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The Proliferation Security Initiative: A Tentative Assessment

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Nuclear Non-Proliferation in International Law

Abstract

The PSI was launched by the United States in 2003 as a programme aimed at interdicting the transfer or transport of WMD, their delivery systems and related materials to and from States and non-State actors of proliferation concern. Being a voluntary activity and not an international organization, its structure is not institutionalized. Although more than 100 countries have endorsed the PSI, some important States are absent especially in the Asian region and in the Arabic peninsula. The PSI activities are based on the Principles of Interdiction, which do not conflict with existing international law, notably the freedom of the high seas and the principle of flag State consent. Accordingly, a number of ship-boarding agreements have been reached and amendments to the SUA Convention have been adopted to legitimize the interdiction of vessels involved in WMD smuggling. Since 2003 PSI cooperation has gradually contributed to the development of participating States’ critical capabilities and practices in relation to the interdiction of WMD and related materials, although a proper evaluation of the PSI’s effectiveness is difficult to make due to its lack of transparency. In the future, the Initiative would benefit from a greater involvement of civilian law enforcement authorities for the interdiction of dual-use goods, as well as from a geographical expansion of its scope.

Professor of Human Rights in Armed Conflict, Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights; former Director of the Department of International Studies, Università degli Studi di Milano, Italy; Member of the ILA Committee on Nuclear Weapons, Non-Proliferation and Contemporary International Law. The author is grateful to Natalino Ronzitti for his helpful comments on an earlier version of this chapter.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) of 1 July 1968, 729 UNTS 161.

  2. 2.

    Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (13 January 1993) 1974 UNTS 45.

  3. 3.

    Convention on the Prohibition of the Development and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (10 April 1972) 1015 UNTS 163.

  4. 4.

    Zangger Committee, http://fas.org/nuke/control/zangger/; Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/Leng/default.htm; Australia Group fighting the spread of chemical and biological weapons, http://www.australiagroup.net/en/index.html; Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, http://www.wassenaar.org/; Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), http://www.mtcr.info/english/index.html; Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c37079.htm.

  5. 5.

    http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/05/20030531-3.html; see S.J. Koch, The Proliferation Security Initiative: Origins and Evolution, Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction Occasional Paper No. 9, National Defense University Press, Washington, DC, pp. 8–10.

  6. 6.

    http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered.

  7. 7.

    Nuclear Security Strategy, May 2010, The White House, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf, p. 24. Accessed 13 January 2015.

  8. 8.

    See Lehrman 2004, p. 225; Winner 2005, p. 130; Heupel 2007, pp. 57–66, p. 58; Malisch and Prill 2007, p. 232; Holmes and Winner 2009, p. 140; Thomas 2009, p. 661; Durkalec 2010, p. 1.

  9. 9.

    See Proliferation Security Initiative: Chairman’s Conclusions at the Fourth Meeting, London, October 10, 2003. http://www.state.gov/t/isn/115305.htm.

  10. 10.

    Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, the UK and the USA.

  11. 11.

    For a list of the 102 participating States see SIPRI Yearbook 2014, p. 527 and http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c27732.htm.

  12. 12.

    See A. Kaliadine (2005) Russia in the PSI: The Modalities of Russian Participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative, WMDC Paper No. 29, The Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, Stockholm, at: http://www.un.org/disarmament/education/wmdcommission/files/No29.pdf, pp. 8–11 reporting the domestic debates about Russian participation in the PSI and discussing Russia’s role in the PSI.

  13. 13.

    These countries’ concerns over the PSI are especially related to interception on the high seas, the status of warships or military aircraft and the determination of the States of proliferation concern. See Becker 2005, pp. 165–167; Allen 2007, p. 58; Bocheński 2007, pp. 74–77; Thomas 2009, p. 678; Klein 2012, p. 196. It should be mentioned, however, that China, India and Pakistan are among the partner nations of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT, http://www.gicnt.org/), co-chaired by the USA and Russia, which promotes nuclear security through deterrence, prevention, detection, and response activities.

  14. 14.

    See above n. 7.

  15. 15.

    However, in 2004, the EU Council issued a statement on ‘Non-proliferation: Support of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)’, Brussels, 1 June 2004, 10052/04 (Presse 189).

  16. 16.

    See J. Durkalec, The Proliferation Security Initiative: Evolution and Future Prospects, EU Non-Proliferation Consortium, Non-Proliferation Papers No. 16, at: http://www.nonproliferation.eu/documents/nonproliferationpapers/jacekdurkalec4fcc7fd95cfff.pdf, pp. 10–11.

