Legal Constraints on Evidence in Anti-Doping

Viret, Marjolaine

doi:10.1007/978-94-6265-084-8_3

Legal Constraints on Evidence in Anti-Doping

Marjolaine Viret^5,6

Chapter
First Online: 01 January 2015

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Part of the book series: ASSER International Sports Law Series ((ASSER))

Abstract

This chapter presents the legal constraints on evidence in the context of anti-doping. A proper legal characterisation of evidentiary issues, which lie at the intersection between substantive and procedural rules, is essential to determining both the law applicable to these issues and the parties’ freedom in agreeing on their “own” law of evidence applicable to their dispute. Although the distinctive features of international doping cases make the characterisation of evidentiary issues particularly difficult, generally accepted principles governing evidence in international arbitration can be identified and proposed for use as a reference standard in international doping cases (Sect. 3.1). The WADC evidentiary regime—when implemented through international anti-doping regulations—can be described as a system of private agreement(s) on evidence, but limitations that may be imposed on private autonomy by a national legal system prevent the WADC regime from departing freely from the general principles governing evidence in international arbitration. These limitations should apply in a similar way, whether the evidentiary issue regulated in the WADC is substantive (i.e. dictates to the legal hearing panel a given burden or standard of proof), or procedural (i.e. contains prescriptions to the legal hearing panel about the admissibility or evaluation of evidence) (Sect. 3.2). A more relevant categorisation, however, is between all the substantive or procedural evidentiary rules that contain prescriptions directed at legal hearing panels during the judicial process on the one hand, and technical rules that govern the gathering of scientific evidence in Doping Control for the sake of future use in the judicial process on the other. The idiosyncrasies of anti-doping in this context need to be taken into account (Sect. 3.3).

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Notes

1.
See Sect. 2.1.1 above.
2.
For an analysis of the difficulties encountered in this regard in transnational disputes, see Nigg 1999.
3.
For a comparative overview at the European level, see Lebre de Freitas 2004, p. 1 et seq.; specifically for international arbitration, see Rodriguez Francisco, Standard of Proof: A Pleas for Precision or an Unnecessary Remedy?, Conference ICCA 2014, Kluwer Arbitration Blog, http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2014/04/10/icca-2014-standard-of-proof-a-plea-for-precision-or-an-unnecessary-remedy/ (accessed 27.04.15).
4.
Berger-Steiner 2008, p. 108; Nigg 1999, p. 6; Genin-Meric, p. 137.
5.
See the overview of the approaches in different European countries by Lebre de Freitas 2004, p. 2.
6.
See Sect. 2.1.3 above on the role of Swiss law in CAS proceedings.
7.
Berti et al. 2000 (Michael Schneider), ad Article 184 SPILA, n° 13; Poudret and Besson 2002, n° 643.
8.
Schlaepfer and Bärtsch 2010, p. 212; Lew et al. 2003, n° 22-22, refer to the burden of proof as lying “in the greyzone between substance and procedure”.
9.
CAS 2011/A/2384 & 2386, UCI & WADA v. Contador & RFEC, para 93; Berti et al. 2000 (Michael Schneider), ad Article 184 SPILA, n° 11; Berger and Kellerhals 2015, n° 1316; Poudret and Besson 2002, n° 643; for numerous references under Swiss conflict-of-law rules, see Nigg 1999, p. 96; Spühler et al. 2010, 10. Kapitel, n° 42; Honsell et al. 2014 (Flavio Lardelli), ad Article 8, n° 92; Rigozzi 2005, n° 1095.
10.
Lew et al. 2003, n° 22-25; Patocchi and Meakin 2006, p. 889.
11.
See same solution for the European Union in Article 18 para 1 of EC Regulation 593/2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I).
12.
Garnett 2012, n° 7.15 et seq.
13.
Rigozzi and Quinn 2012, p. 15.
14.
Berger-Steiner 2008, p. 108; Spühler et al. 2010 (Peter Guyan), ad Article 157, n° 1.
15.
Van Houtte 2009, p. 197.
16.
A solution endorsed by the CAS panel in CAS 2011/A/2384 & 2386, UCI & WADA v. Contador & RFEC, para 93, with references; for the standard of proof, see CAS 2013/A/3256, Fenerbahçe v. UEFA, para 274.
17.
Nigg 1999, p. 82.
18.
Nigg 1999, p. 65.
19.
Nigg 1999, p. 97/98. The precision is important as different aspects of a dispute may be governed by different laws on the merits.
20.
Garnett 2012, n° 7.14; Kummer 1966, n° 112: “Nicht beweisbarer Anspruch steht nicht einklagbarem gleich”.
21.
Nigg 1999, p. 94.
22.
Nigg 1999, p. 128; in CAS arbitration, see Barak and Koolaard 2014, p. 12 and the references cited.
23.
See Sects. 3.1.1.1 and 3.1.1.2 above.
24.
See, with examples and references, Garnett 2012, n° 7.18 et seq.
25.
Born 2014, p. 2668.
26.
Born 2014, p. 2668.
27.
For state courts, Nigg 1999, p. 100, footnote 41; Leitner 2008, p. 13, points at the importance of clarifying the principle governing evidence and the taking of evidence before introducing an action.
28.
Groner 2011, p. 77; for a detailed analysis, Kummer 1966, n° 115 et seq.
29.
See Sect. 3.1.3 below.
30.
See Sect. 3.2.1 below.
31.
For a European perspective, Lebre de Freitas 2004, p. 1; for Swiss law, Kummer 1966, n° 10; see also Sect. 3.1.2.3 below.
32.
Berger and Kellerhals 2015, n° 1306: “facts that are relevant for the case and material to its outcome”; Anderson et al. 2005, p. 90.
33.
Anderson et al. 2005, Glossary of terms and symbols, p. 379 et seq.; in Swiss law, “unmittelbar erheblich” and “mittelbar erheblich” (see Kummer 1966, n° 93).
34.
If a legal rule were worded (or reworded) as a conditional statement (“if xy exist, then yz”), legal facts represent the minor premise (xy), while the major premise enshrines the legal consequences (yz).
35.
The German language uses the distinction Tatbestand versus Sachverhalt; Murphy and Glover 2011, p. 71, distinguishes “evidential facts” to describe the facts of the individual case versus “facts in issue” or “ultimate facts” to describe the facts that derive from the substantive legal rules applicable to the claim.
36.
Kummer 1966, n° 10 and 97.
37.
See Sect. 4.3 below.
38.
Kummer 1966, n° 97.
39.
See Sect. 4.3.1 below.
40.
Berger and Kellerhals 2015, n° 1306 et seq.
41.
Pichonnaz and Foëx 2010 (Denis Piotet), ad Article 8, n° 7.
42.
Poudret and Besson 2002, n° 648.
43.
Steinauer 2009, n° 637 [fragments of social reality” (author’s translation)].
44.
Kummer 1966, n° 87 [concrete past or present occurrences of the external world (so-called external facts) or internal human life (so-called internal facts), which can be identified by place and time (author’s translation)].
45.
Lew et al. 2003, n° 22-4; Poudret and Besson 2002, n° 648.
46.
Anderson et al. 2005, p. 66.
47.
Poudret and Besson 2002, n° 648.
48.
Dwyer 2008, p. 77; see e.g. Rule 701 et seq. of the US Federal Rules of Evidence, which still incorporate the distinction, albeit in a somewhat attenuated form.
49.
See Sect. 4.3.1.1 below.
50.
However, parties needs to identify the potentially applicable rules of law in order to allege and substantiate the relevant facts, so that the process of fact-finding and determination of the applicable rule are necessarily entwined in practice (see Berger and Kellerhals 2015, n° 1308).
51.
Kaufmann-Kohler and Rigozzi 2010, n° 493.
52.
The terminology varies: in this book, we refer preferably to “relevance” of evidence to describe the capacity of the evidence to make a fact alleged by a party more or less probable (see Groner 2011, p. 64, under Swiss law (“Beweistauglichkeit”)). Relevance is thus detached from the legal context (see Murphy and Glover 2011, p. 25: “relevance is not a legal concept, but a logical one, which describes the relationship between a piece of evidence and a fact in issue to the proof of which the evidence is directed”). We refer to “materiality” of the evidence to describe whether the fact that the party seeks to prove with the support of such evidence is material to the case (regardless of whether the evidence is relevant or not to this fact, see Groner 2011, p. 62/63 (“Rechtserheblichkeit”)). However, in effect, to be relevant a piece of evidence usually needs to bear some connection with the abstract legal facts of the underlying rules of substantive law.
53.
Article 21.1 of the ALI/Unidroit Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure.
54.
See e.g. under Swiss law, Pichonnaz and Foëx 2010 (Denis Piotet), ad Article 8, n° 71; Bohnet et al. 2011 (Philippe Schweizer), ad Article 150, n° 9.
55.
Under Swiss law: Kummer 1966, n° 10.
56.
Berger and Kellerhals 2015, n° 1307.
57.
Berger and Kellerhals 2015, n° 1309.
58.
For Swiss law, see Kummer 1966, n° 45; Hohl 2001, n° 942.
59.
CAS 2011/A/2384 & 2386, UCI & WADA v. Contador & RFEC, para 98; CAS 2009/A/1817 & 1844, WADA & FIFA v. CFA, Marques et al./FIFA v. CFA & Eranosian, para 122 (however, with an imprecise reference to Swiss Supreme Court case law dealing with the duty for an arbitral court to attract the parties’ attention on issues of law in exceptional circumstances to avoid a “surprise effect”, as opposed to issues of facts).
60.
Bohnet et al. 2011 (Philippe Schweizer), ad Article 152, n° 3.
61.
Berger and Kellerhals 2015, n° 1311: the two aspects are sometimes referred to as the “inquisitorial” versus “adversarial” principles.
62.
In Swiss law, these features are known as maxime sociale inquisitoire or maxime des débats atténuées. Typically, in Swiss law, labour law and lease contracts (Bohnet et al. 2011 (Philippe Schweizer), ad Article 152, n° 5); for German law, family law matters (see Schäfer 2008, p. 19).
63.
For an European overview, see Lebre de Freitas 2004, p. 8.
64.
See also, more generally, Berger and Kellerhals 2015, n° 1127, on the option for arbitral tribunals under the Swiss lex arbitrii “to consider that the consequences of the principle are mitigated in Swiss legal tradition in certain situations by an obligation of the court (or arbitral tribunal) to examine the facts of the case on its own initiative, which is referred to as the “duty of the judge to ask question” (Richterliche Fragepflicht)).
65.
In the absence of explicit provisions in the arbitration rules, the arbitral tribunal determines to what extent the arbitrators may examine facts on their own initiative; see on the subject Berger and Kellerhals 2015, n° 1311/1312.
66.
For the common law terminology, see Murphy and Glover 2011, p. 679 et seq.
67.
Berger and Kellerhals 2015, n° 1309.
68.
Landa and Ramjohn 2009, p. 17 et seq.
69.
Bohnet et al. 2011 (Philippe Schweizer), ad Article 151, n° 4; Murphy and Glover 2011, p. 680, rightly notes that in practice many issues of judicial notice go unnoticed in the judicial process “because of numerous tacit assumptions”.
70.
Bohnet et al. 2011 (Philippe Schweizer), ad Article 151, n° 6; Kaufmann 2009, p. 14/15, however, notes that facts that are judicial notice for the judge but not publicly available must be introduced into the proceedings, and parties may present evidence to dispute these facts.
71.
Kaufmann 2009, p. 16; Hohl 2001, n° 945; Leitner 2008, p. 3; on the unsettled status of specialised or “fortuitous” personal knowledge in common law, see Murphy and Glover 2011, p. 684.
72.
Bohnet et al. 2011 (Philippe Schweizer), ad Article 151, n° 8.
73.
See explicitly Article 151 of the Swiss Code of Civil Procedure; Groner 2011, p. 13.
74.
See Sect. 3.1.2.2.4 below.
75.
In US Supreme Court, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals (1993), Opinion of the Court (Blackmun), footnote 11, the court noted that “theories that are so firmly established as to have attained the status of a scientific law, such as the law of thermodynamics, properly are subject to judicial notice”; see, similarly, Hrubesch and Bosshardt, 2012, p. 166, whereby scientifically grounded laws of nature do not require proof.
76.
Groner 2011, p. 18, under Swiss law, whereby “physical laws” can be recognised as general rules of experience, but courts will generally be hesitant to draw these rules from recent scientific insights; see e.g. Swiss Supreme Court, 6S.451/2003, para 1.3, where the Swiss Supreme Court considered “dass keine allgemeinen Erfahrungssätze betreffend die Frage bestehen, unter welchen Umständen im Einzelnen eine DNA-Analyse welche Aussagekraft besitzt” [there are no general rules of experience concerning the issue, which significance a DNA analysis specifically has in which circumstances (author’s translation)], and therefore found that the appellant was merely criticising the evaluation of the expert report and the probative value assigned to this evidence by the prior instance.
77.
The situation is less clear-cut, however, for tribunals that officially sit as specialist bodies, see Brulhart, p. 39 & 45; for English case law in medical matters, Murphy and Glover 2011, p. 684.
78.
On the comparison with common civil proceedings and the possibility to create specialised state courts, Bettex 2006, p. 16 et seq.; see Sect. 8.3.2.4.3 below.
79.
In certain circumstances and jurisdictions, foreign law may also become a subject area for proof, often supported by expert opinion (Fouchard et al. 1999, n° 1263). Under Swiss law, the Swiss Supreme Court adopted the expression “demonstration” (“Nachweis”) as opposed to “proof” (“Beweis”) to describe the duties of the parties in this respect (see Bohnet et al. 2011 (Philippe Schweizer), ad Article 150, n° 18); see also Article 22 of the ALI/Unidroit Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure.
80.
Pichonnaz and Foëx 2010 (Denis Piotet), ad Article 8, n° 8.
81.
Poudret and Besson 2002, n° 648.
82.
Harris 2010, p. 215; Poudret and Besson 2002, n° 648.
83.
CAS 2010/A/2315, Netball New Zealand v. IFNA, Article by Prof. Ulrich Haas.
84.
Davies 2012. p. 30.
85.
Harris 2010, p. 215.
86.
Kreindler 2005, p. 90.
87.
Berger and Kellerhals 2015, n° 1342.
88.
See e.g. CAS 2010/A/2268, I. v. FIA, para 81, where the Athlete as a Polish national filed a legal opinion on joint parental representation under Polish law.
89.
See Sect. 8.3.3.2 below.
90.
Kummer 1966, n° 124; Nigg 1999, p. 100.
91.
Kummer 1966, n° 30.
92.
Graham 2006, p. 569.
93.
Kummer 1966, n° 125; Groner 2011, p. 77.
94.
See Sect. 3.1.1.2 above.
95.
See Sect. 3.2.1 below.
96.
Poudret and Besson 2002, n° 645.
97.
Honsell et al. 2014 (Flavio Lardelli), ad Article 8, n° 4; CAS 2011/A/2384 & 2386, UCI & WADA v. Contador & RFEC, para 96.
98.
Thus the expression sometimes used in English law of the “risk of non-persuasion” or other similar terms (see Landa and Ramjohn 2009, p. 26).
99.
Mougenot 2004, p. 72.
100.
Berger and Kellerhals 2015, n° 1316; Kummer 1966, n° 23.
101.
Born 2014, p. 2313.
102.
