Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Regulating Public Services and International Investment Law

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Services of General Interest Beyond the Single Market

Part of the book series: Legal Issues of Services of General Interest ((LEGAL))

Abstract

International investment law is increasingly becoming an important reference field of international economic law. The chapter examines if, and the extent to which, investment arbitral tribunals sought to meet the need to respect host State’s capacity to regulate in the public interest. Preliminarily, the chapter deals with the notion of regulation in the public service sector, by exploring its categorization as a right and as a duty of States. Subsequently, it assesses whether the regulation of public services is a matter falling within international investment law’s scope of application and whether all regulatory measures used to govern public services’ provision may fall under international arbitral tribunals’ scrutiny. It then analyses the controversial distinction between lawful regulation and regulatory expropriation under international investment law. To this purpose, the chapter takes into consideration the different approaches adopted by arbitral tribunals, in order to evaluate their capacity to meaningfully contribute to find a balance between investors’ and States’ competing interests with regard to public services. Lastly, the analysis turns to the increasingly important role played by the fair and equitable treatment standard in arbitral practice, also with regard to public services’ cases. In particular, this part of the chapter looks at the difficulties in finding an equilibrium between stability and regulatory change in the public services’ sector, by examining the impact of the legitimate expectations doctrine upon host States’ regulatory autonomy.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Hardcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    The term has not a uniform definition under international law. This paper will use it as indicating all those activities that States subject to specific obligations in order to meet objectives of general interest. The term will mostly, albeit not exclusively, cover services provided through network industries, such as electricity, gas and water. On the definition of the notion of “public service” see below Sect. 4.2.

  2. 2.

    Krajewski 2003a, p. 4.

  3. 3.

    The Glossary of Industrial Organisation Economics and Competition Law, compiled by R.S. Khemani and D.M. Shapiro, commissioned by the Directorate for Financial, Fiscal and Enterprise Affairs, OECD, 1993 defines regulation as the “imposition of rules by government, backed by the use of penalties that are intended specifically to modify the economic behaviour of individuals and firms in the private sector”. An equally broad definition is used by Mitnick 1980, 1. The A. defines regulation as “[…] the intentional restriction of a subject’s choice of activity by an entity not directly party or involved in that activity”.

  4. 4.

    This distinction is not to be taken too rigidly, as regulatory measures normally pursue different types of objectives simultaneously. See Krajewski 2003a, p. 18.

  5. 5.

    Baldwin and Cave 1999, Chap. 2. Conversely, according to the private interest theories of regulation, regulatory functions are not meant to serve the public interest, as they are captured by powerful private groups. See Stigler 1971, pp. 122–126.

  6. 6.

    Baldwin and Cave 1999, p. 9.

  7. 7.

    Palast et al. 2003.

  8. 8.

    Houben 2008, pp. 7–27.

  9. 9.

    See Hauriou 1927; Jèze 1926, pp. 171–172.

  10. 10.

    But these efforts seems to be to no avail, as the notion of services of general economic interest, as well as its relationship with other related concepts, such as that of services of general interest, is still uncertain and it has generated much confusion. See generally Neergaard 2009, pp. 17–50.

  11. 11.

    European Commission, Green Paper on Services of General Interest, COM(2003) 270 final, 21 May 2003, para 17.

  12. 12.

    Lowe 2002, pp. 450–451.

  13. 13.

    The recognition of this right sought to respond to the concerns that the adoption of GATS could jeopardise States’ capacity to regulate services and, in particular, public services. The WTO website also features a section devoted to “Misunderstanding and scare stories: The right to regulate” (http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/gats_factfiction11_e.htm). On the relationship between trade and public services see Arena 2011, pp. 489–528; Krajewski 2003b, pp. 341–367; Adlung 2006, pp. 455–485.

  14. 14.

    See Hariou 1901, pp. 26–27.

  15. 15.

    Duguit 1925, p. 55.

  16. 16.

    M. Krajewski, Investment Law and Public Services http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2038514. 1 April 1 2012. Accessed 20 November 2014.

  17. 17.

    See High Commissioner for Human Rights, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Handbook for National Human Rights Institutions, United Nations: New York—Geneva (2005), 18 where it says that “[t]he obligation to fulfil economic, social and cultural rights […] can entail issues such as […] the provision of basic public services and infrastructures”.

  18. 18.

    Graham 2005, pp. 33–56.

  19. 19.

