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Disputes on Nuclear Proliferation: Means and Methods for Their Settlement

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Nuclear Non-Proliferation in International Law

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Abstract

Disputes arising from an alleged lack of compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or initiated by shortcomings of the Treaty text have impeded international cooperation and even led to threats to international peace and security. Means and measures of their effective settlement deserve and require reconsideration. After evaluating some shortcomings and bringing them into context with reported cases of non-compliance, the author examines possible solutions by the Security Council, States and international organizations. In this context various measures of and procedures for dispute settlement are discussed, and the effectiveness of Security Council sanctions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter is critically reviewed in light of the fact that none of the cases reported to the Security Council have been successfully solved by such Council measures. Consequences for States, international organizations, and non-State actors are considered and further studies are suggested on these issues. The author concludes that the obligations under the NPT are clear in principle, requiring no amendment of its text; but the UN Charter rules on pacific dispute settlement, as set out in Article 2(3) and Chapter VI, need to be better implemented and further developed in multilateral cooperation. The General Assembly (Article 11), the Security Council (Article 26), the Secretary-General (Article 99) and States have active roles to fulfil in this regard.

The present system offers an array of measures ranging from dialogue to sanctions to enforcement actions. But judging by our record in recent years, these measures—rather than being applied in a systematic manner to deal effectively with proliferation issues—are employed haphazardly, and too often with political overtones.

Dialogue is withheld as a reward for good behavior, rather than as a means to change behavior and reconcile differences. Public rhetoric substitutes for effective diplomacy. The lesson should be obvious by now: we cannot bomb our way to security. Rather, we should focus on addressing the underlying causes of insecurity.

Mohamed ElBaradei 2008, p. 211

Former Director International Agreements & Policy, Federal Ministry of Defence, Germany; Member of the Advisory Board of the Amsterdam Center for International Law (ACIL); Honorary President, International Society for Military Law and the Law of War; Rapporteur of the ILA Committee on Nuclear Weapons, Non-Proliferation and Contemporary International Law.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1 July 1968), 729 UNTS 161.

  2. 2.

    See e.g. Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material—CPPNM—(30 March 1980), 1456 UNTS 125, entered into force on 8 February 1987, amended on 8 July 2005 (International Atomic Energy Agency Information Circular) INFCIRC/274/Rev 1, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/cppnm.html (amendment not yet in force); Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation—SUA Convention—(10 March 1988), amended by Protocol of 2005 to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (14 October 2005); Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms located on the Continental Shelf (10 March 1988), amended on 14 October 2005, www.imo.org/About/Conventions/Pages/Home.aspx; http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/StatusOfConventions/Documents/Status%20-%202014.docx.pdf; http://www.state.gov/t/isn/trty/81728.htm.

  3. 3.

    See Bothe 1994, pp. 181–182.

  4. 4.

    Crawford 2012, p. 718.

  5. 5.

    For countermeasures to ensure compliance with nuclear non-proliferation obligations see Black-Branch, Chap. 16 in this volume.

  6. 6.

    Far from reducing ‘peaceful settlement’ to ‘judicial settlement’, Article 33 UN Charter refers to ‘negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means’. As Article 2(3) UN Charter confirms, such means shall be used ‘in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered’.

  7. 7.

    See Fry 2013, p. 34 and throughout his monograph.

  8. 8.

    See e.g. R. Higgins, The Place of International Law in the Settlement of Disputes by the Security Council, published in Rosalyn Higgins, Themes and Theories, Oxford University Press, 174–192, Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2012, DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198262350.001.0001, especially at pp. 183–185 and 189–192; de Wet 2004, pp. 369–372.

  9. 9.

    As well put by Shaw 1999, p. 54: ‘The Court does not constitute a different or rival system of dispute settlement; it is firmly locked into that integrated and pluralist system established under the Charter’.

  10. 10.

    See Dahlitz 1984, pp. 212–213.

  11. 11.

    See e.g. Nystuen and Hugo 2014, pp. 387–390; A. Persbo, A Reflection on the Current State of Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Safeguards, EU Non-Proliferation Consortium Non-Proliferation Papers No. 8, http://www.sipri.org/research/disarmament/eu-consortium/publications/publications/non-proliferation-paper-8, pp. 4–5.

  12. 12.

    Willrich 1968, pp. 1477–1478; Willrich 1969, p. 95.

