Abstract
Countermeasures against non-compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and other pertinent obligations remain an open option for States and international organizations, even if implementing activities by the International Atomic Energy Agency and nation States are regulated in rather specific form and United Nations Security Council sanctions may come into place. The purpose of this chapter is to explore the role of countermeasures in the case of non-compliance with nuclear non-proliferation obligations relating to their legal requirements, effectiveness and consequences. Gaps in legal regulation are explored to identify the need for legal developments and to promote international cooperation to ensure compliance with existing nuclear obligations. The chapter explores the use of individual, or collective, countermeasures, which may not at first seem like an obvious choice, but employing them to achieve compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and other relevant obligations may prove to be a useful and effective device. The author concludes that not only are countermeasures permissible under the 2001 Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts and the 2011 Draft Articles on Responsibility of International Organizations, but they may be necessary to ensure compliance with erga omnes obligations and may prove to be a successful option for enforcing requirements under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as well as other relevant obligations.
Professor of International Law, Royal Holloway University of London; a member of Wolfson College, Oxford; Chairman of the International Law Association (ILA) Committee on Nuclear Weapons, Non-Proliferation and Contemporary International Law.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons—NPT—(1 July 1968), 729 UNTS 161 (Article I).
- 2.
China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States (as defined in Article IX(3) NPT).
- 3.
Specifically, Article II NPT states that it is the obligation of non-nuclear-weapon States, ‘not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly’ and ‘not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear devices’.
- 4.
The Security Council established a Committee pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) on 14 October 2006 to oversee the relevant sanctions measures and to undertake various tasks set out in para 12 of that same resolution. Additional functions were entrusted by the Council to the Committee in Resolutions 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013) and 2094 (2013). By its Resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013) and 2094 (2013), the Council imposes certain measures relating to the DPRK.
- 5.
On pacific settlement of nuclear disputes see Chap. 17 in this volume by Dieter Fleck.
- 6.
Article III.1 NPT: ‘Each Non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency’s safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. …’. Article III.4 NPT: ‘Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this Article either individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. …’
- 7.
See Rockwood 2013; Status List of safeguards agreements, additional protocols and small quantities protocols as of 31 December 2014, https://www.iaea.org/safeguards/documents/sir_table.pdf.
- 8.
See Black-Branch 2015.
- 9.
Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts—ARSIWA—(2001) UN Doc. A/56/10, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, vol. II, Part Two, http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf.
- 10.
Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations (DARIO), UN Doc. A/66/10, para 87, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2011, vol. II, Part Two, http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_11_2011.pdf.
- 11.
See Chap. 17 in this volume by Dieter Fleck, footnotes 97–99 and accompanying text.
- 12.
Alland 2010, p. 1135.
- 13.
Article 41 UN Charter: ‘The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.’
- 14.
Note that Article 42 allows for the use of force stating: ‘Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.’
- 15.
See de Wet 2004.
- 16.
SC Res. 1874 (2009), 1928 (2010), 1985 (2011), 2050 (2012), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013).
- 17.
SC Res. 1696 (2006) and 1737 (2006).
- 18.
SC Res. 1172 (1998).
- 19.
See Chap. 17 in this volume by Dieter Fleck.
- 20.
See Tzanakopoulos 2011, p. 202.
- 21.
See Pellet and Miron 2012, para 61.
- 22.
See above n. 9 and 10.
- 23.
Sicilianos 1990, p. 1142.
- 24.
EU Doc. 10198/1/04 REV 1 (7 June 2004).
- 25.
EU Doc. 15114/05 (2 December 2005).
- 26.
See Hertwig 2014, p. 234.
- 27.
Dupont 2012, pp. 301–336.
- 28.
EU Strategy Against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/foreign_and_security_policy/cfsp_and_esdp_implementation/l33234_en.htm.
- 29.
A secure Europe in a better world—European security strategy, EU Doc. 15895/03, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf.
- 30.
Council Regulation (EC) No. 428/2009, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/import-and-export-rules/export-from-eu/dual-use-controls/.
- 31.
