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The EU in Crisis: Crisis Discourse as a Technique of Government

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Part of the book series: Netherlands Yearbook of International Law ((NYIL,volume 44))

Abstract

This chapter argues that it is illuminating to read ‘crisis’ not as a fact, but as a political discourse that functions as a ‘technique of government’. Drawing examples from the context of the EU’s contemporary policy responses to the financial crisis, it illustrates how experts produce knowledge about ‘crises’, and how the discourse of crisis is operationalized as a tool for giving effect to governmental ambitions. This reading of crisis as a technique of government raises three inter-related challenges to the implied assumptions of the crisis narrative. First, it puts into question the idea that crises are ‘uncommon’ or ‘special’ events, and instead argues that the discourse of crisis is commonplace in the EU, and acts as a normative assertion about the status quo. Second, it undermines the simplistic logic of cause and effect by emphasizing the production of truth that lies at the heart of crisis discourse and how these truths shape expectations and policy proposals. Third, this reading complicates the idea that crises are ‘game changing’ moments of social or political shift, arguing rather that their political effects remain uncertain and tied up with the success of particular forms of knowledge.

Europe will be forged in crisis, and will be the sum of the solutions adopted for those crises. 1Monnet 1976, at 488

Jessica C. Lawrence is a doctoral candidate in international and European law at the VU University Amsterdam. She would like to thank Juan Amaya-Castro, Tanja Aalberts, and Laura Henderson for their helpful engagements with this paper. Thanks are also due to the Editorial Board of the Netherlands Yearbook of International Law for their useful suggestions.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See e.g. Borger 2013; Chiti and Teixeira 2013; De Ville and Orbie 2011; Habermas 2012; Lapavitsas et al. 2012; Overbeek 2012; Ruffert 2011; Schmidt 2013; Wigger and Buch-Hanen 2013.

  2. 2.

    For example, the establishment of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and European Financial Stabilization Mechanism (EFSM); the establishment of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM); the adoption of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the EMU (TSCG); and the adoption of the Six-Pack reforms to the Stability and Growth Pact. Conclusions of the Council—Economic and Financial Affairs of 9–10 May 2010, www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/114324.pdf. Accessed 7 October 2013; European Council, Council Regulation No. 407/2010 of 11 May 2010 establishing a European Financial Stabilization Mechanism, OJ 2010 L 118/1; Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), 1 February 2012, OJ 2011 L 91/1; Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union, 2 March 2012; Regulation 1173/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the effective enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the euro area, OJ 2011 L 306/1; Regulation 1174/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on enforcement measures to correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area, OJ 2011 L306/8; Regulation 1175/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council, of 16 November 2011, amending Council Regulation 1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies, OJ 2011 L 306/12; Regulation 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances, OJ 2011 L 306/25; Council Regulation 1177/2011 of 8 November 2011 amending Regulation 1467/97 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure, OJ 2011 L 306/22.

  3. 3.

    Chiti and Teixeira, for example, argue that the balance of power in Europe is shifting as European policy-makers have gradually set aside the ‘Union method’ of EU action in favour of intergovernmental instruments, the increasing use of ‘partly internal, partly external’ measures, and the transformation of the EMU from a ‘community of mutual benefits’ to a ‘community of benefits and risk-sharing’. Chiti and Teixeira 2013. Another example is the revision of Article 136 TFEU to permit the establishment of a mechanism to safeguard the stability of the eurozone. European Council Decision of 25 March 2011 amending Article 136 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union with regard to a stability mechanism for Member States whose currency is the euro (2011/199/EU), OJ 2011 L91/1. Additionally, the reinterpretation of the ‘no-bailout’ principle of Article 125 TFEU by the CJEU in the Pringle case ran counter to prior expectations. Case C-370/12, Thomas Pringle v. Government of Ireland, judgment of 27 November 2012 (not yet reported). On the Court’s ‘strained reasoning’ in attempting to reconcile the ESM with Article 125, see Borger 2013.

  4. 4.

    See De Ville and Orbie 2011; Lesage and Vermeiren 2011; Wigger and Buch-Hansen 2013.

  5. 5.

    ‘Dislocation’ is used here in the sense of Laclau, to refer to the process by which discursive structures are revealed as contingent. Laclau 1990, at 39–44.

  6. 6.

    J Zeleny, Obama Weighs Quick Undoing of Bush Policy, The New York Times, 9 November 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/10/us/politics/10obama.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. Accessed 26 October 2013.

  7. 7.

    McCreevy 2008.

  8. 8.

    This is in no way intended to imply that crises are ‘fake’ or ‘made up’ for political gain, or anything of the sort. Rather, I mean to suggest that events—even catastrophic ones—only become crises through the operation of discourse.

  9. 9.

    Though Foucault has been dead for 30 years, a number of transcripts of his lectures from the late 1970s and early 1980s have only recently been released in English. The publication of these works (which due to his early death Foucault was never able to collect into a monograph) has spurred a new surge of interest in Foucault’s later work on governmentality, biopolitics, and subjectivity.

  10. 10.

    Foucault 2008, at 226. The ‘entrepreneur of oneself’ is not the only subjectivity available in the political milieu of contemporary neoliberalism. However, its prominence is demonstrated by the popularity things like behavioral economics and self-improvement.

  11. 11.

    Ibid., at 229.

  12. 12.

    Ibid., at 66.

  13. 13.

    Ibid., at 68. Nicholas J. Kiersey has written in several instances about the contemporary relevance of the ‘consciousness of crisis’, including in the context of the financial crisis. Kiersey 2011.

