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General Reports of the XIXth Congress of the International Academy of Comparative Law Rapports Généraux du XIXème Congrès de l'Académie Internationale de Droit Comparé pp 319–350Cite as

The Law of Close Corporations

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Part of the book series: Ius Comparatum - Global Studies in Comparative Law ((GRIA,volume 24))

Abstract

Instead of attempting to develop a strict definition, this comparative study seeks to outline the concept of a close corporation by identifying its characteristic features. Important recent reforms and relevant trends pertaining to the law of close corporations are examined in more detail before the study moves on to the specific elements of the governance framework. Considering the legitimate interest of the shareholders of a close corporation to restrict share transfers, default rules on share transfers and limits on share transfer restrictions are comparatively analysed. Thereafter, light is shed on the various modes in which an investment of a shareholder may be withdrawn from the company—either on a voluntary basis, or involuntarily as a result of shareholder expulsion. Finally, different types of shareholder conflicts and possible remedies are analysed.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See for example Gregor Bachmann, Horst Eidenmüller, Andreas Engert, Holger Fleischer and Wolfgang Schön, Regulating the Closed Corporation (De Gruyter 2014) 5 et seqq.

  2. 2.

    In this sense, see the title of the collected volume Joseph A McCahery and Erik P M Vermeulen (eds), Corporate Governance of Non-Listed Companies (Oxford Univ Press 2008).

  3. 3.

    For another potential way of describing this material, see Larry E Ribstein, The Rise of the Uncorporation, (Oxford Univ Press 2010) 1: “The book concerns a particular form of business – what it calls an uncorporation. The term presently includes general and limited partnerships, limited liability companies (LLCs) and variations on these entities. This is not a book about a particular type of business (i.e., big, small, closely held, or public) or a particular industry.”

  4. 4.

    See Holger Fleischer, ‘Internationale Trends und Reformen im Recht der geschlossenen Kapitalgesellschaft’ [2014] NZG 1081, 1082.

  5. 5.

    According to Robert A Kessler, ‘With Limited Liability For All: Why Not a Partnership Corporation’ (1967) 36 Fordham L. Rev. 235, 255: “Clearly, the statement that a close corporation is like a spiral staircase, hard to describe but recognizable when you see one, is not appropriate to a statutory definition, although it does point up the definitional problem.”

  6. 6.

    For more information on this, see Laurence C B Gower, ‘The English Private Company’ (1953) 18 Law & Contemp. Probs. 535, 539: “[I]t was by the 1907 Act, embodied in the new Companies (Consolidation) Act, 1908, that private companies were first given a statutory definition and clearly distinguished from others. Section 121 of the 1908 Act […] defined a private company as one which by its articles: (a) restricts the right to transfer its shares; and (b) limits the number of its members to 50; and (c) prohibits any invitation to the public to subscribe for any shares or debentures of the company.”

  7. 7.

    From an Italian perspective, see the analysis of the Reform Commission Mirone, Scheda di sintesi, February 2000, Art. 3 n° 2: “Nel progetto di riforma non si è ritenuto di seguire le proposte, sostenute anche nell’ambito della Commissione, volte a fissare in sede di legge delegata un limite massimo dimensionale (numero dei soci e/o dei dipendenti; entità del capitale, o dell’attivo patrimoniale, o del fatturato).”

  8. 8.

    For the reasons, see Botschaft zur Revision des Obligationenrechts from 19.12.2001, BBl 2002, p. 3148, 3156: “Mit der Revision soll die obere Begrenzung von 2 Millionen Franken aufgehoben werden, da sie das Wachstum von Gesellschaften beeinträchtigen kann, die auf die Zufuhr von Eigenkapital angewiesen sind, ohne dass ein sachlich überzeugender Grund für eine derartige Beschränkung vorliegt. Insbesondere ist eine obere Limitierung des Stammkapitals für eine Abgrenzung gegenüber der Rechtsform der Aktiengesellschaft weder erforderlich noch sinnvoll.”

  9. 9.

    For an English perspective, see Laurence C B Gower and Paul L Davies, Principles of Modern Company Law (9th ed, Thomson Sweet & Maxwell 2012) marg. n°. 1-15: “Given the significance of the distinction between public and private companies in the present Companies Act and the likely increase in the importance of that distinction in the future, it is important to see that the choice between a public and a private company is one for the incorporators themselves or, after incorporation, for the shareholders.”

  10. 10.

    See also Laurence C B Gower and Paul L Davies (note 9), marg. n°. 1-15: “In fact, the default rule is that the company is private: unless the company states that it is to be registered as a public company, it will be a private one.”

  11. 11.

    For a contemporary perspective, see Boris I Bittker and James S Eustice, ‘Corporate Elections Under Subchapter S’ (1966) 39 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1, 3: “[I]t should be noted at the outset that the term ‘small business corporation’ is misleading. The size of the corporation’s income, assets, net worth, or other financial characteristics plays no part in determining its eligibility under Subchapter S; the only restriction of this type is that it may not have more than ten shareholders.”

  12. 12.

    For more, see Sect. 13.2.2 below.

  13. 13.

    For a Spanish perspective on the following considerations, see Jesús Alfaro Águila-Real, ‘Los problemas contractuales en las sociedades cerrades’, InDret 4/2005, 2, 6: “En una sociedad cerrada el número de socios es típicamente muy pequeño (más del 80% de las sociedades limitadas tienen tres o menos socios); los socios son familiares o amigos y viven próximos unos de otros; todos participan activamente en la gestión social (es decir, son ‘inversores activos’) y ‘viven’ de la empresa social, en el sentido de que tienen buena parte de su patrimonio invertido en la empresa social y ésta es su principal fuente de rentas siendo, a menudo, asalariados de ésta.”