Article 21.1 of the ALI/Unidroit Transnational Principles of Civil Procedure expresses the principle as follows: “Ordinarily, each party has the burden to prove all the material facts that are the basis of that party’s case”; see Nigg 1999, p. 92; Lebre de Freitas 2004, p. 5; Steinauer 2009, n° 632; for Swiss law, see Honsell et al. 2014 (Flavio Lardelli), ad Article 8, n° 24 et seq.; for German law, Berninger 2012, p. 176.
103.
Patocchi and Meakin 2006, p. 888; Berti et al. 2000 (Michael Schneider), ad Article 184 SPILA, n° 12; Van Houtte 2009, p. 196; Schlaepfer and Bärtsch 2010, p. 212.
104.
Lew et al. 2003, n° 22-25; Zuberbühler et al. 2012, ad Article 9, n° 8; Sharpe 2006, p. 552.
105.
Article 8 of the Swiss Civil Code reads: “Chaque partie doit, si la loi ne prescrit le contraire, prouver les faits qu'elle allègue pour en déduire son droit”/“Wo das Gesetz es nicht anders bestimmt, hat derjenige das Vorhandensein einer behaupteten Tatsache zu beweisen, der aus ihr Rechte ableitet” [Unless the law provides otherwise, the burden of proving the existence of an alleged fact shall rest on the party who derives rights from that fact (author’s translation)]; formally, the provision applies only to civil obligations, but its scope has been extended by case law and legal commentators to a general principle of Swiss law, including by analogy in public law matters (see e.g. Swiss Supreme Court, BGE/ATF 122 II 397, para 2b).
106.
See e.g., in non-doping matters: CAS 2013/A/3258, Besiktas Jimnastic Kulubu v. UEFA, para 112 et seq.; CAS 2007/A/1380, MKE Ankaragücü Spor Kulubu v. S., para 26.
107.
CAS 2011/A/2384 & 2386, UCI & WADA v. Contador & RFEC, para 106; sports regulations that contain specific provisions on the burden of proof usually merely codify Article 8 of the Swiss Civil Code (see Rigozzi and Quinn 2012, p. 15/16 for examples).
108.
See Comment ad Article 21.1 of the ALI/Unidroit Transnational Principles of Civil Procedure. As opposed to in dubio pro reo which addresses the burden of proof with respect to one specific circumstance (i.e. the guilt of the accused), Article 8 does not specify, in itself, what facts must be proven.
109.
Kummer 1966, n° 122.
110.
See, for a detailed analysis, Kummer 1966, n° 130 et seq.
111.
Hohl 2001, n° 1183 et seq.; Pichonnaz and Foëx 2010 (Denis Piotet), ad Article 8, n° 31.
112.
Kummer 1966, n° 139; Honsell et al. 2014 (Flavio Lardelli), ad Article 8, n° 38; similarly, from a German perspective, and specific to anti-doping, Berninger 2012, p. 176.
113.
Landa and Ramjohn 2009, 2009, p. 31 et seq., in particular p. 32; see also Comment ad Article 21.1 of the ALI/Unidroit Transnational Principles of Civil Procedure; under Swiss law, see Kummer 1966, n° 93 & 124.
114.
See the references in Zuberbühler et al. 2012, ad Article 9, n° 8.
115.
CAS 2007/A/1380, MKE Ankaragücü Spor Kulubu v. S., para 28; see, for Swiss civil law, Kummer 1966, n° 31; for an analysis of the different types of burden under common law, Graham 2006, p. 570 (US perspective), and Murphy and Glover 2011, p. 71 et seq. (English perspective).
116.
Pichonnaz and Foëx 2010 (Denis Piotet), ad Article 8, n° 60; Honsell et al. 2014 (Flavio Lardelli), ad Article 8, n° 29; CAS 2011/A/2384 & 2386, UCI & WADA v. Contador & RFEC, para 97.
117.
See e.g. in Swiss law, Honsell et al. 2014 (Flavio Lardelli), ad Article 8, n° 5.
118.
Berger and Kellerhals 2015, n° 1357.
119.
Nigg 1999, p. 76/77; see Sect. 3.1.3.2 below.
120.
Murphy and Glover 2011, p. 71/72; in Swiss law, fardeau et charge de la preuve/objektive versus subjektive Beweislast oder Beweisführungslast (Nigg 1999, p 89, Groner 2011, p. 73).
121.
Under English law, the distinction is further relevant because the trier of law (the judge) decides whether the evidential burden is discharged and a fact may be submitted to the trier of fact (i.e. the jury in some cases), who in turn decides whether the legal burden is discharged. In Switzerland, before the adoption of the uniform Code of Civil Procedure, the distinction used to determine the allocation of competences between the federal State (for matters of substantive civil law) and the Cantons (for matters of civil procedure).
122.
Poudret and Besson 2002, n° 646; Berger and Kellerhals 2015, n° 1317.
123.
See Sect. 3.1.2.1.2 above.
124.
CAS 2011/A/2384&2386, UCI & WADA v. Contador & RFEC, para 100; Spühler et al. 2010, 10. Kapitel, n° 70.
125.
Honsell et al. 2014 (Flavio Lardelli), ad Article 8, n° 29/30; Swiss Supreme Court, BGE/ATF 117 II 113, para 2.
126.
See the overview of different manners of treating admission in civil proceedings across Europe, Lebre de Freitas 2004, p. 22.
127.
Lebre de Freitas 2004, p. 23; Bohnet et al. 2011 (Philippe Schweizer), ad Article 150, n° 12.
128.
Kummer 1966, n° 107.
129.
Rigozzi and Quinn 2012, p. 17.
130.
For a detailed presentation in the context of anti-doping, see Natsch 2009, p. 188; Walker 1998, p. 144.
131.
Pichonnaz and Foëx 2010 (Denis Piotet), ad Article 8, n° 54.
132.
CAS 2011/A/2384 & 2386, UCI & WADA v. Contador & RFEC, para 102; see also recognising the concept of Beweisnotstand, CAS 2013/A/3256, Fenerbahçe v. UEFA, para 281.
133.
Kummer 1966, n° 142.
134.
CAS 2011/A/2384 & 2386, UCI & WADA v. Contador & RFEC, para 104; see Pichonnaz and Foëx 2010 (Denis Piotet), ad Article 8, n° 53; contra Spühler et al. 2010, 10. Kapitel, n° 53, who consider that this results, in effect, in a reversal of the burden of proof. Although this opinion is not without merits, an important difference is that the absence of counter-proof is only one element within the overall evaluation of the evidence, but failure to adduce counter-proof does not automatically result in the party bearing the consequences thereof, unlike an actual legal burden of proof (for international arbitration, see Van Houtte 2009, p. 197).
135.
Rigozzi and Quinn 2012, p. 17.
136.
CAS 2011/A/2384 & 2386, UCI & WADA v. Contador & RFEC, para 102/103.
137.
CAS 2011/A/2384 & 2386, UCI & WADA v. Contador & RFEC, para 109.
138.
Spühler et al. 2010, 10. Kapitel, n° 50; on negative facts, see Groner 2011, p. 192/193.
139.
Some national laws grant the party an attenuated standard of proof instead (see Mougenot 2004, p. 81).
140.
Article 9.5 of the IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence; O’Malley 2010, p. 508, for an overview of the requirements which an arbitral tribunal should have regard to before drawing an adverse inference; see also Sect. 8.2.3 below.
141.
For a similar view, Murphy and Glover 2011, p. 686/687.
142.
See Sect. 3.1.4 below.
143.
Rigozzi and Quinn 2012, p. 17.
144.
Under Swiss law, the presumption of law typically results from an explicit legal provision (see already the wording of Article 8 of the Swiss Civil Code). However, in isolated cases, it may also result from judicial gap-filling.
145.
Under Swiss law, some commentators argue that presumptions can also presume the existence of a right (see Hohl 2001, n° 935).
146.
Murphy and Glover 2011, p. 685: “The theoretical basis for recognizing presumptions is that the presumed fact would, in the usual course of events, flow naturally from the existence of the primary fact, so that there is such a strong rational connection between the two that it is unnecessary to require evidence of the presumed fact in the absence of unusual circumstances”.
147.
Steinauer 2009, n° 659; Sibony 2012, p. 170; Murphy and Glover 2011, p. 686, considers that an irrebuttable presumption is a “contradiction in terms”.
148.
See Sect. 3.1.4 below.
149.
Rigozzi and Quinn 2012, p. 18.
150.
Rigozzi and Quinn 2012, p. 18.
151.
Hohl 2001, n° 1198; Graham 2006, p. 573.
152.
See Sect. 3.1.2.2.2 above.
153.
Steinauer 2009, n° 649.
154.
Sharpe 2006, p. 552, notes that no actual “reversal” occurs, since the allocation of the legal burden of proof for a particular fact remains the same from the outset and throughout the proceedings.
155.
Steinauer 2009, n° 661 et seq.; considering these ”rules improperly described as presumptions“, Murphy and Glover 2011, p. 868.
156.
Zuberbühler et al. 2012, ad Article 9, n° 10.
157.
At times, the standard of proof is assimilated to the evaluations of the evidence (as denounced by Nigg 1999, p. 115). This assimilation is inaccurate since the standard of proof is set ex ante, independently from the dispute at stake, and thus does not pertain to the evaluation process.
158.
Honsell et al. 2014 (Flavio Lardelli), ad Article 8, n° 15, consider that the standard of proof bears no direct connection either with the burden of proof or with the evaluation of the evidence. In common law jurisdictions, there is not even consensus that standards of proof represent legal rules (see Anderson et al. 2005, p. 242).
159.
For a similar analysis, see CAS 2013/A/3256, Fenerbahçe v. UEFA, para 274; Barak and Koolaard 2014, p. 12.
160.
Murphy and Glover 2011, p. 71, show how the standard of proof and the burden of proof work in an interplay to create fair situations in civil and criminal proceedings.
161.
Berger-Steiner 2008, p. 43 and 116. The Swiss Supreme Court treats the determination of the standard of proof applicable to a particular issue as a matter of substantive law (see Honsell et al. 2014 (Flavio Lardelli), ad Article 8, n° 94).
162.
Steinauer 2009, n° 666, footnote 64.
163.
See, for Swiss civil proceedings, Pichonnaz and Foëx 2010 (Denis Piotet), ad Article 8, n° 24 et seq.
164.
These principle derive directly from Article 6 para 2 ECHR (see Groner 2011, p. 178; Kaufmann 2009, p. 195); EU Commission Staff Working Document Impact Assessment of 27 November 2013, Proposal for measures on the strengthening of certain aspects of the presumption of innocence and of the right to be present at trial in criminal proceedings, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52013SC0478&from=EN (accessed 22.12.2014), para 4.2.2.
165.
Landa and Ramjohn 2009, p. 54; Murphy and Glover 2011, p. 101; on the relative character of the standards, see Anderson et al. 2005, p. 243.
166.
Zuberbühler et al. 2012, ad Article 9, n° 10.
167.
Rigozzi and Quinn 2012, p. 24.
168.
Rodriguez Francisco, Standard of Proof: A Plea for Precision or an Unnecessary Remedy?, Conference ICCA 2014, Kluwer Arbitration Blog, http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2014/04/10/icca-2014-standard-of-proof-a-plea-for-precision-or-an-unnecessary-remedy/ (accessed 27.04.15); on the fact that the exact standard of proof is often not made explicit in arbitration proceedings, see: Voser Nathalie/Moss Benjamin, Arbitral tribunal’s admission of unlawfully obtained evidence did not violate procedural public policy (Swiss Supreme Court), Practical Law Arbitration, UKpracticallaw.com, Legal Update: Case Report, 28 May 2014, p. 2; Lew et al. 2003, n° 22-26 & 22-27: “the arbitrators must be satisfied that the parties’ allegations are proven”.
169.
See the account of the ICCA 2014 meeting by Rodriguez Francisco, Standard of Proof: A Plea for Precision or an Unnecessary Remedy?, Conference ICCA 2014, Kluwer Arbitration Blog, http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2014/04/10/icca-2014-standard-of-proof-a-plea-for-precision-or-an-unnecessary-remedy/ (accessed 27.04.15).
170.
Zuberbühler et al. 2012, ad Article 9, n° 10; Born 2014, p. 2314: “balance of probability” or “more likely than not”.
171.
Zuberbühler et al. 2012, ad Article 9, n° 11; Born 2014, p. 2314; obiter dictum, for a similar indication in the context of sports arbitration CAS 2014/A/3630, De Ridder v. ISAF, para 114.
172.
Rigozzi and Quinn 2012, p. 26, whereby the relevant standard can depend “on matters as diverse as the international federation involved, the type of matter and the stage of the proceedings”.
173.
CAS 2013/A/3256, Fenerbahçe v. UEFA, para 274 et seq.; CAS 2011/A/2490, Köllerer v. ATP, para 86.
174.
Rigozzi and Quinn 2012, p. 29; see, explicitly, CAS 2014/A/3630, De Ridder v. ISAF, para 114.
175.
For match-fixing, see CAS 2009/A/1920, FK Pobeda et al. v. UEFA, para 85; confirmed in CAS 2010/A/2172, Oriekhov v. UEFA, para 53 and CAS 2013/A/3258 Besiktas Jimnastik Kulübü v. UEFA, p. 119 et seq.; see also CAS 2011/A/2425, Fusimalohi v. FIFA, para 92 and equivalent paragraph in French in CAS 2011/A/2433, Amadou Diakite v. FIFA, para 47.
176.
CAS 2014/A/3630, De Ridder v. ISAF, para 114.
177.
David 2013, p. 204; Anderson et al. 2005, p. 244; on the strength of this standard for establishing an anti-doping rule violation under the WADC regime, see Sect. 7.3.3.2 below.
178.
Both “balance of probabilities” and “balance of probability” are found in literature and practice. In this book, we use the term “balance of probability” in accordance with Article 3.1 of the WADC.
179.
CAS 2008/A/1480, Pistorius v. IAAF, para 38, where the CAS panel found that—outside disciplinary matters—the “ordinary” standard of proof to be imposed on the sports organisations is the balance of probability; Rigozzi and Quinn 2012, p. 27, describe “comfortable satisfaction” and “balance of probabilities” as the two standards “most commonly employed in sports arbitration”.
180.
David 2013, p. 205.
181.
CAS 2009/A/1926, ITF v. Gasquet, para 5.9; confirmed in CAS 2014/A/3475, Van Snick v. FIJ, para 79.
182.
Durston 2011, p. 129.
183.
Durston 2011, p. 129, mentions rightly that even a 50.1 % would meet the balance of probability standard; by contrast, the Comment ad Article 3.1 of the 2015 NADA Code interprets the standard as meaning that a 50 % probability is sufficient to discharge the burden when proof is on the Athlete; similarly, Berninger 2012, p. 173, considers that it is sufficient for the Athlete to prove that existence of extraordinary circumstances is equally likely than their non-existence. On these aspects and their relevance for the presumption of Fault, see Sect. 7.3.3.1 below.
184.
Durston 2011, p. 127.
185.
Dwyer 2008, p. 32/33.
186.
Privy Council, Campbell v. Hamlet (Trinidad and Tobago) [2005] UKPC 19 (25 April 2005), para 25: “In any event, as the recent English cases show, the apparent difference between the two standards “is, in truth, largely illusory” (Lord Bingham in B); “the heightened civil standard and the criminal standard are virtually indistinguishable” (Lord Steyn in McCann)”.
187.
For an overview, see Durston 2011, p. 134 et seq.
188.
CAS 2014/A/3630, De Ridder v. ISAF, para 115; David 2013, p. 204, mentioning the debate in common law jurisdictions regarding the existence of an “intermediate” standard, who also refers to the rationale of the English House of Lords, i.e. that something “serious” is inherently less likely to have occurred than something less serious.
189.