  13. 13.

    See the US and Soviet statements, Willrich 1968, p. 1478, n. 73, and the convincing assessment of the negotiations by Shaker 1980, pp. 191–267.

  14. 14.

    See below, n. 32–36 and accompanying text.

  15. 15.

    Marauhn 2013, p. 49.

  16. 16.

    See paras 19–20 INFCIRC/66/Rev.2, The Agency’s Safeguards System (16 September 1968), http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc66r2.pdf.

  17. 17.

    Falk 2008, p. 47.

  18. 18.

    IAEA, Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) Between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards, INFCIRC/540 (Corr.), http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/1997/infcirc540c.pdf.

  19. 19.

    See e.g. http://www.iaea.org/safeguards/documents/AP_status_list.pdf, and the Additional Protocols concluded with China (INFCIRC/369/Add.1 of 22 April 2002), the United Kingdom (INFCIRC/263/Add.1 of 24 February 2005), France (INFCIRC/290/Add.1 of 24 February 2005), the Russian Federation (INFCIRC/327/Add.1 of 8 January 2008), and the United States (INFCIRC/288/Add.1 of 9 March 2009).

  20. 20.

    See above n. 18 and the Safeguards Agreements concluded with Israel (INFCIRC/249 of 28 September 1977), India (INFCIRC/754 of 29 May 2009), and Pakistan (INFCIRCs 34, 90, 116, 135, 150, 239, 248, 285, 393, 418, 596, 636, 669, 705, 712, 816, and 832 as listed at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Countries/pakistan.shtml).

  21. 21.

    See e.g. Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community—EURATOM—(25 March 1957), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/12006A/12006A.htm; Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, last amended on 12 February 2004, http://www.oecd-nea.org/law/Unofficial%20consolidated%20Paris%20Convention.pdf.

  22. 22.

    See e.g. Convention on Nuclear Safety—CNS—(5 July 1994), INFCIRC/449, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/inf449.shtml; Agreement between the Republic of Argentina, the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (13 December 1991), http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/inf435.shtml.

  23. 23.

    See e.g. IAEA, The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, INFCIRC/153 (Corr.), http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc153.pdf.

  24. 24.

    Nuclear Security Summit 2012, http://armscontrolcenter.org/issues/nuclearterrorism/articles/fact_sheet_2012_seoul_nuclear_security_summit_results/; see Anthony 2013.

  25. 25.

    Nuclear Security Summit 2014, http://www.denhaag.nl/en/residents/to/Nuclear-Security-Summit-2014-in-The-Hague.htm.

  26. 26.

    See The Hague Nuclear Security Summit Communiqué, https://www.nss2014.com/sites/default/files/documents/the_hague_nuclear_security_summit_communique_final.pdf, para 25: ‘We recognise that nuclear security and safety have the common aim of protecting human health, society and the environment. We reaffirm that nuclear safety measures and nuclear security measures need to be designed and managed in a coherent and coordinated manner in the specific areas where nuclear security and nuclear safety overlap. In these areas, efforts to further improve nuclear security might benefit from experience gained with nuclear safety. We emphasize the need to develop a nuclear security culture, with a particular focus on the coordination of safety and security. Sharing good practices, without detriment to the protection of sensitive information, might also be beneficial. The principle of continuous improvement applies to both safety and security. In this regard we acknowledge the IAEA Nuclear Security Guidance Committee and the IAEA Commission on Safety Standards and their activities aimed at properly addressing safety and security interface issues.’

  27. 27.

    See ECJ, Commission of the European Communities v. Ireland (Case C-459/03), Judgment of 30 May 2006, http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2009-02/cp060045en.pdf.

  28. 28.

    See Permanent Court of Arbitration, Ireland v. United Kingdom (‘MOX Plant case’, 2001–2008), http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1148.

  29. 29.

    See Wilkinson 2012, pp. 52–61.

  30. 30.

    See Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c37079.htm.

  31. 31.

    Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c10390.htm, see Venturini, Chap. 10 in this volume; see US Department of State, ‘Proliferation Security Initiative 10th anniversary high-level political meeting outcomes’ (28 May 2013), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/05/210010.htm.

  32. 32.

    See Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI), http://www.cdi.org/program/document.cfm?DocumentID=3650.

  33. 33.