The issue of individual State countermeasures under State responsibility has had a long history. The Charter of the United Nations provides that the General Assembly ‘shall initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose of … encouraging the progressive development of international law and its codification’ (Article 13, para 1(a)). With the establishment of the UN in 1948 the General Assembly set up the International Law Commission (ILC) as a subsidiary organ of the UN, with a mission of seeking to promote the progressive development and codification of primarily public international law. The issue of State Responsibility had been a long-standing area for consideration in the international community extending back to the League of Nations, and indeed it was one of the main subjects reviewed at its conference in The Hague in 1930, albeit unsuccessfully. With the establishment of the ILC, State responsibility was selected as one of the 14 original topics for review and development (for a more complete discussion see J. Crawford, Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 2001, Historical background and development of codification, UN Audiovisual Library of International Law, http://legal.un.org/avl/ha/rsiwa/rsiwa.html. Over the years several reports were submitted under the work of the various Special Rapporteurs and from 1998 to 2001 Professor James Crawford undertook a comprehensive review of the entire text with the adoption of a new draft, consisting of 59 draft articles, which was subsequently adopted by the General Assembly during its fifty-third session, in 2001.
- 32.
- 33.
See articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries 2001, in the Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, vol. II, Part Two.
- 34.
Chapter I: General Principles.
- 35.
Including collective.
- 36.
See the statements made on ratification of API by Belgium, Canada, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Spain, UK, France,—on its accession on 11 April 2001, and—on signature—by the US, printed in Roberts and Guelff 2000, pp. 499–512, and referred to in UK Ministry of Defence 2004, para 617, p. 117.
- 37.
Article 3. Characterization of an act of a State as internationally wrongful: ‘The characterization of an act of a State as internationally wrongful is governed by international law. Such characterization is not affected by the characterization of the same act as lawful by internal law.’
- 38.
This rule is without prejudice to Article 46 which states: 1. A State may not invoke the fact that its consent to be bound by a treaty has been expressed in violation of a provision of its internal law regarding competence to conclude treaties as invalidating its consent unless that violation was manifest and concerned a rule of its internal law of fundamental importance. 2. A violation is manifest if it would be objectively evident to any State conducting itself in the matter in accordance with normal practice and in good faith.
- 39.
The North Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported the successful launch of the second version of the DPRK’s Kwangmyongsong-3 [Una-3] satellite from the Sohae Space Centre and that the satellite had entered the orbit as planned, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-20690338. 12 December 2012.
- 40.
- 41.
- 42.
- 43.
Article 51 UN Charter: ‘Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.’
- 44.
ICJ, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 8 July 1996, ICJ Rep. 1996, 226, at p. 257, para 79.
- 45.
Article 22 ARSIWA: ‘The wrongfulness of an act of a State not in conformity with an international obligation towards another State is precluded if and to the extent that the act constitutes a countermeasure taken against the latter State in accordance with Chapter II of part three.’
- 46.
Specifically, Article 49 sets out the object and limits of countermeasures stating that, ‘1. An injured State may only take countermeasures against a State which is responsible for an internationally wrongful act in order to induce that State to comply with its obligations under Part Two. 2. Countermeasures are limited to the non-performance for the time being of international obligations of the State taking the measures towards the responsible State. 3. Countermeasures shall, as far as possible, be taken in such a way as to permit the resumption of performance of the obligations in question.’
- 47.
Namely obligations to refrain from the threat or use of force as embodied in the Charter of the United Nations (50(1)(a)); obligations for the protection of fundamental human rights (50(1)(b)); obligations of a humanitarian character prohibiting reprisals (50(1)(c)); as well as other obligations under peremptory norms of general international law (50(1)(d)) including jus cogens. Article 50 specifies that a State, in taking countermeasures, is ‘not relieved from fulfilling its obligations’ (50(2)), particularly those under any dispute settlement procedure applicable between it and the responsible State (50(2)(a)); as well as to respect the inviolability of diplomatic or consular agents, premises, archives and documents (50(2)(b)).
- 48.
Article 51 states: ‘Countermeasures must be commensurate with the injury suffered, taking into account the gravity of the internationally wrongful act and the rights in question.’
- 49.
Ibid.
- 50.
Ibid., 33.
- 51.
Article 52 states: ‘1. Before taking countermeasures, an injured State shall: (a) call upon the responsible State, in accordance with article 43, to fulfil its obligations under part two; (b) notify the responsible State of any decision to take countermeasures and offer to negotiate with that State. 2. Notwithstanding paragraph 1(b), the injured State may take such urgent countermeasures as are necessary to preserve its rights. 3. Countermeasures may not be taken, and if already taken must be suspended without undue delay if: (a) the internationally wrongful act has ceased; and (b) the dispute is pending before a court or tribunal which has the authority to make decisions binding on the parties. 4. Paragraph 3 does not apply if the responsible State fails to implement the dispute settlement procedures in good faith.’
- 52.
‘Countermeasures shall be terminated as soon as the responsible State has complied with its obligations under Part Two in relation to the internationally wrongful act.’
- 53.
