Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

The Admission of Torture Statements into Evidence

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia

Part of the book series: International Criminal Justice Series ((ICJS,volume 6))

Abstract

The ECCC are bound by their mandate to comply fully with domestic and international standards of the rule of law. This entails that, even though the ECCC must engage with a setting in which torture was rife, they must not admit into evidence any statements established to have been made as a result of torture. The case law of the ECCC has been mindful of this principle. In this chapter, the relevant case law of the ECCC will be presented and assessed. It will be shown that the case law of the ECCC is in line with the international discussion, but that some questions remain open to further discussion, in the ECCC as in international law more generally.

The author is Attorney-at-Law at Weissleder Ewer in Kiel, Germany.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 189.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Hardcover Book
USD 249.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    A and Others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (No. 2) [2005] UKHL 71, [2006] 2 AC 221, § 160 (Lord Brown).

  2. 2.

    Ibid., § 82 (Lord Hoffmann).

  3. 3.

    On the relevance of the exclusionary rule to the rule of law, see ibid., § 167 (Lord Brown).

  4. 4.

    See Articles  3(1), 5(2) and 6 ECCC Law.

  5. 5.

    This form of the Defence request is taken from the Order on Use of Statements which were or may have been Obtained by Torture, Nuon Chea and others (002/19-09-2007/ECCC-D130/8), Co-Investigating Judges, 28 July 2009, § 1. The Defence Request for Exclusion of Evidence Obtained by Torture, Nuon Chea and others (002/19-09-2007/ECCC-D130), 11 February 2009, § 56 and the Defence Reply to the Co-Prosecutors’ Response to Ieng Thirith’s Defence Request for Exclusion of Evidence Obtained by Torture, Nuon Chea and others (002/19-09-2007/ECCC-D130/6), 18 May 2009, § 46, contained somewhat different language.

  6. 6.

    1465 UNTS 85 (1984) (hereafter CAT).

  7. 7.

    Order, Nuon Chea and others, supra note 5, § 17.

  8. 8.

    Order, Nuon Chea and others, supra note 5, § 16.

  9. 9.

    Ibid., § 19.

  10. 10.

    Defence Request, Nuon Chea and others, supra note 5, § 45, cited in Order, Nuon Chea and others, supra note 5, § 22.

  11. 11.

    Co-Prosecutors’ Response to Ieng Thirith’s Defence Request for Exclusion of Evidence Obtained by Torture, Nuon Chea and others (002/19-09-2007/ECCC-D130/5), 30 April 2009, §§ 30−32. The Defence Reply, supra note 5, § 35, briefly adverted to the issue of command responsibility and joint criminal enterprise, but again only stressed the rule in Article 15 of the CAT that a torture statement could only be used ‘as evidence that the statement was made’.

  12. 12.

    Order, Nuon Chea and others, supra note 5, § 22.

  13. 13.

    Ibid., § 23.

  14. 14.

    Ibid., § 24.

  15. 15.

    Ibid., §§ 25−26.

  16. 16.

    Ibid., § 28.

  17. 17.

    Decision on the Admissibility of the Appeal against Co-Investigating Judges’ Order on Use of Statements which were or may have been Obtained by Torture, Nuon Chea and others (002/19-09-2007/ECCC-D130/9/21), Pre-Trial Chamber, 18 December 2009, § 29, quoting verbatim Decision on Parties’ Requests to Put Certain Materials before the Chamber pursuant to Internal Rule 87(2), Kaing Guek Eav (Duch) (001/18-7-2007/ECCC-E176), Trial Chamber, 28 October 2009, § 8. The PTC issued identical decisions in the other cases.

  18. 18.

    Decision, Nuon Chea and others, supra note 17, § 30.

  19. 19.

    Judgment, Nuon Chea and others (002/19-09-2007/ECCC-E313), Trial Chamber, 7 August 2014, § 35, referencing Decision, Kaing Guek Eav (Duch), supra note 17 and Trial Chamber Response to Motions E67, E57, E56, E58, E23, E59, E20, E33, E71 and E73 following Trial Management Meeting of 5 April 2011, Nuon Chea and others (002/19-09-2007/ECCC-E74), Trial Chamber, 8 April 2011, at 3, which in turn referenced, inter alia, the Transcript of Trial Proceedings, Kaing Guek Eav (Duch) (001/18-7-2007/ECCC-E1/27.1), Trial Chamber, 28 May 2009, at 9.