  17. 17.

    This issue intermingles with the question of the U.S. ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) which, despite efforts displayed both by the Bush and the Obama administration, is still pending. Some US military and government officials argue that PSI would be positively affected by US participation in UNCLOS, while others deem that it would limit the US sovereignty under customary law. See M.B. Nikitin, Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), CRS Report for Congress RL34327, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34327.pdf, p. 8.

  18. 18.

    See Becker 2005, p. 228; Garvey 2005, pp. 137–139 and Valencia 2006, p. 128, arguing that the legitimacy and effectiveness of interdiction would require the establishment of an institutional organization, possibly within the UN system.

  19. 19.

    http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c27726.htm. See J. Durkalec, The Proliferation Security Initiative: Evolution and Future Prospects, EU Non-Proliferation Consortium, Non-Proliferation Papers No. 16, at: http://www.nonproliferation.eu/documents/nonproliferationpapers/jacekdurkalec4fcc7fd95cfff.pdf, pp. 6–8 and S.J. Koch, The Proliferation Security Initiative: Origins and Evolution, Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction Occasional Paper No. 9, National Defense University Press, Washington, DC, p. 21.

  20. 20.

    The 10th Anniversary High Level Political Meeting of the PSI was held in Warsaw, Poland on 27–29 May 2013, http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c10390.htm.

  21. 21.

    The SIP is analyzed in detail by PSI commentators, especially Lehrman 2004, pp. 226–227, 231–233; Persbo and Davis 2004, pp. 22–36; Ahlström 2005, pp. 748–755; Winner 2005, pp. 132–134; Song 2007, pp. 105–110; Thomas 2009, pp. 664–667; Durkalec 2010, pp. 3–6; Dunne 2013, pp. 13–18.

  22. 22.

    At the time of PSI’s adoption the term was understood with reference to States such as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), Iran, Libya and Syria. See A. Persbo and I. Davis, Sailing into Uncharted Waters? The Proliferation Security Initiative and the Law of the Sea, Basic Research Report, The British American Information Council, http://www.basicint.org/sites/default/files/basic_psi_report_final_all.pdf, pp. 28–29; Heintschel von Heinegg 2006, p. 56; Allen 2007, p. 50; Bocheński 2007, pp. 78–79; Song 2007, p. 106. The archetype of ‘non-State actor of proliferation concern’ was the nuclear smuggling network established in the 1980s by the Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan. See Kaliadine 2005, p. 1.

  23. 23.

    ‘Means of delivery: missiles, rockets and other unmanned systems capable of delivering nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, that are specially designed for such use. […] Related materials: materials, equipment and technology covered by relevant multilateral treaties and arrangements, or included on national control lists, which could be used for the design, development, production or use of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery.’ See A. Persbo and I. Davis,) Sailing into Uncharted Waters? The Proliferation Security Initiative and the Law of the Sea, Basic Research Report, The British American Information Council, http://www.basicint.org/sites/default/files/basic_psi_report_final_all.pdf, pp. 30–31 assessing alternative definitions of WMD. SC Res. 1540 (2004) is discussed below in Sect. 10.3.3.

  24. 24.

    See Becker 2005, p. 183; Song 2007, p. 115; Holmes and Winner 2009, p. 151 and Joyner 2009, p. 324 considering problems arising with defining dual-use materials for interdiction purposes.

  25. 25.

    See below Sects. 10.3.3 and 10.4.

  26. 26.

    See Klein 2012, p. 198.

  27. 27.

    Logan 2005, p. 271; Winner 2005, p. 134; J. Durkalec, The Proliferation Security Initiative: Evolution and Future Prospects, EU Non-Proliferation Consortium, Non-Proliferation Papers No. 16, at: http://www.nonproliferation.eu/documents/nonproliferationpapers/jacekdurkalec4fcc7fd95cfff.pdf, p. 19. But see Doolin 2006, p. 50 and Garvey 2013, p. 196 arguing that the PSI may gradually give rise to a new customary exception to the right of free navigation, and Perry 2006, p. 40 contending that it will affect the customary international law of the sea by blurring its jurisdictional boundaries.

  28. 28.

    United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 397. Although the USA is not a party to the UNCLOS, its provisions applicable to PSI activities are recognized as part of international customary law.

  29. 29.

    Article 110 para (1e) UNCLOS. See Klein 2012, p. 202.

  30. 30.

    Byers 2004, p. 532; Ronzitti 2008, p. 274.

