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The Mavi Marmara Incident and the Application of International Humanitarian Law by Quasi-Judicial Bodies

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Book cover Applying International Humanitarian Law in Judicial and Quasi-Judicial Bodies

Abstract

Whether Israel’s enforcement of its naval blockade against the Mavi Marmara on 31 May 2010 was in conformity with international humanitarian law has been recently considered by four quasi-judicial bodies. This chapter compares and contrasts the four reports produced by these quasi-judicial bodies and identifies significant discrepancies between them as to the interpretation and application of international humanitarian law (the law of naval blockade). In the light of this, this chapter then locates the role of quasi-judicial bodies within the broader context of international adjudication; specifically, and although recognising the clear benefits of quasi-judicial bodies in a world order where judicial bodies proper are often unable to exercise their jurisdiction, this chapter flags up some of the potential problems that this new type of adjudication yields for international law generally and international dispute resolution in particular.

Russell Buchan is a Lecturer in International Law at the University of Sheffield. He has published widely in the field of international peace and security and his book International Law and the Construction of the Liberal Peace (2013) is published by Hart.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See generally Kimmerling and Migdal 1994.

  2. 2.

    For a critical overview of the Oslo Accords see Miller 1998.

  3. 3.

    BBC News, ‘Hamas Sweeps to Election Victory’, 26 January 2006, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/4650788.stm. Accessed 24 September 2013.

  4. 4.

    New York Times, ‘Hamas Seize Broad Control in Gaza Strip’, 13 June 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/14/world/middleeast/14mideast.html. Accessed 24 September 2013.

  5. 5.

    Ibid.

  6. 6.

    Statement of Israel’s Foreign Minister Regarding Israel’s Policy towards Hamas and its Terrorism, 1 October 2007, available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/About+the+Ministry/Foreign+Minister+Livni/Speeches+interviews/Statements+by+Israeli+FM+Livni+regarding+Israeli+policy+toward+the+Hamas+and+its+terrorism+11-Sep-20.htm. Accessed 24 September 2013.

  7. 7.

    These land crossings were implemented in response to the Second Intifada, which began in September 2000. See generally Pressman 2003.

  8. 8.

    Number 1/2009 Blockade of the Gaza Strip 3 January 2009, publicised by the Israeli government at http://en.mot.gov.il/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=124:no12009&catid=17:noticetomariners&Itemid=12. Accessed 24 September 2013.

  9. 9.

    For an overview of the activities of the Free Gaza Movement see their webpage at http://www.freegaza.org/.

  10. 10.

    The Public Commission to Examine the Maritime Incident of 31 May 2010, 23 January 2011, para 3 available at http://www.turkel-committee.gov.il/files/wordocs/8808report-eng.pdf. Accessed 24 September 2013 (herein referred to as the Turkel Report).

  11. 11.

    These facts have been determined and outlined by a fact-finding mission established by the UN Human Rights Council; United Nations Human Rights Council, Report of the International Fact-Finding Mission to Investigate Violations of International Law, Including International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law, Resulting from the Israeli Attacks on the Flotilla of Ships Carrying Humanitarian Assistance, A/HRC/15/21, 27 September 2010 (herein the UN Human Rights Council Report).

  12. 12.

    The Washington Post, ‘Israel’s Flotilla Raid revives Questions of International Law’, 1 June 2010, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/01/AR2010060102934.html?hpid=topnews. Accessed 24 September 2013.

  13. 13.

    ‘We were acting totally without our legal rights. The international law is very clear on this issue … if you have a declared blockade, publicly declared, legally declared, publicised as international law requires, and someone is trying to break that blockade and though you have warned them … you are entitled to intercept even on the high seas’; M Regev, Spokesman for Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, quoted in The Washington Post, 1 June 2010, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/01/AR2010060102934.html. Accessed 24 September 2013.

  14. 14.

