Abstract
In the aftermath of the 2007 general elections in Kenya, widespread violence erupted. Subsequent inquiries by various commissions concluded that serious human rights violations, some of which amounting to crimes against humanity, had been committed, and that Kenya was duty-bound to investigate, prosecute and punish those responsible. This chapter describes the various aspects of the violence, and analyses the findings and recommendations of such inquiries, the main focus being the nature of the ensuing crimes and the agreed road map for domestic criminal accountability. It shows that the attempts to create a special tribunal for Kenya, which was at the core of the aforementioned road map, failed, and that such a failure resulted mainly from the lack of a political will at the domestic level. Most of the political elite favoured impunity, thereby frustrating the initiatives to implement the road map. However, the perception of the Kenyan civil society organizations and ordinary citizens remained that the crimes must not go unpunished, and that to achieve this, the masterminds of the violence, mostly politicians, must be prosecuted by an externally controlled judicial process, preferably the ICC.
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Notes
- 1.
These were presidential, parliamentary and civic elections. In total, there were nine presidential candidates, 2,548 candidates contesting for 310 parliamentary seats and 15,332 candidates contesting for 2,500 civic local authority seats. See Commonwealth Secretariat 2008, p. 28.
- 2.
Kibaki and Odinga had almost equal amount of support. Two weeks before the elections, opinion poll showed that the two were “virtually tied”, commanding 44 and 43 % of support, respectively. See East African Standard, 19 December 2007; Gallup, 17 December 2007.
- 3.
See United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 2008, p. 7. E.g., a poll revealed that “93 % of registered Luo voters planned to vote for Odinga, a Luo; 92 % of Kikuyus to vote for Kibaki, a Kikuyu; and 78 % of Kambas were for Musyoka, a Kamba”. See Gallup, 21 November 2007.
- 4.
See Constitution of Kenya of 1963, Article 41.
- 5.
No legal criteria were laid down for the President to follow in appointing of commissioners, save for the Chairman and Vice Chairman who were only supposed to be individuals with qualifications equal to those of High Court or Court of Appeal Judges. The President could also cancel the appointment of any commissioner by forming a five-member tribunal of his choice to advise him accordingly. See Ibid.
- 6.
E.g., such confidence had dropped from 60 % in 2006 to only 24 % in 2008. See Gallup 30 October 2008.
- 7.
- 8.
See Kenya National Commission on Human Rights 2007, p. 6.
- 9.
According to the official results of the Electoral Commission, in the presidential election, Kibaki garnered 4,584,721 votes (46 %), Raila Odinga 4,352,903 votes (44 %) and Kalonzo Musyoka (ODM-Kenya) 879,903 votes (9 %). In the parliamentary elections, the ODM got 99 seats, PNU (43 seats), the ODM-K (16 seats) and KANU (14 seats). See International Republican institute 2007, pp. 41–50.
- 10.
E.g., see BBC News, 8 January 2008; BBC News, 31 December 2007.
- 11.
BBC News, 8 January 2008; Lynch 2009, p. 1.
- 12.
African Press International, 12 January 2008; The Standard, 2 January 2008.
- 13.
The Citizen, 30 December 2011.
- 14.
See, e.g. East African Community Observer Mission 2008; European Union Election Observation Mission 2008; International Republican Institute 2008, pp. 31–34; Kenya Elections Domestic Observation Forum 2007; Kenya Human Rights Commission 2008; Kenyans for Peace with Truth and Justice 2008; Pan-African Parliament 2008; Republic of Kenya 2008b, pp. 115–138.
- 15.
See Gallup, 30 October 2008.
- 16.
See Kanyinga 2011, p. 97.
- 17.
See Law Society of Kenya 2008.
- 18.
See Articles 10 and 44 of the Constitution of Kenya of 1963, read together with ss. 19–23 and 28–30 of the National Assembly and Presidential Elections Act (R.E 2009).
- 19.
Specifically, Odinga’s party, ODM contended that it was “not possible to receive justice from a partisan judiciary that was known to subvert justice in electoral matters”; and that President Mwai Kibaki’s appointment of new judges 2 days before the elections was done in “preparation for a biased consideration of the anticipated election petitions”. See Kenya National Commission on Human Rights 2008, para 58; Republic of Kenya 2008b, p. 59. For a critical examination of the appointment and functioning of the then Kenyan judiciary see Mutua 2001, pp. 96 et seq.
- 20.
See Kenya National Commission on Human Rights 2008, paras 78 and 121.