  31. 31.

    A. Persbo and I. Davis, Sailing into Uncharted Waters? The Proliferation Security Initiative and the Law of the Sea, Basic Research Report, The British American Information Council, http://www.basicint.org/sites/default/files/basic_psi_report_final_all.pdf, pp. 64–68, Logan 2005, pp. 269–270; Allen 2007, p. 171. But see Heintschel von Heinegg 2006, p. 65 arguing that in case of a terrorist background interception, boarding, search or arrest of a vessel finds its legal basis either in the right of self-defence or in the international law of counter-measures.

  32. 32.

    Article 110 para (1e) UNCLOS.

  33. 33.

    See Lehrman 2004, p. 253; Heintschel von Heinegg 2006, p. 70; Malisch and Prill 2007, p. 240; Song 2007, p. 134; Joyner 2009, p. 315.

  34. 34.

    Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session’, ILC Yearbook (2001, Vol. II, Part One) Articles 24 and 25, 27, 31 Issues of international responsibility for unlawful interdictions and the settlement of related claims are discussed by Becker 2005, pp. 227–228; Ronzitti 2008, pp. 281–283 and Guilfoyle 2009, pp. 324–330.

  35. 35.

    Convention on Civil Aviation, 7 December 1944, 15 UNTS 295, Articles (3c), 3bis(b), 5, 6.

  36. 36.

    See Ronzitti 2008, p. 278 referring to the German law of June 2004 and to the Russian law of March 2006. On 15 February 2006 the German Federal Constitutional Court overruled the German law as contrary to constitutional norms. 1 BvR 357/05, http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/rs20060215_1bvr035705en.html. See Nickel 2010, pp. 625–627.

  37. 37.

    See Ahlström 2005, p. 749; Joyner 2009, p. 329; J. Durkalec, The Proliferation Security Initiative: Evolution and Future Prospects, EU Non-Proliferation Consortium, Non-Proliferation Papers No. 16, at: http://www.nonproliferation.eu/documents/nonproliferationpapers/jacekdurkalec4fcc7fd95cfff.pdf, p. 4 and A. Dunne (2013) The Proliferation Security Initiative. Legal Considerations and Operational Realities, SIPRI Policy Paper No. 36, pp. 22–23.

  38. 38.

    A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, Report of the Secretary General’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (2004) para 132, http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pdf/historical/hlp_more_secure_world.pdf.

  39. 39.

    Secretary-General Offers Global Strategy for Fighting Terrorism, in Address to Madrid Summit, Press Release SG/SM/9757, 10/03/2005, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/sgsm9757.doc.htm.

  40. 40.

    While the USA attempted to incorporate an endorsement of interdiction in the resolution, this was prevented by the opposition of China and Russia. See Valencia 2006, p. 126 and Winner 2005, p. 136.

  41. 41.

    Byers 2004, pp. 531–532; Logan 2005, p. 270; Allen 2007, p. 59; M. Heupel, The Proliferation Security Initiative: Advancing Commitment and Capacity for WMD Interdictions, Disarmament Forum, Central Asia at the Crossroads at: http://www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art2688.pdf, p. 60; Malisch and Prill 2007, p. 236; Joyner 2009, pp. 320–322.

  42. 42.

    Persbo and Davis 2004, p. 66; Kaliadine 2005, p. 7; Doolin 2006, pp. 45–46; Heintschel von Heinegg 2006, p. 68; Roach 2006, p. 358. See also Guilfoyle 2009, p. 243 arguing that Res. 1540 ‘leaves a great deal of flexibility to national law in its implementation.’

  43. 43.

    See J.L. Black-Branch in Chap. 16 in this volume.

  44. 44.

    SC Res. 1874 (2009), paras 11–13.

  45. 45.

    SC Res. 2094 (2013), paras 16–17.

  46. 46.

    SC Res. 1929 (2010), para 15.

  47. 47.

    According to Garvey 2013, pp. 201–204 the PSI’s effectiveness would be enhanced if the Initiative as a whole were covered by a Security Council mandate. This appears unlikely at this stage.

  48. 48.

    For the text of existing PSI ship-boarding agreements see http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c27733.htm. Their role and scope of application are discussed by Spadi 2006, pp. 257–267; Byers 2007, paras 10–15; Guilfoyle 2009, pp. 246–254; Klein 2012, pp. 184–192; Garvey 2013, pp. 192–193 and 200–201.

  49. 49.