  20. 20.

    Notice of Appeal against the Judgment in Case 002/01, Nuon Chea and others (002/19-09-2007/ECCC-E313/1/1), 29 September 2014, § 5, Ground 36. The appeal by the Defence of Khieu Samphan does not raise any similar grounds of appeal: see Déclaration d’appel de la Défense de M. Khieu Samphan contre le jugement rendu dans le procès 002/01, Nuon Chea and others (002/19-09-2007/ECCC-E313/2/1), 29 September 2014; Mémoire d’appel de la Défense de M. Khieu Samphan contre le jugement rendu dans le procès 002/01, Nuon Chea and others (002/19-09-2007/ECCC-F17), 29 December 2014. Neither does the appeal by the Co-Prosecutors; see Co-Prosecutors’ Notice of Appeal of a Decision in Case 002/01, Nuon Chea and Others (002/19-09-2007/ECCC-E313/3/1), 29 September 2014, § 2.

  21. 21.

    See Nuon Chea’s Appeal against the Judgment in Case 002/01, Nuon Chea and others (002/19-09-2007/ECCC-F16), 29 December 2014, §§ 706−722; Co-Prosecutors’ Response to Case 002/01 Appeals, Nuon Chea and others (002/19-09-2007/ECCC-F17/1), 24 April 2015, § 6.

  22. 22.

    Nuon Chea’s Submissions regarding the Use of ‘Torture-Tainted Evidence’ in the Case 002/02 Trial, Nuon Chea and others (002/19-09-2007/ECCC-E350), §§ 4, 13−28.

  23. 23.

    Order, Nuon Chea and others, supra note 5, § 17 and § 24 note 30.

  24. 24.

    Contra Scharf 2008, at 152, note 114. The ECCC were established by a Cambodian statute ‘in the existing court structure’ (Article 2 new ECCC Law). They apply Cambodian law, subject to international human rights law (see Article 12(1) ECCC Agreement and Article 23(1) ECCC Law). Special status and immunities attach only to persons on the ECCC, not to the ECCC itself (Articles 41−42 of the ECCC Law). On the other hand, the ECCC were established pursuant to the ECCC Agreement with the UN, and their expenses are shared between Cambodia and the UN.

  25. 25.

    A and Others, supra note 1, § 35 (Lord Bingham); Hanseatisches Oberlandesgericht Hamburg (Regional Court of Appeal of Hamburg), El Motassadeq, Order of 14 June 2005, in 58 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (2005) 2326−2330, at 2326; Ambos 2009, at 380; Pattenden 2006, at 10, 12; Thienel 2006b, at 360; contra Scharf 2008, at 152−155.

  26. 26.

    Order, Nuon Chea and others, supra note 5, § 22.

  27. 27.

    Ibid.

  28. 28.

    Summary Prepared by the Secretary-General, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1314, 19 December 1978, § 86, at 18.

  29. 29.

    See infra note 40.

  30. 30.

    Surprisingly, in an article aimed at reading down the effect of Article 15, Professor Scharf accepts this narrow interpretation of the word ‘torturer’, excluding the charged persons before the ECCC from the let-out clause: Scharf 2008, at 159.

  31. 31.

    It is true that Article 31(1) and (4) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1155 UNTS 331—hereafter VCLT) privileges the ordinary meaning of a word over any special meaning. However, it is submitted that even the ordinary meaning of the word ‘torturer’ supports the interpretation suggested here. Moreover, the criminal law context should be enough to support a special meaning under Article 31(4) VCLT.

  32. 32.

    See also the Application of Amnesty International, ‘The International Commission of Jurists and the Redress Trust to Present an amicus curiae Submission Pursuant to Internal Rule 33’, §§ 9−13, at 4−5, available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/ASA23/020/2009/en (visited 15 June 2015).

  33. 33.

    Conspiracy in the common law sense would be a separate offence, in that it would not require proof of the actual commission of acts of torture. However, the offence of conspiracy is not in this sense accepted in international criminal law (cf. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 548 U.S. 557, 603−612 (plurality opinion)). Conspiracy to commit genocide is an exception both in the ECCC Law and in general international law, except at the ICC; see Schabas 2008, at 155.

  34. 34.

    It is worth stressing that the CIJ did not generally deny that torture statements were not to be assessed for the truth of their contents. Their statement came only in the context of the reliability aspect of the object and purpose behind Article 15 CAT. It was therefore only relevant on the basis that the deterrence aspect of the object and purpose had been respected by using the statements only against the torturers.

