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From Douhet to Drones, Air Warfare, and the Evolution of Targeting

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Targeting: The Challenges of Modern Warfare

Abstract

Through the prism of the experience of air warfare, this chapter identifies key factors that have shaped targeting. These include technological developments, organizational structures, and processes and inter-service competition for scarce resources. Moreover, targeting is informed by perspectives on the nature of the political mandate and objectives, by the type of war, by intelligence on the nature of the opponent, and by assumptions that are derived from experience, doctrine, or strategic theory. It is, of course, shaped by societal norms. Targeting’s evolutionary process is one of solving technical and informational obstacles to finding and hitting targets. It is characterized by a trend in increased munitions accuracy and pinpoint attack capability against objects of an ever-decreasing physical signature in ever-shortening response times, and, if necessary, from ever-increasing distances from the target. The evolution is also a story of constant organizational learning, rediscovery, and theorizing about and experimenting with new targeting planning tools and processes. Moreover, there is a constantly swinging pendulum between the poles of centralized and decentralized control, with a strong tendency toward stringent political oversight. Finally, norms play an increasing role. As this chapter will argue, contemporary targeting challenges emanate from a paradox—as targeting accuracy has reached an unprecedented level, so too has the societal demand for risk-mitigation, precisely because of demonstrated targeting capabilities.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    For a full definition, see Allied Joint Doctrine For Joint Targeting AJP-3.9, 2008, p. 1.

  2. 2.

    As targeting doctrine in the West is heavily shaped by American experiences and capabilities, and as these are thoroughly documented, this chapter leans heavily on American case studies.

  3. 3.

    Tucker et al. 1999, p. 13; Benbow 2011, p. 29. For a general history of the role and evolution of air power in the Great War, see Kenneth 1991.

  4. 4.

    This very brief description does not do justice to the work of these theorists. For outstanding discussions of air power theory development during the interbellum see, for instance, McIsaac 1986; Meilinger 1997, in particular Chaps. 1–6; Biddle 2003b; Overy’s excellent 2013 tome The Bombing War, Europe 1939–1945 (Overy 2013), in particular Chap. 1; and Faber 2015.

  5. 5.

    Faber 2015; Watts 1984, Chap. 7 in particular.

  6. 6.

    See Overy 1998, pp. 11–17, 72–73.

  7. 7.

    For an excellent concise overview of the development of norm in air warfare until 1945, see Biddle 1994, pp. 140–159.

  8. 8.

    Reynolds 2005, p. 10.

  9. 9.

    Thomas 2001, p. 125. This section merely touches upon the question whether norms influenced targeting. The debate on the morality of the bombing campaigns at the time, and the previous decades, merits greater attention than is possible in this chapter.

  10. 10.

    For the development of the CBO, see Overy 2013, in particular Chap. 6.

  11. 11.

    For a detailed analysis of the effectiveness of CBO, see Overy 1980; and Overy 2013, Chaps. 6 and 10 in particular.

  12. 12.

    Overy 2013, p. 611.

  13. 13.

    Overy 2013, p. 337; Glock 2012, p. 156.

  14. 14.

    This draws from the excellent detailed Chaps. 2 and 3 on British and U.S. air offensives in Hall 1998; and Overy 2013, in particular Chap. 6. The following studies offer concise and focused overviews: Meilinger 1999; Schmidt 1993; Moeller 1994; and Ballew 2011.

  15. 15.

    Overy 2013, pp. 305–308.

  16. 16.

    The United States Strategic Bombing Surveys (European War) (Pacific War) 1987, pp. 39 and 117.

  17. 17.

    See Thomas 2001, pp. 136–146.

  18. 18.

    For debates concerning the air war in Korea, see, e.g., Mark 1994, Chap. 8; Winnefeld and Johnson 1993, Chap. 5; Crane 2000; Schmidt 1993; and Moeller 1994. For comprehensive and very detailed studies of air operations in the Korean War, see Hone 1998, pp. 469–527; and Futrell 1997.

  19. 19.

    On command problems, see in particular Winnefeld and Johnson 1993: The Renewed Clash of Service Air Command and Control Doctrines.

  20. 20.

    See Pape 1996, pp. 160–61; and Hone 1998, p. 488.