    I refer to these bodies as quasi-judicial on the basis that they satisfy the definition outlined by Alvarez in his seminal work on this topic. For Alvarez, a quasi-judicial body is a body that can be ‘characterized by some serious attempt, primarily through rules for the type of expertise required of the dispute settlers, their method of selection, or their tenure in office (or all three), to recognize the “independent” status of the third party decision-maker from the governments involved in their creation’; Alvarez 2005, p. 459. The four bodies under consideration in this chapter can be regarded as quasi-judicial because their members were selected on the basis of their professional standing; namely, their expertise in international law and/or experience and knowledge of international relations. Consequently, there was a serious attempt by their creators to establish bodies that were capable of independently adjudicating the dispute. The reports compiled by the bodies established by the Turkish government and the Israeli government are perhaps most susceptible to being criticised for lacking independence. However, it should be noted that both these reports were formulated in response to a Presidential Statement of the Security Council requiring that both governments conduct a ‘prompt, impartial, credible and transparent investigation conforming to international standards’ (emphasis added); Presidential Statement of the Security Council, UN Doc SC/9940 (31 May 2010). Both reports confirmed that they adhered to this requirement of impartiality.

  15. 15.

    Report of Turkish National Commission of Inquiry, 11 February 2011, available at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/data/Turkish%20Report%20Final%20-%20UN%20Copy.pdf. Accessed 24 September 2013.

  16. 16.

    Turkel Report 2011, supra n. 10.

  17. 17.

    UN Human Rights Council Report 2010, supra n. 11.

  18. 18.

    Report of the Secretary-General’s Panel of Inquiry on the 31 May 2010 Flotilla Incident, July 2011, available at http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/middle_east/Gaza_Flotilla_Panel_Report.pdf. (Accessed 24 September 2013).

  19. 19.

    Buchan 2011, 2012.

  20. 20.

    Article 92 of the Law of the Sea Convention 1982. Although note that many argue that there must be a ‘genuine link’ between the vessel and the state under which the vessel sails; see generally Solomon and Maogoto 2013.

  21. 21.

    Lex specialis is a principle of legal interpretation that provides that where two laws govern the same factual situation the law governing a specific subject matter (lex specialis) overrides a law which only governs general matters (lex generalis).

  22. 22.

    Jones 1983, p. 760 (arguing that the law of blockade has created an exception to the principle of exclusive jurisdiction).

  23. 23.

    Green 2008, p. 204.

  24. 24.

    See the Introduction to the San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea, 12 June 1994.

  25. 25.

    Doswald-Beck 1995.

  26. 26.

    Section II, San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea, 12 June 1994.

  27. 27.

    Buchan 2011, pp. 217–218.

  28. 28.

    An international armed conflict is defined as ‘recourse to armed force between States’; Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-I-I, Judgement, 15 July 1999, para 70.

  29. 29.

    Although this is a position that would of course change over time, not least with the introduction of Common Article 3 of the Four Geneva Conventions of 1949.

  30. 30.

    supra n. 28.

  31. 31.

    Turkish Report 2011, supra n. 15, p. 33 ff.

  32. 32.

    Turkel Report 2011, supra n. 10, para 38.

  33. 33.

    HCJ 769/02 Public Committee Against Torture v. Government [2006] (2) IsrLR 459. In actual fact, the Turkel Report identifies two grounds for internationalising an armed conflict between a state and an organised armed group; the Targeted Killings scenario and where the state occupies the territory within which the armed group is located. However, the report clearly states that Gaza was not occupied by Israel on 31 May 2010, and therefore the only conclusion is that the Turkel Report sought to internationalise the armed conflict on the basis of the Targeted Killings judgement.

  34. 34.

    Ibid., para 18.

  35. 35.

    Turkel Report 2011, supra n. 10, para 44.

  36. 36.

    Ibid., para 39.

  37. 37.

    Ibid., para 43 and footnote 131.

  38. 38.

    See for example UN Human Rights Council Report 2010, supra n. 11, para 51 ff.

  39. 39.

    Report of the Secretary-General’s Panel of Inquiry on the 31 May 2010 Flotilla Incident (Palmer Report 2011), paras 73–74.

  40. 40.

    Ibid., para 73.

  41. 41.