    UN Economic and Social Council, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (focusing on the concept of progressive realization of economic, social and cultural rights), E/2007/82, 25 June 2007, paras 34–36.

  20. 20.

    UN General Assembly, Resolution adopted by the Human Rights Council. Human Rights and Access to Safe Drinking Water and Sanitation, A/HRC/RES/15/9, 6 October 2010.

  21. 21.

    UNCTAD, Scope and Definition, Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements II. UN Publication, 2011, pp. 7–12. New York, Geneva.

  22. 22.

    M. Krajewski, Public Services in Bilateral Free Trade Agreements of the EU http://www.epsu.org/IMG/pdf/PublicServicesFTAs_FinalVersion.pdf, p. 7. Accessed 20 November 2014. See also Arena 2011, pp. 495–496.

  23. 23.

    North American Free Trade Agreement between the Government of Canada, the Government of the United Mexican States and the Government of the United States of America, 12 December 1992, Annex II.

  24. 24.

    Australia—United States Free Trade Agreement, 18 May 2004, Annex II.

  25. 25.

    Colombia—United States Free Trade Agreement, 22 November 2006, Annex II.

  26. 26.

    Republic of Korea—United States Free Trade Agreement, 30 June 2007, Annex II.

  27. 27.

    On the different interpretation of the words “on a commercial basis” see Arena 2011, p. 502.

  28. 28.

    Krajewski 2003b, p. 350.

  29. 29.

    See generally Burke-White 2010, pp. 407–432.

  30. 30.

    In the second half of the ‘90s the growth of public debt drove the country into recession that caused massive protests and social rests, as most of Argentina’s households were no longer able to cope with everyday life expenses. In order to guarantee the access to basic public services, the Government first forced private investors to accept a temporary tariffs’ freezing. Subsequently, in January 2002, it adopted the Ley de Emergencia, which terminated tariffs’ automatic adjustment mechanism, based on the US Producer Price Index (PPI), as well as the peso-to-dollar 1-to-1 peg.

  31. 31.

    Schreuer 1996, pp. 318–492.

  32. 32.

    Methanex Corp. v. United States of America , UNCITRAL Case, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility of 7 August 2002, para 139. This notwithstanding the fact that Article 1101 NAFTA only speaks of measures “relating to” investments or investors of another party.

  33. 33.

    CMS Gas Transmission Company v. The Republic of Argentina , ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction of 7 July 2003, para 33. See also Total S.A. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/1, Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction of 25 August 2006, para 59; Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. and Vivendi International S.S. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19 and AWG Group Ltd. v. The Argentine Republic, UNCITRAL Case, Decision on Jurisdiction of 3 August 2006, paras 27–31; Telefonica S.A. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/20, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction of 25 May 2006; paras 62–67; Gas Natural SDG S.A. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/10, Decision on Preliminary Questions on Jurisdiction of 17 July 2005, paras 37–39.

  34. 34.

    AES Corp. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/17, Decision on Jurisdiction of 26 April 2005, para 57.

  35. 35.

    Van Harten and Loughlin 2006, p. 146.

  36. 36.

    Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. and Vivendi International S.S. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19 and AWG Group Ltd. v. The Argentine Republic, UNCITRAL Case, Decision on Liability of 30 July 2010, para 132.

  37. 37.

    One of the best-know definitions of indirect expropriation is that elaborated by the Iran-US Claims Tribunal in the Starrett Housing decision, where it has been observed that “[…] it is recognized in international law that measures taken by a State can interfere with property rights to such an extent that these rights are rendered so useless that they must deemed to have been expropriated, even though the State does not purport to have expropriated them and the legal title to the property formally remains with original owner” (Starret Housing Corp. v. Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. ITL 32-24-1 of 19 December 1983, Iran-US CTR, 4, 154).

  38. 38.

    See generally, Newcombe 2005, pp. 1–57; Coe and Rubins 2005, pp. 597–667.

  39. 39.

    See Sacerdoti 1997, p. 381; Higgins 1983, p. 324; Christie 1962, pp. 310–311.

  40. 40.

    For an overview of these references in some international investment agreements, see UNCTAD, Expropriation. A Sequel, Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements II. UN Publication, 2012, pp. 8–12. New York, Geneva.

  41. 41.

    Norwegian Shipowners Claims, 13 October 1922, UNRIAA, I, 1922, 334.

  42. 42.

