Abstract
This chapter discusses Perelman’s New Rhetoric and its application in a legal context in the form of a legal logic. In his New Rhetoric Perelman describes the argumentative techniques a speaker can use to convince his audience. In his application of the general New Rhetoric in his legal logic, Perelman discusses the argumentative techniques that are used by lawyers to convince a legal audience. Section 4.2 describes Perelman’s general argumentation theory. Section 4.3 specifies how the ideas of this general theory are applied in his legal argumentation theory. Section 4.4 discusses applications of Perelman’s ideas in the literature of legal argumentation. The chapter concludes with Sect. 4.5, providing a summary of the insights offered by Perelman’s theory with respect to the analysis and evaluation of legal argumentation.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
Because Perelman’s argumentation theory has been discussed at length by others, I will confine myself here to a short description of the central concepts. For a more comprehensive discussion of Perelman’s theory see van Eemeren et al. (2014 Chapter 5). See also Alexy (1989:155–173).
In addition to the New Rhetoric, Perelman has addressed the concept of justice, in a collection of studies in legal philosophy Justice, Law, and Argument. Essays on Moral and Legal Reasoning (1980).
- 2.
Sometimes a specific audience may play the role of the universal audience if the arguer perceives the group of people he is addressing as representative of reasonable people, on the whole. In principle, the universal audience is an abstract norm. The main problem is that in practice there is no clear line between both types of audience. For a critique of the distinction between the two types of audience see Aarnio (1987:222) and van Eemeren et al. (2014, chapter 5).
- 3.
See Alexy (1989:161 ff.) for a critique of the ambiguity of the concept of the universal audience that depends on the one hand on historical and social factors and is a collection of all rational beings on the other.
- 4.
For a discussion of Perelman’s legal logic see also Goltzberg (2013) and Vannier (2001). In Goltzberg (2013) the author discusses Perelman’s legal logic in light of Perelman’s legal philosophical ideas. In Vannier (2001) the author introduces Perelman’s New Rhetoric for the legal field. For a discussion of Perelman’s legal philosophical ideas see Frydman & Meyer (2012) and Mootz (2010). For a discussion of Perelman’s ideas in Italian literature on legal argumentation and rhetoric see Chap. 11 of this book in the section on studies of legal argumentation in Italy (by, for example, Damele, Gianformaggio and Manzin).
- 5.
- 6.
- 7.
Of course, the standards of reasonableness of the argumentation depend on the subject and the legal field. In Toulmin’s terms, the standards of reasonableness are ‘field-dependent ’.
- 8.
See Martinez 541/983, 1983; Martinez 366/983,1984.
- 9.
See Loving v. Virginia, 388, U.S. 1 (1967).
References
Aarnio, A. (1987). The rational as reasonable. A treatise of legal justification. Dordrecht etc.: Reidel.
Alexy, R. (1989). A theory of legal argumentation. The theory of rational discourse as theory of legal justification. Oxford: Clarendon press. (Translation of: Theorie der juristischen Argumentation. Die Theorie des rationalen Diskurses als Theorie der juristischen Begründung. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1978).
Brunet, P. (2012). Perelman, le positivisme et l’interpretation (Perelman, positivism and interpretation). In: B. Frydman & M. Meyer (Eds.), Chaïm Perelman (1912–2012). De la nouvelle rhétorique à la logique juridique (pp. 189–202). Paris: PUF.
Eemeren, F.H. van, Garssen, B.J., Krabbe, E.C.W., Snoeck Henkemans, A.F., Verheij, B. & Wagemans, J.H.M. (2014). Handbook of argumentation theory. Dordrecht etc.: Springer.
Frydman, B. (2012). Perelman et les juristes de l’école de Bruxelles (Perelman and the lawyers of the Brussels’ school). In: B. Frydman & M. Meyer (Eds.) (2012). Chaïm Perelman (1912–2012). De la nouvelle rhétorique à la logique juridique (pp. 17–48). Paris: PUF.
Frydman, B. & Meyer, M. (Eds.) (2012). Chaïm Perelman (1912–2012). De la nouvelle rhétorique à la logique juridique (Chaïm Perelman (1912–2012). From the New Rhetoric to the legal logic). Paris: PUF.
Golden, J.L. & Pilotta, J. J. (eds.) (1986). Practical reasoning in human affairs. Studies in honor of Chaim Perelman. Dordrecht etc.: Reidel.
Goltzberg, S. (2013). Chaïm Perelman. L’argumentation juridique (Chaïm Perelman. Legal argumentation). Paris: Michalon.
Haarscher, G. (1993). Chaim Perelman et la pensée contemporaine (Chaïm Perelman and contemporary thought). Brussels: Bruylant.
Makau, J.M. (1984). The Supreme Court and reasonableness. Quarterly Journal of Speech, Vol. 70, pp. 379–396.
Maneli, M. (1993). Perelman’s new rhetoric as philosophy and methodology for the next century. Dordrecht etc.: Kluwer.
Mootz, I.I.I. (2010). Perelman’s theory of argumentation and natural law. Philosophy and Rhetoric 43(4).
Perelman, Ch. (1976). Logique juridique. Nouvelle rhétorique (Legal logic. New Rhetoric). Paris: Dalloz.
Perelman, Ch. (1980). Justice, law and argument. Essays on moral and legal reasoning. Dordrecht etc.: Reidel.
Perelman, Ch. & Olbrechts-Tyteca, L. (1958). La nouvelle rhétorique. Traité de l’argumentation. (The new rhetoric. A treatise on argumentation). Brussels: l’Université de Bruxelles.
Perelman, Ch. & Olbrechts-Tyteca, L. (1969). The new rhetoric. A treatise on argumentation. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. (English translation of La nouvelle rhétorique, 1958).
Rieke, R.D. (1986). The evolution of judicial justification: Perelman’s concept of the rational and the reasonable. In: J. L. Golden and J. J. Pilotta (Eds.) Practical reasoning in human affairs. Studies in honor of Chaim Perelman. Dordrecht etc.: Reidel. pp. 227–244.
Schuetz, J. (1991). Perelman’s rule of justice in Mexican appellate courts. In: F.H. van Eemeren, R. Grootendorst, J.A. Blair & C.A. Willard (Eds.), Proceedings of the Second International Conference on Argumentation (pp. 804–812). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.
Tarello, G. (1972). Sur la spécificité du raisonnement juridique (On the specific nature of legal reasoning). In: Die juristische Argumentation (Vorträge des Weltkongresses für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, Brüssel, 29. VIII-3. IX 1971). (pp. 103–124). Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag.
Vannier, G. (2001). Argumentation et droit. Introduction à la Nouvelle Rhetorique de Perelman. (Argumentation and law. Introduction to the New Rhetoric of Perelman). Paris: PUF.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2017 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Feteris, E.T. (2017). Perelman’s New Rhetoric. In: Fundamentals of Legal Argumentation. Argumentation Library, vol 1. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-024-1129-4_4
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-024-1129-4_4
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-024-1127-0
Online ISBN: 978-94-024-1129-4
eBook Packages: Religion and PhilosophyPhilosophy and Religion (R0)