Abstract
Contemporary Psychological Behaviorists argue against the existence of mental events in ways that are but little more refined than those of Watson, Lashley, and others 40 years ago. The orthodox case stated by today’s psychologists against the possibility of a science of mental events is inconclusive. This is because their attack is usually based on factual considerations, instead of being, what it ought to be, a conceptual analysis of the idea of a mental event. This article seeks to disclose some weaknesses in the standard pattern of attacks on Introspection. It does this by defending the latter (i.e. Introspection) against such factually-orientated criticisms as those of Watson, Lashley, Hull and Skinner. It then challenges Introspection as it should be attacked; not externally with counterfacts, but internally with demonstrations of what is untenable in the very concept of a science of private events called “mental”.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
In a paper called: ‘Purposive or Mechanical Psychology?’, which the editor of the Psychological Review 30 (1923), artfully inserted between the two halves of Lashley’s famous article: ‘The Behavioristic Interpretation of Consciousness’.
- 2.
See Watson (1913).
- 3.
E.g. tiny laryngeal movements, as discussed by Watson (1920).
- 4.
Compare:
-
Münsterberg: “Psychology thus presupposes… a most complicated transformation (of our mental life), and any attitude… which does not need or choose this special transformation may be something else, but it is not psychology” (1899, 112).
-
McDougall: “Psychology can have no bearing upon, and no application to, the problems of human life, the problems of voluntary conduct, the acts of men proceeding from desire and will” (1923, 279).
-
Moore: “… the term ‘psychology’ means and can only mean the science of mind (consciousness, mental life, or other more or less equivalent expression),… some other term must be invented for the science of behavior, and for that comprehensive science which covers the study of consciousness and of behavior in their mutual relations” (1923, 235).
-
- 5.
“The conception of mind has undergone a long course of evolution and many of its supposed attributes are only vestiges of… superstition, religious dogma, and false psychologizing…” (1923a, 247).
- 6.
“[They omit] a whole universe of phenomena, which have been supposed to constitute the chief realm of psychology” (239).
- 7.
This is an almost verbatim rendering of remarks made in lectures and in print by Professor D. Ellson of Indiana University.
- 8.
“… the statement ‘I am conscious’ does not mean anything more than the statement that ‘such and such physiological processes are going on within me’” (Lashley 1923a, 272).
- 9.
Lashley (1923a, 251) demurs: “The behaviorist may study a behaviorist in the act of studying a behaviorist, and is justified in concluding that his own processes of study resemble those of the other”.
- 10.
See Fernberger (1922).
- 11.
Compare Lashley (1923a, 245):”… by changing the rules of the game innumerable self-consistent systems can be developed”.
- 12.
On this matter Lashley errs badly: “The controversy between behaviorism and dualism is not a question for philosophy, but one to be answered strictly in the light of empirical evidence provided by psychological study” (1923a, 246). To me this indicates a failure to have appreciated the nature of the controversy between behaviorism and dualism.
- 13.
Thus Lashley observes: “… the behaviorist seems to have failed to strike at the root of the dualistic systems”.
- 14.
As have most Behaviorists (including Tolman, Lashley, Weiss, Hunter, Skinner, Hull, and Ellson).
- 15.
This is analogous to the attempts of modern philosophers, like Carnap, Reichenbach, Hempel and Bergmann, to crack old conceptual chestnuts by creating an artificial language in which traditional philosophical problems cannot arise. This is like fixing a flat by resolving to walk, or like patching a lover’s quarrel by joining a monastic order.
- 16.
This stresses Bridgman’s dictum: “If you wish to know what a man means by a term, don’t ask him, watch how he uses it” (1927).
References
Augustine. 1876. The Confessions of St. Augustine. Trans. J.G. Pilkington. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark.
Bawden, Heath. 1918. The presuppositions of a behaviorist psychology. Psychological Review 25 (3): 171–190.
Bekhterev, Vladimir Mikhaĭlovich. 1913. La psychologie objective. Paris: Librairie F. Alcan.
Bridgman, P.W. 1927. The logic of modern physics. New York: Macmillan Co.
Fernberger, S.W. 1922. Behavior versus introspective psychology. Psychological Review 29 (6): 409–413.
Lashley, K.S. 1923a. The behavioristic interpretation of consciousness I. Psychological Review. 30 (4): 237–272.
———. 1923b. The behavioristic interpretation of consciousness II. Psychological Review 30 (5): 329–353.
McDougall, W. 1923. Purposive or mechanical psychology? Psychological Review 30 (4): 273–288.
Moore, Jared S. 1923. Discussion: Behavior vs. introspective psychology. Psychological Review 30 (3): 235–235.
Münsterberg, Hugo. 1899. Psychology and life. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
Watson, John B. 1913. Psychology as the behaviorist views it. Psychological Review 20 (2): 158–177.
———. 1920. Is thinking merely action of language mechanisms? British Journal of Psychology. General Section 11 (1): 87–104.
Weiss, Albert Paul. 1917. Relation between structural and behavior psychology. Psychological Review 24 (4): 301–317.
———. 1925. A theoretical basis of human behavior. Columbus: R.G. Adams & Co.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1953. Philosophical investigations. New York: Macmillan.
———. 1958. Preliminary studies for the “Philosophical investigations”, generally known as: The blue and brown books. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2020 Springer Nature B.V.
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Hanson, N.R. (2020). Mental Events Yet Again: Retrospect on Some Old Arguments. In: Lund, M.D. (eds) What I Do Not Believe, and Other Essays. Synthese Library, vol 38. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-024-1739-5_13
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-024-1739-5_13
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-024-1738-8
Online ISBN: 978-94-024-1739-5
eBook Packages: Religion and PhilosophyPhilosophy and Religion (R0)