    See Byers 2004, pp. 538–540 and Lehrman 2004, p. 251 reviewing precedents for ship-boarding agreements in the fight against slave trade, the preservation of straddling fish stocks and the interdiction of drug smuggling. See also Byers 2007 arguing that ‘the widespread conclusion of such treaties could itself generate a new rule of customary international law in parallel to treaty obligations’ (para 21).

  50. 50.

    See Roach 2006, providing an analytical commentary to the provisions of a standard ship-boarding agreement (at pp. 360–416).

  51. 51.

    Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 10 March 1988 (SUA Convention), 1678 UNTS 221 and Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf (SUA Protocol 1988) 1678 UNTS 304. Both treaties entered into force on 1st May 1992. http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/StatusOfConventions/Pages/Default.aspx.

  52. 52.

    SUA Convention Article 3, SUA Protocol 1988 Article 2.

  53. 53.

    See Kieserman 2006, pp. 427–430; Tuerk 2008, pp. 341–353 and Klein 2012, pp. 151–154 describing the background and analyzing the basic provisions of the SUA Convention.

  54. 54.

    Protocol of 2005 to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 14 October 2005. http://www.refworld.org/docid/49f58c8a2.html. Protocol of 2005 to the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, 14 October 2005. http://www.refworld.org/docid/49f58cee2.html. Both Protocols entered into force on 28 July 2010.

  55. 55.

    See Spadi 2006, pp. 269–274; Malisch and Prill 2007, pp. 236–238; Tuerk 2008, pp. 358–365; Guilfoyle 2009, pp. 254–259; Klein 2012, pp. 172–173 and A. Dunne, The Proliferation Security Initiative. Legal Considerations and Operational Realities, SIPRI Policy Paper No. 36, pp. 21–22 analyzing the new provisions included in the SUA Convention by the 2005 Protocol. See also Joyner 2009, p. 318 and J. Durkalec, The Proliferation Security Initiative: Evolution and Future Prospects, EU Non-Proliferation Consortium, Non-Proliferation Papers No. 16, at: http://www.nonproliferation.eu/documents/nonproliferationpapers/jacekdurkalec4fcc7fd95cfff.pdf, p. 14 elaborating upon their limited influence over the PSI so far.

  56. 56.

    SUA Convention 2005 Article 3bis para 2. See Thomas 2009, p. 678 making reference to India’s disagreement with the discriminatory stance of that provision.

  57. 57.

    SUA Convention 2005 Article 8bis paras 4, 5(a)–(c). The 2005 Protocol to the 1988 SUA Protocol does not include provisions on inspection of fixed platforms.

  58. 58.

    Idem., para 5(d).

  59. 59.

    Idem., paras 9–10. See Heintschel von Heinegg 2010, pp. 391–393 describing the generally accepted principles and procedures for visit and search.

  60. 60.

    SUA Convention 2005 Article 2bis para 2.

  61. 61.

    As at 31 March 2013 the SUA Convention as amended in 2005 has 33 States parties totalling about 36 % of the world’s merchant fleet tonnage. While more than twenty are PSI participating States, the USA is not among them. http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/StatusOfConventions/Pages/Default.aspx.

  62. 62.

    See Huang 2009, pp. 112–155 describing the network of treaties concluded under the auspices of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to strengthen aviation safety against unlawful interference.

  63. 63.

    http://www.icao.int/secretariat/legal/Pages/TreatyCollection.aspx. The two treaties are not yet in force. http://www.icao.int/secretariat/legal/Lists/Current%20lists%20of%20parties/AllItems.aspx.

  64. 64.

    Beijing Convention 2010 Article 1 para 1(g), (h), (i). See Abeyratne 2011, pp. 136–140 reviewing the offences under the new Convention.

  65. 65.

    See D. van der Toorn, September 11 Inspired Aviation Counter-terrorism Convention and Protocol Adopted, 15 ASIL Insights (3), http://www.asil.org/files/insight110126pdf.pdf explaining the negotiating positions at the 2010 Diplomatic Conference.

  66. 66.

    Beijing Convention 2010 Article 22, Beijing Protocol 2010 Article XXIII.

  67. 67.

    See Bocheński 2007, p. 71, M. Heupel, The Proliferation Security Initiative: Advancing Commitment and Capacity for WMD Interdictions, Disarmament Forum, Central Asia at the Crossroads at: http://www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art2688.pdf, p. 62, Holmes and Winner 2009, p. 145, M.B. Nikitin, Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), CRS Report for Congress RL34327, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34327.pdf, pp. 7–8, Klein 2012, p. 206 and S.J. Koch, The Proliferation Security Initiative: Origins and Evolution, Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction Occasional Paper No. 9, National Defense University Press, Washington, DC, pp. 24–25 highlighting criticism of the PSI’s lack of transparency.