Durston 2011, p. 123; on the factors that influence the “reconstruction” of past events in the judicial process, Kaufmann 2009, p. 75 et seq.: perception, memory, contextual knowledge, forgetfulness, falses recollections; idem, ibidem, p. 190: from a scientific viewpoint, any proof in the judicial process is a “Wahrscheinlichkeitsbeweis” [probabilistic proof (author’s translation)].
190.
Steinauer 2009, n° 666; for a detailed analysis, see Berger-Steiner 2008, p. 41 et seq.; similarly, for German civil procedure, Schäfer 2008, p. 20.
191.
Swiss Supreme Court, BGE/ATF 133 III 153, para 3.3. Some legal provisions require “certainty” or “obviousness” as a standard of proof, but it is generally submitted in literature that this can hardly represent a special higher standard, as absolute certainty is impossible to achieve (see e.g. Pichonnaz and Foëx 2010 (Denis Piotet), ad Article 8, n° 26).
192.
Hohl 2001, n° 1061.
193.
Swiss Supreme Court, BGE/ATF 132 III 715, para 3.1.
194.
For a critical overview and a proposal for a mere twofold standard of proof, see Hohl 2001, n° 1085; Groner 2011, p. 180, describes the definitions of strict proof in court practice as blurry (“schwammig”).
195.
Groner 2011, p. 181, tentatively considers that an uncertainty of 10 % should be tolerated for strict proof; for the high likelihood, the probability should be higher than 51 %; simple likelihood would be fulfilled with 51 %.
196.
Hohl 2001, n° 1092.
197.
See, for an overview and standard of proof diagram, Murphy and Glover 2011, p. 101/102.
198.
Patocchi and Meakin 2006, p. 889, submit that the “inner conviction” standard of civil law tradition is not different in its results from the English law “balance of probabilities” standard; for a similar remark on the comparison between German and Austrian standards, Nigg 1999, p. 124 et seq.
199.
See also, Berger-Steiner 2008, p. 126/127, on the generally overstated character of these differences.
200.
See Sect. 7.3.3.1.4 below.
201.
For an overview of the limited scholarly discussion on the standard of proof under Swiss law, see Berger-Steiner 2008, p. 99 et seq., in particular see p. 107.
202.
For CAS arbitration, see Barak and Koolaard 2014, p. 9.
203.
See the debate in English law on the existence of a “third standard of proof” or “standards within standards”, Murphy and Glover 2011, p. 108 et seq. and Durston 2011, p. 131 et seq.
204.
Berger-Steiner 2008, p. 151, points at the inevitable contribution of the judge’s personal judgment in the assessment, a contribution that cannot be replaced by a purely objective process; Bohnet et al. 2011 (Philippe Schweizer), ad Article 157, n° 21, compares the different standards with the plucking daisy verses and claims that degrees of conviction, like degrees of love, cannot be brought back to arithmetics.
205.
See Sect. 7.3.3.1 below.
206.
Durston 2011, p. 122/123.
207.
Lew et al. 2003, n° 22-7; it is often said that, for historical reasons, common law countries tend to be rather prescriptive and contain detailed rules, while civil law countries are more laconic and limited to general principles, often leaving considerable discretion to the court (see Born 2014, p. 2307). With respect specifically to expert evidence, see Harris 2010, p. 212.
208.
Specifically for CAS arbitration, see Rigozzi and Quinn 2012, p. 4; CAS 2011/A/2425, Fusimalohi v. FIFA, para 79 et seq. and the references cited, in particular para 94: “Incidentally, the Panel observes that such a liberal attitude in the admission of evidence should not come as a surprise, given that intra-association disciplinary proceedings are, by their very nature, less formalistic and guarantee-driven than criminal proceedings”; CAS panels have also insisted that they are not governed by criminal law standards in disciplinary proceedings, CAS 2011/A/2426, Diakite v. FIFA, para 21 et seq.; for arbitration in general: Poudret and Besson 2002, n° 644.
209.
CAS 2009/A/1879, Valverde v. CONI, para 34 et seq.; Lew et al. 2003, n° 22-12; Schlaepfer and Bärtsch 2010, p. 212.
210.
Lew 2009, p. 12; Fouchard et al. 1999, n° 1259.
211.
Lew et al. 2003, n° 22-12; Patocchi and Meakin 2006, p. 884; Fouchard et al. 1999, n° 1260.
212.
The IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence (2nd version, 2010) are a set of model rules drafted by the Arbitration Committee of the International Bar Association, with a view to assisting arbitral tribunals in achieving fair and efficient proceedings. The parties may either make these rules part of their arbitration agreement or agree to the application of the rules at a subsequent point, or the arbitrators may use these rules as a guidance to conduct evidentiary proceedings; for the use of these rules, see Sattar 2010, p. 210 and Schlaepfer 2004, p. 66.
213.
Berger and Kellerhals 2015, n° 1313.
214.
Article 184 para 1 of the SPILA merely provides that the arbitral tribunal is in charge of evidence-taking; Poudret and Besson 2002, n° 644; Schlaepfer and Bärtsch 2010, p. 211.
215.
CAS 2009/A/1879, Valverde v. CONI, para 37; Kaufmann-Kohler and Rigozzi 2010, n° 529.
216.
Rigozzi and Quinn 2012, p. 3.
217.
Many institutional rules are very broad and merely confirm that discretion of the arbitral tribunal (see Born 2014, p. 2307 et seq.).
218.
On the controversy regarding whether the parties may depart from the rules of the arbitral institution they chose, see Kaufmann-Kohler and Rigozzi 2010, n° 531 et seq.; more specifically with respect to evidentiary issues before CAS, Rigozzi and Quinn 2012, p. 4.
219.
Kaufmann-Kohler and Rigozzi 2010, n° 480; Schlaepfer and Bärtsch 2010, p. 212.
220.
Rigozzi and Quinn 2012, p. 5, describe the IBA Rules as a “handbook for arbitrators” under the Swiss lex arbitrii for issues not specifically regulated in the arbitration rules.
221.
Lew et al. 2003, n° 22-45.
222.
Born 2014, p. 2310/2311; Lew et al. 2003, n° 22-29 & 22-44; Davies 2012, p. 25.
223.
Poudret and Besson 2002, n° 644; Sutton et al. 2007, n° 4-078.
224.
CAS panels are not bound by the rules of Swiss civil procedure, which lists the admissible categories of evidence in an exhaustive manner (Article 168 of the Swiss Code of Civil Procedure); Bohnet et al. 2011 (Philippe Schweizer), ad Article 168, n° 1 (“numerus clausus”).
225.
Lew 2009, p. 12/13; Schlaepfer and Bärtsch 2010, p. 213.
226.
Rigozzi and Quinn 2012, p. 39; see Sect. 3.2.1 below.
227.
Documentary evidence in CAS arbitration, as in the definition in Article 1 of the IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence, is generally understood in a broad sense, including paper or electronic data (see Rigozzi and Quinn 2012, p. 6).
228.
Article 9 of the IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence contains a list of such grounds that are generally recognised in international arbitration.
229.
See Sect. 8.1.2.1 below.
230.
Schlaepfer and Bärtsch 2010, p. 214, mention the same grounds as the two most relevant ones in international arbitration in general; specifically for unlawfully obtained evidence in doping matters, see Sect. 3.3.2.2 below.
231.
Kaufmann-Kohler and Rigozzi 2010, n° 493.
232.
Kaufmann-Kohler and Rigozzi 2010, n° 493; Zuberbühler et al. 2012, ad Article 9, n° 7.
233.
Born 2014, p. 2344 et seq.; Lew et al. 2003, n° 22-10.
234.
For a presentation of English-, respectively US-style discovery from a comparative perspective, see Elan Visson 1997, p. 259 et seq. and Reed and Hancock, 2009, p. 339 et seq.
235.
Lew 2009, p. 21.
236.
Born 2014, p. 2345/2346; under French law of arbitration, the arbitral tribunal may impose financial penalties as an incentive for the production of documents (Article 1467(3) of the French Civil Code (“CCfr”)).
237.
Rigozzi and Quinn 2012, p. 13; Berger and Kellerhals 2015, n° 1360 et seq.
238.
Schlaepfer and Bärtsch 2010, p. 215; Sharpe 2006, p. 549 et seq.; Born 2014, p. 2312; see also Article 21.3 of the ILA/Unidroit Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure.
239.
Schäfer 2008, p. 23.
240.
Hohl 2001, n ° 979.
241.
For Swiss law, see Hohl 2001, n ° 1042; for French law, Dumoulin 2012, p. 301; for German law, Schäfer 2008, p. 25; for English law, Murphy and Glover 2011, p. 397.
242.
For Swiss law, Groner 2011, p. 277; for German law, Brehm 2004, p. 200; Schäfer 2008, p. 25.
243.
For Swiss law, Articles 183 et seq. of the Swiss Civil Code of procedure. See for list systems in Greece, Orfanides, p. 236; for France, see Brown 2005, p. 77 et seq., p. 78; in general for civil law inspired arbitration, see Bernard 2004, p. 25.
244.
Harris 2010, p. 212; Craig 2001, p. 20; Allen 2004, p. 19.
245.
Brown 2005, p. 80.
246.
Berger and Kellerhals 2015, n° 1342.
247.
Davies 2012, p. 25.
248.
For example, the Chapter 12 of the SPILA dedicated to international arbitration in Switzerland contains no provision regarding specifically expert evidence, thus leaving full discretion to the arbitral tribunal or the parties to choose either solution; see Sachs Klaus, Experts: Neutral or Advocates, http://www.josemigueljudice-arbitration.com/xms/files/02_TEXTOS_ARBITRAGEM/01_Doutrina_ScolarsTexts/evidence/experts__icca_2010_sachs.pdf (accessed 19.05.15), n° 12; for France and England, see Brown 2005, p. 81.
249.
Jones 2008, p. 137 et seq.; Voser and Mueller 2006, p. 73 et seq.; Ibid. 2006, p. 4 et seq.
250.
Berti et al. 2000 (Michael Schneider), ad Article 184, n° 31.
251.
Poudret and Besson 2002, n° 662.
252.
Harris 2010, p. 212; Sachs and Schmidt-Ahrens 2010, p. 216 et seq.
253.
Berger and Kellerhals 2015, n° 1333; this rule is reflected in Article 4.2 of the IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence.
254.
Berti et al. 2000 (Michael Schneider), ad Article 184, n° 44 & 46; Article 8.4 of the IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence leaves some discretion to the arbitral tribunal to make such party witness commit to tell the truth ”in a manner determined appropriate“.
255.
It is debated whether arbitrators in Switzerland may take a formal “oath” from a witness (Berger and Kellerhals 2015, n° 1339). In any event, false testimony is a criminal offence under Swiss law, whether under oath or not, albeit with lower sanctions if no oath is taken (see Articles 306, 307 & 309 of the Swiss Criminal Code and Rigozzi 2005, n° 991).
256.
Rigozzi and Quinn 2012, p. 9.
257.
See Sect. 8.3.1.1 below.
258.
Bettex 2006, p. 213.
259.
The terms “force” or “strength” are also encountered in arbitration practice.
260.
Some studies on evidence, especially in a common law context (see e.g. Anderson et al. 2005, p. 385), make a distinction between the process of evaluation of a particular piece of evidence (to what extent is such and such piece of evidence probative of such and such fact) and to the weighing of the evidence (the combination of all pieces of evidence to reach a decision on the ultimate probanda, to the degree of certainty required by the applicable standard of proof).
261.
The probative value of evidence answers the question: to what extent does this piece of evidence favour or disfavour some issue to be proven in the case at hand? (see Anderson et al. 2005, p. 71).
262.
Rigozzi and Quinn 2012, p. 51/52; the Swiss Supreme Court does not review the panel’s evaluation of the evidence, save for breach of public policy (see e.g. Swiss Supreme Court, 4A_584/2009, para 3.3).
263.
Lew et al. 2003, n° 22-15.
264.
Zuberbühler et al. 2012, ad Article 9, n° 13; Schlaepfer and Bärtsch 2010, p. 216; see also, specifically for CAS arbitration in doping disputes, Sect. 8.1.1.1 below.
265.
Even though the free evaluation of evidence is a generally accepted procedural principle in modern civil and criminal law proceedings, national legal systems may still contain isolated rules of procedure that impose a formal legal value on a certain types of evidence (Bohnet et al. 2011 (Philippe Schweizer), ad Article 157, n° 1 et seq.). It is enshrined in Article 16.6 of the ILA/Unidroit Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure. For common law: see Landa and Ramjohn 2009, p. 13; Anderson et al. 2005, p. 226.
266.
Bohnet et al. 2011 (Philippe Schweizer), ad Article 157, n° 3.
267.
See e.g. Steinauer 2009, n° 659.
268.
Some commentators submit that the distinction has, in general, no practical consequences (Steinauer 2009, n° 659, footnote 52).
269.
Nigg 1999, p. 106.
270.
Nigg 1999, p. 106; see also Sect. 3.1.2.2.4.1 above.
271.
Schlaepfer and Bärtsch 2010, p. 216.
272.
This cannot alter the fact that arbitrators may show an (informal) preference for certain forms. See e.g. Born 2014, p. 2255 et seq., whereby arbitration tends to rely more heavily on written than on oral evidence.
273.
Leitner 2008, p. 12.
274.
See Sects. 4.1.2.5 and 4.3.1.2 below.
275.
Nigg 1999, p. 137; for more details on common law thinking, see Anderson et al. 2005, p. 226 et seq.
276.
In the context of international arbitration, Lew et al. 2003, n° 22-30: “the relevant and probative value of evidence, i.e. the logical relationships between oral and written statements and facts”; on the difficulty to formalise the logic behind the evaluation of evidence, see Groner 2011, p. 106.
277.
Zuberbühler et al. 2012, ad Article 9, n° 15; many disciplines beyond the strict legal context involve drawing inferences from evidence (see Anderson et al. 2005, p. 46; Murphy and Glover 2011, p. 686/687).
278.
See Sect. 3.1.2.1.1 above.
279.
Anderson et al. 2005, p. 94.
280.
Lindell 2004, p 428.
281.
Anderson et al. 2005, p. 101 and 263.
282.
Anderson et al. 2005, p. 263.
283.
See Sect. 3.1.2.3 above.
284.
Anderson et al. 2005, p. 71.
285.
Anderson et al. 2005, p. 272; see, for tools in the context of anti-doping, Sect. 10.3 below.
286.
Hohl 2001, n° 961; see the critical comment about the term “presumption of fact” in Murphy and Glover 2011, p. 686/687, citing Phipson, that: “in reality it is no more than a slightly grandiose term for the ordinary process of judicial reasoning about facts”; see, for presumptions of fact, Sect. 3.1.2.2.4.1 above.
287.
Hohl 2001, n° 962.
288.
Groner 2011, p. 65, on direct evidence and indirect evidence from a Swiss law perspective. Under English law, see Murphy and Glover 2011, p. 17: “Direct evidence” is evidence “that requires no mental process on the part of the tribunal of fact in order to draw the conclusion sought by the proponent of the evidence, other than acceptance of the evidence itself”. “Indirect evidence”, by contrast, is evidence “from which the desired conclusion may be drawn, but which requires the tribunal of fact not only to accept the evidence tendered, but also to draw an inference from it”.
289.