    See IAEA, How We Implement Safeguards, http://www.iaea.org/safeguards/what.html and for example, IAEA Report GOV/2013/6 (21 February 2013), n. 61, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2013/gov2013-6.pdf.

  34. 34.

    See Dupont, Chap. 3 in this volume; Dupont 2014, p. 209; Joyner 2011, pp. 92–93; D.H. Joyner, New IAEA DG report on Iran Still Incorrect on the Legal Mandate of the IAEA (11 March 2013), http://armscontrollaw.com/2013/03/11/new-iaea-dg-report-on-iran-still-incorrect-on-the-legal-mandate-of-the-iaea/; contra: Rockwood and Johnson, Chap. 4 in this volume; L. Rockwood, The IAEA’s State-Level Concept and the Law of Unintended Consequences, in Arms Control Today (September 2014), https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2014_09/Features/The-IAEAs-State-Level-Concept-and-the-Law-of-Unintended-Consequences; D. Albright, O. Heinonen and O Kittrie, Understanding the IAEA’s Mandate in Iran: Avoiding Misinterpretations. http://www.isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/Misinterpreting_the_IAEA_27Nov2012.pdf.

  35. 35.

    See above n. 18.

  36. 36.

    See http://www.iaea.org/safeguards/documents/AP_status_list.pdf; SC Res. 1887 (2009), para 15b; Asada, Chap. 5 in this volume.

  37. 37.

    IAEA, Annual Report for 2013, http://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/anrep2013_full_0.pdf, pp. 8–9. See also ElBaradei 2008, p. 211.

  38. 38.

    See Anthony 2012, pp. 25–44; Zangger Committee, with its Trigger List for the processing, use, or production of special fissionable materials, developed to clarify language in Article III(2) NPT (INFCIRC/209), http://cns.miis.edu/inventory/pdfs/zang.pdf; Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) with its Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers (INFCIRC/254, Part 1) and Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, Materials, Software, and Related Technology (INFCIRC/254, Part 2), http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/Leng/default.htm.

  39. 39.

    See Australia Group fighting the spread of chemical and biological weapons, http://www.australiagroup.net/en/index.html.

  40. 40.

    See Franceschini 2008, pp. 173–180.

  41. 41.

    Article II of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (26 October 1956, amended 1963, 1973, 1989, and 1999), http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/library/treaties/atomic-energy-act/trty_atomic-energy-statute.htm.

  42. 42.

    See Bauer and O’Reilly, Chap. 6 in this volume; see also Venturini 2014, p. 133.

  43. 43.

    See Kilb, Chap. 7 in this volume; see also Kilb 2014, p. 97.

  44. 44.

    Agreement on the Exclusively Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy (Guadalajara Agreement between Argentina and Brazil, 18 July 1991), http://cns.miis.edu/inventory/pdfs/abacc.pdf; see http://www.abacc.org.br/?page_id=5&lang=en.

  45. 45.

    See Nuclear Threat Initiative, Iraq Country Overview, www.nti.org/e_research/profiles//Iraq/Nuclear/index.html; IAEA Annual Report for 1991.

  46. 46.

    See SC Res. 681 (1991), para 13; SC Res. 715 (1991), paras 1–8.

  47. 47.

    IAEA, ‘Fourth Consolidated Report of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency under Paragraph 16 of Resolution 1051 (1996)’, UN Doc. S/1997/779 (8 October 1997), Iraqwatch.org; Negm 2009, pp. 160–170.

  48. 48.

    See above n. 45, and SC Res. 687 (1991), 1051 (1996), 1154 (1998), 1284 (1999), 1957 (2010).

  49. 49.

    See Fleck 2002, p. 108.

  50. 50.

    See http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/2012/iraqap.html.

  51. 51.

    SC Res. 1957 (2010).

  52. 52.

    See http://fas.org/irp/threat/svr_nuke.htm.

  53. 53.

    See SC Res. 1695 (2006), 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2050 (2012), 2087 (2013), and 2094 (2013). On the relationship between the DPRK and the IAEA see IAEA Doc. GOV/2013/39-GC(57)/22 (28 August 2013) Application of Safeguards in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Report by the Director General, https://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC57/GC57Documents/English/gc57-22_en.pdf.

  54. 54.