    Case concerning certain German interests in Polish Upper Silesia (The Merits), 25 May 1925, PCIJ, Ser. A, 7, 1926; Interpretation of Judgements Nos. 7 and 8 (The Chorzów Factory), 16 December 1927, PCIJ, Ser. A, 13, 1927; The Oscar Chinn Case, 12 December 1934, PCIJ, Ser. A, 63, 1934.

  43. 43.

    Starrett Housing, above n 37, para 154. The Iran-US Claims Tribunal’s contribution to the development of the legal notion of indirect expropriation has been substantial, also from a quantitative perspective as this issue has been dealt with in more than 60 cases. See Brower and Brueschke 1998.

  44. 44.

    See Lowe 2002, pp. 457–460.

  45. 45.

    Reinisch 2008, p. 432.

  46. 46.

    AWG/Suez, above n 36, para 132.

  47. 47.

    S.D. Mayers Inc. v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, Partial Award of 13 November 2000, para 282.

  48. 48.

    Sempra Energy International v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award of 28 September 2007, para 284.

  49. 49.

    The same paragraph pointed out that “[t]he list of measures could be expanded significantly”.

  50. 50.

    See also PSEG Global Inc., The North American Coal Corp., and Konya Ilgin Elektrik Üritim ve Ticaret Limited Sirketi v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/25, Award of 19 January 2007, para 278.

  51. 51.

    CMS Gas Transmission Company v. The Republic of Argentina , ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Final Award of 12 May 2005, para 262.

  52. 52.

    LG&E Energy Corp., LG&E Capital Corp. And LG&E International Inc. v. The Argentine Republic , ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability of 3 October 2006, para 199.

  53. 53.

    Compañia de Aguas del Aconquijia S.A. and Vivendi Universal S.A. v. The Argentine Republic , ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Award of 20 August 2007, para 7.5.34.

  54. 54.

    Dolzer 2003, p. 78.

  55. 55.

    Arena 2011, pp. 515–516. The author uses the concept to describe GATS approach toward public services.

  56. 56.

    LG&E, above n 52, para 195.

  57. 57.

    Vivendi II, above n 53, para 7.5.20. The same approach has been consistently adopted also by the Iran-US Claims Tribunal: see, for instance, Tippets, Abbett, McCarthy, Stratton v. TAMS-AFFA Consulting Engineers of Iran, Award No. 141-7-2 of 29 June 1984, Iran-US CTR, 21, para 115.

  58. 58.

    See Wälde and Dow 2000, pp. 1–61; Sacerdoti 1999.

  59. 59.

    Reisman and Sloane 2004, p. 129; Brownlie 2003, p. 509.

  60. 60.

    Azurix v. Argentine Republic , ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award of 14 July 2006, para 310.

  61. 61.

    LG&E, above n 52, para 191.

  62. 62.

    Sempra, above n 48, paras 284–285.

  63. 63.

    Vivendi II, above n 53, para 7.5.11; Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Award of 22 May 2007, 245; CMS, above n 51, para 262. In this regard Coe and Rubins 2005, p. 621 observe that “the sense often conveyed is that interference must approach total impairment”.

  64. 64.

    This leniency would represent a counterbalance to the far stricter interpretative stance adopted with regard to the fair and equitable treatment. In this manner, arbitral tribunals would seek to “comfort loosing respondents—“giving them something”—by declaring that there was no expropriation”. See Paulsson 2006, p. 7.

  65. 65.

    See Christie 1962, p. 388; White 1961, p. 145.

  66. 66.

    See recently Karkkainen 2006.

  67. 67.

    American Law Institute 1987, para 712(1).

  68. 68.

    Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, 12 April 1988.

  69. 69.

    Newcombe 2005, p. 26.

  70. 70.

    H. Mann, The Final Decision on Methanex v. United States: Some New Wine in Some New Bottles. International Institute for Sustainable Development http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2005/commentary_methanex.pdf. August 2005. Accessed 20 November 2014; Freeman 2003, p. 208. See also Clough 2005, p. 563.

  71. 71.

    Schreuer 2005a, p. 28.

  72. 72.

    Azurix, above n 60, paras 310–311. See Costamagna 2006.

  73. 73.

    Cross-regime comparison has been often advocated as a way to increase the capacity of international arbitral tribunals to deal with non-economic values and, implicitly, enhance their legitimacy. However, this approach has been criticized, highlighting that boundary crossing is not always desiderable and that, in any case, international arbitrators engaging in it should pay greater attention to the context. In this sense see J.E. Alvarez, Beware: Boundary Crossing. http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/sela/Bewareboundarycrossings_nofootnotes_%282%29.pdf. 19 March 2013. Accessed 20 November 2014.