  14. 14.

    328 N.E.2d 505, 511 (Mass. 1975): “[…] (1) a small number of stockholders; (2) no ready market for the corporate stock; (3) substantial majority stockholder participation in the management, direction and operations of the corporation.”

  15. 15.

    See the detailed evaluation by Douglas K Moll, ‘Protection of Minority Shareholders in Closely-Held Corporations: Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype’ in Jonathan R Macey (ed), The Iconic Cases in Corporate Law (West 2008) 98 et seqq.

  16. 16.

    According to the classic finding of Carlos D Israels, ‘The Close Corporation and the Law’ (1948) 33 Cornell L. Q. 488: “[T]he participants in a close corporation consider themselves ‘partners’ and seek to conduct the corporate affairs to a greater or lesser extent in the manner of a partnership.” For an earlier decision on German law, RGZ 101, 55 regarding the agreement between the two sole shareholders of a GmbH to treat each other internally as if they were partners of a commercial partnership, Holger Fleischer, in Holger Fleischer/Wulf Goette (eds.), Münchener Kommentar zum GmbH-Gesetz (2. ed, C.H. Beck 2015), Introduction marg. n°. 22 with further annotations.

  17. 17.

    Leading decision: Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd [1973] AC 360 (HL).

  18. 18.

    See Robert A Kessler, ‘Statutory Requirement of a Board of Directors: A Corporate Anachronism’ (1969) 27 U. Chi. L. Rev. 696, 717; catchier terminology, E R Latty, ‘The Close Corporation and the New North Carolina Business Corporation Act’ (1956) 34 N.C.L. Rev. 432, 453: “incorporated hot dog stand”.

  19. 19.

    Conceptually, Ulrich Immenga, Die personalistische Kapitalgesellschaft (Athenäum 1970) 17.

  20. 20.

    Discussing the application of partnership law to the GmbH, Holger Fleischer, ‘Die Lückenausfüllung des GmbH-Rechts durch das Recht der Personengesellschaften’ [2008] GmbHR 1121.

  21. 21.

    For further details, see Erik P M Vermeulen, The Evolution of Legal Business Forms in Europe and the United States (Kluwer International 2003) 23: “Because it is not yet clear when and to what extent the partnership principles should be applied to close corporations, the ‘partnership analogy’ is full of perils and pitfalls.”

  22. 22.

    See Frank H Easterbrook and Daniel R Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law (Harvard Univ Press 1991) 250: “Proponents of the partnership analogy assume that participants in closely held corporations are knowledgeable enough to incorporate to obtain the benefits of favourable tax treatment but ignorant of all other differences between corporate and partnership law.”

  23. 23.

    See Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366 (Del. 1993).

  24. 24.

    For further details, Holger Fleischer (note 4) [2014] NZG 1081, 1083 et seqq.; Édouard-Jean Navez, Yves De Cordt (eds), La simplification du droit des sociétés privées dans les États membres de l’Union européenne (Bruylant 2015); Joseph A McCahery, Levinus Timmerman and Erik P M Vermeulen (ed), Private Company Law Reform. International and European Perspectives (Asser 2010).

  25. 25.

    For a detailed assessment, see Paul Le Cannu, ‘La loi l’initiative économique et le droit des sociétés’ [2003] Rev. sociétés 409; for a briefer analysis in reference to the swift progress of the French Reform Acts (“multiplication des réformes”), see Philippe Merle, Sociétés commerciales (16. ed, Dalloz 2013) marg. n°. 18.

  26. 26.

    Instructive overview recently published by Mette Neville, ‘The Regulation of Close Corporations in Danish Company Law in an International Regulatory Context’, Nordic & European Company Law, LSN Research Paper Series, N°. 14-02, July 2014, p. 2 et seqq.; see also Jan Andersson, ‘The Making of Company Law in Scandinavia and Europe’, in Holger Fleischer, Jesper Lau Hansen and Wolf-Georg Ringe (eds), German and Nordic Perspectives on Company Law and Capital Markets Law (Mohr Siebeck 2015), 27 et seqq.

  27. 27.

    Bundesamt für Justiz (ed), Groupe de réflexion Gesellschaftsrecht, Schlussbericht, September 1993. This group included Peter Böckli, Peter Forstmoser, Roland Ruedin and Walter Schluep.

  28. 28.

    See Company Law Review Steering Group, The Strategic Framework (February 1999); Company Formation and Capital Maintenance (October 1999); Developing the Framework (March 2000); Completing the Structure (November 2000); Final Report (July 2011); for an overview of the reform process, see Stephen W Mayson, Derek French and Christopher Ryan, Company Law (31. ed, Oxford Univ Press 2014) 14 et seq.

  29. 29.

    Expertgroep, Vereenvoudiging en flexibilisering van het Nederlandse BV-recht (May 2004).

  30. 30.

    For a summary of the motivations for reforming corporation law in Germany, see Gregor Bachmann, ‘Grundtendenzen der Reform geschlossener Gesellschaften in Europa – dargestellt am Beispiel des britischen Reformprozesses und der Europäischen Privatgesellschaft’ [2001] ZGR 351, 368 et seqq.; for a “permanent forum on company law” at the European level, Jan Wouters, ‘European Company Law: Quo Vadis‘ [2000] CMLR 257, 300.

  31. 31.

    Discussed in more detail below, Sect. 13.2.3.2.

  32. 32.

    For further details, see Eduardo Valpuesta, La sociedad nueva empresa (Bosch 2004) 15 et seq., 155 et seq.; additional detailed assessment Michael Grimm, Die Finanzverfassung der kleinen Kapitalgesellschaft. Eine rechtsvergleichende Untersuchung der Reformdiskussion in Europa (Duncker & Humblot 2013) 349 et seqq.

