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Shell Nigeria: Changing the Community Engagement Model

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Managing Sustainable Business

Abstract

After years of broken promises, environmental mishaps and conflict in the Niger Delta region, Shell’s host communities had little trust in the company—the largest oil and gas producing company in Nigeria. By the late 1990s–early 2000s, the company had suffered reputational damage due to its environmental record in the Delta and in wake of the 1995 execution of Ogoni activist Ken Saro-Wiwa by the Nigerian government. By the early 2000s, Shell’s historically paternalistic community engagement model, which required bilateral agreements and multiple interfaces with nearly 1000 host communities, was becoming unsustainable. The company needed to figure out a more effective way of meeting the needs of local communities without compromising its long term position in the region. In 2005, Gloria Udoh, a community development officer at SPDC, Shell’s premier subsidiary in Nigeria, led a team that was charged with proposing a new community engagement model to Shell senior management.

With senior management approval, they prepared to implement a pilot programme with communities in the Gbaran-Ubie project, one of Shell’s largest gas projects. How would she and her team gain the trust of communities that had often been at the short end of broken promises for decades? How would she convince community leaders that the new model would benefit them more in the long run than paternalistic handouts? What are the challenges in implementing a new engagement model in the context of a military insurgency in the Niger Delta?

“Please leave. We are not willing to discuss with you if you are not going to address the outstanding electricity project.”

The reaction of a Chief of the Nembe community as recalled by Shell community development officer Gloria Udoh to Shell’s plans for a new community engagement model in the Niger Delta.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The focal company in the case is SPDC. SPDC is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Royal Dutch Shell. SPDC focuses on onshore and shallow water oil and gas production in the Niger Delta. Royal Dutch Shell and the companies in which it owns investments are distinct entities. For convenience, we use the word “Shell” to refer to these companies.

  2. 2.

    In addition to SPDC, Royal Dutch Shell has interests in three other companies operating in Nigeria. They are (a) Shell Nigeria Exploration and Production (SNEPCo)—holds interests in four deep water oil and gas blocks; (b) The Nigeria Liquefied Gas Company—produces liquefied natural gas (LNG) and natural gas liquids for export. Royal Dutch Shell owns 25.6% equity stake; and (c) Shell Nigeria Gas Limited (SNG)—distributes gas domestically in Nigeria.

  3. 3.

    According to correspondence with knowledgeable industry insiders in 2015, the “split of the barrel” in the JOAs has changed since 2005. Though the NNPC and its JOA partners do not release publicly their production costs, a combination of high oil prices in the years 2007–2014 and the tense security situation in the Niger Delta have led to increased production cost. For the purpose of the case, however, Fig. 14.2 will suffice as an indication of how revenues from the JVs were split between the partners in the years 2000–2005, the time in which the case is set.

    Fig. 14.2
    An area graph depicts the split of the barrel, indicating the oil price increase from $10 to $50. The costs are constant. A slight increase is seen in the partners’ margin. There is an increase from $7 to $38 for the government take.

    “Split of the barrel” between venture partners and Nigerian government in the years 2000–2004. The Nigerian government receives an increasing share of revenues from oil production as the oil price increased above $10 per barrel (Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria 2004, p. 7)

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Correspondence to Onajomo Akemu .

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Akemu, O., Mes, A., Comiteau, L. (2019). Shell Nigeria: Changing the Community Engagement Model. In: Lenssen, G.G., Smith, N.C. (eds) Managing Sustainable Business. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-024-1144-7_14

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