- 21.
Republic of Kenya 2008a, pp. 345–352; Roberts 2009, p. 2.
- 22.
Kenya National Commission on Human Rights 2008, p. 34.
- 23.
- 24.
Republic of Kenya 2008a, pp. 346 and 347.
- 25.
- 26.
Republic of Kenya 2008a, p. 347.
- 27.
Kenya National Commission on Human Rights 2008, para 4.
- 28.
Ibid., paras 214, 307, 331, 523 and 537.
- 29.
Ibid., para 204.
- 30.
- 31.
Republic of Kenya 2008a, pp. 92 and 97.
- 32.
UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 2008, pp. 9 and 10.
- 33.
Ibid., p. 3.
- 34.
Republic of Kenya 2008a, pp. 102 and 106.
- 35.
Ibid., pp. 105, 106 and 117.
- 36.
Ibid., p. 89.
- 37.
Ibid., p. 76.
- 38.
See Ibid., pp. 89–91; UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 2008, pp. 10 and 11.
- 39.
Republic of Kenya 2008a, p. 346.
- 40.
Human Rights Watch 2008a, p. 27; Ibid., pp. 342–343.
- 41.
Republic of Kenya 2008a, p. 346.
- 42.
- 43.
- 44.
Republic of Kenya 2008a, pp. 108–112 and 424.
- 45.
Ibid., p. 424.
- 46.
- 47.
See Human Rights Watch 2008a, pp. 45–47.
- 48.
Ibid., p. 94.
- 49.
- 50.
Republic of Kenya 2008a, p. vii.
- 51.
Kenya Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission Report 2013, Vol. IV, para 264.
- 52.
But note that Kenya had been under a Kalenjin President (Moi) for 23 years, but the Kalenjins had not been able to “reclaim” their “invaded” land.
- 53.
Human Rights Watch 2008a, p. 36.
- 54.
See Republic of Kenya 2008a, p. 92.
- 55.
IRIN News, 22 January 2008.
- 56.
See Fackler et al. 2011 for a detailed analysis of the role of the Kenyan media during the violence.
- 57.
Human Rights Watch 2008a, p. 36.
- 58.
Ibid., p. 37; IRIN News, 22 January 2008.
- 59.
IRIN News, 22 January 2008 (noting that similar hate speeches from vernacular radio stations dominated also during the 2005 constitutional referendum as a result of which KASS FM was temporarily suspended on allegations that it was inciting violence). Cf. Republic of Kenya 2008a, p. 41.
- 60.
This refers to the closely intertwined Kikuyu, Embu and Meru people who inhabit Kenya’s Central Province, who are known for their Gikuyu, Embu and Meru Association (GEMA), an influential ethnic association in politics, and allegedly very close to Kikuyu-backed presidents, Jomo Kenyatta and Mwai Kibaki. See BBC News, 14 April 2006. This is reportedly comparable to the KAMATUSA (Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana and Samburu) association that backed Moi’s rule. See Republic of Kenya 2008a, pp. 25–26.
- 61.
See IRIN News, 22 January 2008.
- 62.
Ibid.
- 63.
See further Lindenmayer and Kaye 2009.
- 64.
Other members were Benjamin Mkapa, former President of the United Republic of Tanzania and Graça Machel, former First Lady of Mozambique. See Kofi Anan Foundation 2009, p. 1.
- 65.
Each party appointed a negotiating team of five members. See KNDR Negotiating Team at http://www.dialoguekenya.org/index.php/negotiating-team.html. Accessed September 2014.
- 66.
See KNDR, Annotated Agenda and Timetable. http://www.dialoguekenya.org/Agreements/1%20February%202008%20-Annotated%20Agenda%20for%20the%20Kenya%20Dialogue%20and%20Reconciliation.pdf. Accessed September 2014. Also see Kofi Anan Foundation 2009, pp. 2 and 3.
- 67.
See, e.g. KNDR Statements on: agreed security measures at http://www.dialoguekenya.org/Agreements/Agreed%20Statement%20on%20Security%20Measures.pdf; how to address humanitarian crisis http://www.dialoguekenya.org/Agreements/4%20February%202008-Agreed%20Statement%20on%20Measures%20to%20Address%20Humanitarian%20Crisis.pdf; and how to resolve the political crisis http://www.dialoguekenya.org/Agreements/14%20February%202008-Agreed%20Statement%20on%20How%20to%20Resolve%20Political%20Crisis.pdf. All links accessed September 2014.
