.

  68. 68.

    See Annemarieke Vermeer-Künzli 2007, at 553–581 (with an emphasis on erga omnes obligations). It was considered in Kaunda case, South African Constitutional Court, 2004, 136 ILR 463, at 503–504.

  69. 69.

    Conklin 2012, at 83.

  70. 70.

    Orakhelashvili 2006, at 413–448.

  71. 71.

    Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, Rio Tinto Limited, US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, No. 02-5625, Decision of 12 April 2007, at 4147.

  72. 72.

    Verdross 1937, at 577.

  73. 73.

    Orakhelashvili 2006, at 164–176. The case-law of the Inter-American Court is very illustrative in this respect. See, e.g., Juridical Condition of the Rights of the Undocumented Migrants, IACtHR, Advisory Opinion, Series A No. 18, 17 September 2003.

  74. 74.

    Imbler 2007, at 747.

  75. 75.

    Vinuales 2008, at 79.

  76. 76.

    Conforti 2006, at 166–167 (cited by Focarelli 2008, at 441).

  77. 77.

    North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands), ICJ, Judgment of 20 February 1969, Separate Opinion of Judge Padilla Nervo, at 97; ibid., Dissenting Opinion of Judge Tanaka, at 182; ibid., Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sorensen, at 248; Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Rwanda), ICJ, Jurisdiction of the Court and Admissibility of the Case, Judgment of 3 February 2006, Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, Elaraby, Owada and Simma, para 29. See also UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 24 1994, para 8; Cassese 2012, at 161. On this debate, see generally Linderfalk 2004, at 213–234.

  78. 78.

    Cassese 2012, at 161.

  79. 79.

    International Law Commission, Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 53rd session of the ILC, UNGA Res 56/83, 12 December 2001. See Myrna Mack Chang v Guatemala, IACtHR, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Series C No. 101, 25 November 2003, para 139; and Masacre Plan De Sanchez v Guatemala, IACtHR, Merits, Series C No. 105, 29 April 2004, para 51; Juridical Condition of the Rights of the Undocumented Migrants, para 106. The aggravated consequences have however been deemed limited in the literature. See the remarks of Maia 2009, at 271–311, esp. 303–309. See also Tigroudja 2006, at 638.

  80. 80.

    Maia 2009, at 271–311; and Alvarez-Rio and Contreras-Garduno 2013, at 167–192.

  81. 81.

    See, e.g., Bassiouni 1996, at 63.

  82. 82.

    See, e.g., Prefecture of Voiotia v. Federal Republic of Germany, Areios Pagos (Hellenic Supreme Court), Case No. 11/2000, May 4, 2000, 129 ILR 513, at 514, note 54; Ferrini v. Federal Republic of Germany, Italian Supreme Court, Decision No. 5044/2004, 11 March 2004, 128 ILR 658, at 660.

  83. 83.

    This disagreement pertains to the divisibility of treaties found contrary to jus cogens. Compare with Article 44(5) VCLT; and Fragmentation of international law, at 155.

  84. 84.

    Contra Orakhelashvili 2006, at 580; Focarelli 2008, at 445; Cassese 2005, at 205; and Shelton 2006, at 291.

  85. 85.

    Kolb 2015, at esp. chapter 6; Linderfalk 2011, at 375–376; and Linderfalk 2013, at 369–389.

  86. 86.

    Weil 1983, at 429–430.

  87. 87.

    Linderfalk 2008, at 853–871.

  88. 88.

    The expression is from Kolb 2015, at esp. chapter 6.

  89. 89.

    See the remarks of Bianchi on this point Bianchi 2008, at 506.

  90. 90.

    Ibid., at 491–508.

  91. 91.

    Hameed 2014, at 55; and Dupuy 2002, at 271.

  92. 92.

    For a similar finding, see Danilenko 1991, at 43; Simma 1995, at 53; and Saul 2014, at 26–54. See also the account of Focarelli 2008, at 429–459; and Zemanek 2011, at 409.

  93. 93.

    On this question, see d’Aspremont 2011.

  94. 94.

    The debate has been particularly fierce in connection to the sources of international law. See Cohen 2012, at 1049; Besson 2010, at 163–185; and d’Aspremont 2013, at 103–130.

  95. 95.

    Linderfalk 2011, at 359–378; Linderfalk 2013, at 369–389.

  96. 96.

    Verhoeven 2008a, at 231.

  97. 97.