  33. 33.

    Suzel Castagné, ‘La création d’entreprise en questions-réponses ou la liberté d’entreprendre (L. n° 2003-721 pour l’initiative économique’, 1er août 2003), [2004] JCP N 1778, 1803; for a critical view, Alain Pietrancosta, ‘Capital zéro ou zéro capital’ in Alain Couret and Hervé Le Nabasque (eds), Quel avenir pour le capital social? (Dalloz 2004) 127, 130, who sees the lack of a more profound discussion with analysis of the consequences as a fundamental problem of recent French law-making.

  34. 34.

    For further details, see Holger Fleischer (note 16), Introduction marg. n°. 64 with additional references.

  35. 35.

    See also Hugo Keyßner, ‘Reichsgesetz betreffend die Gesellschaften mit beschränkter Haftung. Vom 20. April 1892’ (1892) 40 ZHR 394, 399; as well as the observations by Hans Erich Feine, ‘Die Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung’ in Victor Ehrenberg (ed), Handbuch des gesamten Handelsrechts (Vol. III/3, O R Reisland 1929) 26: “So rasch wie dieser Entwurf ist nie eine Vorlage von gleicher wirtschaftlicher Tragweite durch die Maschine der Gesetzgebung gelaufen.”

  36. 36.

    Steering Group (note 28), Strategic Framework, marg. n°. 5.2.13: “So the main problems which small companies find with the present law appear to be that it is opaque, unwieldy, unnecessarily complex and burdensome.”

  37. 37.

    See Marco Becht, Colin Meyer and Hannes F Wagner, ‘Where do firms incorporate? Deregulation and the cost of entry’ (2008) 14 J. Corp. Finance 241; William W Bratton, Joseph A McCahery and Erik P M Vermeulen, ‘How Does Corporate Mobility Affect Lawmaking? A Comparative Analysis’ (2009) 57 Am. J. Comp. L. 347; for further details, see Holger Fleischer (note. 1), Introduction marg. n°. 222 et seqq.

  38. 38.

    ECJ 1999, I-1459, Case C-212/97.

  39. 39.

    From a German perspective, Begr. RegE MoMiG, BT-Drucks. 16/6140, p. 59: “zunehmende[r] Wettbewerb der Gesellschaftsformen in Europa”; from a Dutch perspective Maarten J Kroeze, ‘Flexibility and Function of Private Company Law Statutes’ (2007) 8 EBOR 121, 122: “The immediate cause for the current activity of the Ministry of Justice is the recent case law from the European Court of Justice in the Centros, Überseering and Inspire Art cases.”

  40. 40.

    See Ioannis Papadimopoulos, ‘Die Private Kapitalgesellschaft im griechischen Recht’ [2014] RIW 344.

  41. 41.

    Overview and systematic classification by Marco Cian, ‘S.r.l., s.r.l. semplificata, s.r.l. a capitale ridotto. Una nuova geometria del sistema o un sistema disarticolato?’ [2012] Riv. soc. 1101.

  42. 42.

    See Steering Group (note 28), Final Report, marg. n°. 1.53 et seqq.

  43. 43.

    From a UK perspective in this regard, Arad Reisberg, ‘Corporate Law in the UK after Recent Reforms: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly’ (2010) 63 Current Legal Problems 315, 344 et seqq.; very clear in his opinion, Sealy, [2006] Sweet & Maxwell’s Company Law Newsletter 18, 3: “The truth is that ‘think small first’ is a mere smoke-screen which the draftsman has totally disregarded.”

  44. 44.

    See Relazione al d.lgs. n°. 6/2003, § 11: “[La riforma] si volge a soddisfare esigenze particolarmente presenti nell’ambito del settore delle piccole e medie imprese.”

  45. 45.

    See Ley 7/2003, BOE núm. 79, 2.4.2003, 12679, 12680: “[L]a presente ley desarrolla el denominado ‚Proyecto Nueva Empresa’ que tiene por objeto estimular la creación de nuevas empresas, especialmente las de pequeña y mediana dimension, que constituyen la columna vertebral de la economía española y de la europea y son claves en la creación de puestos de trabajo.”

  46. 46.

    Steering Group (note 28), Final Report, marg. n°. 1.27: “The overwhelming majority of British companies are small, private and largely owner-managed. These businesses are the source of much of our economic growth and employment and some of them should be the new great public quoted global companies of the future.”

  47. 47.

    See COM(2008) 394 Final: The “Small Business Act” for Europe.

  48. 48.

    See COM(2011) 78 Final: Review of the “Small Business Act” for Europe”.

  49. 49.

    Commission Recommendation of 6 May 2003 concerning the definition of micro, small and medium sized enterprises, OJ. L 124/36 of 20 May 2003.

  50. 50.

    Directive 2013/34/EU of 26 June 2013 on the annual financial statements and related reports of certain types of undertakings, OJ. L 182/19 of 29 June 2013.

  51. 51.

    See most recently, World Bank, Doing Business 2014 – Understanding Regulations for Small and Medium-Size Enterprises (2013).

  52. 52.

    World Bank (note 51), 24: “Doing Business functions as a barometer of the regulatory environment for domestic businesses. To use a medical analogy, Doing Business is similar to a cholesterol test. A cholesterol test does not tell us everything about our health. But our cholesterol level is easier to measure than our overall health, and the test provides us with important information, warning us when we need to adjust our behaviour.”

  53. 53.

