Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Technical Limits of Verification and Their Implications for Treaty Design

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Nuclear Non-Proliferation in International Law

Abstract

Verification regimes to support nuclear non-proliferation are largely based on cooperative schemes. By becoming a member of a treaty (such as the NPT), members accept both substantial non-proliferation obligations and intrusive (cooperative) verification including on-site inspections. But such on-site inspections at short notice have of necessity to be based on additional cooperative action, and in the NPT case acceptance of an additional legal Protocol. As a result, the verification regime of the NPT is open to weakness when genuine cooperation is missing. This chapter will start by looking at the technical limits of verification if a Member State engages in non-cooperative behaviour. This requires an on-site inspection at short notice, since routine inspections may be subject to manipulative tactics to hide nuclear weapons activities. In an optimal treaty design, verification regimes need to combine routine cooperative verification activities with a safety net of unilateral technical verification options such as short-notice on-site inspections. This raises the practical issues of the degree to which unilateral verification measures are technically and politically feasible in circumstances where the State concerned refuses to cooperate, and what information should be sought through on-site inspections at short notice. The chapter will therefore provide an overview of the technical options for both routine and unilateral verification activities. This will be followed by an examination of the impact upon treaty design of a broad range of verification measures, and whether it is possible to include non-cooperative means of technical verification in the design of a treaty-based verification regime. Also, given the limited possibilities to amend the wording of a multilateral treaty like the NPT, could the existing cooperative verification regime be strengthened by ‘bolting-on’ some additional means of external and non-cooperative technical verification? The wording of the NPT does not explicitly exclude this. Indeed one option may be to insert such an amendment into the existing IAEA-NPT safeguarding arrangements.

Gerald Kirchner—Director of the Carl-Friedrich von Weizsäcker Center for Science and Peace Research, University of Hamburg. Formerly Member of the German Radiation Protection Commission and of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation.

Stefan Oeter—Professor of Public International Law and Director of the Institute of International Affairs, University of Hamburg; President of the Historical Commission of the International Society for Military Law and the Laws of War; Member of the German Commission for International Humanitarian Law.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 139.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Hardcover Book
USD 179.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1 July 1968), 729 UNTS 161.

  2. 2.

    International Atomic Energy Agency: The Structure and Content of Agreements Between the Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. (International Atomic Energy Agency Information Circular) INFCIRC/153 (Corr.), 1972.

  3. 3.

    Ibid., para 28.

  4. 4.

    International Atomic Energy Agency: Safeguards Techniques and Equipment: 2011 Edition. International Nuclear Verification Series No. 1 (Rev. 2), 2011.

  5. 5.

    International Atomic Energy Agency: Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) Between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards. INCIRC/540 (Corr.), 1998.

  6. 6.

    See http://www.iaea.org/safeguards/what.html.

  7. 7.

    Exceptions are tritium, carbon-14 (as carbon dioxide) and noble gases.

  8. 8.

    This does not apply for tritium and only to a limited extent for iodine and technetium isotopes.

  9. 9.

    Based on data compiled by the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR) (ibid.) and on own measurements.

  10. 10.

    Weapons fallout inventories refer to the mid-latitudes of the Northern hemisphere and are corrected for radioactive decay.

  11. 11.

    With 95 % confidence assuming measurement uncertainties of 5 % (uranium-235) and 1 % (uranium-238), respectively.

  12. 12.

    Ross et al. 2009.

  13. 13.

    The significant quantity specifies the mass of a fissile material sufficient for building a nuclear weapon. For safeguards, IAEA has set this value to 8 kg for plutonium.

  14. 14.

    See in general on the IAEA safeguards regime Rockwood 2013, pp. 11 et seq., 17 et seq., 21 et seq.

  15. 15.

    See, for instance, Black-Branch and Fleck 2014, p. 5 et seq.; Denza 2005, p. 290.

  16. 16.

    See, for instance, Gilligan 2014, p. 96 et seq.

  17. 17.

    See Gilligan 2014, pp. 97–99.

  18. 18.

    See also Gilligan 2014, pp. 93–96.

  19. 19.

    On the IAEA safeguards regime see, for instance, Rockwood 2012, pp. 304 et seq.; see also Meier 2014, pp. 10 et seq.; Szasz 1996, p. 239 et seq.; ElBaradei 1995, pp. 347 et seq.; Scheinman 1995, pp. 133 et seq.