    On the idea that 2nd order rules are not jus cogens but customary rules (as a result customary law can explain the effect of jus cogens without a self-explanatory and self-referential detour to jus cogens to explain the effect of jus cogens), see Linderfalk 2011, at 375–376; and Linderfalk 2013, at 369–389. For the exact opposite position, see Cassese 2005, at 205. See generally Hannikainen 1988; Shelton 2006, at 291; and Focarelli 2008, at 429.

  98. 98.

    For an exception, see Linderfalk who anchors the jus cogens mechanism in the international legal order by virtue of the mechanism of customary international law. Linderfalk 2011, at 375–376; and Linderfalk 2013, at 369–389.

  99. 99.

    See Sect. 4.2.2 above.

  100. 100.

    For a similar point, see Cannizzaro 2011, at 440.

  101. 101.

    Onuf and Birney 1974, at 195; Christenson 1988, at 592; Monaco 1983, at 606; Vidmar 2012, at 13; Orakhelashvili 2006, at 104–105; and Hernandez 2014, at 218–219.

  102. 102.

    Gomez Robledo 1981, at 105; de Wet 2013, at 541–561; and de Hoog 1996, at 45–46.

  103. 103.

    Verdross and Simma 1984, at 324; and Kolb 1998, at 93.

  104. 104.

    Linderfalk 2008, at 862; and Reuter 1995, at 143.

  105. 105.

    Henkin 1989, at 60 and 216; Schachter 1988, at 734; Sur 1988, at 128; Orakhelashvili 2006, at 301–302; and Tomuschat 1993, at 307.

  106. 106.

    Michael Domingues v United States, IACsionHR, Merits, Case 12.285, Report No. 62/02, Merits, 22 October 2002, para 5.

  107. 107.

    Danilenko 1991, at 49.

  108. 108.

    U.N. Conference on the Law of Treaties, Summary records of the plenary meetings and the Committee of the Whole, 1st session, A/CONF.39/11, 26 March–24 May 1968, at 94.

  109. 109.

    Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations of the United States, para 102; Ragazzi 1997, at 53; Paust 1981, at 82; D’Amato 1971, at 111 and 132; Meron 1987, at 350; Linderfalk 2011, at 359; Linderfalk 2013, at 369; Byers 1997, at 220; Dupuy 2002, at 275–276; Verhoeven 2008a, at 231; Sztucki 1974, at 75; Conforti 1988, at 129. For a criticism of this jus cogens-based approach, see Janis 1988, at 360; Dubois 2009, at 133 and 175; and Verhoeven 2011, at 305.

  110. 110.

    Alexidze 1981, at 230–232; Macdonald 1987, at 132.

  111. 111.

    1945 Statute of the International Court of Justice, 33 UNTS 993.

  112. 112.

    This reading of the travaux is put forward by Ragazzi 1997, at 53.

  113. 113.

    See Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), ICJ, Judgment of 20 July 2012, para 99. For Saul, this judgment seems to indicate that jus cogens comes from customary law. Saul 2014, at 7. See also Delimitation of Maritime Boundary between Guinea-Bissau and Senegal, Arbitral Award, 31 July 1989, XX RSA 119, para 44. For a detailed discussion of the case-law of the ICJ in relation to jus cogens, see Hernandez 2014, at 229–236.

  114. 114.

    H. Lauterpacht, Special Rapporteur, Report on the law of treaties, UN Doc. A/CN.4/63, 24 March 1953, at 155; Reuter 1995, at 145; and Alston and Simma 1988. See also Delimitation of Maritime Boundary between Guinea-Bissau and Senegal, para 44.

  115. 115.

    Alexidze 1981, at 256; and Kolb 1998, at 69 and 105.

  116. 116.

    This is the opinion of Danilenko 1991, at 49. He cites the statement of Greece, Cuba, Poland, Italy, Ivory Coast, Cyprus, USA, and Bulgaria (U.N. Conference on the Law of Treaties, Summary records of the plenary meetings and the Committee of the Whole, 1st session, A/CONF.39/11, 26 March–24 May 1968, at 295, 297, 302, 311, 321 and 387; and U.N. Conference on the Law of Treaties, Summary records of the plenary meetings and the Committee of the Whole, 2nd session, A/CONF.39/11/Add.1, 9 April–22 May 1969, at 102).

  117. 117.

    International Law Commission, Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its twenty-eighth session, 28th session, UN Doc. A/31/10, 3 May–23 July 1976, at 86.

  118. 118.

    Verdross 1937, at 573; Hameed 2014, at 78; Simma 1995, at 34 and 53; Dubois 2009, at 133; H. Lauterpacht, Special Rapporteur, Report on the law of treaties, UN Doc. A/CN.4/63, 24 March 1953, at 154; Ragazzi 1997, at 57; Hannikainen 1988, Part II.