    M Milanovic (2 September 2011) Palmer Committee Report on the Mavi Marmara Incident, EJIL: Talk! available at http://www.ejiltalk.org/palmer-committee-report-on-the-mavi-marmara-incident/ (Accessed 24 September 2013).

  42. 42.

    Palmer Report 2011, supra n. 39, para 23 of Appendix I.

  43. 43.

    Ibid., para 21 of Appendix I.

  44. 44.

    Ibid.

  45. 45.

    I have discussed this elsewhere; Buchan 2011, pp. 221–223. Cf Guilfoyle 2011, p. 18.

  46. 46.

    See generally International Law Association 2010.

  47. 47.

    Applying similar reasoning to the US Supreme Court’s determination that the US (a state) is engaged in a non-international armed conflict with Al Qaeda (an organised armed group); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 US 557 (2006).

  48. 48.

    Milanovic 2007, p. 384.

  49. 49.

    Falk 1964, p. 203. Although interestingly note that the Turkel Report concludes that the doctrine of belligerency is ‘almost irrelevant’ under contemporary international humanitarian law; Turkel Report 2011, supra n. 10, para 39.

  50. 50.

    Lauterpacht 1947, p. 176.

  51. 51.

    See for example EU Council Commons Position 2001/931/CFDSP, 27 December 2001.

  52. 52.

    The use of weapons in an indiscriminate manner constitutes a clear violation of international humanitarian law; see Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2005, Rule 11.

  53. 53.

    Turkel Report 2011, supra n. 10, footnote 131.

  54. 54.

    Palmer Report 2011, supra n. 39, para 21 of Appendix I.

  55. 55.

    US Department of State: Office of the Historian, The Blockade of Confederate Ports, 1861–1865, available at http://history.state.gov/milestones/1861-1865/Blockade. Accessed 24 September 2013.

  56. 56.

    Turkel Report 2011, supra n. 10, footnote 131.

  57. 57.

    Woosley 1950, p. 350.

  58. 58.

    Turkel Report 2011, supra n. 10, para 43.

  59. 59.

    ‘Responsibility for this belligerent act of war lies with the Government of Lebanon, from whose territory these acts have been launched into Israel’; Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations, Identical Letters Dated July 12 2006 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. A/60/937, S/2006/515, 12 July 2006.

  60. 60.

    Doswald-Beck 1995, p. 73.

  61. 61.

    For this nexus see S Solomon , J Maogoto (22 July 2013) Jurisdictional Aspects of the Article 12(2) Rome Statute Vessel Provision: Some Thoughts on the Provision’s Dogma and Implementation in Light of the Comoros Referral, Opinio Juris, available at http://opiniojuris.org/2013/07/21/jurisdictional-aspects-of-the-article-122-rome-statute-vessel-provision-some-thoughts-on-the-provisions-dogma-and-implementation-in-light-of-the-comoros-referral/. (Accessed 24 September 2013).

  62. 62.

    Turkish Report 2011, supra n. 15, p. 70; Turkel Report 2011 supra n. 10, para 63; UN Human Rights Council Report 2010, supra n. 11, para 59.

  63. 63.

    Turkish Report 2011, supra n. 15, p. 38.

  64. 64.

    Ibid., p. 6 [‘The Israeli blockade was excessive in relation to any advantage to Israel’s military objective and has a disproportionate impact on the civilian population as documented by numerous UN agencies and the international community at large’].

  65. 65.

    Ibid., p. 68.

  66. 66.

    Turkel Report 2011, supra n 10, para 61 ff.

  67. 67.

    Ibid., para 87.

  68. 68.

    Ibid., para 89.

  69. 69.

    Ibid., para 76.

  70. 70.

    Ibid., para 97.

  71. 71.

    Nevertheless, the UN Human Rights Council does conclude that the blockade constitutes a collective punishment under Article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention; UN Human Rights Council Report 2010, supra n. 11, para 54.

  72. 72.

    Ibid., para 13.

  73. 73.

    Palmer Report 2011, supra n. 39, para 70.

  74. 74.