  20. 20.

    See Rockwood 2013, pp. 22–23.

  21. 21.

    See, for instance, Rockwood 2012, pp. 310–312.

  22. 22.

    See, however, the decision of the IAEA Board of Governors that the scope of safeguards agreements includes verifying the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in the State (‘correctness and completeness’)—Rockwood 2013, p. 19.

  23. 23.

    As a paradigmatic example for such situation see the Iran case—Meier 2014, p. 10 et seq.

  24. 24.

    See Petritz 2012, pp. 134–139.

  25. 25.

    See, for instance, Negm 2009, p. 160 et seq.; Simpson 1992, p. 249 et seq.

  26. 26.

    See Negm 2009, p. 170 et seq.; Zedalis 2006, p. 115 et seq.; Findlay 2004, pp. 65–83.

  27. 27.

    See Reed and Sullivan 2009, p. 145.

  28. 28.

    See, for instance, Denza 2005, p. 291; but also Rockwood 2013, p. 13; Meier 2014, pp. 12–14; Asada 2011, pp. 3–11; Rockwood 2002, pp. 127–136.

  29. 29.

    On the background of the Iran nuclear issue see, for instance, Ronen 2010, pp. 16 et seq.; Khan 2010, pp. 63 et seq., 89 et seq.; Meier 2014, pp. 10–16.

  30. 30.

    See, for instance, Petritz 2012, p. 125 et seq.

  31. 31.

    See Rockwood 2013, p. 23.

  32. 32.

    See http://www.iaea.org/safeguards/documents/AP_status_list.pdf; Petritz 2012, pp. 125–127.

  33. 33.

    See, for instance, Meier 2014, above n. 19, p. 30.

  34. 34.

    See, as a general introduction to the advantages (and inherent problems) of airborne measurements, Wendisch and Brenquier 2013.

  35. 35.

    See in general on the requirement of prior permit for overflight Wouters and Demeyere 2008, paras 13–22.

  36. 36.

    International Atomic Energy Agency: The Structure and Content of Agreements Between the Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. INFCIRC/153 (Corr.), 1972, para 28.

  37. 37.

    See also Cooley 2003, pp. 29–44.

  38. 38.

    See, for instance, Nye 1985, p. 123 et seq.

  39. 39.

    See also Cooley 2003, pp. 36–39.

  40. 40.

    See, for instance, Meier 2014, above n. 20, p. 30; see also, with a strategy how to universalize the system of Additional Protocols, Asada 2011, at pp. 20–34; see also Chap. 5 in this volume.

  41. 41.

    See in this regard also Meier 2014, pp. 14–16, 28–32.

  42. 42.

    See on this point also Cooley 2003, pp. 30–33.

  43. 43.

    The same objective is pursued by the program of ‘integrated safeguards’, see Cooley 2003, pp. 31–39.

  44. 44.

    See Kokott 2011, paras 43–49.

  45. 45.

    See, for instance, Oeter 2012, in particular para 37.

  46. 46.

    See as radical examples of such a differential, context-related treatment Pollack 2013, p. 158 et seq., 224 et seq.; Glennon 2013, pp. 124–127.

  47. 47.

    See, for instance, Gunn 2002, p. 137 et seq.; Koh 2003, p. 1479 et seq.; Nolte and Aust 2013, p. 407 et seq.

  48. 48.

    See, for instance Krisch 2003, p. 135 et seq.

  49. 49.

    See, for instance, Garvey 2013, pp. 29–33.

  50. 50.

    See in detail Joyner 2011, pp. 47–74, 78–94.

  51. 51.

    See, for instance, Gilligan 2014, pp. 93–95.

  52. 52.

    See in detail on Article VI NPT, Rietiker 2014, pp. 47 et seq.; Joyner 2011, pp. 95–108.

  53. 53.

    See, for instance, Roehrig 2012, pp. 81 et seq.; Jones and Holmes 2012, pp. 201 et seq.; Sagan et al. 2012, pp. 175 et seq.; Said 2011, pp. 39 et seq.

  54. 54.

    See in detail Rietiker 2014, p. 53.

  55. 55.

    See Falk and Krieger 2012, p. 191 et seq.