    See most recently, Mette Neville and Karsten Engsig Sorensen, ‘Promoting entrepreneurship – The new company law agenda?’, 2014 (15) EBOR 545; on UK law, Arad Reisberg, ‘Corporate Law in the UK after Recent Reforms: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly’ (2010) 63 Current Legal Problems 315, 319: “Developing an enterprise culture in the UK was a major policy initiative of the Labour Government since coming into power in May 1997.”

  54. 54.

    Monographically, Bayless Manning and James Hanks Jr, Legal Capital (Foundation Press 1990).

  55. 55.

    Renauld Dutreil, of the Loi Dutreil, was then the State Secretary for SMEs in the Ministry of Finance.

  56. 56.

    Philippe Merle (note 25), marg. n°. 178; from a comparative law perspective, Michael Grimm (note 32), 320 et seqq.

  57. 57.

    More on these kinds of reforms below, Sect. 13.2.6.

  58. 58.

    ErlRV 24 BlgNR 25, GP 27.

  59. 59.

    To loosely translate the title of a contribution by Heinz Krejci, ‘Einmal hin, einmal her, rundherum, das ist sehr schwer: Zur geplanten GmbH-“Gegenreform”’ [2014] GES 1.

  60. 60.

    For more, see Thomas Bachner, ‘Die gründungsprivilegierte GmbH’ [2014] RdW 115; Paul Schörghofer and Ines Krausler, ‘Gründungsprivilegierung nach § 10b GmbHG’ [2014] GesRZ 168.

  61. 61.

    World Bank (note 51), 41 et seqq.

  62. 62.

    Nadja Vietz, ‘Die neue “Blitz-GmbH” in Spanien’ [2003] GmbHR 26.; for a more detailed account Pilar Montero García-Noblejas, ‘Rapport Espagnol – Modernisation et Simplification du Droit des Sociétés en Espagne’, in Édouard-Jean Navez, Yves De Cordt (eds), La simplification du droit des sociétés privées dans les États membres de l’Union européenne (Bruylant 2015) 265, 269 et seqq.

  63. 63.

    European Commission, COM(2014) 212 final.

  64. 64.

    Critical of this, Peter Ries, ‘Societas Unius Personae – cui bono? Eine Anmerkung eines deutschen Registerrichters’ [2014] NZG 569 et seq.; Hartmut Wicke, ‘Societas Unius Personae – SUP: eine äußerst wackelige Angelegenheit’ [2014] ZIP 1414, 1415 et seq.

  65. 65.

    For further details on this subject, see the recent Directive 910/1014 of the European Parliament and of the Council on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market of 23.7.2014, L. 257/73 of August 28, 2014.

  66. 66.

    World Bank (note 51), 72.

  67. 67.

    Critical Ulrich Noack and Michael Beurskens, ‘Of Tradition and Change – The Modernization of the German GmbH in the Face of European Competition’ in Joseph A McCahery, Levinus Timmerman and Erik P M Vermeulen (eds), Private Company Law Reform (Springer Netherlands 2010) 157, 165: “While other states are moving ahead and allowing for formation online, Germany ignores modern communications altogether.”

  68. 68.

    For a compilation of relevant studies, Gregor Bachmann, Horst Eidenmüller, Andreas Engert, Holger Fleischer and Wolfgang Schön (note 1), 179 et seq.; World Bank (note 51), 30 et seqq.

  69. 69.

    Reiner Braun, Horst Eidenmüller, Andreas Engert and Lars Hornuf, ‘Does Charter Competition Foster Entrepreneurship? A Difference-in-Difference Approach to European Company Law Reform’ (2013) 51 J. Common Market Studies 399; Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio López-de-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer ‘The Regulation of Entry’ (2002) 117 Q. J. Econ. 1; Leora Klapper, Luc Laeven and Raghuran Rajan, ‘Entry Regulation as a Barrier to Entrepreneurship’ (2006) 82 J. Fin. Econ. 591; for an alternative conclusion, André van Stel, David J Storey and A Roy Thurik, ‘The Effect of Business Regulations on Nascent and Young Business Entrepreneurship’ (2007) 28 Small Bus. Econ. 171.

  70. 70.

    Lee Branstetter, Francisco Lima, Lowell J Taylor and Ana Venâncio, ‘Do Entry Regulations Deter Entrepreneurship and Job Creation? Evidence from Recent Reforms in Portugal’ (2014) 124 The Economic Journal 805.

  71. 71.

    Axel Dreher and Martin Gassebner, ‘Greasing the Wheels? The Impact of Regulations and Corruption on Firm Entry’ (2013) 155 Public Choice 413.

  72. 72.

    See Steering Group (note 28), Final Report, Vol. I, marg. n°. 5: “Small and medium-sized companies suffer regulation that was designed for large, publicly-owned companies.”

  73. 73.

    Maarten J Kroeze, ‘Flexibility and Function of Private Company Law Statutes’ (2007) 8 EBOR 121, 122: “The private company statute was, and still is, an almost 100 per cent copy of the public company statute.”

  74. 74.

    Expertgroep (note 29) 2.

  75. 75.

    For further details, see Sect. 13.2.5.

  76. 76.

    Mario Campobasso speaks of “tracing”, Diritto delle società (8. ed, UTET 2012) 567: “[S]econdo la disciplina delineata dal codice del 1942 l’asseto organizzativo della società a responsabilità limitata ricalcava il modello base della società per azioni […].”

  77. 77.

    Guiseppe Zanarone, Della società a responsabilità limitata, (vol. 1, Guiffrè 2010) 121 with note 232: “piccola società per azioni senza azioni”.

  78. 78.

    See Mario Campobasso (note 76) 567: “L’obiettivo di fondo è quello di accentuare il distacco della società a responsabilità limitata dalla società per azioni […].”