  21. 21.

    Meilinger 2007, p. 161. A total of 320,000 interdiction sorties were flown by the services combined, destroying or damaging a total of 5,087 bridges, 2,345 locomotives, 41,882 rail cars and 111,623 vehicles.

  22. 22.

    Winnefeld and Johnson 1993, p. 53.

  23. 23.

    Winnefeld and Johnson 1993, p. 53.

  24. 24.

    Thomas 2001, pp. 150–151.

  25. 25.

    In 1972, each offensive sortie during the Linebacker campaign required four EW sorties in protective support. Allocation and prioritization became acute issues.

  26. 26.

    For detailed discussions, see Hone 1998, pp. 491–516; and Winnefeld and Johnson 1993, Chap. 6: Vietnam, 1965–1968: Regression and Progress.

  27. 27.

    The literature on the Vietnam bombing campaigns is extensive. For brief but detailed discussion, see, e.g., Hone 1998. For a detailed analysis, see Clodfelter 1989.

  28. 28.

    Thomas 2001, p. 152.

  29. 29.

    See Hone 1998, pp. 500–501.

  30. 30.

    Thomas 2001, pp. 155–158.

  31. 31.

    See, e.g., Citino 2004, Chaps. 7 and 8.

  32. 32.

    The following short overview of the ‘lessons’ of Desert Storm is based on several sources. Besides Cohen and Keaney 1995 and Hallion 1992, see Gordon and Trainor 1995, For a well researched counterpoint on the alleged decisive impact on Iraqi ground units, see Press 2001, pp. 5–44.

  33. 33.

    Hallion 1992, p. 205.

  34. 34.

    Titus 1996, p. 19.

  35. 35.

    Cohen 1996, p. 44.

  36. 36.

    Hallion 1992, pp. 121–123.

  37. 37.

    For a good discussion of this distinction, see Hosmer 1996, Chap. 10.

  38. 38.

    See, e.g., Warden 1995, pp. 40–55. For an elaborate discussion of Warden’s ideas, see Olson 2007.

  39. 39.

    For a balanced account of the strategic air offensive against Iraq, see Davis 1998.

  40. 40.

    Instant Thunder was designed to offer a strategic offensive retaliation option for the Joint Force Commander, General Norman Schwarzkopf , in the event Iraq decided to strike into Saudi Arabia while US troops were still in the build-up phase.

  41. 41.

    See Hallion 1992, pp. 150–155; Davis 1998, pp. 540–554.

  42. 42.

    Source: Desert Storm Target Sets (030226-D-9085 M-006), at http://www.defense.gov/news/briefingslide.aspx?briefingslideid=110.

  43. 43.

    For a concise focused discussion of the command arrangements, see in particular Winnefeld and Johnson 1993, Chap. 8.

  44. 44.

    Winnefeld and Johnson 1993, p. 107.

  45. 45.

    Davis 1998, p. 554.

  46. 46.

    Winnefeld and Johnson 1993, p. 136.

  47. 47.

    Davis 1998, pp. 556–557.

  48. 48.

    Thomas 2001, p. 159.

  49. 49.

    See Hallion 1992, p. 252; and Cohen and Keaney 1995.

  50. 50.

    Cohen 1994, pp. 109–124. See also Farrell 2002, p. 286.

  51. 51.

    See, e.g., Mueller 1998, pp. 182–228.

  52. 52.

    The EBO concept was developed by David Deptula, an assistant to John Warden, and key planner of the strategic component of the Desert Storm air campaign. See Deptula 1996. For the historical pedigree of EBO, see Meilinger 2007.

  53. 53.

    For an exchange which neatly summarized this debate, which has been ongoing since 1991, see Pape 1997. pp. 93–114; Watts 1997, pp. 115–71; Mueller 1997, pp. 182–228. For a description of the emergence of EBO as a doctrinal concept, see, e.g., Mann et al. 2002.

  54. 54.

    See, e.g., Byman and Waxman 2002, Chap. 5; Jakobsen 1998, pp. 70–109; Jakobsen 2000, pp. 1–22; Byman and Waxman 1999, pp. 107–120.

  55. 55.