  119. 119.

    Cassese 2012, at 158 and 164. See the critical remarks of Ruiz Fabri 2012, at 1049.

  120. 120.

    Simpson writes: ‘The scoffing of the voluntarist is never far away when the phrase “common good” is invoked.’ Simpson 1991, at 182. See also Koskenniemi 2005a, at 322. Koskenniemi understands jus cogens as being built on ascending (consensualist) and descending (non-consensualist) modes of argumentation and inevitably condemned to collapse in either naturalism or voluntarism.

  121. 121.

    An exception is provided by Linderfalk, who anchors the jus cogens mechanism in the international legal order by virtue of the mechanism of customary international law. See Linderfalk 2011, at 375–376; and Linderfalk 2013, at 369.

  122. 122.

    Linderfalk 2011, at 359; Linderfalk 2013, at 369. As is mentioned above, Linderfalk uses this distinction to anchor. The jus cogens mechanism in the international legal order by virtue of the mechanism of customary international law.

  123. 123.

    For a comprehensive overview of the various approaches found in the literature, see Kolb 1998, at 69 and 105; Kolb 2001, 2015, at esp. chapter 3; Cannizzaro 2014, at 261–270; Zemanek 2011, at 381–410; Hameed 2014, at 52; and Criddle and Fox-Decent, 2009, at 331.

  124. 124.

    Danilenko 1991, at 64; Linderfalk 2011, at 359; Linderfalk 2012, at 3; Hameed 2014, at 52; Shelton 2006, at 299–302; Cassese 2012, at 158; Cannizzaro 2014, at 270.

  125. 125.

    See, e.g., Orakhelashvili 2006, at 7–132.

  126. 126.

    This is not unheard of in relation to other doctrines of international law as well. In relation to customary international law, see, e.g., Sir M. Woods, Special Rapporteur, Third report on identification of customary international law, UN Doc. A/CN.4/682, 27 March 2015, para 4. ‘The main materials for seeking guidance on the topic were decisions of international courts and tribunals, in particular the International Court of Justice.’

  127. 127.

    See e.g. Fragmentation of international law, at 183, para 363 and at 190, para 377; Meron 2003, at 202; O’Connell 2012, at 79. For a discussion of the case-law of the ICJ in relation to jus cogens, see Hernandez 2014, at 229–236.

  128. 128.

    Janis 1988, at 361–362; Dubois 2009; O’Connell 2012, at 84. At the Vienna Conference, the role of natural law was mentioned. See, e.g., the statements of the representative of Mexico, Lebanon, Nigeria, Italy, Ecuador, Uruguay, Ivory Coast, Monaco, U.N. Conference on the Law of Treaties, Summary records of the plenary meetings and the Committee of the Whole, 1st session, A/CONF.39/11, 26 March–24 May 1968, at 294, 297, 298, 303, 311, 320 and 324.

  129. 129.

    In the same vein, see Danilenko 1991, at 44.

  130. 130.

    Focarelli 2008, at 444.

  131. 131.

    Danilenko 1991, at 46; Gomez Robledo 1981, at 105 and 109; Verhoeven 2008a, at 230; and Fragmentation of international law, at 183, para 362.

  132. 132.

    Compare with Focarelli 2008, at 446 (who sees it as a blend of deductive and inductive constructions).

  133. 133.

    Orakhelashvili 2006, at 27.

  134. 134.

    Verhoeven 2011, at 306.

  135. 135.

    Kolb 2001, at 172–173. See also Kolb 2015, at esp. chapter 3.

  136. 136.

    It has not been spared by criticisms. For some criticisms of the indeterminacy and deductive character of such a foundation of jus cogens, see Zemanek 2011, at 385–386.

  137. 137.

    Zemanek 2011, at 383; See also Kolb 2015, at esp. chapter 3.

  138. 138.

    Orakhelashvili 2006, at 7–35; Dupuy 2002, at 281.

  139. 139.

    Mosler 1974, at 33–36. See also the statement of Lauterpacht. H. Lauterpacht, Special Rapporteur, Report on the law of treaties, UN Doc. A/CN.4/63, 24 March 1953, at 155.

  140. 140.

    Zemanek 2011, at 383–384.

  141. 141.

    See also Kolb 2015, at esp. chapter 3.

  142. 142.

    Dupuy 2002, at 271.

  143. 143.

    Hameed 2014, at 52. Weatherall 2015a.