  79. 79.

    Heinrich Menkhaus and Sebastian Pawlowski, ‘Contribution on Japan’ in Rembert Süß and Thomas Wachter (eds), Handbuch des internationalen GmbH-Rechts (2. ed, Zerb 2011) marg. n°. 9.

  80. 80.

    In detail, Christoph Van der Elst and Erik P M Vermeulen, ‘The Dutch Private Company: Successfully Relaunched?’, in Édouard-Jean Navez, Yves De Cordt (eds), La simplification du droit des sociétés privées dans les États membres de l’Union européenne (Bruylant 2015), 165 et seqq.; also, Niek F M M Zamak, ‘Die niederländische Flex-BV’ [2012] GmbHR 1062.

  81. 81.

    Department of Trade and Industry, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy (1998) marg. n°. 5.2.

  82. 82.

    Lampros E Kotsiris, Greek Law on Partnerships and Corporations (4. ed, Sakkoulas 2013) marg. n°. 369: “Appealing to simplification and flexibility […].” (emphasis in original).

  83. 83.

    Relazione al d.lgs. n°. 6/2003, § 11: “elasticità”.

  84. 84.

    Hiroyuki Kansaku and Moritz Bälz, ‘Gesellschaftsrecht’ in Harald Baum and Moritz Bälz (eds), Handbuch Japanisches Handels- und Wirtschaftsrecht (Carl Heymanns 2011) § 3 marg. n°. 122: “Die Hauptstoßrichtung des Gesellschaftsgesetzes ist eine weitere Flexibilisierung. Dies ist auch vor dem Hintergrund zu sehen, dass durch die faktische Zusammenlegung der Aktiengesellschaft mit der GmbH […] nunmehr Aktienrecht mehr noch als bisher für eine große Bandbreite von Unternehmen gilt.”

  85. 85.

    See Draft and Explanatory Memorandum of the German GmbH Act, 1892, 45, arguing that there is no reason to create binding provisions due to the lack of participation of the “broader public” and because the persons participating in a GmbH are in a position to protect their interests themselves.

  86. 86.

    See also Philippe Merle (note 25), marg. n°. 595-1: “La grande nouveauté de cette SAS est de donner l’absolue priorité à la liberté contractuelle des associés qui s’exprime dans les statuts.”; also Paul Le Cannu, ‘La SAS: un cadre légal minimal’, [2014] Rev. soc. 543.

  87. 87.

    § 18-1101(b) Del. LLC Act: “It is the policy of this chapter to give the maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract […].”

  88. 88.

    In re Grupo Dos Chiles, LLC, 2006 Del. Ch. LEXIS 45, *5-6; in detail Mark J Loewenstein, ‘Freedom of Contract for Alternative Entities in Delaware: Myth or Reality?’, in Robert W. Hillman and Mark J. Loewenstein (eds), Research Handbook on Partnerships, LLCs and Alternative Forms of Business Organizations (Edward Elgar Publishing 2015), 28 et seqq. (forthcoming).

  89. 89.

    Department of Trade and Industry (note 81), marg. n°. 5.2: “maximum amount of freedom and flexibility to those organising and directing the enterprise”.

  90. 90.

    Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Statute for a European private company, COM(2008) 396, Recital 3; in detail Édouard Jean Navez, ‘The Internal Organisation of the European Private Company: Freedom of Contract under National Constraints?’, in Heribert Hirte and Christoph Teichmann (eds), The European Private Company – Societas Privata Europaea (SPE) (Berlin, Boston 2013), 147, 150 et seqq.

  91. 91.

    See for example M J G C Raaijmakers, Rechtspersonen tussen contract en instituut (Kluwer 1987).

  92. 92.

    Expertgroep (note 29), 2 with note 2.

  93. 93.

    See also Larry E Ribstein (note 3), 6: “Uncorporations are characterized by their reliance on contracts. This is an aspect of uncorporations’ partnership heritage, as partnerships are contracts among the owners.”

  94. 94.

    For further details, see Michael Klausner, ‘The Contractarian Theory of Corporate Law: A Generation Later’ (2005) 31 J. Corp. L. 779; from a comparative perspective Holger Fleischer, ‘Gesetz und Vertrag als alternative Problemlösungsmodelle im Gesellschaftsrecht’ (2004) 168 ZHR 673, 685 et seqq.

  95. 95.

    For a comprehensive Belgian perspective, see the comparative work by Isabelle Corbisier, La société: contrat ou institution? Droits étatsunien, français, belge, néerlandais, allemand et luxembourgeois (Larcier 2011).

  96. 96.

    See Zenichi Shishido, ‘Does Law Matter to Financial Capitalism? The Case of Japanese Entrepreneurs’, (2014) 37 Fordham Int. L.J. 1087, 1098: “In the corporate law reformation of 2005, the principle of freedom of contract was formally acknowledged and established. Now, at least in closely held corporations […] Japanese shareholders can plan their inter-relationship as freely as their counterparts in the United States.”

  97. 97.

    For further details on the following, see William J Carney, ‘Limited Liability Companies: Origins and Antecedents’ (1995) 66 U. Colo. L. Rev. 855, 857 et seqq.

  98. 98.

    According to Phillip L Jelsma and Pamela Everett Nollkamper, The Limited Liability Company (James 2012) § 1:20: “The limited liability company is a triumph of comparative law. The origin of this relatively new institution is generally attributed to the German law of 1892, authorizing the Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung […]. The route from Berlin to Cheyenne, Wyoming, was a long and twisted road.”

  99. 99.