    See Owen 2010. A total of 293 aircraft flew 3,515 sorties in two weeks to deter Serb aggression. Compared to Desert Storm, the percentage of PGMs used was much greater, totaling 98 percent of US and 28 percent of non-US ordnance delivered.

  56. 56.

    For balanced analysis of the Kosovo operation, see Posen 2000, pp. 39–84; Byman and Waxman 2002; Daalder and O’Hanlon 2000; and in particular Lambeth’s very detailed operational analysis, NATO’s Air War for Kosovo, A Strategic and Operational Assessment, Lambeth 2001.

  57. 57.

    McInnes 2002, p. 92. To appreciate this accomplishment, two decades earlier, the United States lost sixteen B-52 bombers in just 11 days during the Linebacker II campaign against North Vietnam.

  58. 58.

    For an enlightening detailed assessment, see Lambeth 2001, Chap. 7. See also Kometer 2007, pp. 96–99.

  59. 59.

    See Clark 2002, pp. 183–84 and 346; and Byman and Waxman 2000, p. 85.

  60. 60.

    Lambeth 2001, p. 195.

  61. 61.

    Lambeth 2001, pp. 133–134.

  62. 62.

    U.S. Department of Defense 2000.

  63. 63.

    Kometer 2007, pp. 160–164.

  64. 64.

    Lambeth 2001, p. 212.

  65. 65.

    Around 2,500 sorties were tasked with Scud hunting, with 1,500 strikes against Scud-related sites or production facilities. There was not one confirmed Scud destroyed.The time between target detection and that information reaching a pilot was up to fourteen hours.

  66. 66.

    Lambeth 2001, p. 206.

  67. 67.

    For an enlightening study of accidents in recent wars, see Larson and Savych 2006. See Chap. 3 for the key ‘misfortunes’ during Allied Force.

  68. 68.

    See Posen 2000, pp. 39–84.

  69. 69.

    See Larson and Savych 2006, pp. 43–57 for the Al Firdos incident during Desert Storm. The Al Firdos accident that killed two to three hundred civilians highlighted the increasing aversion for civilian casualties and the dramatically strengthened bombing norm. The target was a functioning C2 bunker in Baghdad, and thus a legitimate military target; however, unbeknownst to US planners, it was also used during nighttime as a bomb shelter for Ba’ath party family members. Precisely because it was located in an urban area, the planners had decided to attack it at night when the risk of civilians nearby was low. Exploited by Saddam Hussain in the media, it was a moral, political and strategic crisis because it threatened the stability of the coalition and international support. The result was that Chairman of the JCS, General Colin Powell, put Baghdad off limits for further strategic attacks.

  70. 70.

    Thomas 2001, p. 164.

  71. 71.

    See, e.g., Latham 2002; McInnes 2002; Maoz and Gat (eds) 2001, in particular Luttwak 2001 and Gat 2001.

  72. 72.

    Ignatieff 2002.

  73. 73.

    See Shaw 2005, in particular Chap. 4. For a broader discussion on the Risk Society, see, e.g., Rasmussen 2006; and Coker 2009.

  74. 74.

    See, e.g., Shue 2010, pp. 2–8; Smith 2002; Thomas 2006; and Crawford 2013.

  75. 75.

    Gat 2001, p. 86.

  76. 76.

    Eventually, these became a category of so called time-critical targets. The 2001 US Joint Pub 3–60 Joint Doctrine for Targeting defined time-sensitive targets as “air-, land- or sea-based targets of such high priority to the friendly force that the JFC designates them as requiring immediate response because they pose (or will pose) a danger to friendly forces or because they are highly lucrative, fleeting targets of opportunity.”

  77. 77.

    Rumsfeld 2002, pp. 20–32. For a comprehensive overview of these developments, see, e.g., Kagan 2006.

  78. 78.

    For a concise description of the tenets of Transformation, see Farrell et al. 2010, Chap. 2. For a thorough overview of the evolution of air command and control, see Kometer 2007. The concept of NCW is discussed in detail in Alberts 1999. Another influential volume is Arquilla and Ronfeldt 1997.

  79. 79.

    Lambeth 2005, pp. 247–252. This book is the most detailed open source study of the campaign.

  80. 80.

    Lambeth 2005, p. 260.

  81. 81.

    Fyfe 2005, p. 11.