  35. 35.

    Order, Nuon Chea and others, supra note 5, § 28.

  36. 36.

    See the text supra, at notes 17 through 19.

  37. 37.

    Decision, Nuon Chea and others, supra note 17, § 30 note 33.

  38. 38.

    Inserted at the proposal of Austria and the United States, see UN Doc. E/CN.4/1314, supra note 28, §§ 85−86, at 18.

  39. 39.

    See Report of the Working Group on a Draft Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1367, 5 March 1980, §§ 82−84, at 14−15.

  40. 40.

    Ingelse 2001, at 366. It is only recorded (UN Doc. E/CN.4/1367, supra note 39, § 83, at 15) that some changes to the revised Swedish draft were proposed to achieve uniformity between the convention and Article 12 of the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, GA Res. 3452 (XXX), 9 December 1975. However, that declaration had contained no qualification to the exclusionary rule at all.

  41. 41.

    Pattenden 2006, at 6. As to the related question of the admissibility of torture statements adduced by the Defence, see infra, Sect. 18.7.

  42. 42.

    Methodologically, this is not even a case of expressio unius est exclusio alterius (contra Scharf 2008, at 159). This maxim of interpretation means that where one thing is expressed, the exclusion of another is implied. Here, the exclusion of all statements not covered by the clause beginning with ‘except’ is quite express. To describe this as a case of the application of expressio unius is to understate the strength of the argument.

  43. 43.

    See also Burgers and Danelius 1988, at 148.

  44. 44.

    Order, Nuon Chea and others, supra note 5, § 26.

  45. 45.

    Ibid.

  46. 46.

    Decision on Admissibility of Material on the Case File as Evidence, Kaing Guek Eav (Duch) (001/18-7-2007/ECCC-E43/4), Trial Chamber, 26 May 2009, § 6, partly adopted in Decision, Kaing Guek Eav (Duch), supra note 17, § 2.

  47. 47.

    The rule also does not apply to the executive: Ambos 2009, at 379 note 93; Thienel 2006a, at 406; contra Pollard 2005, at 358−359.

  48. 48.

    Ambos 2009, at 380. Nowak and McArthur 2008, at 504, 530, 536, are somewhat unclear in that they use the phrase ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’, but sometimes in relation only to statements (ibid., 530, 536). Pattenden 2006, at 8−10, 41, collects some official sources in support of the doctrine, but—contrary to a Defence submission to the Trial Chamber (Ieng Sary’s Motion against the Use of Torture Tainted Evidence at Trial, Nuon Chea and others (002/19-09-2007/ECCC-E33), 4 February 2011, § 20)—does not ultimately support the view.

  49. 49.

    See the sources assembled by Pattenden 2006, at 9, and adopted in Ieng Sary’s Motion, supra note 48, § 20, note 55. In the individual communication case of G.K. v. Switzerland, UN Doc. CAT/C/30/D/219/2002, 7 May 2003, the Committee appears to have been silent as to the author’s ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ argument (contra Pattenden 2006, ibid.).

  50. 50.

    Cf. Nowak 2005, at 731.

  51. 51.

    See Jalloh v. Germany, ECtHR RJD 2006-IX, §§ 99−102, 105−108; Gäfgen v. Germany, ECtHR RJD 2010-IV, §§ 165−167, 173−188. See also Grabenwarter 2010, at 3131; Meyer 2015, at 202.

  52. 52.

    213 UNTS 221 (1950) (hereafter ECHR).

  53. 53.

    See Jalloh, supra note 51, § 105.

  54. 54.

    Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of Justice), Case No. 3 StR 573/09, Order of 14 September 2010, in 64 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (2011) 1523−1525, at 1524; on the practice of States parties, see also Gäfgen, supra note 51, §§ 69, 73−74, 174.

  55. 55.

    Pattenden 2006, at 9. Judge Zupančič appears to miss this argument in his concurring opinion in Jalloh, supra note 51, at his note 7, when he draws from the wording of Article 15 that ‘no insubstantial distinction is made [in the article] between verbal and non-verbal evidence’. He highlights instead the words ‘as evidence’, but these are qualified by the word ‘statements’.

  56. 56.

    Pattenden 2006, at 8.

  57. 57.

    Ibid., at 8−9; Ambos 2009, at 380; Ieng Sary’s Motion, supra note 48, § 20.