    William J Carney, ‘Limited Liability Companies: Origins and Antecedents’ (1995) 66 U. Colo. L. Rev. 855, 857: “[M]y own view is that the statute was drawn from domestic sources, primarily the Wyoming Business Corporation Act, the Uniform Partnership Act, and the Uniform Limited Partnership Act.”

  100. 100.

    Philippe Merle (note 25), marg. n°. 595-1.

  101. 101.

    Art. L. 227-1 (3) C. com.

  102. 102.

    In reference to the article title by Catherine Brocal, ‘La création de la Sprl-S en Belgique. La Sprl-S et sa demi-sœur allemande l’Unternehmergesellschaft (UG), une concurrence timide pour la Limited anglaise!’ (2010) 95 DAOR 240.

  103. 103.

    This requirement has recently been abandoned, see Alain François, Jeroen Delvoie, and Tina Coen, ‘Rapport Belge – Modern times Pour le Droit Belge des Sociétés?’, in Édouard-Jean Navez, Yves De Cordt (eds), La simplification du droit des sociétés privées dans les États membres de l’Union européenne (Bruylant 2015) 67, 86.

  104. 104.

    For further details, see Troels Michael Lilja, ‘Entrepreneur Companies in Denmark and Germany – On the Danish IVS and the German UG (haftungsbeschränkt)’ in Holger Fleischer, Jesper Lau Hansen and Wolf-Georg Ringe (eds), German and Nordic Perspectives on Company Law and Capital Markets Law (Mohr Siebeck 2015) 53 et seqq.

  105. 105.

    For further details, see Ioannis Papadimopoulos and Katharina Fink, ‘Die Vereinfachung des Verfahrens zur Gründung von Kapital- und Personengesellschaften in Griechenland’ [2013] RIW 745, 751 et seqq.

  106. 106.

    World Bank (note 51), 72.

  107. 107.

    For empirical data, see Larry E Ribstein (note 3), 2 et seq.

  108. 108.

    In this vein, see Larry E Ribstein (note 3), 252 et seqq. under the sub-heading “Towards the Disappearance of the Close Corporation”.

  109. 109.

    According to the precise wording of the statute, “[w]ithin one hundred twenty days after the effectiveness of the initial articles of organization […] a copy of the same or a notice containing the substance thereof shall be published once in each week for six successive weeks, in two newspapers of the county, in which the office of the limited liability company is located, one newspaper to be printed weekly and one newspaper to be printed daily, to be designated by the county clerk.” The rationale of this regulation is difficult to fathom, as the information is also available on the New York Department of State website. Some suspect it to be an indirect subsidy of the local print publications in Manhattan, e.g. the NY Law Journal.

  110. 110.

    Numerical data in Maurice Cozian, Alain Viandier and Florence Deboissy, Droit des sociétés (27. ed, LexisNexis 2014) marg. n°. 7; for a comparative law perspective, Holger Fleischer, ‘Comparing Business Organizations in France and Germany: German Company Law in a Nutshell’ [2013] Rev. trim. dr. fin. 3, 4 et seqq.

  111. 111.

    Numerical data in Udo Kornblum, ‘Bundesweite Rechtstatsachen zum Unternehmens- und Gesellschaftsrecht (Stand 1.1.2014)’ [2014] GmbHR 694, 701.

  112. 112.

    For further details, see Michael Grimm (note 32), 361 et seqq. with relevant footnotes.

  113. 113.

    See Alain François, Jeroen Delvoie, and Tina Coen, ‘Rapport Belge – Modern times Pour le Droit Belge des Sociétés?, in Édouard-Jean Navez, Yves De Cordt (eds), La simplification du droit des sociétés privées dans les États membres de l’Union européenne (Bruylant 2015), 67, 89: “Le succès de la SPRL Starter a, par conséquent, été médiocre.”; 90: “Il restera à voir si la correction apportée par la loi du 15 janvier 2014 est de nature à réellement améliorer le statut de la SPRL Starter et de la rendre plus séduisante.”

  114. 114.

    Joseph A McCahery, Erik P M Vermeulen, Masato Hisatake and Jun Saito, ‘The new Company Law: What Matters in an Innovative Economy’ in Joseph A McCahery, Levinus Timmerman and Erik P M Vermeulen (eds), Private Company Law Reform (Asser 2010) 71, 73, 87.

  115. 115.

    Joseph A McCahery, Erik P M Vermeulen, Masato Hisatake and Jun Saito (note 114), 71, 113 et seqq.

  116. 116.

    With an instructive account on such advantages of standardisation and network effects in company law, Michael Klausner, ‘Corporate Law and Networks of Contract’ (1995) 81 Va. L. Rev. 757; for a German adaptation, see Holger Fleischer, ‘Der Einfluss der Societas Europaea auf die Dogmatik des Deutschen Gesellschaftsrechts. Zugleich Vortrag vor der Zivilrechtslehrervereinigung’ (2004) 204 AcP 502, 509 et seq.

  117. 117.

    With some variance, see also Joseph A McCahery and Erik P M Vermeulen (note 2), 1, 5 et seqq., the “three pillars of the governance framework” differentiating between: “company law”, “contract” and “optional guidelines”.

  118. 118.

    See also from a European perspective, ECJ 1988, 5483, Case C-81/87, marg. n°. 19 – Daily Mail, according to which a company “beyond the national jurisdiction that regulates its founding and existence, does not exist”; similarly from a US perspective, Justice John Marshall in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woordward, 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819), according to whom a company is an “artificial being, existing solely in contemplation of state law”.

  119. 119.

    See Steering Group (note 28), marg. n°. 5.2.23: “A wide variety of approaches is possible and various models have been proposed and adopted in other jurisdictions; some have been found wanting, here and abroad. We have broken these down into two broad kinds of approach, which we shall call the ‘free standing’ and the ‘integrated’ approaches.”