  74. 74.

    Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. United Mexican States , ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award of 29 May 2003, paras 121–122.

  75. 75.

    See Henckels 2012, pp. 234–237.

  76. 76.

    See, ex multis, Schill 2012, pp. 87–119; Leonhardsen 2012, pp. 95–136, Stone Sweet 2010, pp. 47–76; Kingsbury and Schill 2010, pp. 75–104.

  77. 77.

    Paulsson 2006, p. 2.

  78. 78.

    Stone Sweet and Matthews 2008, p. 83. See also Wälde and Kolo 2001, pp. 827–835.

  79. 79.

    Contra Burke-White and von Staden 2010, p. 287.

  80. 80.

    Henckels 2012, p. 239; Kingsbury and Schill 2010, p. 79.

  81. 81.

    Henckels 2012, p. 238.

  82. 82.

    Kavanagh 2008, p. 186.

  83. 83.

    Henckels 2012, p. 240.

  84. 84.

    Burke-White and von Staden 2010, pp. 287–295.

  85. 85.

    LG&E, above n 52, para 195.

  86. 86.

    Henckels 2012, p. 255.

  87. 87.

    S. Schill, Deference in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Re-Conceptualizing the Standard of Review through Comparative Public Law. http://ssrn.com/abstract=2095334. 28 June 2012, p. 27. Accessed 20 November 2014.

  88. 88.

    Krajewski, above n 16, p. 3.

  89. 89.

    Schreuer 2007, p. 92.

  90. 90.

    Dolzer 2005, p. 87.

  91. 91.

    AWG/Suez, above n 36, para 188.

  92. 92.

    International Thunderbird Gaming v. The United Mexican States, UNCITRAL (NAFTA), Arbitral Award of 26 January 2006, Separate Opinion of Prof. T. Wälde. See also Sempra, above n 48, para 301.

  93. 93.

    S. Schill, Fair and Equitable Treatment under Investment Treaties as an Embodiment of the Rule of Law. Global Administrative Law Series, IILJ Working Paper 2006/6, p. 5.

  94. 94.

    Choudhury 2005, p. 297.

  95. 95.

    Dolzer 2005, p. 88.

  96. 96.

    Lowe 2002, p. 455. See also Haynes 2013, pp. 114–146.

  97. 97.

    See Potestà 2013, pp. 90–93. See also Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. and Vivendi International S.S. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19 and AWG Group Ltd. v. The Argentine Republic, UNCITRAL Case, Decision on Liability of 30 July 2010, Dissenting Opinion of Arbitrator Pedro Nikken, para 3, arguing against the possibility of including this item in the FET.

  98. 98.

    Tecmed, above n 74, para 154. See also Sempra, above n 48, para 299. Contra Gazzini 2009, p. 117.

  99. 99.

    Treaty between United States of America and the Argentine Republic Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, 14 November 1991.

  100. 100.

    El Paso Energy International Company v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, Award of 31 October 2011, para 355. See also AWG/Suez, above n 36, para 222. In this case, the Tribunal simply observed that “[i]n an effort to develop an operational method for determining the existence or non-existence of fair and equitable treatment, arbitral tribunals have increasingly taken into account the legitimate expectations that a host country has created in the investor and the extent to which conduct by the host government subsequent to the investment has frustrated those expectations”.

  101. 101.

    EDF v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/13, Award of 8 October 2009, para 216.

  102. 102.

    Saluka v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award of 17 March 2006, para 301.

  103. 103.

    Hirsch 2011, p. 786.

  104. 104.

    UNCTAD, Fair and Equitable Treatment. A Sequel. Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements II. UN Publication, 2012, p. 63. New York, Geneva.

  105. 105.

    See Vernon 1967, pp. 81–89. See more recently, Woodhouse 2006, pp. 121–219.

  106. 106.

    Vivendi II, above n 53, para 7.4.19.

  107. 107.

    CMS, above n 51, para 277. See also Schreuer 2005b, p. 374.

  108. 108.

    El Paso, above n 100, para 371.

  109. 109.

    Doak Bishop and Aguirre Luzi 2005, p. 432.

  110. 110.

    Law No 25.561 of 6 January 2002.