  68. 68.

    See J. Durkalec, The Proliferation Security Initiative: Evolution and Future Prospects, EU Non-Proliferation Consortium, Non-Proliferation Papers No. 16, at: http://www.nonproliferation.eu/documents/nonproliferationpapers/jacekdurkalec4fcc7fd95cfff.pdf, p. 18 describing PSI interdiction as every interdiction operation involving a PSI participating State or intentionally linked to the Initiative.

  69. 69.

    Detailed accounts of PSI interdiction training exercises are given by Song 2007, pp. 108–109, J. Durkalec, The Proliferation Security Initiative: Evolution and Future Prospects, EU Non-Proliferation Consortium, Non-Proliferation Papers No. 16, at: http://www.nonproliferation.eu/documents/nonproliferationpapers/jacekdurkalec4fcc7fd95cfff.pdf, pp. 14–15 and S.J. Koch, The Proliferation Security Initiative: Origins and Evolution, Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction Occasional Paper No 9, National Defense University Press, Washington, DC, pp. 22–23.

  70. 70.

    See Winner 2005, p. 134; Doolin 2006, p. 43; Bocheński 2007, p. 69, M. Heupel (2007) The Proliferation Security Initiative: Advancing Commitment and Capacity for WMD Interdictions, Disarmament Forum, Central Asia at the Crossroads at: http://www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art2688.pdf, p. 61 assessing the results of joint training exercises.

  71. 71.

    J. Durkalec, The Proliferation Security Initiative: Evolution and Future Prospects, EU Non-Proliferation Consortium, Non-Proliferation Papers No. 16, at: http://www.nonproliferation.eu/documents/nonproliferationpapers/jacekdurkalec4fcc7fd95cfff.pdf, p. 16.

  72. 72.

    Remarks on the Second Anniversary of the Proliferation Security Initiative, Secretary Condoleezza Rice, http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/46951.htm. Accessed 16 January 2015. See Winner 2005, p. 137; Byers 2007, paras 8–9; M. Heupel, The Proliferation Security Initiative: Advancing Commitment and Capacity for WMD Interdictions, Disarmament Forum, Central Asia at the Crossroads at: http://www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art2688.pdf, p. 58; Malisch and Prill 2007, p. 231. Some other maritime interdiction incidents possibly related with the PSI are reported by Song 2007, p. 119.

  73. 73.

    Final Report of the UN Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Resolution 1929 (2010), S/2014/394 of 11 June 2014 paras 19–30.

  74. 74.

    This was the case, for instance, of a shipment of 1800 bobbins of carbon fibre that was reportedly seized in Singapore in December 2012 aboard the Shahraz, a ship en route from China to Bandar Abbas in Iran. See N. Gillard, Interdicted Carbon Fibre. Proliferation Case Study Series. Project Alpha, Center for Science and Security Studies, King’s College London 26 September 2014, 20140926_-_Project_Alpha_-_Carbon_fibre-2.pdf, p. 5.

  75. 75.

    Joyner 2009, p. 302, M.B. Nikitin, Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), CRS Report for Congress RL34327, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34327.pdf, pp. 2–3.

  76. 76.

    See Allen 2007, p. 113; Song 2007, p. 132; J. Durkalec, The Proliferation Security Initiative: Evolution and Future Prospects, EU Non-Proliferation Consortium, Non-Proliferation Papers No. 16, at: http://www.nonproliferation.eu/documents/nonproliferationpapers/jacekdurkalec4fcc7fd95cfff.pdf, p. 17 and A. Dunne, The Proliferation Security Initiative. Legal Considerations and Operational Realities, SIPRI Policy Paper No. 36, pp. 31–33.

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  1. Via Fratelli Cervi, Milano Due, Residenza Dei Mestieri 222, 20090, Segrate, MI, Italy

    Gabriella Venturini

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  1. Gabriella Venturini
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Correspondence to Gabriella Venturini .

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  1. School of Management - Law, Royal Holloway University of London, Egham, Surrey, United Kingdom

    Jonathan L. Black-Branch

  2. Cologne, Germany

    Dieter Fleck

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Venturini, G. (2016). The Proliferation Security Initiative: A Tentative Assessment. In: Black-Branch, J., Fleck, D. (eds) Nuclear Non-Proliferation in International Law. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-075-6_10

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