- 68.
See agreed statement on how to resolve the political crisis at http://www.dialoguekenya.org/Agreements/14%20February%202008-Agreed%20Statement%20on%20How%20to%20Resolve%20Political%20Crisis.pdf. Accessed September 2014.
- 69.
Ibid.
- 70.
Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation 2008a.
- 71.
By this agreement, the leader of the party with majority in Parliament (ODM) would become Prime Minister, while an equal number of other cabinet ministers would be nominated from both sides of the coalition government through consultation. See Ibid., p. 1.
- 72.
It was agreed that the coalition government would be dissolved under the following three circumstances: When the Tenth Parliament (2007–2012 phase) was dissolved; or if the parties agreed in writing to dissolve the coalition; or if one partner in the government withdrew from the coalition. See Ibid., p. 2.
- 73.
Ibid., Preamble.
- 74.
Act No. 4 of 2008: commencement date: 20 March 2008.
- 75.
Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation 2008b.
- 76.
Commissions of enquiry in Kenya are regulated under the Commissions of Inquiry Act, Cap. 102 (R.E. 2009).
- 77.
Apart from Justice Waki, the two other commissioners were Gavin Alistair MCFadyen, a former Police Assistant Commissioner in New Zealand and Pascal K. Kambale, a lawyer from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. George Mong’are Kegoroas, an advocate of the High Court of Kenya and Kenyan Section Director of the International Commission of Jurists, was appointed as Secretary to the Commission, while David Shikomera Majanja, advocate of the High Court of Kenya, was appointed as Counsel to assist the Commission. See Kenya GN No. 4473, Vol. CX-No. 4, 23 May 2008.
- 78.
See Kenya GN No. 4474, Vol. CX-No. 41, 23 May 2008.
- 79.
Ibid.
- 80.
Ibid.
- 81.
See Kenya National Commission on Human Rights Act, No. 9 of 2002.
- 82.
More information about the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights can be found on its website http://www.knchr.org/. Accessed September 2014.
- 83.
Kenya National Commission on Human Rights Act, s. 16(1)(a).
- 84.
See Kenya National Commission on Human Rights 2008.
- 85.
See UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 2008.
- 86.
See UN General Assembly 2009.
- 87.
See Human Rights Watch 2008a.
- 88.
See, e.g. Daily Nation, 1 December 2008; The Telegraph, 3 January 2008.
- 89.
Kenya National Commission on Human Rights 2008, para 634.
- 90.
- 91.
- 92.
- 93.
Kenya National Commission on Human Rights 2008, para 633.
- 94.
Cf. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, A/CONF.183/9, 17 July 1998 (hereafter “ICC, Statute”), Article 6; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, UNGA Res. 260 (III) A, 9 December 1948, Article II.
- 95.
Republic of Kenya 2008a, p. 303.
- 96.
Kenya National Commission on Human Rights 2008, paras 638–648.
- 97.
Ibid., para 648.
- 98.
Ibid., paras 641 and 658.
- 99.
The Commission was criticized for this seemingly uncertain finding. See, e.g. Musila 2009, p. 454 and The Standard, 23 November 2008.
- 100.
Republic of Kenya 2008a, p. 17 (emphasis original).
- 101.
Ibid., p. 472 (emphasis added).
- 102.
Ibid., p. 17.
- 103.
Human Rights Watch 2011b, p. 29.
- 104.
Human Rights Watch 2008b.
- 105.
- 106.
Human Rights Watch 2008b, p. 6.
- 107.
Werle 2009, pp. 373–376.
- 108.
Kenya National Commission on Human Rights 2008, para 629.
- 109.
Republic of Kenya 2008a, p. 472.
- 110.
Ibid., p. 475.
- 111.
Ibid., pp. ix and 472.
- 112.
Ibid., pp. 472 and 476.
- 113.
Cap. 76 [R.E 2012].
- 114.
Republic of Kenya 2008a, p. 476.
- 115.
Ibid., p. 473.
- 116.
For extensive findings of the Commission on this aspect, see Ibid., pp. 443–454.
- 117.
Ibid., p. 473.
- 118.
Ibid.
- 119.
Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation 2008c.
- 120.
Bosire 2009.
- 121.
See Daily Nation, 1 September 2011.
- 122.
Special Tribunal for Kenya Bill, Preamble para 1.
- 123.
Ibid., Preamble para 2.
- 124.
Ibid., Preamble para 4.
- 125.
Republic of Kenya 2008a, p. 473, see specifically recommendation 6.