  58. 58.

    While the right to a fair trial is absolute, what constitutes unfairness may be left to a balancing exercise: R. v. A (No. 2) [2001] UKHL 25, [2002] 1 AC 45, § 38 (Lord Steyn); Secretary of State for the Home Department v. MB [2007] UKHL 46, [2008] 1 AC 440, §§ 29−32 (Lord Bingham).

  59. 59.

    Draft Convention for the Prevention and Suppression of Torture, Submitted by the International Association of Penal Law, UN Doc. E/CN.4/NGO/213, 15 January 1978, Article VII; also noted by Pattenden 2006, at 9.

  60. 60.

    Pattenden 2006, at 9.

  61. 61.

    UN Doc. E/CN.4/1314, supra note 28, §§ 85−86, at 18.

  62. 62.

    See also Pattenden 2006, at 41, noting that the United Kingdom probably would not ‘incur global opprobrium’ if it failed to apply the ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine in relation to Article 15 of the CAT.

  63. 63.

    Order, Nuon Chea and others, supra note 5, § 16. See supra, Section 2.

  64. 64.

    So did the observations of the present author, kindly cited by the CIJ: Thienel 2006b, at 354.

  65. 65.

    For the following distinction, see Thienel 2007, at 545−549.

  66. 66.

    Ireland v. United Kingdom, ECtHR (1978) Series A, No. 25, § 160; Artico v. Italy, ECtHR (1980) Series A, No. 37, § 30.

  67. 67.

    See Defence Request, Nuon Chea and others, supra note 5, §§ 10, 26; Co-Prosecutors’ Response, Nuon Chea and others, supra note 11, § 27; Defence Reply, Nuon Chea and others, supra note 5, § 25. In fact, their discussion of the burden of proof may not have related so much to the question of fact of whether ill-treatment had occurred, but to the question of law of whether such treatment had constituted torture. This is not actually a matter of the burden of proof at all; see Thienel 2007, at 556−557.

  68. 68.

    Thienel 2007, at 548−549.

  69. 69.

    Order, Nuon Chea and others, supra note 5, § 19.

  70. 70.

    A and Others, supra note 1, § 118 (Lord Hope), § 138 (Lord Rodger), § 158 (Lord Carswell), § 172 (Lord Brown). For this characterisation of the issue, see also RB (Algeria) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] UKHL 10, [2010] 2 AC 110, § 202 (Lord Hoffmann). The fact that this burden was to be discharged by proof on the balance of probabilities is due to the simple fact that this is the general civil standard of proof (and the criminal standard of proof for burdens on the defence) in English law. This, therefore, involves no relaxation of the general standards on account of the difficulties of proving torture (possibly contra Ambos 2009, at 395−396).

  71. 71.

    A and Others, supra note 1, § 56 (Lord Bingham), § 80 (Lord Nicholls), § 98 (Lord Hoffmann).

  72. 72.

    El Motassadeq, supra note 25, at 2328.

  73. 73.

    Ibid.; A and Others, supra note 1, § 121 (Lord Hope); see also ibid., § 145 (Lord Rodger) and § 172 (Lord Brown), as well as the concessions by Lord Bingham, ibid., § 58, and Ambos 2009, at 396.

  74. 74.

    Ambos 2009, at 394−396; Nowak and McArthur 2008, supra note 45, at 534, and Pattenden 2006, at 25, 26−27, had earlier arrived at the same view.

  75. 75.

    Othman (Abu Qatada) v. United Kingdom, ECtHR RJD 2012-I, §§ 185, 273−280.

  76. 76.

    El Haski v. Belgium (ECtHR, 25 September 2012, summary in (2013) 56 EHRR 31), § 88.

  77. 77.

    Cf. In re H (Minors) (Sexual Abuse: Standard of Proof) [1996] AC 563, 576 (Lord Lloyd) (HL); R (N) v. Mental Health Tribunal (Northern Region) [2005] EWCA Civ 1605, [2006] QB 468, § 99 (Richards LJ). A contrary argument would be that the test in El Haski does not relate to a standard of proof, but to whether something has to be ‘established’ at all.

  78. 78.

    Order, Nuon Chea and others, supra note 5, § 19.

  79. 79.

    Ibid.

  80. 80.

    Gäfgen, supra note 51, §§ 101−108; see also Scharf 2008, at 141−143.

  81. 81.

    Ibid., §§ 101, 107.

  82. 82.