    Ibid., para 47(e).

  75. 75.

    Ibid., para 78.

  76. 76.

    Ibid., para 79.

  77. 77.

    See the discussion in Finkelstein 2011, p. 14 ff.

  78. 78.

    Number 1/2009 Blockade of the Gaza Strip 3 January 2009, publicised by the Israeli government at http://en.mot.gov.il/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=124:no12009&catid=17:noticetomariners&Itemid=12. Accessed 24 September 2013.

  79. 79.

    Turkel Report 2011, supra n. 10, para 89.

  80. 80.

    See ‘Iron Dome: Missile Defense System a Game Change, Israelis Say’, CNN (20 November 2012), available at http://edition.cnn.com/2012/11/17/world/meast/iron-dome-israel-gaza-conflict. Accessed 24 September 2013.

  81. 81.

    See ICRC News Release No. 10/103, 14 June 2010.

  82. 82.

    As the Palmer Report rightly notes, the psychological damage that the constant threat of rocket attacks causes Israeli citizens is considerable; Palmer Report 2011, supra n. 39, para 71. On this see further Eliav Lieblich’s chapter in this volume. However, my view is that in terms of justifying a blockade that is having a devastating impact on a civilian population, there is a clear division between damage to property and/or death or injury to people on one hand and psychological damage on the other.

  83. 83.

    San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea, 12 June 1994, para 98.

  84. 84.

    See Bothe 2008, p. 596.

  85. 85.

    See generally International Committee of the Red Cross 2009.

  86. 86.

    As Blum notes, ‘[t]he striking feature of the mainstream literature is its general acceptance (albeit at times, with some moral discomfort) of the near-absolute license to kill combatants and of the law’s view of combatants as nothing more than instruments of war’; Blum 2010, p. 118.

  87. 87.

    M/V ‘Saiga’ (No. 2) (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea), 38 ILM (1999) 1323, para 156.

  88. 88.

    Turkish Report 2011, supra n. 15, 53.

  89. 89.

    Ibid., p. 56.

  90. 90.

    ‘The salient issue is whether the passengers were civilians taking a direct part in hostilities or uninvolved civilians’; Turkel Report 2011, supra n. 10, para 188.

  91. 91.

    supra n 33.

  92. 92.

    Ibid., para 195.

  93. 93.

    Ibid., para 213.

  94. 94.

    Ibid., para 197.

  95. 95.

    Ibid.

  96. 96.

    Ibid., para 201.

  97. 97.

    Ibid., para 239.

  98. 98.

    UN Human Rights Council Report 2010, supra n. 10, para 66.

  99. 99.

    Ibid., para 172.

  100. 100.

    Ibid., para 264.

  101. 101.

    Palmer Report 2011, supra n. 39, para 47 of Appendix I.

  102. 102.

    Ibid., para 131.

  103. 103.

    Ibid., para 134.

  104. 104.

    It is interesting to note that the Turkel Report explains that the determination that the crew members were directly participating in hostilities would have been reached even if the ICRC’s guidance on direct participation in hostilities had been used. On this see Turkel Report 2011, supra n. 10, para 201. For a good discussion of the ICRC’s guidance on this topic see Goodman and Jinks 2010.

  105. 105.

    International Committee of the Red Cross 2009, p. 46.

  106. 106.

    Indeed, Israel suggests that there is video footage to substantiate this claim; see the website of Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, available at http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFA-Archive/2010/Pages/Gaza_flotilla_videos.aspx. Accessed 24 September 2013.

  107. 107.

    See for example the International Commission of Inquiry for Darfur (2004) which was established by the UN Security Council in 2004 to determine whether violations of the Genocide Convention had been committed; the Fact-Finding mission established by the UN Human Rights Council in 2009 to investigate whether Israel had committed violations of international law in the Palestinian territories; the Fact-Finding mission created by the Council of the European Union in 2009 to investigate the origins and causes of the conflict in Georgia; the International Commission of Inquiry on Syria was established in 2012 by the UN Human Rights Council to determine whether violations of international humanitarian law and international criminal law had been committed in the conflict in Syria; and the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya created in 2012 by the UN Human Rights Council in order to assess whether international crimes had been committed by Colonel Gaddafi’s forces during the recent armed conflict in Libya.