  56. 56.

    See Holloway 2011, pp. 151 et seq.; Joyner 2011, pp. 95–108.

  57. 57.

    See, for instance, Falk and Krieger 2008, pp. 29 et seq., 39 et seq., 209 et seq.

  58. 58.

    In this sense see also Rietiker 2014, p. 81; Garvey 2013, pp. 22–28.

References

  • Asada M (2011) The treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the universalization of the additional protocol. J Confl Secur L 16:3–34

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Black-Branch JL, Fleck D (2014) Nuclear weapons, non-proliferation and disarmament: a comprehensive audit of relevant legal issues and international concerns. In: Black-Branch JL, Fleck D (eds) Nuclear non-proliferation in international law. TMC Asser Press, The Hague, pp 1–21

    Google Scholar 

  • Cooley JN (2003) Integrated nuclear safeguards: genesis and evolution. Verification Yearbook 2003:29–44

    Google Scholar 

  • Denza E (2005) Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons: the European Union and Iran. Eur Foreign Aff Rev 10:289–311

    Google Scholar 

  • ElBaradei M (1995) Verifying non-proliferation pledges. The evolution and future direction of the IAEA safeguards system. Leiden J Int Law 8:347–359

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Falk RA, Krieger D (2008) At the nuclear precipice: catastrophe or transformation? Palgrave Macmillan, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Falk RA, Krieger D (2012) The path to zero: dialogues on nuclear dangers. Paradigm Publishers, Boulder, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Findlay T (2004) The lessons of UNSCOM and UNMOVIC. Verification Yearbook 2004:65–86

    Google Scholar 

  • Garvey JI (2013) Nuclear weapons counterproliferation: a new grand bargain. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Gilligan K (2014) The non-proliferation regime and the NPT. In: Black-Branch JL, Fleck D (eds) Nuclear non-proliferation in international law. TMC Asser Press, The Hague, pp 85–104

    Google Scholar 

  • Glennon MJ (2013) Pre-empting proliferation: international law, morality, and nuclear weapons. Eur J Int Law 24:109–127

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gunn TJ (2002) American exceptionalism and globalist double standards. Columbia J Transnational Law 41:137–152

    Google Scholar 

  • Holloway D (2011) The United States and the NPT ‘double bargain’. In: Njølstad O (ed), Nuclear proliferation and international order. Nobel symposium 142. Routledge, London, pp 151–166

    Google Scholar 

  • Jones SA, Holmes JR (2012) Regime type, nuclear reversals, and nuclear strategy: the ambiguous case of Iran. In: Yoshihara T, Holmes JR (eds) Strategy in the second nuclear age: power, ambition, and the ultimate weapon. Georgetown University Press, Washington, DC, pp 201–224

    Google Scholar 

  • Joyner DH (2011) Interpreting the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Khan S (2010) Iran and nuclear weapons: protracted conflict and proliferation. Routledge, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Koh HH (2003) On American exceptionalism. Stanford Law Rev 55:1479–1527

    Google Scholar 

  • Kokott J (2011) Sovereign equality. In: Wolfrum R (ed), Max Planck encyclopedia of public international law: MPEPIL. Oxford University Press, Oxford (online edn)

    Google Scholar 

  • Krisch N (2003) More equal than the rest? Hierarchy, equality, and US predominance in international law. In: Byers M, Nolte G (eds) United States hegemony and the foundations of international law. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 135–175

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Meier O (2014) In der Krise liegt die Chance. Der Atomkonflikt mit Iran und seine Auswirkungen auf das nukleare Nichtverbreitungsregime. SWP-Studie S 17/Okt. 2014, http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/studien/2014_S17_mro.pdf

  • Negm N (2009) Transfer of nuclear technology under international law: case study of Iraq, Iran and Israel. Nijhoff, Leiden

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Nolte G, Aust HP (2013) European exceptionalism? Global Constitutionalism 2:407–436

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Nye JS (1985) NPT: the logic of inequality. Foreign Policy 59:123–131

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Oeter S (2012) Self-determination. In: Simma B et al (eds) The charter of the United Nations: a commentary, vol I, 3rd edn. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 313–334