Kummer 1966, n° 93: “Unmittelbar erheblich sind Tatsachen, auf deren Vorliegen oder Fehlen der abstrakte Rechtssatz gründet; mittelbar erheblich solche, die nach abstraktem Rechtssatz nicht Voraussetzung einer Rechtsfolge bilden, aus denen aber nach Erfahrungssätzen auf Vorliegen oder Fehlen unmittelbar erheblicher Tatsachen geschlossen werden kann” [Facts that are directly relevant are those on the presence or absence of which the abstract rule of law relies; facts that are indirectly relevant are those that are not a prerequisite for a legal consequence based on the abstract legal rule, but from which one can conclude, through rules of experience, to the presence or absence of directly relevant facts (author’s translation)].
290.
Groner 2011, p. 149, distinguishes in addition “presumption of fact” from “proof through indicies”.
291.
Hohl 2001, n° 959.
292.
Kaufmann 2009, p. 23.
293.
Zuberbühler et al. 2012, ad Article 9, n° 13.
294.
Hohl 2001, n° 959 et seq.
295.
See, as Leitner 2008, p. 12, whereby the judge’s personal life experience, his acquired knowledge and his level of education automatically flow into the evaluation of the evidence.
296.
See, in effect, also Groner 2011, p. 67, whereby the relevance of indicies depends on how many “links” exist between the indicium and the fact to be proved; on the probandum, see Sect. 3.1.2.1.1 above.
297.
Anderson et al. 2005, p. 76/77; Murphy and Glover 2011, p. 17, footnote 1: “it will be apparent that almost all evidence is circumstantial”.
298.
Kummer 1966, n° 96; Binet 2002, p. 232, describes the importance of this task in order to submit scientific issues to the appropriate legal rules.
299.
Groner 2011, p. 7, whereby deciding whether an abstract legal fact of a legal rule is fulfilled or not requires a “legal judgment” (“rechtliche Wertung”) and is therefore an issue of law.
300.
See for the implications in anti-doping, Sect. 10.3 below.
301.
Groner 2011, p. 95: “Natürliche Vermutungen basieren auf empirischen Erkenntnissen des Gerichts: was häufig vorkommt, kann generell angenommen werden” [Presumptions of fact are based on empirical findings of the court: what frequently occurs can be assumed in general (author’s translation)].
302.
Anderson et al. 2005, p. 102.
303.
See Sect. 4.3.1.2 below.
304.
Born 2014, p. 2312; Van Houtte 2009, p. 196.
305.
See Sect. 3.1.1 above.
306.
The distinction between “substantive” and “procedural” is also essential for determining which version of the rules applies in case the relevant provisions are amended (see for an overview in Europe, Lebre de Freitas 2004, p. 4).
307.
Lebre de Freitas 2004, p. 3.
308.
Rigozzi 2005, n° 1097; Poudret and Besson 2002, n° 646.
309.
See Sect. 3.2.2 below; Pichonnaz and Foëx 2010 (Denis Piotet), ad Article 8, n° 89, submits that the situation should remain the same under the uniform Swiss Code of Civil Procedure, despite the fact that a draft provision explicitly allowing for such agreements was finally deleted from the final version of the text.
310.
See for Austria, Mayr 2004, p. 46; for Germany, Brehm 2004, p. 186, where, however, agreements that seek to alter the standard of proof are considered inadmissible.
311.
Kummer 1966, n° 371, with further references; Hrubesch and Bosshardt 2012, p. 182; for Austrian law, see Mayr 2004, p. 46; in German law, restrictions on the admissible means of evidence appear predominantly accepted, as opposed to agreements that seek to restrict the free evaluation of the evidence (Brehm 2004, p. 186).
312.
Lew et al. 2003, n° 22-15 et seq.
313.
Rigozzi 2005, n° 1097.
314.
See Sect. 3.1.3.1 above.
315.
In CAS 2011/A/2425, Fusimalohi v. FIFA, paras 84/85 & 96 et seq., the panel did not make any distinctions based on the different contents of the evidentiary FIFA rules.
316.
See Sect. 3.1.1 above.
317.
In the context of international civil proceedings, Nigg 1999, p. 77, notes that the “right to give evidence” is part of the claim of substantive law and can only be restricted if there is (i) a legal basis, (ii) a public interest to the restriction or a colliding private protected interest, and (iii) the restriction is proportionate.
318.
Cpre CAS 2011/A/2425, Fusimalohi v. FIFA, para 84/85, 96 et seq., on the admissible means of evidence in disciplinary matters, and CAS 2011/A/2490, Köllerer v. ATP, para 82 et seq., for the standard of proof, under Florida laws, appears to consider that the limits to sports regulations would only be constrained by mandatory national law or even national or international public policy.
319.
CAS 2011/A/2425, Fusimalohi v. FIFA, para 85.
320.
Barak and Koolaard 2014, p. 12.
321.
For a discussion of these rationales, see Born 2014, p. 2123 et seq., especially p. 1785/1786; see also Lew et al. 2003, n° 22-23.
322.
The same question arises when it comes to deciding whether parties may agree on evidentiary rules departing from the CAS Code. Rigozzi and Quinn 2012, p. 4, consider that the CAS Code does not contain any mandatory rules when it comes to the rules of evidence stricto sensu, but advise sports organisations against making ad hoc agreements “as they are intrinsically at odds with the paramount obligation to treat all of their members in an equal manner”.
323.
CAS 2011/A/2425, Fusimalohi v. FIFA, para 96; however, in CAS 2011/A/2490, Köllerer v. ATP, para 82, the CAS panel seemed to reduce the test to a public policy one: “each association can decide for itself which standard of proof to apply, subject to national and/or international rules of public policy”, but then nevertheless conducted a full “unconscionability test”.
324.
CAS 2011/A/2425, Fusimalohi v. FIFA; CAS 2011/A/2433, Amadou Diakite v. FIFA.
325.
See Sect. 3.2.2.2 below; CAS 2011/A/2490, Köllerer v. ATP, para 89 et seq., did in fact submit the standard of proof provided for in the sports regulations to a comparable “unconscionability test”, but found both that in subjective terms the player had consented to the relevant ATP rule clause and, in objective terms, that the standard of proof did not “unreasonably favour” the ATP.
326.
On the implementation of this principle at the national level, see Berninger 2012, p. 71/72; David 2013, p. 140, considers that, in any event, it is unlikely that outcome of the interpretation would differ depending on Swiss law or common law principles.
327.
David 2013, p. 205.
328.
David 2013, p. 125, himself implicitly accepts that distinction for national level, noting that the law which governs a specific set of anti-doping rules is unlikely to have a great influence on questions of interpretation of the Code, in light of the increasing assimilation of the principles of contractual interpretation across many jurisdictions, but it is more likely that such law will need to be considered by a court or CAS panel “in the context of arguments that the provisions of an anit-doping policy are contrary to the fundamental rights protected under that legal system”; Berninger 2012, p. 73 et seq., makes the same distinction from the German perspective.
329.
See Sect. 2.1.1.2.2 above.
330.
See Sect. 2.1.3.2 above.
331.
See Sect. 2.1.3.2 above.
332.
Viret 2014, p. 100/101; Rouiller 2006, n° 82; see also Baddeley 2008b, p. 710/711 : “Il n’étonne donc pas que les analyses des divers problèmes faites sur la base des droits fondamentaux appliqués par analogie dans une relation entre privés, n’aboutissent pas, en droit suisse, à un autre résultat que celles fondées sur la protection de la personnalité du droit privé” [Thus, it does not comes as a surprise that assessments of the various issues made on the basis of fundamental rights, applied by analogy in a relation among private parties, do not lead, under Swiss law, to a different result than those assessments based on the protection of personality rights rooted in private law (author’s translation)].
333.
Honsell et al. 2014 (Anton Heini/Urs Scherrer), ad Vor Article 60-79 CC, n° 5 et seq.; Riemer 1990, n° 226, distinguishes the “freedom of association” as a fundamental right on the one hand, and the “autonomy of the association” based on private law on the other hand. The first represents the freedom of the individuals towards the state to gather in communities (irrespective of the legal form chosen) under Article 23 of the Swiss Constitution or Article 11 of the ECHR. The second is a component of the private contractual autonomy, which gives individuals the right, among themselves, to organise their association freely within the frame of the legal order (see also Fuchs1999, p. 35). This distinction between public and private seems less apparent in Germany or under European law (Haas and Martens 2011, p. 60). In Germany, the association’s autonomy is derived directly from the German Constitution (§ 9 Deutsches Grundgesetz), see for an overview, Haas 2004, p. 58; Nolte 2009, p. 246.
334.
CAS 2011/A/2433, Diakite v. FIFA, para 20, in which the CAS panels declared that these principles apply equally in “most legal systems” (“selon le droit suisse, de même que selon la plupart des systèmes juridiques”).
335.
Swiss Supreme Court, 4P.240/2006, para 4.2; this also encompasses the right to enforce a sanction by imposing other sanctions, e.g. a fine to compel a club to abide to a disciplinary decision made by the international federation; see, similarly, for Germany: BGH Urteil Bundesgerichtshof, 28 November 1994 (“Reiter-Urteil”), reproduced in SpuRt 1-2/95, p. 43 et seq., para I.1.
336.
Honsell et al. 2014 (Anton Heini/Urs Scherrer), Vor Article 60-79, n° 9; Oswald et al. 2010, p. 136. In countries where corporations are predominant, those principles have been replaced by “good governance” with the aim to strike a balance between democratic process and administrative efficiency and accountability (see Lewis and Taylor 2014, A2.42).
337.
Haas 2004, p. 58; Baddeley 1998, p. 316.
338.
Oswald et al. 2010, p. 136; for German law, see Röhricht 1997, p. 22.
339.
Baddeley 1994, p. 110.
340.
Fenners 2006, n° 122 et seq.; Steiner 2010, p. 45; recognised in CAS awards, e.g. CAS 2007/A/1298 et al.,Wigan Athletic FC v. Heart of Midlothian, para 99; CAS 93/103, SC Langnau v. LSHG; for Swiss association law in general, Perrin and Chappuis 2008, p. 172.
341.
CAS 2011/A/2612, Hui v. IWF, para 102; CAS 2008/A/1705, Grasshopper v. Alianza Lima, para 25.
342.
Fenners 2006, n° 123 et seq.; Pinna 2005, p. 15; for German law, see BGH Urteil Bundesgerichtshof, 28 November 1994 (“Reiter-Urteil”), reproduced in SpuRt 1-2/95, p. 43 et seq., para III.2.
343.
Steiner 2010, p. 45.
344.
CAS 2005/C/976 & 986, FIFA & WADA, para 123: “the freedom of associations to regulate their own affairs is limited only by mandatory law”.
345.
Zen-Ruffinen 2002, n° 161; Riemer 1990, ad Article 63, n° 36 et seq.; Pichonnat and Foëx 2010 (Vincent Jeanneret/Olivier Hari), ad Article 63, n° 2.
346.
Perrin and Chappuis 2008, p. 41; Oswald et al. 2010, p. 129; with regard to withdrawal of member rights, see Riemer 1990, ad Article 70, n° 220; with regard to the WADC, see CAS 2005/C/976 & 986, FIFA & WADA, para 140.
347.
I.e. “unwritten mandatory law” (Baddeley 1994, p. 108); in German: “zwingendes ungeschriebenes Recht” (Riemer 1990, ad Article 63, n° 39 et seq.).
348.
CAS 2005/C/976 & 986, FIFA & WADA, para 124, with reference to the principle of proportionality, “which pervades Swiss jurisprudence and the Swiss legal system”.
349.
Fenners 2006, n° 110; for an overview in the context of doping, CAS 2005/C/976 & 986, FIFA & WADA, para 126 et seq.
350.
Riemer 1990, ad Article 70, n° 149; some aspects of this principle are explicitly enshrined in the provisions on associations (e.g. Article 67 para 1 of the Swiss Civil Code for voting rights), but it is more generally accepted as a general principle of the law of corporations, in particular of associations; in the context of the sport association, see Zen-Ruffinen 2002, n° 298 & 1393; CAS 2005/C/976 & 986, FIFA & WADA, para 137; the principle may even constitute an independent cause for action against the association (see Haas and Köppel 2012, n° 15).
351.
Riemer 1990, ad Article 63, n° 40 & ad Article 70, n° 153; Oswald et al. 2010, p. 128 et seq.
352.
Swiss Supreme Court, BGE/ATF 131 III 459, para 5.4.2; Swiss Supreme Court, 5C.58/2005, para 1.2.2; BGE/ATF 108 II 15, para 4b); Heini et al. 2009, n° 218.
353.
CAS 2005/C/976 & 986, FIFA & WADA, para 137.
354.
CAS 2011/A/2612, Hui v. IWF, para 103; this requirement should in our view apply beyond disciplinary sanctions to all decisions or other measures taken by the association that may have adverse effects for an Athlete. For disciplinary sanctions, Swiss Supreme Court, 4P.240/2006, para 4.2; see also Honsell et al. 2014 (Anton Heini/Urs Scherrer), ad Article 70, n° 22. The “principle of legal certainty” (Bestimmtheitsgrundsatz) also applies in German law of associations, see Urteil Amtsgericht Karlsruhe, 21 May 2007 (final), reproduced in SpuRt 2/2008, p. 82 et seq., para II.1 (nulle poena sine lege); Haas and Prokop 1998, p. 16. German law of associations is even stricter in this respect: based on the principle that all important aspects of the association’s life must be regulated in the statutes (as opposed to other regulations or by-laws), the fundamental disciplinary rules must be contained in the statutes (Wesentlichkeitsgrundsatz). Berninger 2012, p. 36, considers that evidentiary provisions are of such importance to be contained in the actual statute; however, courts do not seem to apply this “hierarchical” requirement for non-members bound by contractual agreement (see Haas 2004, p. 59).
355.
CAS 2005/C/976 & 986, FIFA & WADA, para 126; as explained in Sect. 2.1.1.3 above, various solutions (from membership to special contractual agreements) can be contemplated here, none entirely satisfactory.
356.
For disciplinary sanctions, see Zen-Ruffinen 2002, n° 1394; for the punitive withdrawal of member rights, see Riemer 1990, ad Article 70, para 253.
357.
Fenners 2006, n° 117 et seq.; for the Uebermassverbot in German law, see Urteil Amtsgericht Karlsruhe, 21 May 2007 (final), reproduced in SpuRt 2/2008, p. 82 et seq., para II.1.
358.
Baddeley 1994, p. 211; Fenners 2006, n° 119 et seq.
359.
Oswald et al. 2010, p. 157; similarly, under German law, the sports associations must guarantee internal proceedings complying with general basic procedural safeguards recognised in states operating under the rule of law (Rechtsstaat), as well as with its own procedural regulations, BGH Urteil Bundesgerichtshof, 28 November 1994 (“Reiter-Urteil”), reproduced in SpuRt 1-2/95, p. 43 et seq., para III.2; Urteil Amtsgericht Karlsruhe, 21 May 2007 (final), reproduced in SpuRt 2/2008, p. 82 et seq., para II.1; Vieweg 1995, p. 100.
360.
Riemer 1990, ad Article 70, para 236; Honsell et al. 2014 (Anton Heini/Urs Scherrer), ad Article 70, n° 21.
361.
See early Swiss Supreme Court case law on exclusion, BGE/ATF 85 II 525, para 9b (association of Swiss musicians); confirmed in BGE/ATF 90 II 346, para 2 (professional association of veterinarians); it is generally recognised for internal disciplinary proceedings (Zen-Ruffinen 2002, n° 320 and 1393).
362.
Riemer 1990, ad Article 70, n° 236.
363.
CAS 98/200, AEK Athen and SK Slavia Prague v. UEFA, para 60.
364.