    See IAEA Annual Report for 2004, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Reports/Anrep2004/index.html, p. 9, referring to Libya’s past failures to fulfil the requirements of its NPT safeguards agreement, and stating that Libya had taken corrective actions, and decided to sign and implement, pending entry into force, an additional protocol to that agreement. When Libya had submitted its initial declarations under the protocol and showed good cooperation with the Agency, the IAEA Board adopted a resolution on the implementation of safeguards in Libya. See Corea 2006.

  55. 55.

    See SC Res. 825 (1993).

  56. 56.

    Solingen 2007, p. 129.

  57. 57.

    Mazarr 1995, p. 95.

  58. 58.

    Agreed Framework of 21 October 1994 Between the United States of America and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, INFCIRC/457, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc457.pdf.

  59. 59.

    The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea had declared its withdrawal from the NPT on 12 March 1993, but suspended that declaration on 11 June 1993. On 10 January 2003 it declared an ‘immediate effectuation of its withdrawal from the NPT’, see http://www.atomicarchive.com/Docs/Deterrence/DPRKNPTstatement.shtml.

  60. 60.

    SC Res. 1695 (2006), 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 1928 (2010), 2050 (2012), 2087 (2013) and 2094 (2013). See J. Bajora and B. Xu, The Six-Party Talks on North Korea’s Nuclear Program’, Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/proliferation/six-party-talks-north-koreas-nuclear-program/p13593; Pollack 2011.

  61. 61.

    See IAEA Report GOV/2013/40 (28 August 2013), http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2013/gov2013-40.pdf.

  62. 62.

    SC Res. 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006). 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), 1887 (2009), 1929 (2011), 1984 (2011), 2049 (2012).

  63. 63.

    See SC Res 2231 (2015); Joint Statement by the IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano and the Vice-President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, President of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, Ali Akbar Salehi and Road-map for the clarification of past and present outstanding issues regarding Iran’s nuclear program, Vienna 14 July 2015, http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/iaea-director-generals-statement-and-road-map-clarification-past-present-outstanding-issues-regarding-irans-nuclear-program.

  64. 64.

    http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/syria/.

  65. 65.

    See IAEA Annual Report for 2011, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Reports/Anrep2011/yearinreview.pdf, p. 11.

  66. 66.

    See https://www.armscontrol.org/print/1753.

  67. 67.

    See K. Fishman, IAEA South Korean Concerns Resolved. Arms Control Today, July/August 2008, https://www.armscontrol.org/2008_07-08/SouthKorea.

  68. 68.

    Letter of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iraq dated 8 June 1981, UN Doc. S/14509.

  69. 69.

    UN Doc. S/14532.

  70. 70.

    SC Res. 487 (1981).

  71. 71.

    See http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/2013/insarrisrael.html.

  72. 72.

    Unconfirmed estimates for Israel’s nuclear weapons stockpile range around 80 intact nuclear weapons and additional inventories of fissile materials of 0.3 tons highly enriched uranium (HEU) plus 0.84 ± 0.13 tons of separated plutonium. See Schell and Kristensen, p. 333; Glaser and Mian, pp. 326–331; Cohen; Kandel, pp. 173–184. See also reports by the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/israel/nuke/; Negm 2009, pp. 227–258; Kroenig 2010, pp. 67–110.

  73. 73.

    SC Res. 1172 (1998).

  74. 74.

    See Ogden 2012, pp. 149–160; Chakma and Pant 2012, pp. 161–172. On the bilateral U.S.-Indian deal see Handl 2010, pp. 11–15.

  75. 75.

    See e.g. Shaker, Vol. I, pp. 22, 54 and Vol. II, p. 487.

  76. 76.

    Marauhn 2007, p. 272.

  77. 77.

    See Fujita 1994, pp. 92, 101.

  78. 78.

    See Fry 2013, passim.

  79. 79.

    Article 33(1) UN Charter.

  80. 80.

    INFCIRC/153, para 22, provides for arbitration on disputes arising out of interpretation or implementation of a safeguards agreement, except for disputes on findings of the Board. For an assessment of standard dispute settlement clauses including certain variations in some safeguards agreements with the IAEA see Fry 2013, pp. 268–285.

  81. 81.

    Rockwood 2013, p. 25.

  82. 82.