  120. 120.

    For an international perspective, Marcus Lutter, Limited Liability Company and Private Company, in Alfred Conard and Detlev Vagts (eds), International Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law, Vol. XIII/1 (Mohr Siebeck 2006).

  121. 121.

    From a French perspective, see Maurice Cozian, Alain Viandier and Florence Deboissy (note 109), marg. n°. 1079: “Elle [= la SARL] a une nature hybride: elle participe à la fois de la nature des sociétés de personnes et celle de sociétés de capitaux. Son essence est celle d’une société de personnes: associés peu nombreux, intuitus personae, parts sociales non négociables, mécanisme légal d’agrément; à l’évidence, la personne de l’associé est importante.”

  122. 122.

    Stephen W Mayson, Derek French and Christopher Ryan (note 28), 58: “British company law traditionally regards private and public companies as two variants of the same basic form of legal organisation, unlike legal systems in Continental Europe which tend to treat them as different forms of organisations.”

  123. 123.

    Ron Harris, ‘The Private Origins of the Private Company: Britain 1862–1907’ (2013) 33 Oxford J. Leg. Stud. 339, 343: “The 1862 Act, like those of 1844, 1855 and 1856, did not distinguish between companies based on the number of incorporators and shareholders, on capital, or on transferability of shares.”

  124. 124.

    According to a sub-title in Ron Harris (note 123), 342.

  125. 125.

    See the numbers in Ron Harris (note 123), 343 et seqq.

  126. 126.

    Seminal, Francis Beaufort Palmer, Private Companies; Or How to Convert your Business into a Private Company, and the Benefit of So Doing (1877).

  127. 127.

    Salomon v Salomon [1897] AC 22 (HL).

  128. 128.

    See Laurence C B Gower and Paul L Davies (note 9), marg. n°. 2-3: “Not only did it finally establish the legality of the ‘one person’ company (long before EC law required this) and showed that incorporation was as readily available to the small private partnership and sole trader as to the large public company.”

  129. 129.

    Parliamentary Papers, 1906, Vol. XLIV, Cmnd 3052.

  130. 130.

    Emphasising this, Timothy W Guinnane, Ron Harris, Naomi R Lamoreaux and Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, ‘Ownership and Control in the Entrepreneurial Firm: An International History of Private Limited Companies’ (December 2007), available under http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1071007, p. 28: “Whereas in Germany a company became private by organizing under a different law from a corporation, in Britain a company became private by including in its articles of association the above provisions.”

  131. 131.

    See also A New Form of Incorporation for Small Firms: a Consultative Document, 1981, Cmnd 8171.

  132. 132.

    For further details on this, see DTI, Company Law Review: the Law Applicable to Private Companies (1994); for a summary, see Stephen W Mayson, Derek French and Christopher Ryan (note 28), 27 et seq.

  133. 133.

    Company Law Review Steering Group (note 28), marg. n°. 5.2.27 et seq.

  134. 134.

    Company Law Review Steering Group, Final Report, July 2011, marg. n°. 1.53 et seqq.

  135. 135.

    Company Law Review Steering Group, Final Report, July 2011, marg. n°. 1.53 et seqq.

  136. 136.

    More under Sect. 13.3.2.

  137. 137.

    Abram Chayes, ‘Madame Wagner and the Close Corporation’ (1959) 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1532.

  138. 138.

    For a contemporary conclusion, see Robert Kramer, ‘Foreword’ (1953) 18 Law & Contemp. Probs. 433, 434: “One of the most striking facts about the close corporation is the extent to which it is the creation of business men and their counsel rather than of the courts or the legislatures. Most corporate legislation is admittedly drafted for the publicly owned company, at least in this country. Unlike Great Britain and Continental Europe, we have made little attempt in our corporate statutes to provide for the problems and the needs of the close corporation.”

  139. 139.

    For a detailed analysis, Harwell Wells, ‘The Rise of the Close Corporation and the Making of Corporation Law’ (2008) 5 Berkeley Bus. L.J. 263, 297 et seqq.

  140. 140.

    See for example, William L Cary, ‘How Illinois Corporations May Enjoy Partnership Advantage: Planning for the Closely Held Firm’ (1953) 48 Nw. U. L. Rev. 427.

  141. 141.

    Detailed analysis in Dennis S Karjala, ‘An Analysis of Close Corporation Legislation in the United States’ (1989) 21 Ariz. St. L.J. 663.

  142. 142.

    See, for example, William S Hochstetler and Mark D Svejda, ‘Statutory Needs of Close Corporations – An Empirical Study: Special Close Corporation Legislation or Flexible General Corporation Law’ (1985) 10 J. Corp. L. 849.

  143. 143.

    For further details on this, see Brain R Cheffins, ‘U.S. Close Corporation Legislation: A Model Canada Should Not Follow’ (1989) 35 McGill L.J. 160, 179 et seqq.

  144. 144.

    See Mette Neville (note 26), 7 et seq.: “Denmark still has both private limited companies and public limited companies, but in 2009 Denmark gave up the dual Companies Act system, after the German model, and merged both public and private limited companies into one Act after the common law one-law model which is also seen in Finland and Sweden.”; also Jan Andersson (note 26), 27, 33 et seqq.

  145. 145.

    See Stephen W Mayson, Derek French and Christopher Ryan (note 28), 75 et seqq.

  146. 146.

    For a short overview, Frederik Karsten, ‘Kann man eine GmbH auf einem Bierdeckel gründen?’ [2007] GmbHR 958; in detail Michał Romanowski and Bartosz Makowicz, ‘Polnisches GmbH-Recht: Das neue beschleunigte Gründungsverfahren “S24”’ [2012] GmbHR 736.