    Pattenden 2006, at 8; see Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Thirty-sixth Session, 4 February-14 March 1980, UN Doc. E/1980/13 = E/CN.4/1408, §§ 94−96, at 67−68; Report on the Thirty-seventh Session, 2 February−13 March 1981, UN Doc. E/1981/25 = E/CN.4/1475, § 46, at 62.

  83. 83.

    See Burgers and Danelius 1988, at 148; Ingelse 2001, at 366.

  84. 84.

    See Ingelse 2001, at 381−382; Nowak and McArthur 2008, at 535; Pattenden 2006, at 8.

  85. 85.

    See supra note 51. The exclusionary rule with respect to inhuman and degrading treatment is not, however, coextensive with that in relation to torture as far as the admissibility of resulting real evidence is concerned (see ibid.).

  86. 86.

    The reasons for deleting Article 15 from the list in Article 16 are not clear from the travaux préparatoires (see supra note 82). Ingelse 2001, at 366, as well as Nowak and McArthur 2008, at 534, suggest that this was only due to a lack of agreement, not to any agreement that Article 15 should not apply to inhuman or degrading treatment.

  87. 87.

    See Ireland, supra note 66, § 167; Scharf 2008, at 141.

  88. 88.

    Some cases derive the designation of an act as torture solely from the wording of Article 1 of the CAT: Dragan Dimitrijević v. Serbia and Montenegro, UN Doc. CAT/C/33/D/207/2002, 24 November 2004, § 5.3; Jovica Dimitrov v. Serbia and Montenegro, UN Doc. CAT/C/34/D/171/2000, 3 May 2005, § 7.1. This is correct if the purposes in Article 1 make an act inflicting severe suffering torture, but not if the degree of suffering must yet be examined to distinguish torture from inhuman or degrading treatment.

  89. 89.

    See Nowak and McArthur 2008, at 74−75, 535. Gäfgen, supra note 51, § 90, notes the purpose-based test as an additional criterion to that of the degree of suffering inflicted.

  90. 90.

    Cf. Nowak and McArthur 2008, at 535.

  91. 91.

    See e.g. Kalashnikov v. Russia, ECtHR RJD 2002-VI, § 95.

  92. 92.

    Emphasis added.

  93. 93.

    Emphasis added.

  94. 94.

    This point is underlined by the fact that the case law of European Court of Human Rights does not distinguish between the inadmissibility of statements taken by torture and that of statements taken by inhuman or degrading treatment. The argument is slightly weakened, however, by the curious distinction between the two concepts in the same case law with respect to the ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine (see supra note 51).

  95. 95.

    See Notice of Appeal, Nuon Chea and others, supra note 20, § 5, Ground 36; Appeal, Nuon Chea and others, supra note 21, § 706.

  96. 96.

    Appeal, Nuon Chea and others, supra note 21, §§ 710−712.

  97. 97.

    Ibid., §§ 714−716; see also ibid., § 721, regarding the law of Canada, Denmark, Greece, and Austria.

  98. 98.

    Co-Prosecutors’ Submission regarding the Application of the Torture Convention to S-21 Confessions and Other Records relating to Interrogations of Prisoners, Nuon Chea and others (002/19-09-2007/ECCC/E350/1), 21 May 2015, § 19. The Co-Prosecutors did not make (or have not yet made) such submissions before the SCC, presumably because—as the Defence has admitted (Appeal, Nuon Chea and others, supra note 21, § 707)—the Judgment in Case 002/01 did not rely on any holding in this regard and the appeal therefore presumably cannot turn on this issue.

  99. 99.

    El Motassadeq, supra note 25, at 2329; Gleß 2007, at 623; Rogall 2010b, at 1378; Schmitt 2014, at 653. The same is true of some other rules of inadmissibility, such as the inadmissibility under Section 252 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Strafprozessordnung) of the written record of a statement by a close relative of the accused who has since withdrawn the statement: see Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court), Case No. 2 BvR 1337/03, Order of 25 September 2003, in 9 Neue Zeitschrift für Strafrecht—Rechtsprechungsreport (2004), at 18−19; Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of Justice), Case No. 4 StR 616/99, Judgment of 10 February 2000, in 46 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofs in Strafsachen (2001), at 1 et seq. None of this is entirely undisputed; for the most prominent dissenting view, see Roxin, Schäfer and Widmaier 2006, at 656 et seq.

  100. 100.

    Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of Justice), Case No. 3 StR 45/08, Order of 5 August 2008, in 29 Strafverteidiger (2009), at 113.

  101. 101.

    That is also the position under some English and Canadian case law, which the Defence appears to have presented in more absolute terms (Appeal, Nuon Chea and others, supra note 21, § 721). Under this case law, evidence may be ruled admissible despite ‘informer privilege’ (i.e. the rule against the identification of police informers, which exists in the public interest) only if ‘the judge should be of opinion that the disclosure of the name of the informant is necessary or right in order to shew the prisoner's innocence’: Marks v. Beyfus (1890) QBD 494, 498 (Lord Esher MR), approved by the Supreme Court of Canada in Bisaillon v. Keable [1983] 2 SCR 60, at 90, 93.

  102. 102.

    See also Kasikili/Sedudu Island (1999) ICJ Reports 1045, at 1075−1077.

  103. 103.

    Sixth Report on the Law of Treaties, by Sir Humphrey Waldock, Special Rapporteur, Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1966, II, 51−103, at 99; see also Dörr 2012, at 557, 559.

  104. 104.

    Competence of the ILO to Regulate Agricultural Labour (1922) PCIJ Series B Nos. 2 & 3, at 39.

  105. 105.

    See Dörr 2012, at 556−557.

  106. 106.

    This is a general problem in human rights law, because this relates to the relationship between the State and individuals, which is governed primarily by domestic law. Accordingly, subsequent State practice within the meaning of Article 31(3)(b) VCLT does not play a great role in human rights law (but see Loizidou v. Turkey (Preliminary Objections), ECtHR (1995) Series A, No. 310, §§ 73, 79; Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, ECtHR RJD 2005-I, §§ 144, 157; Hassan v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, 16 September 2014, § 101). The ECtHR often looks for a ‘European consensus’ among States parties to the ECHR, but this is not an interpretation under Article 31(3)(b) VCLT. It is specific to the ‘living instrument’ approach of the ECtHR and against that background does not look for practice under the Convention, but for a consensus as to the issue.

  107. 107.

    On this and the foregoing, see Rogall 2010a, at 1315.

  108. 108.

    Cf. Ambos 2009, at 388−389: ‘the use of torture evidence would re-victimize the torture victim again attacking her dignity’.

  109. 109.

    This should also take care of any fair trial issues, because the right to a fair trial, including the right to call and examine witnesses, is open to a balancing exercise; see supra, note 58.

  110. 110.

    See supra, note 25.

  111. 111.

    A and Others, supra note 1, § 150 (Lord Carswell). See also supra, notes 2 and 3.

  112. 112.

    Ambos 2009, at 384, and, as to Article 6 ECHR, Meyer 2015, at 202. Pattenden 2006, at 37, argues for an exception similar to that considered in Germany; see supra, at note 100.

  113. 113.

    Co-Prosecutors’ Submission, supra note 98, § 19.

  114. 114.

    Schenk v. Switzerland, ECtHR (1988) Series A, No. 140, § 51; Butkevicius v. Lithuania, ECtHR RJD 2002-II, § 49.

  115. 115.

    Minelli v. Switzerland, ECtHR (1983) Series A, No. 62, § 37; Allenet de Ribemont v. France, ECtHR (1995) Series A, No. 308, § 35.

  116. 116.

    The Co-Prosecutors have requested this, if for other reasons: Co-Prosecutors’ Submission, supra note 98, § 22.

  117. 117.

    Cf. a question by Judge Fenz: Transcript of Trial Proceedings, Nuon Chea and others (002/19-09-2007/ECCC/E1/304.1), 25 May 2015, at 14−15.

  118. 118.

    Scharf 2008, at 132, 136−139.

  119. 119.

    Ibid., at 147−151.

  120. 120.

    Report of the International Law Commission, Fifty-third Session, 23 April–1 June and 2 July–10 August 2001, UN Doc. A/56/10, at 49.

  121. 121.

    On the absolute nature of the right to a fair trial, see supra note 58.

  122. 122.

    UN Doc. A/56/10, supra note 120, at 205.

  123. 123.

    See e.g. Othman, supra note 75, §§ 21, 180.

  124. 124.

    This is because there is no general definition of terrorism; see R. v. Gul (Mohammed) [2013] UKSC 64, [2014] 1 AC 1260, §§ 44−51 (Lord Neuberger and Lord Judge).

  125. 125.

    Ambos 2009, at 380.

