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Fundamentals of Legal Argumentation pp 95–116Cite as

MacCormick’s Theory of the Justification of Legal Decisions

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Part of the book series: Argumentation Library ((ARGA,volume 1))

Abstract

In his theory of legal justification Neil MacCormick tries to formulate a solution for one of the central problems in modern legal theory. He explains how, in so-called hard cases in which a judge cannot rely on a generally accepted existing rule, a legal decision can be justified rationally. MacCormick specifies the forms of argument a judge must employ when formulating a new rule or when interpreting an existing rule drawn from a statute or precedent. MacCormick locates the solution of this problem in the more general context of an institutional theory of the rationality of legal decision-making and legal justification. Furthermore he attempts to answer the question which general and which specific legal requirements of rationality play a role in the justification of legal decisions from the perspective of the law as an institutional normative order.

This chapter explains in some detail how these insights are developed in MacCormick’s institutional theory of legal reasoning and legal justification. In Sect. 6.2 I address the institutional approach of legal justification. In Sect. 6.3 I examine the deductive mode of justification, and in Sect. 7.4 the second-order mode of justification. The Sects. 6.5, 6.6 and 6.7 deal with consequentialist arguments and arguments from coherence and consistency. Section 6.8 offers an assessment of MacCormick’s theory with respect to the development of a theory of legal argumentation and the analysis and evaluation of legal argumentation.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    For a discussion of MacCormick’s legal philosophical views in relation to his theory of legal interpretation and his model of justification see Michelon (2010), Pino (2010) and Schiavello (2010). In a later edition of the book Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory MacCormick (1994) explains his revised approach of the application and interpretation of legal rules in terms of a ‘post-positivist’ approach.

  2. 2.

    See MacCormick (2005:32–78) for a further discussion of the legal syllogism , deductivism and universals and particulars. See also MacCormick (1997). For a dicussion of MacCormick’s (2005) revised theory of legal reasoning with respect to the implications for the concept of law see Bertea (2008).

  3. 3.

    For a further discussion of his ideas about the law as institution see MacCormick (2008).

  4. 4.

    For a discussion of Dworkin’s idea of the law as argumentative activity see Chap. 1 of this book.

  5. 5.

    See MacCormick (2005:6–7).

  6. 6.

    Cf. Robert Alexy’s requirement of universalization for general practical and legal argumentation discussed in Chap. 7 of this book. See MacCormick (2005:237–253) for a discussion of the defeasibility of legal rules and legal reasoning . See Sartor (2008) for a discussion of MacCormick’s views on defeasibility .

  7. 7.

    See MacCormick (2005: 24).

  8. 8.

    For a discussion of the critique by authors such as White (1979–1980) with respect to MacCormick’s (1978) reconstruction in terms of propositional logic see MacCormick (2005:68 ff.).

  9. 9.

    See MacCormick (1978:25–27).

  10. 10.

    See also MacCormick (1978:63–65, 233, 240–241).

  11. 11.

    See MacCormick (1978:272).

  12. 12.

    For a discussion of the concept of ‘hard case ’ see Chap. 1 of this book. For a discussion of the possibility to reconstruct the second-order justification as a logically valid argument see a.o. Sartor (2008).

  13. 13.

    See MacCormick (1978:67–68).

  14. 14.

    See MacCormick (1978:67–68).

  15. 15.

    See MacCormick (1978:72).

  16. 16.

    MacCormick (1978:97–99) observes that the requirement of ‘equity’ in a concrete case should not be understood as something particular by contrast to the universalizability of a justice. When formal rules of positive law produce injustice in their application, the creation of exceptions to the law for classes of situations to which there is good reason not to apply the law can be justified. However, the exception should be universal.

  17. 17.

    See MacCormick (1978:81).

  18. 18.

    See MacCormick (1978:95).

  19. 19.

    See MacCormick (1978:119–128).

  20. 20.

    See MacCormick (1978:111).

  21. 21.

    For a discussion of MacCormick’s ideas about consequences see Rudden (1979) and a reaction by MacCormick (2005:106).

  22. 22.

    See MacCormick (1978:142–143).

  23. 23.

    MacCormick (1978:115–116) argues that the focus of consequentialist arguments is on the consequences of rival rulings (‘rule utilitarianism’) in similar cases, and not on the consequences for the particular parties of the particular decision (‘act utilitarianism’). For a further discussion of consequentialist arguments see MacCormick (2005:132–137).

  24. 24.

    For a further discussion of arguments from coherence in terms of normative coherence and principles see MacCormick (1984) and (2005:190–205). For a discussion of coherence in MacCormick’s theory see Carbonell (2011).

  25. 25.

    See MacCormick (1978:159).

  26. 26.

    See MacCormick (1978:170).

  27. 27.

    See MacCormick (1978:192). For a further discussion of arguments from analogy in the context of arguments from coherence and legal principles in the development of law see MacCormick (2005:205–213).

  28. 28.

    See MacCormick (1978:161–163).

  29. 29.

    See MacCormick (1978:220–221).

  30. 30.

    See MacCormick (1978:250–251).

  31. 31.

    Cf. Alexy (1989:220–295) who specifies how the various argument forms for the external justification constitute a specific implementation of the general schema for the internal justification (which, in turn, is a specific implementation of the schema for practical argumentation ).

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  1. Speech Communication, Argumentation Theory and Rhetoric, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

    Eveline T. Feteris

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Feteris, E.T. (2017). MacCormick’s Theory of the Justification of Legal Decisions. In: Fundamentals of Legal Argumentation. Argumentation Library, vol 1. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-024-1129-4_6

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