  111. 111.

    CMS, above n 51, para 275.

  112. 112.

    Ibid., para 274.

  113. 113.

    LG&E, above n 52, para 125.

  114. 114.

    Ibid., para 131. This conclusion echoes the very demanding, and much criticized, standard developed in Tecmed (para 154). Douglas observed that “[t]he Tecmed ‘standard’ is not a standard at all; it is rather a description of perfect public regulation in a perfect world, to which all States should aspire but very few (if any) will ever attain”. See Douglas 2006, p. 28.

  115. 115.

    Enron, above n 63, paras 266–268.

  116. 116.

    This approach seems to reflect what Crema convincingly described as the international investment regime’s cultural bias against domestic regulation. Indeed in this framework “excessive domestic regulation, discriminatory or not, unfair or not, is in any case problematic: it is a local, particularistic obstacle to the bigger game of reallocating resources in a better way for the good of a greater number of persons”. See Crema 2014, pp. 60–61.

  117. 117.

    El Paso, above n 100, para 373.

  118. 118.

    See generally Potestà 2013, pp. 100–117; Hirsch 2011, pp. 787–797.

  119. 119.

    See recently Bertoli and Crespi Reghizzi 2014, p. 36.

  120. 120.

    Schreuer 2005b, p. 374. Contra Boute 2011, pp. 523–526.

  121. 121.

    Total S.A. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/01, Decision on Liability of 27 December 2010, para 129.

  122. 122.

    Steele 2005, p. 303.

  123. 123.

    CJEU, Case C-245/81, Edeka Zentrale AG v Germany [1982], ECR 2745, para 27; CJEU, Case C-52/81, Offene Handelsgesellschaft in Firma Werner Faust v Commission, [1982], ECR 3745, para 27; CJEU, Joined Cases 424-425/85, Cooeperative Melkproducentenbedrijven Noord-Nederland BA (Frico) and Others v Voedselvoorzienings In—en Verkoopbureau [1987], ECR 2755, para 33. See generally Craig 2006, pp. 635–639; Tridimas 2006, pp. 273–280.

  124. 124.

    LG&E, above n 52, para 133.

  125. 125.

    Enron, above n 63, para 265.

  126. 126.

    CMS, above n 51, para 277.

  127. 127.

    Potestà 2013, p. 112. Contra Hirsch 2011, pp. 789–790.

  128. 128.

    Continental Casualty Company v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award of 5 September 2008, para 261.

  129. 129.

    Ibid., paras 376–377 (emphasis in the original).

  130. 130.

    Total, above n 121, para 117.

  131. 131.

    Ibid., para 121.

  132. 132.

    Ibid., para 122.

  133. 133.

    Arena 2011, pp. 515–516.

  134. 134.

    Krajewski 2012, p. 366.

  135. 135.

    Sempra, above n 48, para 304; Enron, above n 63, para 268. The only exception in this regard is the LG&E decision, which recognized the economic hardship and “certain political and social realities that may have influenced the Government’s response to the growing economic difficulties”, but considered that Argentina “went too far” (para 139).

  136. 136.

    CFI, Case T-155/99, Dieckmann & Hansen [2001], ECR II-3143; See Craig 2006, pp. 639–641.

  137. 137.

    Ibid., para 81.

  138. 138.

    Wade and Forsyth 2000, p. 242.

  139. 139.

    Total, above n 121, para 160.

  140. 140.

    Ibid., para 162.

  141. 141.

    AWG/Suez, above n 36, para 236. See Tanzi 2013, pp. 592–596. See also Tanzi 2014, pp. 318–335.

  142. 142.

    See above para 4.4.3.

  143. 143.

    Total, above n 121, para 164. This conclusion is opposite to the one reached in CMS, despite the fact that these two cases concerned the very same measures and the very same situation, as both Total and CMS we shareholders of TGN.

  144. 144.

    R. v. North and East Devon Authority ex p. Coughlan, 1999, LGR703, para 57. Clayton 2003, pp. 98–102 which highlights that the categorization may result over simplistic in the light of a much more complex reality. See also Craig 2006, p. 650 which observes that “[t]he ECJ and the CFI have been rather reluctant to assign a discrete legal label to this exercise. It has therefore been left to commentators to divine the legal test for the courts’ reasoning”.

  145. 145.

    R. v. Secretary of State for Education and Employment, ex p. Begbie, 2000, 1 WLR 1115, para 82.

  146. 146.