Article 54 states: ‘This chapter does not prejudice the right of any State, entitled under Article 48, paragraph 1, to invoke the responsibility of another State, to take lawful measures against that State to ensure cessation of the breach and reparation in the interest of the injured State or of the beneficiaries of the obligation breached.’
- 54.
Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 ICJ 3, 32 (Feb. 5). p. 32, para 33.
- 55.
- 56.
The applicable rules of international law continue to govern questions concerning the responsibility of Article 56 states: for an internationally wrongful act to the extent that they are not regulated by these articles.
- 57.
- 58.
See Calamita 2009, p. 1421.
- 59.
See Calamita, p. 1428.
- 60.
Article 22 DARIO: ‘1. Subject to paragraphs 2 and 3, the wrongfulness of an act of an international organization not in conformity with an international obligation towards a State or another international organization is precluded if and to the extent that the act constitutes a countermeasure taken in accordance with the substantive and procedural conditions required by international law, including those set forth in Chapter II of Part Four for countermeasures taken against another international organization. 2. Subject to paragraph 3, an international organization may not take countermeasures against a responsible member State or international organization unless: (a) the conditions referred to in paragraph 1 are met; (b) the countermeasures are not inconsistent with the rules of the organization; and (c) no appropriate means are available for otherwise inducing compliance with the obligations of the responsible State or international organization concerning cessation of the breach and reparation. 3. Countermeasures may not be taken by an international organization against a member State or international organization in response to a breach of an international obligation under the rules of the organization unless such countermeasures are provided for by those rules.’
- 61.
Article 52 DARIO: ‘1. Subject to paragraph 2, an injured State or international organization which is a member of a responsible international organization may not take countermeasures against that organization unless: (a) the conditions referred to in Article 51 are met; (b) the countermeasures are not inconsistent with the rules of the organization; and (c) no appropriate means are available for otherwise inducing compliance with the obligations of the responsible international organization concerning cessation of the breach and reparation. 2. Countermeasures may not be taken by an injured State or international organization which is a member of a responsible international organization against that organization in response to a breach of an international obligation under the rules of the organization, unless such countermeasures are provided for by those rules.’
- 62.
Article 50 DARIO: ‘This Chapter is without prejudice to the entitlement that a person or entity other than a State or an international organization may have to invoke the international responsibility of an international organization.’
- 63.
Article 51 DARIO: ‘1. An injured State or an injured international organization may only take countermeasures against an international organization which is responsible for an internationally wrongful act in order to induce that organization to comply with its obligations under Part Three. 2. Countermeasures are limited to the non-performance for the time being of international obligations of the State or international organization taking the measures towards the responsible international organization. 3. Countermeasures shall, as far as possible, be taken in such a way as to permit the resumption of performance of the obligations in question. 4. Countermeasures shall, as far as possible, be taken in such a way as to limit their effects on the exercise by the responsible international organization of its functions.’
- 64.
Article 53 DARIO: ‘1. Countermeasures shall not affect: (a) the obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force as embodied in the Charter of the United Nations; (b) obligations for the protection of human rights; (c) obligations of a humanitarian character prohibiting reprisals; (d) other obligations under peremptory norms of general international law. 2. An injured State or international organization taking countermeasures is not relieved from fulfilling its obligations: (a) under any dispute settlement procedure applicable between it and the responsible international organization; (b) to respect any inviolability of organs or agents of the responsible international organization and of the premises, archives and documents of that organization.’
- 65.
Article 54 DARIO.
- 66.
Article 56 DARIO.
- 67.
Article 42 ARSIWA: ‘A State is entitled as an injured State to invoke the responsibility of another State if the obligation breached is owed to: (a) That State individually; or (b) A group of States including that State, or the international community as a whole, and the breach of the obligation: (i) Specifically affects that State; or (ii) Is of such a character as radically to change the position of all the other States to which the obligation is owed with respect to the further performance of the obligation.’
- 68.
Materials on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, United Nations Legislative Series, ST/LEG/SER B/25 (2012) at p. 274.
- 69.
Idem, at p. 275.
- 70.
Idem, at p. 275.
- 71.
Idem, at p. 276.
- 72.
Idem, at p. 276.
- 73.
Idem, at p. 277.
- 74.
Idem, at p. 277–278.
- 75.
See S. Singh, Iran, the Nuclear Issue and Countermeasures, on the Blog of the European Journal of International Law (January 10, 2012), http://www.ejiltalk.org/iran-the-nuclear-issue-countermeasures/. Note that in this instance Singh takes the latter view stating: ‘I personally fall into the latter camp, because Article 42(b)(ii) must be conceived of as articulating a rather novel legal position based on conceptualizations with significant intellectual baggage—the relevance of this baggage to the particularities of the law of state responsibility is perhaps to be doubted.’ See also Calamita 2009, p. 1421.