  108. 108.

    Halink 2008, p. 16.

  109. 109.

    Akande and Tonkin 2012.

  110. 110.

    ‘This Panel is not a court. It was not asked to make determinations of the legal issues or to adjudicate on liability’; Palmer Report 2011, supra n. 39, para 1.

  111. 111.

    Ibid., p. 3 (emphasis added).

  112. 112.

    Press Meeting of H E Mr Ahmet Davutoglu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, on Turkish-Israeli Relations, 2 September 2011.

  113. 113.

    Alvarez 2005, p. 516 (emphasis added).

  114. 114.

    See generally Thirlway 2010.

  115. 115.

    Buchan 2013, pp. 19–29.

  116. 116.

    Article 36 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice 1945.

  117. 117.

    Section 5 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982.

  118. 118.

    D Akande and H Tonkin 6 April 2012.

  119. 119.

    Ibid [‘[t]hese commissions do seem to be an additional form of resolving, and obtaining authoritative pronouncements on, contested facts and issues of international law’].

  120. 120.

    ‘The sovereignty and equality of states represent the basic constitutional doctrine of [international law], which governs a community consisting primarily of states having a uniform legal personality’: Brownlie 2008, p. 289.

  121. 121.

    The Commission of Inquiry on Darfur was created by SC Res 1564 (18 September 2004).

  122. 122.

    Article 25 of the United Nations Charter 1945.

  123. 123.

    Press Release, Secretary-General, Secretary-General Names Panel of Experts to Advise on Accountability for Possible Rights Violations During Sri Lanka Conflict, UN Doc SG/SM/12967 (22 June 2010).

  124. 124.

    Ibid., p. ii.

  125. 125.

    Ratner 2012, p. 799.

  126. 126.

    ‘As for the legality of the panel, the secretary-general is clearly entitled under his inherent powers to seek advice from outside experts’; ibid., p. 798.

  127. 127.

    White 2005, pp. 87–89.

  128. 128.

    Ibid., p. 87 ff.

  129. 129.

    Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (1996) ICJ Report 226.

  130. 130.

    See Klabbers 2002, p. 75 ff. Cf Seyersted 1963.

  131. 131.

    Alvarez 2005, p. 420 (emphasis added).

  132. 132.

    In justifying the creation of the Panel of Inquiry for Sri Lanka Ratner explains that UN Secretaries-General have exercised the power to establish Panel of Inquiries many times in the past; Ratner 2012, p. 798. Yet, frequency of an activity does not in itself make it lawful.

  133. 133.

    Report of the Secretary-General’s Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka, available at http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/Sri_Lanka/POE_Report_Full.pdf. Accessed 24 September 2013, para 21 (herein referred to as Sri Lanka Report).

  134. 134.

    Ratner 2012, p. 799.

  135. 135.

    Sri Lanka Report 2011, supra n. 133 para 51.

  136. 136.

    Ratner 2012, pp. 799–800.

  137. 137.

    Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic (23 November 2011) UN Doc A/HRC/S-17/2/Add 1, para 5.

  138. 138.

    Alvarez 2005, p. 463.

  139. 139.

    See Halink 2008.

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  1. University of Sheffield, Yorkshire, UK

    Russell Buchan

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  1. School of Law, University of Texas, Austin, Texas, USA

    Derek Jinks

  2. Law, University of Manchester, Manchester, Lancashire, United Kingdom

    Jackson N. Maogoto

  3. Dickson Poon School of Law, King's College London, London, United Kingdom

    Solon Solomon

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Buchan, R. (2014). The Mavi Marmara Incident and the Application of International Humanitarian Law by Quasi-Judicial Bodies. In: Jinks, D., Maogoto, J., Solomon, S. (eds) Applying International Humanitarian Law in Judicial and Quasi-Judicial Bodies. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-008-4_17

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