    See Quinot 2004, p. 72, which notes that “the ECJ is generally as deferential to administrative discretion, especially in matters regarding policy, as its English counterparts”.

  147. 147.

    Schømberg 2001, p. 150.

  148. 148.

    See Craig 2006, pp. 649–652.

  149. 149.

    Gorraiz Lizarraga et al. v. Spain, Judgment of 27 April 2004, Ap. No. 62543/00 (emphasis added).

  150. 150.

    Dieckmann & Hansen, above n 136, paras 47–56.

  151. 151.

    Contra, although not with regard to the public services sector, see De Luca 2014, pp. 151–152.

References

  • Adlung R (2006) Public services and the GATS. J Int Econ Law 9(2):455–485

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • American Law Institute (1987) Restatement (third) of the foreign relations law of the United States. American Law Institute Publishers, Saint Paul

    Google Scholar 

  • Arena A (2011) The GATS notion of public services as an instance of intergovernmental agnosticism: comparative insights from the EU’s supranational dialectic. J World Trade 45(3):489–528

    Google Scholar 

  • Baldwin R, Cave M (1999) Understanding regulation—theory, strategy and practice. OUP, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Bertoli P, Crespi Reghizzi Z (2014) Regulatory measures, standards of treatment and the law applicable to investment disputes. In: Treves T, Seatzu F, Trevisanut S (eds) Foreign investment, international law and common concerns. Routledge, London, pp 26–49

    Google Scholar 

  • Boute A (2011) Challenging the re-regulation of liberalized electricity prices under investment arbitration. Energy Law J 32(2):497–539

    Google Scholar 

  • Brower CH, Brueschke JD (1998) The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal. Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague

    Google Scholar 

  • Brownlie I (2003) Principles of public international law, 6th edn. OUP, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Burke-White WW (2010) The argentine financial crisis: state liability under BITs and the legitimacy of the ICSID system. In: Waibel M (ed) The backlash against investment arbitration: perceptions and reality. Kluwer Law International, The Hague, pp 407–432

    Google Scholar 

  • Burke-White WW, von Staden A (2010) Private litigation in a public sphere: the standard of review in investor-state arbitrations. Yale J Int Law 35(2):283–346

    Google Scholar 

  • Coe J Jr, Rubins N (2005) Regulatory expropriation and the Tecmed case: context and contributions. In: Weiler T (ed) International investment law and arbitration: leading cases from ICSID, NAFTA, bilateral treaties and customary international law. Cameron May, London, pp 597–667

    Google Scholar 

  • Choudhury B (2005) Evolution or devolution? Defining fair and equitable treatment in international investment law. J World Invest Trade 6(2):297–320

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Christie GC (1962) What constitutes a taking under international law? Br Yearb Int Law 38:310–311

    Google Scholar 

  • Clayton R (2003) Legitimate expectations, policy and the principle of consistency. Camb Law J 62(1):93–105

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Clough D (2005) Regulatory expropriation and competition under NAFTA. J World Invest Trade 6(4):553–584

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Costamagna F (2006) Legitimate regulation vs regulatory expropriation in public infrastructure investments after Azurix. Transnatl Dispute Management 4(2)

    Google Scholar 

  • Craig P (2006) EU administrative law. OUP, Oxford

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Crema L (2014) Investors’ rights and well-being. Remarks on the interpretation of investment treaties in light of other rights. In: Treves T, Seatzu F, Trevisanut S (eds) Foreign investment, international law and common concerns. Routledge, London, pp 50–70

    Google Scholar 

  • De Luca A (2014) Non trade values protection and investment protection in EU investment policy. In: Treves T, Seatzu F, Trevisanut S (eds) Foreign investment, international law and common concerns. Routledge, London, pp 137–153

    Google Scholar 

  • Doak Bishop R, Aguirre Luzi R (2005) Investment claims: first lessons from Argentina. In: Weiler T (ed) International investment law and arbitration: leading cases from the ICSID, NAFTA, bilateral treaties and customary international law. Cameron May, London, pp 425–469

    Google Scholar 

  • Dolzer R (2003) Indirect expropriation: new developments? NYU Environ Law J 11(1):64–93

    Google Scholar 

  • Dolzer R (2005) Fair and equitable treatment: a key standard in investment treaties. Int Lawyer 39(1):87–106

