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Fundamentals of Legal Argumentation pp 49–61Cite as

Toulmin’s Argumentation Model

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Part of the book series: Argumentation Library ((ARGA,volume 1))

Abstract

This chapter discusses Toulmin’s argumentation model and its application in a legal context. In the introduction of his argumentation model, Toulmin uses the legal process to show that the acceptability of practical argumentation does not depend on logical validity. Comparing the process of practical argumentation with a legal process, he tries to demonstrate that the acceptability of a claim depends in part on a fixed procedure for defending standpoints. The elements of such a procedure are field-invariant. However, the evaluation criteria that are used in various forms of legal proceedings to decide whether the content of the arguments put forward in this procedure are acceptable are field-dependent.

In this chapter, Sect. 3.2 describes Toulmin’s argumentation model in which he translates the stages of a legal process in terms of a general procedure for practical argumentation. Section 3.3 discusses the application of Toulmin’s model in literature on legal argumentation. Section 3.4 discusses refinements and extensions of the Toulmin model developed in research on AI and Law. Section 3.5 concludes with a summary of the insights offered by Toulmin’s theory with respect to the analysis and evaluation of legal argumentation.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Because Toulmin’s argumentation theory and its advantages and disadvantages have been discussed at length by others, I will confine myself here to a short description of the model. For a more comprehensive discussion of Toulmin’s model, see Alexy (1989: 79–92), van Eemeren et al. (2014: 203–256), Hitchcock and Verheij (2006a, b), Horovitz (1972: 167–175), Verheij (2005, 2009).

  2. 2.

    Outside the field of legal argumentation, there are also other applications of Toulmin’s model. See van Eemeren et al. (2014: 227–251) for an overview of applications.

  3. 3.

    For a discussion of the various interpretations of the function of the warrant and the critique on Toulmin’s description of the warrant see van Eemeren et al. (2014: 227–251).

  4. 4.

    See Toulmin, Rieke and Janik (1984: 38,46,62,86) and Snoeck Henkemans (1992: 46).

  5. 5.

    Cf. Freeman (1991) who takes a similar view with respect to the macro-structure of arguments. Freeman conceives the monological structure of an argument as the product of an argumentative dialogue, referring to the legal context that was the inspiration of Toulmin. In his opinion, the warrant has a function in the process but should not be included in the diagram that forms a reconstruction of this process in a monological form. For a discussion of the ‘procedural layer’ of models in AI and Law from the perspective of the Toulmin model see Prakken and Sartor (2002: 11–12). For a discussion of the use of Toulmin’s model see also Bench-Capon, Prakken and Sartor (2009: 15).

  6. 6.

    For a more extensive overview of specifications and extensions of the Toulmin model see for example van Eemeren et al. (2014, chapter 4) on Toulmin’s model of argumentation, Hitchcock and Verheij (2006a, b). For a discussion of specifications and extensions of the Toulmin model in Artificial Intelligence see Verheij (2009). As Verheij (2009) indicates, authors often do not refer explicitly to the Toulmin model when they make certain distinctions. However, various distinctions made in AI and Law can be considered as refinements of ideas that underlie Toulmin’s model.

  7. 7.

    A similar analytical distinction between the general rule, R, and the interpretation of the rule for the concrete case, RC, is made by Henket and van den Hoven (1990: 153–154). The step from the general rule R and the formulation of the rule RC is supported by reference to a particular interpretation method.

  8. 8.

    Branting (1994: 13) refers to the Donoghue v. Stevenson case as an example of such a gradation of warrants . See for a discussion of this case in Chap. 6 of this book in the discussion of the theory of MacCormick.

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  1. Speech Communication, Argumentation Theory and Rhetoric, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

    Eveline T. Feteris

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Feteris, E.T. (2017). Toulmin’s Argumentation Model. In: Fundamentals of Legal Argumentation. Argumentation Library, vol 1. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-024-1129-4_3

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