  14. 14.

    Foucault 2008, at 260.

  15. 15.

    Rose and Miller 1992, at 175.

  16. 16.

    Dean 2009, at 41.

  17. 17.

    Otto 2011, at 76.

  18. 18.

    Ibid.

  19. 19.

    Habermas 1975.

  20. 20.

    For an alternative reading of crisis as ‘politics as usual’ that proceeds from a neo-Gramscian, rather than Foucauldian, perspective, see Henderson 2013.

  21. 21.

    Charlesworth 2008, at 382.

  22. 22.

    Freeman 2002; Vincent 2004; Vos 2000.

  23. 23.

    Conrad 2003.

  24. 24.

    Vobruba et al. 2003.

  25. 25.

    Ágh 2010.

  26. 26.

    Van Apeldoorn 2009.

  27. 27.

    Baines 2004.

  28. 28.

    Best 2005.

  29. 29.

    Chiti and Teixeira 2013; De Ville and Orbie 2011; Habermas 2012; Lapavitsas et al. 2012; Overbeek 2012; Ruffert 2011; Schmidt 2013; Wigger and Buch-Hansen 2013.

  30. 30.

    Beck 1992, at 19.

  31. 31.

    Beck himself argues that while ‘normally people speak of “crisis”’, he prefers the term ‘risk’, which ‘goes beyond’ the term crisis because: (1) the notion of crisis blurs the distinction between anticipated and actual crises; (2) the term ‘crisis’ falsely implies the possibility of revision to a pre-crisis state; and (3) the term ‘crisis’ implies an exceptional, rather than a permanent state. Beck 2013, at 6.

  32. 32.

    Agamben 2005, at 2.

  33. 33.

    Otto 2011.

  34. 34.

    Charlesworth 2008, at 382.

  35. 35.

    Ibid.

  36. 36.

    Ibid., at 384.

  37. 37.

    Ibid.

  38. 38.

    Ibid.

  39. 39.

    See, e.g., A Very Short History of the Crisis, The Economist, 12 November 2011, http://www.economist.com/node/21536871. Accessed 7 October 2013.

  40. 40.

    McCreevy 2008.

  41. 41.

    Wigger and Buch-Hansen 2013, at 15.

  42. 42.

    Overbeek 2012.

  43. 43.

    European Commission 2011, at 81.

  44. 44.

    See, e.g., Altvater 2009, at 75; Habermas 2012.

  45. 45.

    See, e.g., Eichengreen 2010; Kupchan 2012.

  46. 46.

    Boin et al. 2008, at 82.

  47. 47.

    Mattli and Woods 2009, at 39.

  48. 48.

    Wigger and Buch-Hansen 2013, at 4–5.

  49. 49.

    Schmidt 2013, at 3.

  50. 50.

    The EFSM and EFSF will eventually cease operations. However, as of this writing they continue to manage their existing commitments with regard to Greece, Portugal, and Ireland. Conclusions of the Council—Economic and Financial Affairs of 9–10 May 2010, www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/114324.pdf. Accessed 7 October 2013; European Council, Council Regulation No. 407/2010 of 11 May 2010 establishing a European Financial Stabilization Mechanism, OJ 2010 L 118/1.

  51. 51.

    Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), 1 Feb. 2012, OJ 2011 L 91/1. The ESM aims to safeguard financial stability in the eurozone by granting conditional financial assistance to Member States under certain circumstances. The ESM, which entered into force in October 2012, will gradually replace the EFSF.

  52. 52.

    The ‘Six-Pack’ measures, which entered into force in December 2011, reinforced the Stability and Growth Pack by adding new economic and fiscal surveillance rules, and introducing a Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure. Regulation 1173/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the effective enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the euro area, OJ 2011 L 306/1; Regulation 1174/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on enforcement measures to correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area, OJ 2011 L306/8; Regulation 1175/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council, of 16 November 2011, amending Council Regulation 1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies, OJ 2011 L 306/12; Regulation 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances, OJ 2011 L 306/25; Council Regulation 1177/2011 of 8 November 2011 amending Regulation 1467/97 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure, OJ 2011 L 306/22.

  53. 53.

    Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union, 2 March 2012. The fiscal compact, which entered into force on 1 January 2013, seeks to strengthen fiscal discipline in the eurozone via the ‘automatic correction mechanism’ and the ‘balanced budget rule’.

  54. 54.

    The ‘Two-Pack’, which entered into force on 30 May 2013, provides for additional budgetary surveillance in the euro area. Regulation 472/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on the strengthening of economic and budgetary surveillance of member states in the euro area experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability, OJ 2013 L 140/1; Regulation 473/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on common provisions for monitoring and assessing draft budgetary plans and ensuring the correction of excessive deficit of the member states in the euro area, OJ 2013 L 140/11.

  55. 55.

    For updates on the current status of the proposed financial transactions tax, see the European Commission’s website. European Commission, Taxation of the Financial Sector, http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/taxation/other_taxes/financial_sector/index_en.htm. Accessed 28 December 2013.

  56. 56.

    De Ville and Orbie 2011, at 1.

  57. 57.

    Ibid., at 1.

  58. 58.

    Wigger and Buch-Hansen 2013, at 1.

  59. 59.

    Ibid., at 15.

  60. 60.

    Ibid., at 16.

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Lawrence, J.C. (2014). The EU in Crisis: Crisis Discourse as a Technique of Government. In: Bulterman, M., van Genugten, W. (eds) Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 2013. Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, vol 44. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-011-4_9

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