    Google Scholar 

  • Douglas Z (2006) Nothing if not critical for investment treaty arbitration. Arbitr Int 22(1):27–51

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Duguit L (1925) Traité de droit constitutionel. Vol 5, Les libertés publiques, 2nd edn. Ancienne Librairie Fontemoing, Paris

    Google Scholar 

  • Freeman EM (2003) Regulatory expropriation under NAFTA chapter 11: some lessons from the European Court of Human Rights. Columbia J Transnatl Law 42:177–215

    Google Scholar 

  • Gazzini T (2009) General principles of law in the field of foreign investment. J World Invest Trade 10(1):103–119

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Graham C (2005) Human rights and the privatization of public utilities and essential services. In: De Feyter K, Gómez Isa F (eds) Privatization and human rights in the age of globalization. Intersentia, Antwerp, pp 33–56

    Google Scholar 

  • Haynes J (2013) The evolving nature of the fair and equitable (FET) standard: challenging its increasing pervasiveness in light of developing countries’ concerns: the case for regulatory rebalancing. J World Invest Trade 14(1):114–146

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hauriou M (1927) Précis de droit administratif et de droit public, 11th edn. Sirey, Paris

    Google Scholar 

  • Henckels C (2012) Indirect expropriation and the right to regulate: revisiting proportionality analysis and the standard of review in investor-state arbitration. J Int Econ Law 15(1):223–255

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Higgins R (1983) The taking of property by the state: recent developments in international law. Recueil des Courses—Hague Acad Int Law 176:259–391

    Google Scholar 

  • Hirsch M (2011) Between fair and equitable treatment and stabilization clause: stable legal environment and regulatory change in international investment law. J World Invest Trade 12(6):783–806

    Google Scholar 

  • Houben I (2008) Public services obligations: moral counterbalance of technical liberalization legislation. Eur Rev Private Law 16(1):7–27

    Google Scholar 

  • Jèze G (1926) Le service public. Revista de Drept Public, pp 167–179

    Google Scholar 

  • Karkkainen BC (2006) The Police power revised: phantom incorporation and the roots of takings “muddle”. Minn Law Rev 90:826–913

    Google Scholar 

  • Kavanagh A (2008) Deference or defiance? The limits of the judicial role in constitutional adjudication. In: Huscroft G (ed) Expounding the constitution: essays in constitutional theory. OUP, Oxford, pp 184–216

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Kingsbury B, Schill S (2010) Public law concepts to balance investor’s rights with state regulatory actions in the public interest—the concept of proportionality. In: Schill S (ed) International investment law and comparative public law. OUP, Oxford, pp 75–104

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Krajewski M (2003a) National regulation and trade liberalization in services—the legal impact of the general agreement on trade in services (GATS) on national regulatory autonomy. Kluwer Law International, The Hague

    Google Scholar 

  • Krajewski M (2003b) Public services and trade liberalization: mapping the legal framework. J Int Econ Law 6(2):341–367

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Krajewski M (2012) The impact of international investment agreements on energy regulation. Eur Yearb Int Econ Law 3:343–369

    Google Scholar 

  • Leonhardsen E (2012) Looking for legitimacy: exploring proportionality analysis in investment treaty arbitration. J Int Dispute Settl 3(1):95–136

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lowe V (2002) Regulation or expropriation? Curr Legal Prob 55:447–466

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mitnick BM (1980) The political economy of regulation. Columbia University Press, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Neergaard U (2009) Services of general economic interest: the nature of the beast. In: Krajewski M, Neergaard U, van de Gronden J (eds) The changing legal framework for services of general interest in Europe. TMC Asser Press, The Hague, pp 17–50

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Newcombe A (2005) The boundaries of regulatory expropriation in international law. ICSID Rev Foreign Invest Law J 20(1):1–57

    Google Scholar 

  • Palast G, Oppenheimer J, MacGregor T (2003) Democracy and regulation: how the public can govern essential services. Pluto Press, London-Sterling

    Google Scholar 

  • Paulsson J (2006) Indirect expropriation: is the right to regulate at risk? Transnatl Dispute Manage 3(2):8–9

    Google Scholar 

  • Potestà M (2013) Legitimate expectations in investment treaty law: understanding the roots and the limits of a controversial concept. ICSID Rev Foreign Invest Law J 28(1):88–122

    Google Scholar 

  • Quinot G (2004) Substantive legitimate expectations in South African and European administrative law. Ger Law J 5(1):65–85