For a comparative analysis of legal cultures when it comes to “privacy”, see Whitman, James Q., ‘The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity versus Liberty’ (2004). Faculty Scholarship Series. Paper 649. http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/649 (accessed 19.05.15), p. 1151 et seq.; similarly, personality rights play a moderate part in interventionistic countries such as France, where Doping Control is regulated by the law, including the possibilities to challenge decisions (see Sect. 2.1.1.3 above). In France, as in common law, the concept “droits de la personnalité” seems to relate more specifically to the protection of privacy, in the sense of image rights; these may be invoked to claim damages for unjustified accusations of doping by the press (see Buy et al. 2009, n° 630 et seq.).
365.
CAS 97/169, M. v. FIC, order on interim relief, para 10 (“droits fondamentaux de la personnalité”); CAS 93/109, FFTri & ITU, p. 5 (“protection de la personnalité et les droits de l’Homme”).
366.
See, extensively, Baddeley 1996, p. 158 et seq.; recently confirmed in Swiss Supreme Court (“Pechstein”), 4A_612/2009, para 6.3.2; see also Kaiser 2011, n° 538.
367.
CAS 2009/A/1870, WADA v. Hardy & USADA, para 73; CAS 2005/A/895, Lissarague et al. v. FEI, para 88; before national courts, see Swiss Supreme Court, BGE/ATF 134 III 193, Schafflützlel & Zöllig v. FSC.
368.
For an overview under Austrian, Italian and Spanish law, see Korff 2009, p. 33 et seq.; for a comparison between the Swiss and German approaches, see Haas and Drallé 2010, p. 107 et seq.: in Germany, the general protection of personality rights has been successfully invoked before national courts against public disclosure of the disciplinary sanction on the internet (see Urteil Hanseatisches Oberlandgericht, 9 February 2010, SpuRt 4/2010, p. 159 et seq.; comment by Methner 2010, p. 150 et seq.); Urteil Landgericht Hamburg, 18 August 2010, SpuRt 2/2011, p. 75 et seq. By contrast, decisions imposing doping sanctions are usually reviewed rather from the perspectives either of the general good faith principle in contract law (Inhaltskontrolle) or of antitrust law.
369.
Manaï 2008, n° 390.
370.
See Sect. 3.2.2.1 above; CAS 2006/A/1063, Rozier v. FEI, para 33; CAS 2002/O/410, Gibraltar Football Association v. UEFA, para 30 (limitations on the association’s power to refuse a member at its sole discretion).
371.
Baddeley 2008b, p. 710; Rouiller 2006, n° 64; Deschenaux and Steinauer 2001, n° 527.
372.
Fuchs 1999, p. 169. The Swiss Supreme Court seems to consider that the protection under Article 75 of the Swiss Civil Code and Article 28 of the Swiss Civil Code coexists (approving, Oswald et al. 2010, p. 160), while some commentators advocate that the remedies of Article 28 of the Swiss Civil Code are no longer available if the action of Article 75 of the Swiss Civil Code is open to a member (see e.g. Fuchs 1999, p. 167, whereby a breach of personality rights that is not challenged within the time limit set by Article 75 of the Swiss Civil Code must be deemed approved). This means that a member affected by a decision which is in conformity with the regulations he or she agreed to submit to is only left with the argument that such agreement was an excessive commitment under Article 27 para 2 of the Swiss Civil Code (see Summermatter 2009, p. 358).
373.
Rigozzi, Provisional Measures, p. 230/231; Summermatter 2009, p. 359; see for a recent example of interim relief granted against the refusal of an organiser to accept an Athlete who had served her Ineligibility period, Cour Civile du Tribunal Cantonal du Canton de Vaud, 24 June 2011.
374.
See e.g. Swiss Supreme Court Decision, 23 August 2007, 5C.248/2006, para 3, confirming BGE/ATF 120 II 369, para 2; CAS 2008/A/1641, NAOC v. IAAF & USOC, para 80; CAS 2003/A/461,471&473, WCM-GP Limited v. FIM, para 30.
375.
Swiss Supreme Court, BGE/ATF 134 III 193, Schafflützlel & Zöllig v. FSC, para 4.4.
376.
Fuchs 1999, p. 167; Manaï 2008, n° 304 et seq.
377.
Aebi-Müller and Hausheer 2001, p. 349; it is disputed whether the action of Article 28 must be filed within the time limit of Article 75 of the Swiss Civil Code (see Haas and Köppel 2012, n° 17).
378.
Legal entities also enjoy the protection of personality rights, to the extent that these rights are not, by their very nature, applicable to individuals only (see Deschenaux and Steinauer 2001, n° 523 and 584).
379.
Swiss Supreme Court, BGE/ATF 134 III 193, Schafflützlel & Zöllig v. FSC, para 4.5; for CAS panels, CAS 2009/A/1879, Valverde v. CONI, para 72 et seq.
380.
Note that CAS panels also use terminology related to the “infringement” and the “legitimate character” of these infringements (see e.g. CAS 2011/A/2425, Fusimalohi v. FIFA, para 96).
381.
Peter 2002, n° 15.
382.
Cour Civile du Tribunal Cantonal du Canton de Vaud, 24 June 2011, para IVa.) & b.).
383.
There is no numerus clausus of personality rights (Bucher 2009, n° 435; Deschenaux and Steinauer 2001, n° 540). Commentators and courts have been struggling to find a suitable general definition for the concept of “personality”; in practice, it is easier to operate with a non-exhaustive list of different elements (see Swiss Supreme Court, BGE/ATF 134 III 193, Schafflützlel & Zöllig v. FSC, para 4.5.
384.
Swiss Supreme Court, BGE/ATF 134 III 193, Schafflützlel & Zöllig v. FSC, para 4.5 (original text in French).
385.
CAS 2008/A/1636, Hoy v. FEI.
386.
CAS 2001/A/345, M. v. Swiss Cycling, para 22.
387.
Aebi-Müller and Hausheer 2001, p. 346.
388.
Manaï 2008, p. 75 et seq., distinguishes types of Athletes who enjoy a different protection of their privacy.
389.
See Baddeley 1998, p. 317 et seq.; Peter 2002, n° 15; Aebi-Müller and Hausheer 2001, p. 346 et seq.
390.
Aebi-Müller and Hausheer 2001, p. 349.
391.
See also, Baddeley 1998, p. 320.
392.
Urteil Hanseatisches Oberlandgericht, 9 February 2010, SpuRt 4/2010, p. 159 et seq.; comment by Methner 2010, p. 150 et seq.
393.
Fuchs 1999, p. 165.
394.
CAS 2001/A/345, M. v. Swiss Cycling, para 22; CAS 2002/A/385, T. v. FIG, para 10; CAS 98/200, AEK Athens & SK Slavia Prague v. UEFA, para 69: “an unfairly adopted long doping ban might harm the whole sporting career of an Athlete, and thus his/her personality”.
395.
Swiss Supreme Court, BGE/ATF 134 III 193, Schafflützlel & Zöllig v. FSC, para 4.4, a reasoning already initiated by the Swiss Supreme Court as early as the “Gundel” matter (Swiss Supreme Court, BGE/ATF 119 II 271, para 2) and BGE/ATF 120 II 369; Meier and Aguet 2002, p. 59, describe financial consequences as indirect effects of the breach of the Athlete’s personality.
396.
For a more detailed analysis in the context of sport, see Manaï 2008, n° 390 et seq.
397.
In the French/German versions: “Nul ne peut aliéner sa liberté, ni s'en interdire l'usage dans une mesure contraire aux lois ou aux mœurs”/“Niemand kann sich seiner Freiheit entäussern oder sich in ihrem Gebrauch in einem das Recht oder die Sittlichkeit verletzenden Grade beschränken”.
398.
Rouiller 2006, n° 83: “Just as the State can restrict fundamental rights only through proportionate measures that are the only means of achieving the public interest objective sought, individuals can alienate their liberty by way of contract only to the extent that the overall scheme of the contract makes this necessary and provided the restriction concerned is in proportion to that need”.
399.
Deschenaux and Steinauer 2001, n° 302.
400.
Swiss Supreme Court, 5C.72/2004, para 4.2; Honsell et al. 2014 (Claire Huguenin), ad Article 27, n° 19.
401.
Swiss Supreme Court, Matuzalem v. FIFA, 4A_558/2011, para 4.3.2; Swiss Supreme Court, BGE/ATF 104 II 6, para 2a; Riemer 1990, ad Article 70, n° 113; Rouiller 2006, n° 67.
402.
Swiss Supreme Court, 4C.130/2001, para 7.1; Bucher 2009, n° 402.
403.
Haas and Martens 2011, p. 83.
404.
Antonio Rigozzi, Legal opinion on the conformity of the exclusion of “team athletes” from organized training during their period of ineligibility with Swiss law, July 2008, https://www.wada-ama.org/fr/nos-activites/espace-juridique/avis-de-droit-et-articles-juridiques-sur-le-code (accessed 08.05.15), para 41; see e.g. Swiss Supreme Court, BGE/ATF 114 II 159, para 2a. and BGE/ATF 104 II 6 para 8: “Grundsätzlich ist eine vertragliche oder statutarische Einschränkung der wirtschaftlichen Bewegungsfreiheit nur dann eine übermässige, wenn sie den Verpflichteten der Willkür eines andern ausliefert, seine wirtschaftliche Freiheit aufhebt oder in einem Masse einschränkt, dass die Grundlagen seiner wirtschaftlichen Existenz gefährdet sind”; see BGE/ATF 102 II 211 for an example of excessive commitment imposed on football players by the Swiss Football Association’s rules on transfer.
405.
Antonio Rigozzi, Legal opinion on the conformity of the exclusion of “team athletes“ from organized training during their period of ineligibility with Swiss law, July 2008, https://www.wada-ama.org/fr/nos-activites/espace-juridique/avis-de-droit-et-articles-juridiques-sur-le-code (accessed 08.05.15).
406.
Antonio Rigozzi, Legal opinion on the conformity of the exclusion of “team athletes“ from organized training during their period of ineligibility with Swiss law, July 2008, https://www.wada-ama.org/fr/nos-activites/espace-juridique/avis-de-droit-et-articles-juridiques-sur-le-code (accessed 08.05.15), para 39.
407.
Antonio Rigozzi, Legal opinion on the conformity of the exclusion of “team athletes“ from organized training during their period of ineligibility with Swiss law, July 2008, https://www.wada-ama.org/fr/nos-activites/espace-juridique/avis-de-droit-et-articles-juridiques-sur-le-code (accessed 08.05.15), para 40; in an equestrian doping matter, in the Swiss Supreme Court, 5C.248/2006, para 4.2, the Swiss Supreme Court considered that there was on overriding interest in the fight against doping, so that there was no need to assess the validity of the consent.
408.
In his legal opinion rendered in 2005, Rouiller 2006, n° 97, came to the same conclusion.
409.
See the reasoning of the cantonal judge in Schafflützel & Zöllig v. FSC, summarized in Swiss Supreme Court, 5C.248/2006, para 4.2.
410.
Antonio Rigozzi, Legal opinion on the conformity of the exclusion of “team athletes“ from organized training during their period of ineligibility with Swiss law, July 2008, https://www.wada-ama.org/fr/nos-activites/espace-juridique/avis-de-droit-et-articles-juridiques-sur-le-code (accessed 08.05.15), para 42.
411.
See e.g. Rouiller 2006, Legal Opinion for WADA; Antonio Rigozzi, Legal opinion on the conformity of the exclusion of “team athletes“ from organized training during their period of ineligibility with Swiss law, July 2008, https://www.wada-ama.org/fr/nos-activites/espace-juridique/avis-de-droit-et-articles-juridiques-sur-le-code (accessed 08.05.15).
412.
This entwinement between duties and consequences raises questions regarding the timely character of the objection of excessive commitment, in particular if the Athlete raises the argument only on the day they are accused of an anti-doping rule violation, after submitting to whereabouts and Sample collection—possibly for years—without objection. In theory, the objection of an excessive commitment may be raised without limitation in time (see Honsell et al. 2014 (Claire Huguenin), ad Article 27, n° 22/23). However, it is questionable whether this rule can apply in full for continuous agreements that extend over time, such as membership in a federation. The “victim” of the excessive commitment may choose not to invoke it and perform under the agreement (see Bucher 2009, n° 421); in recent Swiss Supreme Court case law (BGE/ATF 129 III 209, para 2.2.), the commitment is no longer considered void ex officio, except where the agreement affects the core domain of a person’s personal sphere, thereby infringing bonos mores. Where the commitment is merely excessive, the agreement is only unenforceable, in the sense that the person concerned may choose to apply for the protection granted by Article 27 of the Swiss Civil Code by refusing to comply with his or her commitment; for a critical overview of the various opinions on the legal effect of Article 27 para 2 of the Swiss Civil Code (see Manaï 2008, n° 481 et seq.).
413.
Antonio Rigozzi, Legal opinion on the conformity of the exclusion of “team athletes“ from organized training during their period of ineligibility with Swiss law, July 2008, https://www.wada-ama.org/fr/nos-activites/espace-juridique/avis-de-droit-et-articles-juridiques-sur-le-code (accessed 08.05.15), para 33.
414.
Clauses in sports regulations that are in breach of this provision are invalid per se (see Haas and Martens 2011, p. 83).
415.
Antonio Rigozzi, Legal opinion on the conformity of the exclusion of “team athletes“ from organized training during their period of ineligibility with Swiss law, July 2008, https://www.wada-ama.org/fr/nos-activites/espace-juridique/avis-de-droit-et-articles-juridiques-sur-le-code (accessed 08.05.15), para 32.
416.
Antonio Rigozzi, Legal opinion on the conformity of the exclusion of “team athletes“ from organized training during their period of ineligibility with Swiss law, July 2008, https://www.wada-ama.org/fr/nos-activites/espace-juridique/avis-de-droit-et-articles-juridiques-sur-le-code (accessed 08.05.15), para 39, footnote 24 and para 46.
417.
As a way of example, a provision providing for sanctions ranging from a warning to a two-year Ineligibility may not be found excessive as such under Article 27 of the Swiss Civil Code, whereas imposing the maximum Ineligibility period of two years to a particular Athlete in a particular doping case might be found to be a disproportionate breach of his or her rights under Article 28 of the Swiss Civil Code.
418.
Athletes sanctioned after refusing to submit to Testing, for example, may argue that Testing is in breach of their personality rights under Article 28 of the Swiss Civil Code, and that such breach is not made legitimate through consent, because submitting to the relevant anti-doping rules was an excessive commitment under Article 27 in the first place. The sole application of Article 28 might be encountered in cases in which the Athlete does not challenge the anti-doping rules as such, and accepts his submission to these rules, but merely claims that the sanction imposed upon him or her in the particular case is disproportionate. For a detailed analysis of the interaction in doping matters, see Aebi-Müller and Hausheer 2001, p. 346 et seq.
419.
Aebi-Müller and Morand 2012, p. 241; Aebi-Müller and Hausheer 2001, p. 350; Bucher 2009, n° 412; see Sect. 3.2.2.1 above.
420.
Swiss Supreme Court, Matuzalem v. FIFA, 4A_558/2011, para 4.3.2; Favre-Bulle and Viret 2012, p. 393 et seq.
421.
See Sect. 2.1.2 above.
422.
See Sect. 3.2.2.1 above.
423.
See Sect. 3.3.1 below.
424.
See Sect. 3.3.2 below.
425.
For an overview of the debate, see Haas 2007, n° 157 et seq.; Meier 2011, n° 825.
426.
Appendix 1 (Definitions) of the WADC defines “Minor” as “A natural Person who has not reached the age of eighteen years”. However, this definition can only apply to define consequences that the WADC regime attaches to being a “Minor” within the meaning of its own definition. For matters related to consent, the status of the Athlete would need to be determined on a case-by-case basis, depending on the law applicable in the particular matter.