    Google Scholar 

  • Petritz W (2012) Vor dem Aus? Der Vertrag über die Nichtweiterverbreitung von Kernwaffen: Funktion und Relevanz anhand zweier Beispiele. Peter Lang, Frankfurt am Main

    Google Scholar 

  • Pollack KM (2013) Unthinkable: Iran, the bomb, and American strategy. Simon & Schuster, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Reed TC, Sullivan DB (2009) The nuclear express. Zenith Press, Minneapolis

    Google Scholar 

  • Rietiker D (2014) The meaning of article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: analysis under the rules of treaty interpretation. In: Black-Branch JL, Fleck D (eds) Nuclear non-proliferation in international law. TMC Asser Press, The Hague, pp 47–84

    Google Scholar 

  • Rockwood L (2002) The IAEA’s strengthened safeguards system. J Confl Secur L 7:123–136

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rockwood L (2012) Ensuring compliance with standards on the peaceful use of nuclear energy. In: Cassese A (ed) Realizing utopia. The future of international law. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 304–317

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Rockwood L (2013) Legal framework for IAEA safeguards. IAEA, Vienna

    Google Scholar 

  • Roehrig T (2012) North Korea’s nuclear weapons program: motivations, strategy, and doctrine. In: Yoshihara T, Holmes JR (eds), Strategy in the second nuclear age: power, ambition, and the ultimate weapon. Georgetown University Press, pp 81–98

    Google Scholar 

  • Ronen Y (2010) The Iran nuclear issue. Hart, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Ross O et al. (2009) Simulation of Atmospheric Noble Gas Concentrations to Assess Sampling Procedures for the Detection of Clandestine Reprocessing. Joint Programme on the Technical Development and Further Improvement of IAEA Safeguards Between the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the IAEA, JOPAG/01.09-PRG-373. Hamburg

    Google Scholar 

  • Sagan SD, Waltz KM, Rapp-Hooper M (2012) Iraq, North Korea, and Iran. In: Sagan SD, Waltz KM (eds) The spread of nuclear weapons: an enduring debate. W.W. Norton, New York, pp 175–214

    Google Scholar 

  • Said MK (2011) Israel’s nuclear capability: implications on Middle East security. In: Njølstad O (ed), Nuclear proliferation and international order. Nobel symposium 142. Routledge, London, pp 39–61

    Google Scholar 

  • Scheinman L (1995) Nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation in a changing world order. In: Evan WM (ed) Nuclear proliferation and the legality of nuclear weapons. University Press of America, Lanham, pp 133–149

    Google Scholar 

  • Simpson J (1992) The Iraqi nuclear programme and the future of the IAEA safeguards system. Verification report. Yearbook Arms control Environ Agreements 12:249–253

    Google Scholar 

  • Szasz PC (1996) IAEA safeguards for NPT. Rev Eur Community Int Environ Law 5:239–245

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wendisch M, Brenquier J-L (2013) Airborne measurements for environmental research. Wiley, Weinheim

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Wouters J, Demeyere B (2008) Overflight. In: Wolfrum R (ed) Max Planck encyclopedia of public international law: MPEPIL. Oxford University Press, Oxford (online edn)

    Google Scholar 

  • Zedalis RJ (2006) Weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Int Peacekeeping 10:115–161

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Universität Hamburg, ZNF, Beim Schlump 83, D-20144, Hamburg, Germany

    Gerald Kirchner

  2. Universität Hamburg, IIA, Fakultät Für Rechtswissenschaft, Rothenbaumchaussee 33, D-20148, Hamburg, Germany

    Stefan Oeter

Authors
  1. Gerald Kirchner
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Stefan Oeter
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding authors

Correspondence to Gerald Kirchner or Stefan Oeter .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. School of Management - Law, Royal Holloway University of London, Egham, Surrey, United Kingdom

    Jonathan L. Black-Branch

  2. Cologne, Germany

    Dieter Fleck

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2016 T.M.C. Asser Press and the authors

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Kirchner, G., Oeter, S. (2016). Technical Limits of Verification and Their Implications for Treaty Design. In: Black-Branch, J., Fleck, D. (eds) Nuclear Non-Proliferation in International Law. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-075-6_8

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-075-6_8

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-6265-074-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-6265-075-6

  • eBook Packages: Law and CriminologyLaw and Criminology (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Societies and partnerships

Search

Navigation