    Google Scholar 

  • Reinisch A (2008) Expropriation. In: Muchlinski P, Ortino F, Schreuer C (eds) The Oxford handbook of international investment law. OUP, Oxford, pp 407–458

    Google Scholar 

  • Reisman RW, Sloane RD (2004) Indirect expropriation and its valuation in the BIT generation. Br Yearb Int Law 74:115–150

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sacerdoti G (1997) Bilateral treaties and multilateral instruments on investment protection. Recueil des Courses Hague Acad Int Law 269:251–460

    Google Scholar 

  • Sacerdoti G (1999) The source and evolution of international legal protection for infrastructure investments confronting political and regulatory risk. CEPMLP On-Line J 5(3):7

    Google Scholar 

  • Schill S (2012) Cross-regime harmonization through proportionality analysis; the case of international investment law, the law of state immunity and human rights. ICSID Rev Foreign Invest Law J 27(1):87–119

    Google Scholar 

  • Schømberg S (2001) Legitimate expectations in administrative law. OUP, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Schreuer C (1996) Commentary on the ICSID convention. Article 25. ICSID Rev Foreign Invest Law J 11(2):318–492

    Google Scholar 

  • Schreuer C (2005a) The concept of expropriation under the ECT and other investments protection treaties. Transnatl Dispute Manage 2(5)

    Google Scholar 

  • Schreuer C (2005b) Fair and equitable treatment in arbitral practice. J World Invest Trade 6(3):357–386

    Google Scholar 

  • Schreuer C (2007) Fair and equitable treatment in investment treaty law. In: Ortino F, Liberti L, Sheppard A, Warner H (eds) Investment treaty law, current issues II. British Institute on International and Comparative Law, London, pp 92–96

    Google Scholar 

  • Steele I (2005) Substantive legitimate expectations: striking the rights balance. Law Q Rev 121:300–328

    Google Scholar 

  • Stigler G (1971) The theory of economic regulation. Bell J Econ Manage Sci 2(1):3–21

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Stone Sweet A (2010) Investor-state arbitration: proportionality’s new frontier. Law Ethics Hum Rights 4(1):47–76

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Stone Sweet A, Matthews J (2008) Proportionality balancing and global constitutionalism. Columbia J Transnatl Law 47:72–164

    Google Scholar 

  • Tanzi A (2013) Recent trends in international investment arbitration and the protection of human rights in the public services sector. In: Boschiero N, Scovazzi T, Pitea C, Ragni C (eds) International courts and the development of international law. Essays in Honour of Tullio Treves, TMC Asser Press, The Hague, pp 587–598

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Tanzi A (2014) Public interest concerns in international investment arbitration in the water services sector. Problems and prospects for an integrated approach. In: Treves T, Seatzu F, Trevisanut S (eds) Foreign investment, international law and common concerns. Routledge, London, pp 318–335

    Google Scholar 

  • Tridimas T (2006) General principles of EU law, 2nd edn. OUP, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Van Harten G, Loughlin M (2006) Investment treaty arbitration as a species of global administrative law. Eur J Int Law 17(1):121–150

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Vernon R (1967) Long-run trends in concession contracts. Proc Am Soc Int Law 61:81–89

    Google Scholar 

  • Wade W, Forsyth C (2000) Administrative law, 8th edn. OUP, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Wälde T, Dow S (2000) Treaties and regulatory risk in infrastructure investment. J World Trade 34(2):1–61

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wälde T, Kolo A (2001) Environmental regulation, investment protection and ‘regulatory taking’ in international law. Int Comp Law Q 50:827–835

    Google Scholar 

  • White G (1961) Nationalization of foreign property. Praeger, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Woodhouse EJ (2006) The obsolescing bargain redux? Foreign investment in the electric power sector in developing countries. New York J Int Law Policy 38:121–219

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Associate Professor of European Union Law, University of Turin, Turin, Italy

    Francesco Costamagna

Authors
  1. Francesco Costamagna
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Francesco Costamagna .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Fachbereich Rechtswissenschaft, FAU Erlangen-Nürnberg, Erlangen, Germany

    Markus Krajewski

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2015 T.M.C. Asser Press and the authors

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Costamagna, F. (2015). Regulating Public Services and International Investment Law. In: Krajewski, M. (eds) Services of General Interest Beyond the Single Market. Legal Issues of Services of General Interest. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-063-3_4

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Societies and partnerships

Search

Navigation