- 76.
See S. Singh, Iran, the Nuclear Issue and Countermeasures, on the Blog of the European Journal of International Law (January 10, 2012), http://www.ejiltalk.org/iran-the-nuclear-issue-countermeasures/. Note that in this instance Singh takes the latter view stating: ‘I personally fall into the latter camp, because Article 42(b)(ii) must be conceived of as articulating a rather novel legal position based on conceptualizations with significant intellectual baggage—the relevance of this baggage to the particularities of the law of state responsibility is perhaps to be doubted.’ See also Calamita, p. 1421.
- 77.
Note that India, Israel, and Pakistan are not party to the Treaty. North Korea has stated its withdrawal from it.
- 78.
Zanders 2010, p. 5.
- 79.
Moelling 2010.
- 80.
Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 ICJ 3, 32 (Feb. 5), p. 32, para 33.
- 81.
Article 2 ARSIWA. Elements of an internationally wrongful act of a State: ‘There is an internationally wrongful act of a State when conduct consisting of an action or omission: (a) is attributable to the State under international law; and (b) constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the State.’
- 82.
In the Barcelona Traction case, the ICJ identified erga omnes (obiter dictum). Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 ICJ 3, 32 (Feb. 5).
- 83.
Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 ICJ 3, 32 (Feb. 5).
- 84.
- 85.
A detailed treatment can be found, for example, in the following works: Bassiouni 1996; de Hoogh 1996; Tams 2010; Villalpando 2005; Sicilianos 1990; Picone 2006; as well as in the contributions to Tomuschat and Thouvenin 2006. The clearest summary is Frowein 2012. Ragazzi 2010 offers much information on specific examples of obligations erga omnes, but curiously neglects the concept’s enforcement aspect.
- 86.
See Huesa Vinaixa 2010, p. 951.
- 87.
Article 50 ARSIWA: ‘1. Countermeasures shall not affect: (a) the obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force as embodied in the Charter of the United Nations; (b) obligations for the protection of fundamental human rights; (c) obligations of a humanitarian character prohibiting reprisals; (d) other obligations under peremptory norms of general international law. 2. A State taking countermeasures is not relieved from fulfilling its obligations: (a) under any dispute settlement procedure applicable between it and the responsible State; (b) to respect the inviolability of diplomatic or consular agents, premises, archives and documents.’
- 88.
As referenced in Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 ICJ 3, 32 (Feb. 5), p. 32, para 33.
- 89.
For a full discussion see Ragazzi 2010.
- 90.
Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 ICJ 3, 32 (Feb. 5). p. 32, para 33.
- 91.
Note that not each non-compliance act may necessarily in itself endanger peremptory norms.
- 92.
General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV), adopted on a Report from the Sixth Committee (A/8082) on 24 October 1970.
- 93.
Adopted by Resolution 260 (III) A of the United Nations General Assembly on 9 December 1948.
- 94.
Signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 by 12 member states of the Council of Europe and entered into force on 3 September 1953.
- 95.
Adopted at the Inter-American Specialized Conference on Human Rights, San José, Costa Rica, 22 November 1969.
- 96.
The African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (also known as the Banjul Charter) is an international human rights instrument that is intended to promote and protect human rights and basic freedoms in the African continent. Oversight and interpretation of the Charter is the task of the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights, which was set up in 1987 and is now headquartered in Banjul, Gambia. A protocol to the Charter was subsequently adopted in 1998 whereby an African Court on Human and Peoples Rights was to be created. The protocol came into effect on 25 January 2005. http://www.achpr.org/instruments/achpr/.