  126. 126.

    Judgment, Kaing Guek Eav (Duch) (001/18-7-2007/ECCC-E188), Trial Chamber, 26 July 2010, § 646, note 1086.

  127. 127.

    Judgment, Nuon Chea and others, supra note 19, § 35 and passim.

  128. 128.

    A and Others, supra note 1, § 167 (Lord Brown).

References

  • Ambos K (2009) The Transnational Use of Torture Evidence. Israel Law Review 42:362−397

    Google Scholar 

  • Burgers J, Danelius H (1988) The United Nations Convention against Torture. Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht

    Google Scholar 

  • Dörr O (2012) Article 31. In: id., Schmalenbach K (eds), Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, A Commentary. Springer, Heidelberg, pp 521−570

    Google Scholar 

  • Gleß S (2007) § 136a. In: Erb V et al. (eds) Löwe-Rosenberg, Die Strafprozessordnung und das Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz, Großkommentar, 26th ed., vol. 4. De Gruyter, Berlin, pp 580−631

    Google Scholar 

  • Grabenwarter C (2010) Androhung von Folter und faires Strafverfahren—Das (vorläufig) letzte Wort aus Straßburg. Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 63:3128−3132

    Google Scholar 

  • Ingelse C (2001) The UN Committee against Torture, An Assessment. Kluwer Law International, The Hague

    Google Scholar 

  • Meyer F (2015) Artikel 6. In: Karpenstein U, Mayer F (eds) EMRK, 2nd ed.. C.H. Beck, Munich, pp 151−240

    Google Scholar 

  • Nowak M (2005) UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, CCPR Commentary, 2nd ed. N.P. Engel, Kehl

    Google Scholar 

  • Nowak M, McArthur E (2008) The United Nations Convention against Torture. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Pattenden R (2006) Admissibility in Criminal Proceedings of Third Party and Real Evidence Obtained by Methods Prohibited by UNCAT. International Journal of Evidence & Proof 10:1−41

    Google Scholar 

  • Pollard M (2005) Rotten Fruit: State Solicitation, Acceptance, and Use of Information Obtained through Torture by Another State. Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 23:349−378

    Google Scholar 

  • Rogall K (2010a) § 136. In: Wolter J (ed) Systematischer Kommentar zur Strafprozessordnung, 4th ed., vol. II. Heymann, Cologne, pp 1277−1323

    Google Scholar 

  • Rogall K (2010b) § 136a. Ibid., pp. 1323–1394

    Google Scholar 

  • Roxin C, Schäfer G, Widmaier G (2006) Die Mühlenteichtheorie—Überlegungen zur Ambivalenz von Verwertungsverboten. Strafverteidiger 26:655−661

    Google Scholar 

  • Schabas W (2008) Article 6. In: Triffterer O (ed) Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2nd edn. C.H. Beck, Munich, pp 143−157

    Google Scholar 

  • Scharf M (2008) Tainted Provenance: When, If Ever, Should Torture Evidence Be Admissible? Washington & Lee Law Review 65:129–172

    Google Scholar 

  • Schmitt B (2014) § 136a. In: Meyer-Goßner L, Schmitt B (eds) Strafprozessordnung, 57th ed., C.H. Beck, Munich, pp 645−655

    Google Scholar 

  • Thienel T (2006a) Foreign Acts of Torture and the Admissibility of Evidence. Journal of International Criminal Justice 4:401−409

    Google Scholar 

  • Thienel T (2006b) The Admissibility of Evidence Obtained by Torture under International Law. European Journal of International Law 17:349−367

    Google Scholar 

  • Thienel T (2007) The Burden and Standard of Proof in the European Court of Human Rights. German Yearbook of International Law 50:543−588

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Weissleder Ewer, Kiel, Germany

    Tobias Thienel

Authors
  1. Tobias Thienel
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Tobias Thienel .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Aachen, Germany

    Simon M. Meisenberg

  2. Faculty of Law, Franz von Liszt Institut, Giessen, Germany

    Ignaz Stegmiller

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2016 T.M.C. Asser Press and the authors

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Thienel, T. (2016). The Admission of Torture Statements into Evidence. In: Meisenberg, S., Stegmiller, I. (eds) The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia. International Criminal Justice Series, vol 6. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-105-0_18

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-105-0_18

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-6265-104-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-6265-105-0

  • eBook Packages: Law and CriminologyLaw and Criminology (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Societies and partnerships

Search

Navigation