  144. 144.

    The social existence of jus cogens and its widespread embedding in the consciousness of international lawyers does not, in itself, explain how the concept ought to be formally anchored, from an internal point of view, into international law. In that sense, the social existence of an idea and its pedigree ought to be distinguished. The confusion between social existence and pedigree is confirmed by the occasional oscillation between some veiled consensualism and moral theory. See, e.g., Hameed 2014, at 52. For some severe criticisms of the conflation between source of authority and status to which legal effects are attached and the risk of unravelling the very bindingness of all norms of international law, see de Wet 2013, at 541–556.

  145. 145.

    On this distinction, see Dupuy 2002, at 275.

  146. 146.

    Conklin 2012, at 837; de Londras 2007, at 250; and Criddle and Fox-Decent 2009. It is noteworthy, and also bewildering, that Verdross in his seminal piece on ‘Forbidden Treaties’ also explains jus cogens in terms of compulsory character. See Verdross 1937, at 571.

  147. 147.

    This approach to jus cogens also infuses the case-law of the Inter-American Court where the invocation of jus cogens comes to support some interpretive constructions, without the legal effects being directly attributable to the jus cogens character. For a useful overview, see Maia 2009, at 271–311. There however are a few exceptions where a specific legal effect is attached to the jus cogens qualification. See, e.g., Almonacid-Arellano v Chile, IACtHR, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Series C No. 154, 26 September 2006, para 153. See also Goiburu et al . v Paraguay, para 132.

  148. 148.

    This approach to jus cogens has insightfully been called the ‘promotional role of jus cogens’ by Focarelli 2008, at 429.

  149. 149.

    Dubois 2009, at 155 and 161; and O’Connell 2012, at 80.

  150. 150.

    International Law Commission, Report of the International Law Commission, Jus cogens (Mr. D.D. Tladi), 66th session, UN Doc. A/69/10 Annex, 2014; Gomez Robledo 1981, at 167; Alexidze 1981, at 259; Saul 2014; O’Connell 2012, at 79; Mik 2013, at 27; and Cannizzaro 2014, at 270.

  151. 151.

    On such a distinction, see Linderfalk 2011, at 359; Linderfalk 2013, at 369; Dupuy 2002, at 309; and Focarelli 2008, at 451.

  152. 152.

    Cannizzaro 2014, at 270.

  153. 153.

    This presupposition seems to be made by the recent proposal to include the question of the nature and criteria of identification to the agenda of the International Law Commission. See International Law Commission, Report of the International Law Commission, Jus cogens (Mr. D.D. Tladi), 66th session, UN Doc. A/69/10 Annex, 2014.

  154. 154.

    See section 4.2.1.

  155. 155.

    On the importance of giving it foundations and explaining its coming to existence. See Linderfalk 2011, at 363. See also D’Amato 1990, at 1–6 (for whom the impossibility of providing such a definition invalidates the notion). See also the recent proposal to include the question of the nature to the agenda of the ILC. International Law Commission, Report of the International Law Commission, Jus cogens (Mr. D.D. Tladi), 66th session, UN Doc. A/69/10 Annex, 2014.

  156. 156.

    On the agenda pursued behind some of the foundational doctrines of international law, see d’Aspremont 2015a.

  157. 157.

    For some similar remarks in connection with the making of the ‘rules’ on state responsibility, see Lusa Bordin 2014, at 535.

  158. 158.

    For some critical remarks on the gospels constructed around each of the main doctrines of international law, see d’Aspremont 2013, at 103; d’Aspremont 2014, at 201; and d’Aspremont 2015b.

  159. 159.

    Ibid.

  160. 160.

    The idea of mysticism has already been heard. Simpson reported that the idea was used by Watson in a presentation at the American Society of International Law (see Simpson 1991, at 180), but the expression did not make its way to the written transcript of the contribution. Bodansky and Watson 1992, at 108). Rather than speaking of mysticism, many critics of scholarly debates on jus cogens cynically speak of the ‘mystery’ shrouding jus cogens. Bianchi 2008, at 493; Hameed 2014, at 52; and Cannizzaro 2014, at 270.

  161. 161.

    The argument is not unheard of. See, e.g., Schlag once wrote that ‘legal thought is in part a kind of theological activity’. See also Schlag 1997, at 428.

  162. 162.

    The expression is from Walker 2008, at 374.

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d’Aspremont, J. (2016). Jus Cogens as a Social Construct Without Pedigree. In: Heijer, M., van der Wilt, H. (eds) Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 2015. Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, vol 46. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-114-2_4

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