References
Akehurst M (1970) Reprisals by third states. Br Yearb Int Law 44:1
Alland D (2010) The definition of countermeasures. In: Crawford J, Pellet A, Olleson S (eds) The law of international responsibility. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 1127–1136
Bassiouni MC (1996) International crimes: jus cogens and obligatio erga omnes. Law Contemp Probl 59(4):63–74
Black-Branch J (2015) (Dis)armament and (non)proliferation in international law: the effectiveness of UN sanctions in the case of North Korea. Eleven International Publishing, The Hague
Calamita NJ (2009) Sanctions, countermeasures, and the Iranian nuclear issue. Vanderbilt J Trans Law 42(5):1393
Charney JI (1989) Third state remedies in international law. Mich J Int Law 10(1):57
Dupont P-E (2012) Countermeasures and collective security: the case of the EU sanctions against Iran. J Conflict Secur Law 17(3):301–336
Fleck D (2012) State responsibility consequences of termination of or withdrawal from non-proliferation treaties. In: Joyner DH, Roscini M (eds), Non-proliferation law as a special regime. a contribution to fragmentation theory in international law. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 250–269
Frowein JA (1994) Reactions by not directly affected States to breaches of public international law, RdC 1994–IV, vol 248. Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, p 345
Frowein JA (2012) Obligations erga omnes. In: Wolfrum R (ed) Max-Planck encyclopedia of public international law (MPEPIL), vol 10. Oxford University Press, Oxford www.mpepil.com
Herik L vd (2014) Peripheral hegemony in the quest to ensure security council accountability for its individualized UN sanctions regimes. J Conflict Secur Law 19(3):27–449. http://jcsl.oxfordjournals.org/content/current
Hertwig J (2014) European Union initiatives: strategies against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In: Black-Branch JL, Fleck D (eds) Nuclear non-proliferation and international law, vol I. Asser Press, The Hague, pp 225–256
de Hoogh A (1996) Obligations erga omnes and international crimes. Nijhoff
Huesa Vinaixa R (2010) Plurality of injured states. In: Crawford J, Pellet A, Olleson S (eds) The law of international responsibility. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 949–955
Joyner DH, Roscini M (2012) Withdrawal from non-proliferation treaties. In: Roscini M (ed) Joyner DH. Non-proliferation law as a special regime. A contribution to fragmentation theory in international law. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 151–171
Moelling C (2010), The grand bargain in the NPT: challenges for the EU beyond 2010. In: Zanders JP (ed), Nuclear weapons after the 2010 NPT review conference. Chaillot papers. European Union Institute for Security Studies
Pellet A, Miron A (2012) Sanctions. In: Wolfrum R (ed) Max-Planck encyclopedia of public international law (MPEPIL), vol 10 Oxford University Press, Oxford. www.mpepil.com, para 61
Picione P (2006) Comunità internazionale e obblighi ‘erga omnes’. Jovene, Napoli
Ragazzi M (2010) The concept of international obligations erga omnes. Oxford Scholarship Online
Roberts A, Guelff R (2000) Documents on the laws of war, 3rd edn. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Rockwood L (2013) Legal framework for IAEA safeguards. IAEA
Sicilianos L-A (1990) Les reactions décentralisées á l’illicité: des contre-mesures á la légitime défense. Librairie general de droit et de jurisprudence, Paris
Sicilianos L-A (2010) Countermeasures in Response to grave violations of obligations owed to the international community. In: Crawford J, Pellet A, Olleson S (eds) The law of international responsibility. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 1137–1148
Simma B (1994) From bilateralism to community interest in international law. RdC 1994–VI, vol. 250. Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, p 217
Tams CJ (2010) Enforcing obligations erga omnes in international law, rev edn. Cambridge studies in international and comparative law (44). Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Tomuschat C (1994) Are counter-measures subject to prior recourse to dispute settlement procedures? EJIL 5:77–88
Tomuschat C (2012a) Article 2(3). In: Simma B et al. (eds), The charter of the United Nations. A commentary, 3rd edn. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Tomuschat C (2012b) Article 33. In: Simma B et al. (eds), The charter of the United Nations. A commentary, 3rd edn. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Tomuschat C, Thouvenin JM (2006) (eds), The fundamental rules of the international legal order—jus cogens and obligations erga omnes. Nijhoff
Tzanakopoulos A (2011) Disobeying the Security Council. Countermeasures against wrongful sanctions. Oxford University Press, Oxford
UK Ministry of Defence (2004) The manual of the law of armed conflict. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Villalpando S (2005) L’emergence de la communauté internationale dans la responsabilité des États. Graduate Institute Publications, Genève:
de Wet E (2004) The Chapter VII Powers of the United Nations Security Council. Hart, Oxford
Zanders JP (2010) Introduction in nuclear weapons after the 2010 NPT review conference. In: Zanders JP (ed), Chaillot papers. European Union Institute for Security Studies
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2016 T.M.C. Asser Press and the authors
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Black-Branch, J.L. (2016). Countermeasures to Ensure Compliance with Nuclear Non-Proliferation Obligations. In: Black-Branch, J., Fleck, D. (eds) Nuclear Non-Proliferation in International Law. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-075-6_16
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-075-6_16
Published:
Publisher Name: T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague
Print ISBN: 978-94-6265-074-9
Online ISBN: 978-94-6265-075-6
eBook Packages: Law and CriminologyLaw and Criminology (R0)