427.
As a rule, consent to a breach of personality rights only necessitates the mental capacity to do so, which means that a minor may validly consent (or refuse consent) to the breach (Article 19 para 2 of the Swiss Civil Code); see Bucher 2009, n° 506; Deschenaux and Steinauer 2001, n° 588 g.
428.
The latter situation may occur if the consent is part of a broader contractual context with economic aspects, some of which may not be agreed by representation if the minor lacks the necessary mental capacity to give consent (see Meier 2011, n° 835).
429.
Bucher 2009, n° 506; for data protection, see Meier 2011, n° 833.
430.
CAS 2006/A/1102 & 1146, Johannes Eder v. Ski Austria & WADA v. Johannes Eder & Ski Austria, para 44: “by voluntarily acceding to the association, the Athlete has accepted the application of the disciplinary rules and its sanctions”; see initially CAS 2005/C/976 & 986, FIFA & WADA, para 1.4.4.
431.
See Sect. 2.1.1.3 above.
432.
See, most vigorously, Aguet, n° 60; for an overview of the different issues arising in connection therewith; Baddeley 2008b, p. 711 et seq.; Flueckiger 2008, n° 973, n° 1058, 1061, 1064, 1082; Peter 2002, n° 18; contra: Rouiller 2006, n° 93; for German positions, see Methner 2010, p. 151; for French positions, see Maisonneuve 2011, n° 391 et seq.; for a French opinion with respect to the validity of an arbitration clause in doping disputes, Buy et al. 2009, n° 892.
433.
For an update, see Minutes WADA Foundation Board Meeting 18 May 2014, p. 9/10; Minutes WADA ExCo Meeting 11 May 2013, p. 26; see for more details 1st Opinion 3/2008 on the World Anti-Doping Code Draft International Standard for the Protection of Privacy, p. 5; 2nd Opinion 4/2009 of 6 April 2009 of the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) International Standard for the Protection of Privacy and Personal Information on related provisions of the Code and on other privacy issues in the context of the fight against doping in sport by WADA and (national) anti-doping organizations, p. 11. In the Working Group’s view, the consent given by participants does not comply with the requirements of the Data Protection Directive which defines consent as “any freely given specific and informed indication of his wishes by which the data subject signifies his agreement to personal data relating to him being processed” (Article 2(h) Directive 95/46/EC); this is because of the sanctions attached to a “refusal to subject themselves to the obligations of the Code”; similarly, the Swiss government expressed concerns on this issue in the revision for the Swiss Sports Act (see Message du Conseil fédéral sur l’encouragement du sport et la loi fédérale sur les systèmes d’information de la Confédération dans le domaine du sport du 11 novembre 2009 (09.082), FF2009, pp. 7401–7478, p. 7450).
434.
For an overview, in a basketball matter, see Fribourg, Tribunal civil de la Sarine, Jugement du 20 juin 1997, RFJ 1998, p. 51 et seq., p. 66; see further, Swiss Supreme Court (“Perroud” matter), BGE/ATF 102 II 211, para 6, were the regulations were considered contra bonos mores, and therefore excessive; Kantonsgericht Zurich (1977), in Bondallaz/Zen-Ruffinen, p. 9 et seq. (the only occurrence on which the court questioned more generally that a consent to sports regulations could ever be free); Kantonsgericht Bern, 22 December 1987, Sandra Gasser, RSJ 84/1988, p. 85 et seq., “Gasser” matter; Kantonsgericht Wallis, 2 November 1989 & 13 February 1990, Swiss Ice Hockey League v. Norman Dubé, RVJ 1991, p. 346 et seq.
435.
Swiss Supreme Court, Cañas v. ATP, 4P.172/2006; at the same period, though by way of obiter dictum, the Supreme Court found, in the context of disciplinary sanctions imposed by an association, that “the members voluntarily submit to these potential sanctions, even if—as the appellant [a club sanctioned by FIFA] claims not without merits—, given the dominant position which the respondent [FIFA] holds in football, a withdrawal hardly enters into consideration for a club that wishes to participate in championships” (Swiss Supreme Court, 4P.240/2006).
436.
In one of the very rare decisions where the Swiss Supreme Court had to review anti-doping regulations with a full power of review under the perspective of Article 28 para 2 Swiss Civil Code, the Supreme Court judges left the question of consent undecided by finding that the regulations were, in any event, justified by an overriding interest (see Swiss Supreme Court, BGE/ATF 134 III 193, Schafflützlel & Zöllig v. FSC, para 4.6.3.2.2).
437.
See already, Swiss Supreme Court, 4P.253/2003, para 5.4.
438.
Swiss Supreme Court, Cañas v. ATP, 4P.172/2006.
439.
Swiss Supreme Court, Matuzalem v. FIFA, 4A_558/2011 (published: BGE/ATF 138 III 322).
440.
The 2015 WADC reinforces this trend by including in the expectations that signatories have towards governments in its Article 22, in particular with respect to data protection: ”Each government will put in place legislation, regulations, policies or administrative practices for cooperation and sharing of information with Anti-Doping Organizations and sharing of data among Anti-Doping Organizations as provided in the Code“.
441.
Before, there was no provision of Swiss law directly empowering sports organisations to restrict the Athlete’s right in connection with Doping Control (see Antonio Rigozzi, Legal opinion on the conformity of the exclusion of “team athletes“ from organized training during their period of ineligibility with Swiss law, July 2008, https://www.wada-ama.org/fr/nos-activites/espace-juridique/avis-de-droit-et-articles-juridiques-sur-le-code (accessed 08.05.15), para 51), in particular, Article 63 of the Swiss Civil Code, enshrining the principle of the freedom of association, is not in itself a sufficient basis, because this freedom is subject to mandatory law (Article 63 para 2), of which the protection of personality rights is an integral part (see Baddeley 2008b, p. 711). The provisions of the UNESCO Anti-Doping Convention ratified by Switzerland are not, in the prevailing opinion, sufficiently precise to be self-executing (see Sect. 2.1.1 above).
442.
On the absence of a legal basis authorising private parties to process whereabouts data in Germany, see Nolte 2010, p. 311.
443.
Article 24 of the LESp/78 OESp: communication of data from judicial or criminal authorities to Swiss Antidoping; Article 77 of the OESp: communication of data from the sports organisation responsible for the testing to the criminal authorities; Article 25 of the LESp: cross-border communication of data by Swiss Antidoping to foreign recognised authorities.
444.
Moreover, none of the provisions addresses the public disclosure of data related to Doping Control, even though the public disclosure of the final decision is a mandatory requirement under the WADC.
445.
For this position, see Flueckiger 2012, p. 691. Indeed Article 75 of the OESp only refers to the In-Competition window with respect to the duty for individuals participating in competitions to submit to Testing. The only reference to Out-of-Competition Testing is in Article 76 para 1 lit. c of the OESp, in the duties of Swiss Antidoping regarding its Test Distribution Planning.
446.
This is true at least for disciplinary processes conducted by International Federations incorporated in Switzerland, which will be reviewed under Swiss law. Foreign Athletes tested by a foreign NADO will be subject to disciplinary proceedings according to the relevant foreign laws; for the equivalent situation in Germany, where the National Anti-Doping Code adopted by the German NADO must be imposed by the relevant national federations on their Athletes through private law instruments (see Berninger 2012, p. 33 et seq.).
447.
On informed consent, see Sect. 3.2.3.3.3 below.
448.
See, in particular, Sect. 4.1.1.1 below.
449.
Baddeley 1998, p. 313.
450.
The perception of doping may be different in certain US professional sports, where sports is more akin to show business than to the Olympic spirit. However, even US professional sports are increasingly adopting anti-doping regulations inspired by the principles of the WADC.
451.
CAS 2009/A/1879, Valverde v. CONI, para 74.
452.
In its Schafflützlel & Zöllig v. FSC decision, the Swiss Supreme Court confirmed that the fight against doping constitutes, as a matter of principle, an overriding interest that can be invoked to restrict the Athlete’s personality rights under Article 28 of the Swiss Civil Code (BGE/ATF 134 III 193, Schafflützlel & Zöllig v. FSC, para 4.6.3.2.2); this view has also been supported in the decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union, C-519/04, Meca-Medina & Majcen v. Commission, 18 July 2006, para 43 et seq.
453.
Haas and Drallé 2010, p. 112.
454.
For data protection, see Flueckiger 2008, n° 946.
455.
CAS 2009/A/1879, Valverde v. CONI, para 74.
456.
Aguet 2006, n° 72, distinguishes between legal interests protected in sanctioning intentional doping, and those protected in sanctioning doping by negligence. In our view, there are no categories of interests, some of which would be applicable only to certain provisions or certain aspects of the Doping Control process. Anti-doping rules globally pursue all these interests. Whether a particular rule is proper to achieve these interests and proportionate to these goals is an assessment that take place at the level of the balance of interests and proportionality.
457.
Swiss Supreme Court, BGE/ATF 134 III 193, Schafflützlel & Zöllig v. FSC, para 4.6.3.2.2; CAS 2009/A/1768, Hansen v. FEI; CAS 2008/A/1700 & 1710, Deutsche Reiterliche Vereinigung e.V. v. FEI & Ahlmann, para 85.
458.
Court of Justice of the European Union, C-519/04, Meca-Medina & Majcen v. Commission, 18 July 2006, para 43; CAS 2006/A/1149 & 2007/A/1211, WADA v. FMF & Carmona, para 69.
459.
Court of Justice of the European Union, C-519/04, Meca-Medina & Majcen v. Commission, 18 July 2006, para 43; CAS 2006/A/1149 & 2007/A/1211, WADA v. FMF & Carmona, 16 May 2007, para 69. In equine doping, the Swiss Supreme Court mentioned in addition the animal’s health and breeding quality, Swiss Supreme Court, BGE/ATF 134 III 193, Schafflützlel & Zöllig v. FSC, para 4.6.3.2.2.
460.
Swiss Supreme Court, BGE/ATF 134 III 193, Schafflützlel & Zöllig v. FSC, para 4.6.3.2.2; CAS 2008/A/1700 & 1710, Deutsche Reiterliche Vereinigung e.V. v. FEI & Ahlmann, para 85.
461.
Court of Justice of the European Union, C-519/04, Meca-Medina & Majcen v. Commission, 18 July 2006, para 43; CAS 2008/A/1700 & 1710, Deutsche Reiterliche Vereinigung e.V. v. FEI & Ahlmann, para 85.
462.
CAS 2010/A/2230, IWBF v. UK Anti-Doping & Gibbs, para 11.10.
463.
Swiss Supreme Court, BGE/ATF 134 III 193, Schafflützlel & Zöllig v. FSC, para 4.6.3.2.2; CAS 2006/A/1149 & 2007/A/1211, WADA v. FMF & Carmona, para 69.
464.
See Sect. 7.1 below.
465.
For a more detailed analysis related to the specific provision at stake, see, however, CAS 2010/A/2230, IWBF v. UK Anti-Doping & Gibbs, para 11.10 et seq.; CAS 2000/A/317, A. v. FILA, para 27.
466.
See CAS 2007/A/1396 & 1402, WADA & UCI v. Valverde & RFEC, para 60c (regarding the possibility to use evidence obtained illegally in proceedings): “In the case at hand, the internationally accepted fight against doping is a public interest, which would outweigh a possible violation of Mr Valverde’s personal rights”; see also, para 70 (regarding the allegation of a breach of personality rights): “There is no evidence either that any other personal rights of Mr Valverde were violated as alleged by him. But even if this were different, the overriding interest of the fight against doping would warrant this”; CAS Ad hoc Division CG 02/001, G. v. CGC & TC, para 23, dealing in one sentence with the question: “The rationale for summary reaction to a positive test is obvious: the public interest of the sport trumps the private interests of the Athlete”.
467.
CAS 2004/A/748, ROC, Ekimov v. IOC, USOC, Hamilton, para 118.
468.
CAS 2006/A/1102&1146, Eder v. Ski Austria, WADA v. Eder & Ski Austria, para 51.
469.
CAS 2006/A/1102 & 1146, Eder v. Ski Austria, WADA v. Eder & Ski Austria, para 43: “By voluntarily acceding to the association, the Athlete has accepted the application of the disciplinarly rules and its sanctions”; see also, idem, para 51: “The Athlete was clearly aware of the sanctions when he acceded to the association of Ski Austria”.
470.
Haas/Drallé, p. 134: “Schliesslich rechtfertig auch nicht das hehre Ziel der Dopingbekämpfung jedes Mittel” [Ultimately, even the noble goals of the fight against doping cannot justify all means (author’s translation)].
471.
Flueckiger 2012, p. 693; thus, the control over the contents of anti-doping regulations must not, in our view, take it as granted that the mere pursuit of the legitimate interests as enshrined in the provisions of the WADC recognised by international public law, make any such provision “apt” as such, subject only to a proportionality test, unlike submitted by Berninger 2012, p. 82/83. This supposes that the goals of anti-doping are legitimate, which cannot be automatically assumed.
472.
Swiss Supreme Court, BGE/ATF 134 III 193, Schafflützlel & Zöllig v. FSC, para 4.6.2.
473.
Glocker, p. 95, submits however that ethical considerations to protect the sport, as opposed to commercial interests, should always prevail over he Athlete’s interests.
474.
Moor 2001, §16, n° 58.
475.
See for an example in the context of sports: Swiss Administrative Court, 9A-3364/2008, para 12.1.
476.
In Swiss law, the proportionality principle is explicitly enshrined in Article 5 para 2 of the Swiss Cst (general principle) and Article 36 para 3 of the Swiss Cst (restriction of fundamental rights), see Moor 2001, §16, n° 58; for an historical overview from the perspective of Germany, see Soyez 2002, p. 42 et seq.
477.
Proportionality is also a requirement for any restriction of fundamental rights under the ECHR.
478.
Baddeley 1994, p. 211; in Court of Justice of the European Union, C-519/04, Meca-Medina & Majcen v. Commission, 18 July 2006, the Court declared the proportionality test of competition law applicable to anti-doping regulations; some commentators consider that the requirement to respect proportionality arise from the governmental mission and quasi-public status of national anti-doping organisations, and on the de facto monopolistic nature of other sports organisations (see Aebi-Müller and Hausheer 2001, p. 357). See also Fuchs 1999, p. 121, whereby proportionality is an expression of the indirect horizontal effect of fundamental rights and depends on the organisation’s social power. In effect, the result is the same. See also Maisonneuve 2011, n° 759 et seq., who advocates the application of proportionality as a limitation to the exercise of power, regardless of whether such power is of a public or private nature.
479.
CAS 2004/A/690, H. v. ATP, para 50; Niggli and Sieveking, 2006, n° 26.
480.
See e.g. CAS 2008/A/1513, Hoch v. FIS & IOC, para 8.8.2; CAS 2005/C/976 & 986, FIFA & WADA, para 138; for an early example in the context of a refusal to admit a boxer to a competition, CAS Ad Hoc 00/004, COC & Kibunde v. AIBA, para 12.
481.
Niggli and Sieveking 2006, n° 26; see the Swiss Supreme Court, 4P.148/2006, para 7.3.2: “la proportionnalité des sanctions disciplinaires infligées au sportifs professionnels est l’une des questions les plus disputées à l’heure actuelle dans la doctrine” [the proportionality of disciplinary sanctions imposed on professional sportspeople is currently one of the most disputed questions in literature (author’s translation)]; CAS 2005/C/976 & 986, FIFA & WADA, para 138: “The sanction must also comply with the principle of proportionality, in the sense that there must be a reasonable balance between the kind of the misconduct and the sanction”.