  82. 82.

    For this argument, see in particular Biddle 2003a, pp. 31–46.

  83. 83.

    Kometer 2007, pp. 129–137.

  84. 84.

    Lambeth 2005, p. 254. See 254–258 for a detailed description of the linking of various platforms.

  85. 85.

    See Crawford 2013, pp. 351–356; Graham 2003; US Department of Defense 2000.

  86. 86.

    For detailed analysis see Mahnken and Keaney 2007; Murray and Scales 2003; Woodward 2004; and Cordesman 2003.

  87. 87.

    Kometer 2007, p. 203.

  88. 88.

    US Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center, Commander’s Handbook for Joint Time-Sensitive Targeting, 22 March 2002.

  89. 89.

    Fyfe 2005, pp. 18–19.

  90. 90.

    Lambeth 2013, p. 33. This is the most detailed study as far as targeting and command and control is concerned.

  91. 91.

    Lambeth 2013, p. 35. See the entire Chap. 1 for a detailed overview of the joint planning process.

  92. 92.

    Kometer 2007, p. 204.

  93. 93.

    Fyfe 2005, p. 21.

  94. 94.

    Lambeth 2013, p. 203.

  95. 95.

    See Lambeth 2013, Chap. 4 for key accomplishments.

  96. 96.

    See Andres 2007a, pp. 52–64; and Andres 2007, pp. 69–88.

  97. 97.

    Mueller 2010, pp. 47–65. See for an up to date discussion of air power in COIN, Hayward (ed) 2009.

  98. 98.

    The literature on so called drone warfare is extensive. For a representative overview, see Osinga 2013.

  99. 99.

    See in particular Rid and Hecker 2009, for a detailed account of the use of social media by insurgents groups.

  100. 100.

    See Dunlap 2009, pp. 34–39.

  101. 101.

    This section draws in particular from Krebs 2009, pp. 141–156; and from Brun 2010, pp. 297–324. For a detailed analysis see also Arkin 2007.

  102. 102.

    This section on Israeli counter terrorism practices involving leadership targeting draws from Wilner 2011a, pp. 740–772; Stahl 2010, pp. 111–133; Wilner 2011b, pp. 3–37; Inbar and Shamir 2013, pp. 1–23; Byman 2006; Rid 2012, pp. 124–147; and Henriksen 2012.

  103. 103.

    Hamas likewise has exploited the protected status of mosques, schools and civilians homes to hide weapons caches. See Erlanger 2009.

  104. 104.

    Cordesman 2009. See for a extensive analysis Lambeth 2011.

  105. 105.

    As quoted in Crawford 2013, p. 19.

  106. 106.

    The three main databases are: The New America Foundation 2013; Roggio and Mayer 2013; The Bureau of Investigative Journalism 2011. See further Cole et al. 2010; New America Foundation 2012; The Bureau of Investigative Journalism 2012; Heller 2013, pp. 94–103.

  107. 107.

    Bandura 1999, p. 193; Alston and Shamsi 2010.

  108. 108.

    Miller 2011.

  109. 109.

    U.N. Human Rights Council 2013a.

  110. 110.

    Becker and Shane 2012. See also Boyle 2013, pp. 6–9; U.N. Human Rights Council 2010, p. 3; U.N. Human Rights Council 2013b.

  111. 111.

    See for instance Byman 2013; Frank 2013; Savage 2012; Johnston 2012, pp. 47–79; and book length nuanced analysis such as Williams 2013; and Strawser (ed) 2013.

  112. 112.

    U.N. Human Rights Council 2013c, p. 23.

  113. 113.

    Statement in Kellenberger 2011.

  114. 114.

    Baker 2013.

  115. 115.

    Thomas 2001, pp. 162–164.

  116. 116.

    Isscharoff and Pildest 2013, pp. 1522–1523.

  117. 117.

    Coker 2002, pp. 2–5.

  118. 118.

    Coker 2002, p. 13.

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Osinga, F.P.B., Roorda, M.P. (2016). From Douhet to Drones, Air Warfare, and the Evolution of Targeting. In: Ducheine, P., Schmitt, M., Osinga, F. (eds) Targeting: The Challenges of Modern Warfare. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-072-5_3

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