- 126.
The Constitution of Kenya of 1963 provided for a two-tier court system. The first tier comprised a hierarchy of Kadhi’s Courts (Article 66) with jurisdiction to “determine questions of Muslim law relating to personal status, marriage, divorce or inheritance in proceedings in which all the parties profess[ed] the Muslim religion” (Article 66(5).The second tier consisted of the Court of Appeal (highest) the High Court (second highest) and the Subordinate Courts plus Martial Courts (lowest, same level). See Constitution of Kenya of 1963, Articles 64, 60 and 65, respectively. The Parliament only had powers to establish subordinate courts that were subordinate to the High Court. Therefore, as the proposed Special Tribunal would fall outside this two-tier court system, there was a need to legitimize it by anchoring it in the Constitution. A similar step had been taken in 2008 when Article 60 of the 1963 Constitution was amended by the Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) Act No. 10 of 2008 (by adding Article 60A), thereby creating the Interim Independent Constitutional Dispute Resolution Court, whose role was to hear and determine matters arising from the Constitutional Review process which was in pipeline then.
- 127.
Special Tribunal for Kenya Bill, s. 3(3).
- 128.
This would have applied to the Trial and Appeals Chambers. See Ibid., ss. 16 and 17. The Special Magistracy would have been composed exclusively of Kenyan nationals.
- 129.
Ibid., ss. 30(3) and 31(3), respectively.
- 130.
Ibid., ss. 4, 5 and 6.
- 131.
Ibid., s. 7.
- 132.
Ibid., s. 9(1)(ii).
- 133.
Ibid., s. 9(1)(a). As an exception, these categories of crimes would also be tried by the Special magistrates only if committed by people who did not fall within the Tribunal’s definition of “persons bearing greatest responsibility”. See s. 9(1)(b).
- 134.
Ibid., s. 2.
- 135.
Ibid., ss. 41(1) and 46(1).
- 136.
An application for review proceedings would be made if a new fact not known at the time of the closed proceedings was discovered and which apparently could have been a decisive factor in reaching a different decision. See Ibid., s. 42.
- 137.
The remaining acts would have been the same as those under Article 7 of the ICC Statute, except the crime of apartheid which was omitted. The included acts would have been murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, deportation or forcible transfer of population, imprisonment, torture, rape and other forms of sexual violence, persecution and forced pregnancy.
- 138.
Ibid., s. 14(1). Cf. ICC Statute, Article 25(3)(c).
- 139.
Special Tribunal for Kenya Bill, s. 14(2). Cf. ICC Statute, Article 25(3)(d).
- 140.
Ibid., s. 14(3), (4) and (5).
- 141.
- 142.
Bassiouni 5005, p. 364.
- 143.
- 144.
- 145.
- 146.
- 147.
- 148.
- 149.
Republic of Kenya 2008a, p. 476.
- 150.
Special Tribunal for Kenya Bill, s. 7.
- 151.
A Special Tribunal Fund receiving monetary support from the government and donors would have been created. See Ibid., ss. 58 and 59.
- 152.
According to Nancy Baraza, Deputy Chief Justice of Kenya, by the year 2011, there were cases where the accused persons had been in jail or remand for 15 or 20 years awaiting judgement. See Daily Nation, 13 October 2011. See also the Address by Chief Justice of Kenya at the Launch of the Judiciary Transformation Framework on 31 May 2012. http://kenyalaw.org/kl/index.php?id=156. Accessed August 2014.
- 153.
See Republic of Kenya 2008a, pp. 460–601 (emphasis added). The lack of independence of the Kenyan judiciary was also acknowledged by Justice Jackton Ojwang of the Kenyan High Court. See Ojwang 2008–2010.
- 154.
Republic of Kenya 2008a, p. 461.
- 155.
Wainaina and Chepng’etich 2009.
- 156.
The Star, 12 March 2011 (pointing out that the two leaders wrote a letter to each of the Ministers and Assistant Ministers “directing” them to vote in favour of the bill).
- 157.
International Crisis Group 2012, p. 6.
- 158.
- 159.
Parliament of Kenya 2010a, p. 36.
- 160.
International Crisis Group 2012, p. 6; The Star, 12 March 2011.
- 161.
See Daily Nation, 21 February 2009.
- 162.
International Crisis Group 2012, p. 7. When the two were named by the ICC Prosecutor as suspects, they reversed their stand about The Hague option. See Daily Nation, 26 March 2011.
- 163.
Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) Bill of 2009. For critical comments about the Imanyara bill, see Bosire 2009 (identifying critical flaws in the bill, including on the proposed jurisdictional relationship between the tribunal and the ICC, and which, if approved, would have made the resulting law of the tribunal inconsistent with the ICC Statute).
- 164.
See the Parliament of Kenya 2010b, Doc. Hansard 16.12.110P, p. 22–25. See also The Standard, 2 December 2009; The Star, 12 March 2011.
- 165.
See BBC News, 30 July 2009.
- 166.
See Office of the Prosecutor 2009.
- 167.
See ICC Office of the Prosecutor, Weekly Briefing, 12–18 January 2010, Issue 20, pp. 4 and 5. See also Press Release ICC-OTP-20090709-PR436, 9 July 2009; BBC News, 9 July 2009; The Guardian, 9 July 2009; VOA News, 9 July 2009.
- 168.
See “Note on Handover of post-election violence Materials to the Prosecutor of the ICC” http://www.dialoguekenya.org/pressmedia/29-Jul-2009%20-%20Statement%20by%20the%20Legal%20Advisor%20to%20the%20Panel%20of%20Eminent%20African%20Personalities.pdf. Accessed August 2014.
- 169.
International Crisis Group 2012, p. 7.
- 170.
ICC Office of the Prosecutor, Weekly Briefing, 12–18 January 2010, Issue No. 20, p. 4.
- 171.
BBC News, 15 December 2010. See more details in infra Sect. 6.1.
- 172.
See Daily Nation, 19 July 2009.
- 173.
Musila 2009, p. 456.
- 174.
- 175.
Further on these challenges see infra Sect. 4.3.1.5.
- 176.
- 177.
Alai and Mue 2011, p. 1232. For example, the survey conducted by Infotrack Research and Consulting in November 2009 showed that the public support was 62 % for the ICC trials and 2 % for trials under the proposed Special Tribunal. See Alai and Mue 2010. In September 2010, a poll by Synovate indicated that despite the judicial and legal reforms planned domestically, the public support for accountability measures was as follows: trial at the ICC (54 %), local trials (22 %), granting of amnesty (22 %). See Reuters, 27 September 2010. From another poll published by Synovate in April 2011, the results were: ICC trials (61 %) and a special tribunal (24 %). See Africa Review, 5 April 2010.
- 178.
See Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation 2011, p. 25, para 60.
- 179.
Ibid., p. vi, para 9.
- 180.
Ibid., p. 8, para 26.
- 181.
Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation Monitoring Project 2012a, p. 52, para 133.
- 182.
Ibid., p. 57, para 142.
- 183.
- 184.
Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation Monitoring Project 2011, p. 9, para 27. In March 2011 the confidence was at 72 %. See p. 12, para 34.
- 185.
In December 2010, confidence in the ICC per province was: North Eastern (82 %), Western and Nyanza (75 %), Eastern (74 %), Rift Valley, where three of the ICC suspects hail from (60 %). See ibid., pp. 9–12, paras 28–33.
- 186.
- 187.
Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation Monitoring Project 2011, pp. 19 and 20, para 42.
- 188.
Ibid., p. v, para 6.
- 189.
See Drakard, 2011.
- 190.
See Jalloh 2010.
- 191.
Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation Monitoring Project 2012a, p. 57, para 142. Three of the suspects, namely, Kosgey, Ruto and Sang, come from this province.
- 192.
See Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation Monitoring Project 2013, para 75.
- 193.
See The Star 3, April 2012.
- 194.
Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation Monitoring Project 2012a, p. 53, para 134.
- 195.
See Daily Nation, 24 March 2012. This move elicited a lot of criticism in Kenya. See, e.g. Daily Nation, 25 March 2012 (reporting that Justice Minister Mutula Kilonzo dismissed it as “the height of hypocrisy”); Daily Nation, 26 March 2012 (stating that the Immigration minister Otieno Kajwang’ dismissed it as “dragging Kenya back to the dark old days of ethnicity by organising tribal meetings”).
- 196.
On deferral of cases at the ICC see infra Sect. 6.6.1.
- 197.
Joseph Kimani Gathungu v. Attorney General and 5 Others (2010) eKLR.
- 198.
- 199.
See infra Sect. 4.3.1.4.1.
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Materu, S.F. (2015). The Post-Election Violence and Immediate Aftermath. In: The Post-Election Violence in Kenya. International Criminal Justice Series, vol 2. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-041-1_3
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