482.
Berninger 2012, p. 83.
483.
Introductory section “Purpose, Scope and Organization of the World Anti-Doping Program and the Code”: “The Code has been drafted giving consideration to the principle of proportionality and human rights”.
484.
Costa Jean-Paul, Legal Opinion on the draft 2015 WADC, https://wada-main-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/resources/files/WADC-Legal-Opinion-on-Draft-2015-Code-3.0-EN.pdf (accessed 22.01.15).
485.
For an analysis of these three aspects from the perspective of anti-doping, see Soyez 2002, p. 50 et seq.; see e.g. Swiss Administrative Court, A-3364/2008, para 12.1; CAS 2007/A/1381, RFEC & Valverde v. UCI, para 92; CAS 2005/C/976&986, FIFA & WADA, 21 April 2006, para 138; for the same assessment derived from ECHR and common law jurisprudence, see CAS 2010/A/2230, IWBF v. UKAD & Gibbs, para 11.9.
486.
CAS 2010/A/2230, IWBF v. UKAD & Gibbs, para 11.9: “the measures designed to meet the legitimate objective are rationally connected to it”.
487.
Moor 2001, §16, n° 70.
488.
Kaufmann-Kohler G, Malinverni G and Rigozzi A, Legal Opinion Conformity of Certain Provisions of the Draft WADC with Commonly Accepted Principles of International Law, February 2003, https://www.wada-ama.org/fr/nos-activites/espace-juridique/avis-de-droit-et-articles-juridiques-sur-le-code (accessed 29.04.15), n° 153.
489.
CAS 2010/A/2230, IWBF v. UKAD & Gibbs, para 11.9: “the means used to impair the right or freedom are no more than is necessary to accomplish the objective”; Moor 2001, §16, n° 72.
490.
CAS 2000/A/317, A. v. FILA, para 31.
491.
CAS 2010/A/2230, IWBF v. UKAD & Gibbs, para 11.9: “the measures strike an appropriate balance between the interests of society and those of individuals and groups”.
492.
Moor 2001, §16, n° 75. For example, a fixed two-year suspension for a first offence has been deemed not to be disproportionate in view of the importance of the aim of harmonisation (see Kaufmann-Kohler G, Malinverni G and Rigozzi A, Legal Opinion Conformity of Certain Provisions of the Draft WADC with Commonly Accepted Principles of International Law, February 2003, https://www.wada-ama.org/fr/nos-activites/espace-juridique/avis-de-droit-et-articles-juridiques-sur-le-code (accessed 29.04.15), n° 177).
493.
This is true in particular since consent can only be sufficient if the restrictions on the Athletes’ rights are assessed from a perspective of protection of individual autonomy. By contrast, fundamental rights or competition law do not provide for a justification by consent as these are either designed for relationships between individuals and the state or also aim at protecting the general interest (see Peter 2002, n° 18).
494.
CAS 2008/A/1557, WADA v. CONI, FIGC, Mannini & Possanzini, revised, para 6.13: “Athletes must be given a fair opportunity to fully inform and educate themselves, with the benefit of user-friendly tools and materials, regarding the regulations and procedures. This implies that when regulations and procedures emanate from anti-doping organizations and are enforced via a pyramid of international and national sports federations, associations and anti-doping bodies, it must be ensured at each level that the rules are effectively implemented and that efficient processes are put in place to inform and educate the Athlete. Indeed, because the regulatory framework is complex and partly private and contractual in nature, any other approach would be unfair” (emphasis added); see also the comment by Heermann Peter 2002, p.232 et seq., who submits that the CAS panel hereby introduced an additional requirement for the validity of anti-doping regulation, which assesses whether these are “easily comprehensible” (einfache Verständlichkeit). Heermann criticises the decision, which he interprets as a form of Verbotsirrtum (error on the prohibited character of the conduct).
495.
Contra, Baddeley 1998, p. 322.
496.
See Sect. 3.2.3.2.2.3 above.
497.
Should the WADC be made part of an international convention, state parties would have to agree on solutions that they would consider as striking a fair balance of interest between the goals of Doping Control and Athlete rights. This, however, would not make consent irrelevant. Sports organisations operating on a consensual basis would still have to secure their Athletes’ submission to their rules. This would not remove the requirements of prior, written and explicit consent. However, the result would be a validation of the Athletes’ consent. Such consent could no longer be found excessive to the extent that the anti-doping rule would satisfy the requirements defined in an international consensus.
498.
Deschenaux and Steinauer 2001, n° 588.
499.
See Sect. 3.2.3.1 above.
500.
For an example of such a integrated analysis in connection with blood and urine sampling, see Baddeley 1998, p. 318; see, similarly, Aebi-Müller and Hausheer 2001, p. 355.
501.
See similarly, Steiner 2010, p. 151; Flueckiger 2008, n° 605 & 973, extends the argument to justifications for data processing.
502.
See e.g. in Urteil Hanseatisches Oberlandgericht, 9 February 2010, SpuRt 4/2010, p. 159 et seq., p. 159: “nach der unter dem Gesichtspunkt von Treu und Glauben vorzunehmenden Beurteilung der Einwilligungserklärung kann diese nicht weiter reichen, als der Kläger billigerweise mit einer Veröffentlichung rechnen musste” [under an assessment of the statement of consent conducted from the perspective of good faith, the statement cannot extend beyond the publication that the applicant could reasonably expect (author’s translation)].
503.
See Sect. 3.2.3.1.2 above and the decisions referenced.
504.
See Sect. 2.1.1.3 above.
505.
Haas 2007, n° 255.
506.
See Sect. 3.2.3.3.3 below.
507.
See Sect. 3.2.3.3.4 below.
508.
See Sect. 3.2.3.3.2 below.
509.
Beyond these requirements, the ordinary causes for invalidating consent in relationships among private parties are also applicable, but are not dealt with specifically here; this may include, for example, situations in which a specific Athlete would consent under the influence of an error, deception or threat (see Haas 2007, n° 757 et seq.).
510.
Haas and Drallé 2010, p. 117, consider that the stringent requirements for the medical duties of information cannot be transferred without close consideration, but nevertheless offer requirements to borrow from; The Council of Europe, Recommendation of the Monitoring Group on blood sampling for doping medical controls, 98/3, explicitly refers to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine in its preamble.
511.
See e.g. Jossen 2009. p. 6, whereby a medical intervention is defined by a therapeutic purpose, i.e. the enhancement or maintenance of the patient’s health status through adequate means; Manaï 2006, p. 238, distinguishes therapeutic intervention and intervention for the sake of research.
512.
In reality, consent given after the breach is interpreted rather as a renounciation to the related claim (see Deschenaux and Steinauer 2001, n° 588), for data protection, Meier 2011, n° 894.
513.
Sprumont and Viret, 2013, n° 10 et seq.
514.
Baddeley 2008a, p. 366, insists on the fact that the burden to prove that the Athlete received appropriate information is on the sports organisation; Haas 2007, n° 216.
515.
In the context of data protection, see Meier 2011, n° 891; for medical acts, see Swiss Supreme Court, BGE/ATF 133 III 121, para 4.1.3; in general for restrictions on personality rights, Bucher 2009, n° 496 and Deschenaux and Steinauer 2001, n° 585; Haas 2007, n° 1005 et seq.; Flueckiger 2008, n° 612.
516.
As previously described, predictability is also a requirement that limits the association’s autonomy in adopting its own regulations, see Sect. 3.2.2.1 above.
517.
See e.g. CAS 2012/A/2997, NADA v. Y, para 32.
518.
Paul 2004a, p. 280.
519.
For a detailed analysis, see Haas 2007, n° 585 et seq.
520.
See e.g. Article 4 para 5 of the Swiss Data Protection Act; Article 2 lit. h of the EU Data Protection Directive; Article 5 of the Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, of 4 April 1997 (OVIEDO Convention); Article 13 of the OVIEDO Convention Additional Protocol concerning medical research; Articles 10 and 15 of the Council of Europe Recommendation on research on biological materials of human origin.
521.
Rohmer 2006, p. 189.
522.
Haas 2007, n° 585.
523.
The extent of the information required would need to be examined for each aspect specifically; commentators are rarely explicit about the precise elements that should be part of the information (see in this respect also Flueckiger 2008, n° 615).
524.
Flueckiger 2008, n° 299; see also the Council of Europe, Recommendation of the Monitoring Group “on blood sampling for doping medical controls”: “information, which is a prerequisite of consent, must be given in clear and accessible language, must mention the existence of blood sampling, the sampling method used, the frequency of samples allowed and, especially, the risks of intravenous tests”.
525.
For medical acts, Swiss Supreme Court, BGE/ATF 133 III 121, para 4.1.2; Bucher 2009, specifically for anti-doping, n° 515; for a list of information to be provided in the medical context, see Manaï 2006, p. 117 (for therapy) and p. 249 (for research).
526.
For medical acts, see Manaï 2006, p. 117.
527.
Meier 2011, n° 848.
528.
Sprumont and Viret 2013, in particular n° 10 et seq.; see also, with respect to health data, Flueckiger 2008, n° 965 et seq.; with respect to research on Samples, Haas and Drallé 2010, p. 117.
529.
Flueckiger 2012, p. 689.
530.
The discussion has been of particular importance in Germany, where the German Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof, “BGH”) declared in a leading 1994 decision (Urteil Bundesgerichtshof, 28 November 1994, reproduced in SpuRt 1-2/95, p. 43 et seq.; known as “Reiter-Urteil”)—against the prevailing opinion in literature—that anti-doping regulations of a sports association should not be regarded as standard clauses falling within the ambit of the German Act on commercial standard clauses (AllgemeineGeschäftsbedingungen Gesetz), irrespective of whether the Athlete is bound through membership or by contractual agreement. For a detailed analysis, see Adolphsen 2003, p. 94 et seq.; the reasoning is that the Athlete and the sports organisations are not in a relationship of opposing interests such as typically required for the application of the German Commercial Standard Clauses Act, but pursue a common purpose (see Haas and Martens 2011, p. 73); by contrast, recent commentators have applied the AGBG to the Regelanerkennungsvertrag itself, see e.g. Orth and Pommenering 2010, 2. Teil, p. 11.
531.
Flueckiger 2012, p. 689.
532.
See explicitly for regulations of an association, Riemer 1990, Systematischer Teil, n° 345; Baddeley 1994, p. 286.
533.
Haas 2007, n° 221.
534.
Baddeley 2008a, p. 370; Meier 2011, n° 854 et seq.
535.
Haas 2007, n° 223.
536.
Baddeley 2008a, p. 371.
537.
Flueckiger 2012, p. 689.
538.
Flueckiger 2012, p. 690.
539.
For similar suggestions, see Flueckiger 2008, n° 609; Fuchs 1999, p. 94.
540.
An illustration is the “comeback clause” in the WADC, whereby an Athlete included in a Registered Testing Pool who had announced his or her retirement, must request to be reintegrated into such Registered Testing Pool before being able to resume Competition (Article 5.7 of the WADC; see Noth and Kleiner 2008, p. 450).
541.
Flueckiger 2008, n° 299.
542.
Flueckiger 2008, n° 301.
543.
Maurer and Blechta 2014 (Corrado Rampini), ad Article 13, n° 6 et seq., in the context of data protection.
544.
Specifically for consent to an arbitration clause in sports, Maisonneuve 2011, n° 749 et seq., proposes as useful assessment tools the “unconscionability” doctrine of US law as well as the prohibition of excessive commitments under Article 27 of the Swiss Civil Code.
545.
Haas 2007, n° 746 et seq.
546.
For a similar statement regarding the absence of choice of the sports organisations with respect to the equal application of sports regulations to all Athletes, see Reimann 2002, p. 129.
547.
Baddeley 2008a, p. 367/368, whereby individually negociated clauses are impossible in practice, as the correct functioning of competition requires uniform rules.
548.
See Sect. 3.2.3.1.2 above.
549.
Maisonneuve 2011, n° 723 et seq. n° 776 : “le consentement peut parfaitement être contraint en fait, tout en restant libre en droit” [consent can perfectly well be coerced as a matter of fact, while remaining free as a matter of law (author’s translation)]. Thus, even though the author considers that the power of the sports organisations is also in part in law rather than a mere factual power, this author reaches the conclusion that the validity of the consent cannot be exclude a priori.
550.
Maisonneuve 2011, n° 776; Baddeley 2008a, p. 368; Meier 2011, n° 853 et seq.
551.
Meier 2011, n° 856; Haas 2007, n° 743.
552.
For a similar opinion, see Nolte 2010, p. 312 et seq.
553.
Haas 2007, n° 745.
554.
See Sect. 3.2.3.1.2 above.
555.
CAS 2005/C/976 & 986, FIFA & WADA, para 140: “a person who is joining an association and participates in the association’s activities, is deemed to having consented to the association’s rules and regulations, including the rules on sanctions. Such sanctions are thus not considered as violations of one’s personality as long as they are not excessive under Article 27.2 Swiss Civil Code”; Adolphsen 2003, p. 204.
556.
For the context of data protection, see Maurer and Blechta 2014 (Corrado Rampini), ad Article 13, n° 8.
557.
See Sect. 3.2.3.3.4.2 below.
558.
Adolphsen 2003, p. 204.
559.
Bucher 2009, n° 515.
560.
Adolphsen 2003, p. 204.
561.
Giesen Thomas, Expert Opinion on Opinion 3/2008 issued by the ‘Article 29 Data Protection Working Group’ of the European Commission regarding the Draft of an International Data Protection Standard of the World Anti-Doping Code dated 1 August 2008, https://wada-main-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/resources/files/WADA_ISPP_German_Legal_Opinion_EN.pdf (accessed 25.05.15), Section VII, p. 11.
562.
Fuchs 1999, p. 109 et seq.
563.
Swiss Supreme Court, 4C.130/2001, para 7.1; Deschenaux and Steinauer 2001, n° 319.
564.
Specifically for data protection, see Flueckiger 2008, n° 306; for blood sampling, see Fuchs 1999, p. 288. The idea is that a commitment to such encroachment would be excessive and therefore invalid. The practical solution is to consider that the consent may be withdrawn at all time. Once the act (e.g. the blood collection) is completed without objection from the Athlete, there is no longer any issue of excessive commitment. A posteriori, the lack of validity of the consent may only be invoked based on Article 28 of the Swiss Civil Code (see Bucher 2009, n° 415).
565.
Flueckiger 2008, n° 612; Bergerman 2002, p. 72.
566.
Bergerman 2002, p. 73 et seq., whereby the decision ultimately remains with the Athlete. Bergerman uses the example of the requirement for a pre-engagement health evaluation an employer may request as a comparison.
567.
See the analysis of Giesen Thomas, Expert Opinion on Opinion 3/2008 issued by the ‘Article 29 Data Protection Working Group’ of the European Commission regarding the Draft of an International Data Protection Standard of the World Anti-Doping Code dated 1 August 2008, https://wada-main-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/resources/files/WADA_ISPP_German_Legal_Opinion_EN.pdf (accessed 25.05.15), Section VII, p. 11.
568.
Flueckiger 2008, n° 302; Aebi-Müller and Hausheer 2001, p. 354; see also Fuchs 1999, p. 288, with respect to blood sampling.
569.
Flueckiger 2008, n° 636; Aebi-Müller and Hausheer 2001, p. 351 et seq.
570.
From this perspective, a suspension and withdrawal of titles and prize money have been submitted as being acceptable, while an additional fine of such importance that it may impede the Athlete in his or her freedom of decision has been presented as questionable (see Aebi-Müller and Hausheer 2001, p. 354).