    Article XVII: ‘Settlement of disputes. (A) Any question or dispute concerning the interpretation or application of this Statute which is not settled by negotiation shall be referred to the International Court of Justice in conformity with the Statute of the Court, unless the parties concerned agree on another mode of settlement. (B) The General Conference and the Board of Governors are separately empowered, subject to authorization from the General Assembly of the United Nations, to request the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on any legal question arising within the scope of the Agency’s activities.’

  83. 83.

    See Article III B 4 and Article XII (C) IAEA Statute.

  84. 84.

    See Tomuschat 2012, MN 2.

  85. 85.

    See Krisch 2012a, MN 34.

  86. 86.

    Manila Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes, Annex to UNGA Res. 37/10 (15 November 1982).

  87. 87.

    See also Declaration on the Prevention and Removal of Disputes and Situations Which May Threaten International Peace and Security and on the Role of the United Nations in this Field, UNGA Res. 43/51 (5 December 1988).

  88. 88.

    Article 11 UN Charter.

  89. 89.

    Klein and Schmahl 2012, MN 8, 9–17.

  90. 90.

    Article 26 UN Charter.

  91. 91.

    Schütz 2012, MN 26. See also Krisch 2012b, MN 16, critically observing with respect to long-term arms restrictions for Iraq, Iran, and North Korea, designed to prevent future aggression, that ‘this does not necessarily include a competence to take general measures for the limitation of armaments, or a possibility to regard armament by States in itself as a threat to the peace. In principle, States are free to decide on their armament, and under Article 26 the SC possesses only recommendatory powers for general regulation in this sphere.’

  92. 92.

    2005 World Summit Outcome UN Doc. A/RES/60/1 (24 October 2005), para 109: ‘We … call upon the Security Council … to ensure that fair and clear procedures exist for placing individuals and entities on sanctions and removing them, as well as for granting humanitarian exceptions’.

  93. 93.

    See Marauhn 2013, pp. 66–68, and also Anthony 2012, p. 37.

  94. 94.

    Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council of the European Union [Kadi I] judgment of the Court of Justice (3 September 2008) ECR I-6351; Yassin Abdullah Kadi v. European Commission, supported by Council of the European Union, the French Republic and the United Kingdom [Kadi II] judgment of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) of 30 September 2010, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf;jsessionid=9ea7d0f130d5922fc18d39ee42029102a501ef4d5f41.e34KaxiLc3eQc40LaxqMbN4OahqPe0?text=&docid=83733&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=708499; see de Wet 2013.

  95. 95.

    See Black-Branch, Chap. 16 in this volume.

  96. 96.

    See Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts—ARSIWA—(2001) UN Doc. A/56/10, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, Vol. II, Part Two, http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf, Chapter II, Commentary (before Article 49), para 3, p. 128.

  97. 97.

    For pertinent principles see Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, General Assembly Resolution 2625(XXV), adopted on 24 October 1970 (Annex, The principle concerning the duty not to intervene in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of any State, in accordance with the Charter); Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, General Assembly Resolution 3281(XXIX), adopted on 12 December 1974 (Article 32); Economic measures as a means of political and economic coercion against developing countries, General Assembly Resolution 44/215, adopted on 22 December 1989; and Unilateral economic measures as a means of political and economic coercion against developing countries, General Assembly Resolution 66/186, adopted on 22 December 2011.

  98. 98.

    Bothe 2013, para 46.

  99. 99.

    See Draft Articles on Responsibility of International Organizations (DARIO), UN Doc. A/66/10, para 87, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2011, vol. II, Part Two, http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_11_2011.pdf.

  100. 100.

    EU Council Decisions 2010/413 (26 July 2010); 2011/670/CFSP (10 October 2011); and 2012/35/CFSP (23 January 2012).

  101. 101.

    See EU Council Conclusions on Iran (3142th Foreign Affairs Council meeting, 23 January 2012) Press Release 5592/12, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/127480.pdf, para 1: ‘Iran’s acceleration of enrichment activities is in flagrant violation of six UNSC Resolutions and eleven IAEA Board resolutions and contributes to increasing tensions in the region.’

  102. 102.

    See http://www.genevacall.org/.

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    Dieter Fleck

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    Jonathan L. Black-Branch

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    Dieter Fleck

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Fleck, D. (2016). Disputes on Nuclear Proliferation: Means and Methods for Their Settlement. In: Black-Branch, J., Fleck, D. (eds) Nuclear Non-Proliferation in International Law. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-075-6_17

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