571.
Giesen Thomas, Expert Opinion on Opinion 3/2008 issued by the ‘Article 29 Data Protection Working Group’ of the European Commission regarding the Draft of an International Data Protection Standard of the World Anti-Doping Code dated 1 August 2008, https://wada-main-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/resources/files/WADA_ISPP_German_Legal_Opinion_EN.pdf (accessed 25.05.15), Section VII, p. 11.
572.
See the German BGH Urteil Bundesgerichtshof, 28 November 1994 (“Reiter-Urteil”), reproduced in SpuRt 1-2/95, p. 43 et seq., para I.1, whereby an Athlete‘s submission to sports regulations “ist mithin nicht anderes als das Spiegelbild der von ihm erwarteten Bindung auch aller übrigen Teilnehmer an eben jene Regelwerke” [is therefore nothing but a mirror of the binding effect he expects from all other participants to those same bodies of rules (author’s translation)].
573.
As opposed to the “reasonable alternative” test in data protection (see e.g. Maurer and Blechta 2014 (Corrado Rampini), ad Article 13, n° 6). Thus, for an access to a fitness centre, the centre could introduce a system of access based on the recognition through fingerprints, but simultaneously offer the clients who do not wish to give their fingerprints the possibility of having access by conventional, though slightly less handy, means, i.e. a card with picture and the duty to present the card at the entrance. By contrast, an ADO cannot offer each individual Athlete the choice to submit or not to submit whereabouts information without rendering the system meaningless.
574.
See Sect. 2.1.1.2.2 above.
575.
See Sect. 2.1.1.3 above.
576.
Rigozzi and Quinn 2012, p. 18, footnote 18, with respect to the ”presumption“ in sports regulations.
577.
See Sect. 3.2.1 above.
578.
See Sect. 3.1.2.2.4.2 above.
579.
Pichonnaz and Foëx 2010 (Denis Piotet), ad Article 8, n° 34; for Italian law, Gruber 2008, p. 133; Rigozzi and Quinn 2012, p. 18, further mention a “presumption” introduced through CAS jurisprudence in the context of the Athlete Biological Passport.
580.
See e.g. for procedural defects, Sect. 5.2.2 and Sect. 5.3.2 below, for the presumption of Fault, see Sects. 7.3.3.1 and 7.3.3.2 below.
581.
See Sect. 3.2.1 above.
582.
See Sects. 3.1.1 and 3.2.1 above.
583.
Rigozzi et al. 2014a, p. 308, with respect to the new reference in Article 8 of the 2015 WADC to Article 6 para 1 of the ECHR. This is true unless the relevant sports organisation can claim to have resort to a genuine arbitral tribunal. Entering the debate surrounding the criteria to distinguish an “internal tribunal” from an “arbitral tribunal” would by far stretch the ambit of this book, even more since the assessment may vary depending on the legal culture.
584.
Baddeley 1994, p. 224 et seq.; Riemer 1990, ad Article 70, n° 237.
585.
Mavromati 2014, p. 49; on possible restrictions due to Article R57.3 of the CAS Code, see also Sect. 8.1.2.1.4 below.
586.
See Sect. 3.3.2.2 below.
587.
CAS 2014/A/3630, De Ridder v. ISAF, para 109, with respect to procedural fairness in disciplinary matters in general, the CAS panel did insist that the de novo review “does not mean that the CAS is uninterested in the disciplinary procedures of sports governing bodies—not least because the better those procedures, the fewer the cases in which the subject of an adverse decision may feel compelled to come to CAS”.
588.
See Sect. 2.3.1.3 above.
589.
See Walker 1998, p. 141 et seq.
590.
Cooper 2012, p. 253: “This [testing blood samples] involves many of the same methods used when a blood sample is sent to a medical haematology laboratory”.
591.
On the analytical process, see Chap. 6 below.
592.
Cooper 2012, p. 243: “when it comes to workplace testing, even the US government is a neophyte compared to WADA”.
593.
See Sect. 2.1.2 above and Sect. 8.1.2.1.4 below.
594.
As will be extensively discussed in Chap. 6, and Part III.
595.
On the status of technical rules, see Sect. 5.1.2 below.
596.
See Theme 3 of the WADA Overview of Key Changes, p. 3.
597.
From a Swiss law perspective, of their personality rights, see Sect. 3.2.2.2 above.
598.
See Sect. 3.2.3.3.4 above.
599.
E.g. in Austria, § 15.7 of the Anti-Doping Federal Act provides that in disciplinary proceedings carried out before the NADO, “Beweise, die unter Vortäuschung falscher Tatsachen oder rechtswidrig beschafft wurden, dürfen für die Feststellung eines Dopingverstoßes nicht herangezogen werden” [Evidence obtained by misrepresentation or in an unlawful manner must not be used for a finding of whether an anti-doping rule violation has occurred (author’s translation)].
600.
Wirth, p. 184.
601.
Lew 2009, p. 20.
602.
Zuberbühler et al. 2012, ad Article 9, n° 5; a limit mentioned by commentators in international commercial arbitration is evidence obtained in a manner contrary to public policy, e.g. through torture (see Schlaepfer and Bärtsch 2010, p. 214).
603.
Berger and Kellerhals 2015, n° 1320.
604.
Evidence obtained in breach of rules of civil procedure must not be used unless the rule was neither designed to, nor capable of, preventing that the evidence be obtained (see Spühler et al. 2010, 10. Kapitel, n° 152).
605.
Groner 2011, p. 144, refers to the breach of Article 28 of the Swiss Civil Code as the “central question”.
606.
When Walker 1998, p. 141, compares the situation of a Sample obtained based on erroneous information given to the Athlete to the situation of a testimony obtained without informing a witness of his right to refuse to testify, this comparison can thus represent no more than an analogy.
607.
Spühler et al. 2010, 10. Kapitel, n° 156; a similar balance of interests applies in German civil proceedings (Schäfer 2008, p. 22).
608.
Swiss Supreme Court, 4A_362/2013 & 4A_448/2013, para 3.2.2, referred to this provision in a sports arbitration matters, but without clarifying whether this provision is applicable to arbitral tribunals in Switzerland; for a survey of the situation under Swiss law, Groner 2011, p. 144 et seq.
609.
CAS 2010/A/2267 et al., Football Club “Metalist” et al. v. FFU, para 643.
610.
Berger and Kellerhals 2015, n° 1320.
611.
Swiss Supreme Court, 4A_362/2013 & 4A_448/2013, para 3.2.2. In these two connex matters (known as FC Karpaty & FC Metalist cases after the football clubs involved), the Swiss Supreme Court was content with stating that the CAS panel had, in fact, conducted a balance of interest.
612.
In CAS 2009/A/1879, Valverde v. CONI, para 67 et seq, confirmed in CAS 2007/A/1396 & 1402, WADA & UCI v. Valverde & RFEC, para 56 et seq., the CAS panels declared admissible the evidence allegedly obtained in violation of orders by the Spanish criminal investigation judge and the rules on criminal international cooperation; in CAS 2011/A/2433, Diakite v. FIFA, para 28 et seq., telephone discussions with FIFA officials recorded by journalists offering fake bribery sums for the US candidature for the Olympic Games had been revealed in the press, and the official had been disciplinary sanctioned based on these revelations, where the panel explicitly relied on the Valverde reasoning to admit the evidence.
613.
CAS 2009/A/1879, Valverde v. CONI, para 70; CAS 2011/A/2433, Diakite v. FIFA, para 35; endorsed also in CAS 2011/A/2425, Fusimalohi v. FIFA, para 80.
614.
CAS 2009/A/1879, Valverde v. CONI, para 70, endorsed in CAS 2011/A/2433, Diakite v. FIFA, para 35.
615.
CAS 2011/A/2433, Diakite v. FIFA, para 28; CAS 2010/A/2267 et al., Football Club “Metalist” et al. v. FFU, para 648.
616.
CAS 2011/A/2433, Diakite v. FIFA, para 29.
617.
See in particular CAS 2011/A/2433, Diakite v. FIFA, para 53 et seq., in which the CAS panel, after insisting that it was not limited by the rules of evidence applicable to state courts, nevertheless assessed the compliance of the FIFA rules on the free admissibility of the evidence with the personality rights of the individual subject to the disciplinary proceedings.
618.
CAS 2010/A/2267 et al., Football Club “Metalist” et al. v. FFU, para 642.
619.
Rigozzi and Quinn 2012, p. 45.
620.
Even though the Swiss Supreme Court did not clarify what the applicable legal rules are for conducting that legal assessment, the requirement for a balance of interests was in our view endorsed by the Swiss Supreme Court, 4A_362/2013 & 4A_448/2013, para 3.2.2; see also Voser Nathalie/Moss Benjamin, Arbitral tribunal’s admission of unlawfully obtained evidence did not violate procedural public policy (Swiss Supreme Court), Practical Law Arbitration, UKpracticallaw.com, Legal Update: Case Report, 28 May 2014, p. 2; George Von Segesser, Elisabeth Leimbacher and Katherin Bell, Admitting illegally obtained evidence in CAS proceedings—Swiss Federal Supreme Court Shows Match-Fixing the Red Card, 17 October 2014, http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2014/10/17/admitting-illegally-obtained-evidence-in-cas-proceedings-swiss-federal-supreme-court-shows-match-fixing-the-red-card/ (accessed 04.05.15).
621.
Swiss Supreme Court, Cañas v. ATP, 4P.172/2006, para 4.3.2.3.
622.
Presenting some criteria that could guide the CAS panels, George Von Segesser, Elisabeth Leimbacher and Katherin Bell, Admitting illegally obtained evidence in CAS proceedings—Swiss Federal Supreme Court Shows Match-Fixing the Red Card, 17 October 2014, http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2014/10/17/admitting-illegally-obtained-evidence-in-cas-proceedings-swiss-federal-supreme-court-shows-match-fixing-the-red-card/ (accessed 04.05.15).
623.
Lewis and Taylor 2014, C2.57, state that the result would be the same if English law governed, i.e. evidence unlawfully obtained would be admissible in English criminal law proceedings.
624.
In CAS 2007/A/1396 & 1402, WADA & UCI v. Valverde & RFEC, para 60c, the panel conducted a summary and abstract form of balance of interests, only to reach the conclusion that the balance was in favour of sports authorities: “In the case at hand, the internationally accepted fight against doping is a public interest, which would outweigh a possible violation of Mr Valverde’s personal rights”. In the football corruption cases, the balance of interests was more specific, see CAS 2011/A/2425, Fusimalohi v. FIFA, paras 80 & 107, but the criteria evoked by the CAS panel leave little more hope to Athletes: “general public interest in the exposure of illegal or unethical conduct, such as corruption or other forms of dishonesty”; “vested interest in identifying and sanctioning any wrongdoing among its officials and its direct or indirect members so as to dissuade similar conducts in the future”; “the ethical need to discover the truth and to expose and sanction any wrongdoing”; “the general consensus among sporting and governmental institutions that corrupt practices are a growing concern in all major sports and that they strike at the heart of sport’s credibility and must thus be fought with the utmost earnestness”; “the limited investigative powers of sports governing bodies in comparison to public authorities”. It is easy to see how these interests match the rationales regularly invoked in anti-doping and thus would be transposed to the same argument in a doping matter.
625.
Groner 2011, p. 145.
626.
George Von Segesser, Elisabeth Leimbacher and Katherin Bell, Admitting illegally obtained evidence in CAS proceedings—Swiss Federal Supreme Court Shows Match-Fixing the Red Card, 17 October 2014, http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2014/10/17/admitting-illegally-obtained-evidence-in-cas-proceedings-swiss-federal-supreme-court-shows-match-fixing-the-red-card/ (accessed 04.05.15); in particular, the assessment should include a true proportionality test, Groner 2011, p. 145.
627.
In our view implicitly supported by the Swiss Supreme Court, 4A_362/2013 & 4_448/2013, para 3.2.2.
628.
Due to its limited power of review, the Swiss Supreme Court can in any event not verify the manner in which the CAS panels carry out the balance of interest in a particular matter (George Von Segesser, Elisabeth Leimbacher and Katherin Bell, Admitting illegally obtained evidence in CAS proceedings—Swiss Federal Supreme Court Shows Match-Fixing the Red Card, 17 October 2014, http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2014/10/17/admitting-illegally-obtained-evidence-in-cas-proceedings-swiss-federal-supreme-court-shows-match-fixing-the-red-card/ (accessed 04.05.15)).
629.
See, more generally for disciplinary matters in CAS arbitration proceedings, Rigozzi and Quinn 2012, p. 45.
630.
CAS 2010/A/2267 et al., Football Club “Metalist” et al. v. FFU, para 645. Note that these criteria were used in this match-fixing case in reference to the reasoning in the Valverde matter, whereas in this matter these criteria were precisely described only as a feeble source of guidance for international arbitration panels.
631.
See e.g. CAS 2011/A/2433, Amadou Diakite v. FIFA, para 29, where the CAS panel considered that FIFA had not acted in breach of good faith since the evidence had been obtained by journalists.
632.
George Von Segesser, Elisabeth Leimbacher and Katherin Bell, Admitting illegally obtained evidence in CAS proceedings—Swiss Federal Supreme Court Shows Match-Fixing the Red Card, 17 October 2014, http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2014/10/17/admitting-illegally-obtained-evidence-in-cas-proceedings-swiss-federal-supreme-court-shows-match-fixing-the-red-card/ (accessed 04.05.15), also consider that whether the illegal evidence was obtained by the other party or by a third party should not be a relevant factor in the assessment.
633.
In CAS 2010/A/2174, De Bonis v. CONI & UCI, para 9.5, the CAS panel, in reference to the Athlete Biological Passport, found that the use of new scientific methods in order to uncover violations is perfectly legitimate, “provided that these techniques do not violate fundamental human rights”.
634.
See e.g. Swiss Supreme Court, 8C_239/2008, para 6.4.2; Swiss Supreme Court, BGE/ATF 131 I 272, para 4.1.1. A CAS panel in the Valverde matter referred to this case law, but without analysing this hypothesis further.
635.
With respect to CAS arbitration proceedings, see George Von Segesser, Elisabeth Leimbacher and Katherin Bell, Admitting illegally obtained evidence in CAS proceedings—Swiss Federal Supreme Court Shows Match-Fixing the Red Card, 17 October 2014, http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2014/10/17/admitting-illegally-obtained-evidence-in-cas-proceedings-swiss-federal-supreme-court-shows-match-fixing-the-red-card/ (accessed 04.05.15): “Evidence which was obtained in violation of a person’s physical or mental integrity i.e. by using force or uttering threats is generally inadmissible”; with respect to Swiss Civil Procedure: Spühler et al. 2010 (Peter Guyan), ad Article 152, n° 14; Message du Conseil fédéral du 28 juin 2006 relatif au Code de procédure civile, (06.062), FF 2006 p. 6841 et seq., p. 6922; Wirth, p. 184, notes that depending on the cultural background some arbitrators may be willing to apply the same balance of interests even in case of an attack on personal integrity.
636.
Under German civil procedure law, Schäfer 2008, p. 18: evidence must be excluded if it is against bonos mores, citing as an example a recording conducted in breach of the intimate sphere.

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Attorney-at-law, University of Fribourg, Carouge, Geneve, Switzerland
Marjolaine Viret
University of Neuchâtel School of Law, Carouge, Geneve, Switzerland
Marjolaine Viret

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Viret, M. (2016). Legal Constraints on Evidence in Anti-Doping. In: Evidence in Anti-Doping at the Intersection of Science & Law. ASSER International Sports Law Series. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-084-8_3

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