  147. 147.

    Further, Philippe Merle (note 25), marg. n°. 236; from a comparative perspective Markus Peifer, ‘Gründung und Führung einer Einpersonen-S.A.R.L. französischen Rechts’ [2009] GmbHR 1145.

  148. 148.

    Critical Mercedes Sánchez Ruiz, ‘Estatutos Sociales y Pactos Parasociales en Sociedades Familiares’, in Mercedes Sánchez Ruiz (ed), Régimen jurídico de la empresa familiar (Civitas, Thomson Reuters 2010), 43, 49 49: “endémica ‘estandarización’ de los estatutos sociales”.

  149. 149.

    In detail on the simplification of creating articles of association, see Frauke Wedemann, Gesellschafterkonflikte in geschlossenen Kapitalgesellschaften (Mohr Siebeck 2013) 370 et seq.

  150. 150.

    See Christoph Van der Elst and Erik P M Vermeulen (note 80), 165, 176.

  151. 151.

    See New Zealand Companies Office, Note: “Historically you could purchase draft constitutions online from third party authors via the Companies Office. This option has been discontinued. Now you must deal with the constitution authors directly.”; available under http://www.business.govt.nz/compaines/learn-about/starting-a-company/how-to-apply/constitution-optional/third-party-constitutions.

  152. 152.

    See European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on single-member private limited liability companies, COM/2014/0212 final, art. 11: “Uniform template of articles of association”.

  153. 153.

    Hartmut Wicke, ‘Model articles for the Societas Privata Europaea?’ in Heribert Hirte and Christoph Teichmann (eds), The European Private Company – Societas Privata Europaea (SPE) (De Gruyter 2013) 183.

  154. 154.

    For Germany, see Draft and Explanatory Memorandum of the German GmbH Act (note 85), 45: “In erster Linie entscheidet der Inhalt des Gesellschaftsvertrages.”; Holger Fleischer (note 16), Introduction n°. 21:“die primäre Quelle für die interne Organisation der GmbH”.

  155. 155.

    See Draft and Explanatory Memorandum of the German GmbH Act (note 85), 25, according to which there is no reason to create binding norms due to the lack of “greater public” participation, and to the effect that members of a GmbH are in a position to protect their own interests.

  156. 156.

    See also Lucian Arye Bebchuk, ‘Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The Desirable Constraints on Charter Amendments’ (1989) 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1820, 1826: “Economic theory suggests that, under the assumed conditions, parties left free to design their contractual arrangements will adopt efficient terms – terms that will maximize the size of the contractual pie available for division among the parties.”; similarly, Melvin Aron Eisenberg, ‘Structure of Corporation Law, The Articles and Comments’ (1989) 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1461, 1463: “The reasons for the bargain principle usually apply to bargains among the shareholders in a closely held corporation concerning the corporation’s structural and distributional rules.”

  157. 157.

    See above, Sect. 13.2.5.2.

  158. 158.

    Reform Commission Mirone (note 7), Art. 3 sub 3.

  159. 159.

    According to the sub-heading in Elvin R Latty, ‘The Close Corporation and the New North Carolina Business Corporation Act’ (1956) 34 N.C. L. Rev. 432, 456.

  160. 160.

    Department of Trade and Industry, Companies Act 2006. A summary of what it means for private companies; also Brenda Hannigan, Company Law (3. ed, Oxford Univ Press 2012), marg. n°. 8-10.

  161. 161.

    For further details, see Christoph Van der Elst and Erik P M Vermeulen (note 80), 165, 180 et seqq.

  162. 162.

    Art. 2:190 NBW.

  163. 163.

    For the most recent material on the remedy of unfair prejudice and its derogations, see Rita Cheung, ‘Shareholders’ agreements: shareholders’ contractual freedom in company law’ [2012] J.B.L. 504.

  164. 164.

    Gregor Bachmann, Horst Eidenmüller, Andreas Engert, Holger Fleischer and Wolfgang Schön (note 1), 50 et seq.; in detail Klaus Ulrich Schmolke, Grenzen der Selbstbindung im Privatrecht (Mohr Siebeck 2014) 667 et seqq.

  165. 165.

    For further details, see Darren Guttenberg, ‘Waiving Farewell Without Saying Goodbye: The Waiver of Fiduciary Duties in Limited Liability Companies in Delaware, and the Call For Mandatory Disclosure’ (2013) 86 S. Cal. L. Rev. 869 and relevant footnotes; also Leo E Strine and J Travis Laster, ‘The Siren Song of Unlimited Contractual Freedom’, in Robert W. Hillman and Mark J. Loewenstein (eds), Research Handbook on Partnerships, LLCs and Alternative Forms of Business Organizations (Edward Elgar Publishing 2015), 11 et seqq. (forthcoming).

  166. 166.

    Marc Amstutz and Fernand Chappuis, in Basler Kommentar, OR II (4. ed, Helbing & Lichtenhahn 2012) Art. 803 marg. n°. 11.

  167. 167.

    Monographically, Graham Muth and Sean Fitzgerald, Shareholders’ agreements (6. ed, Thomson Sweet & Maxwell 2012).

  168. 168.

    Monographically Jean-Jacques Daigre and Monique Sentilles-Dupont, Pactes d’actionnaires (GLN Joly 1995).

  169. 169.

    Monographically Ulrich Noack, Gesellschaftervereinbarungen bei Kapitalgesellschaften (Mohr Siebeck 1994).

  170. 170.

    See the national reports collected in Laimer/Perathoner (eds), Gesellschaftsrechtliche Nebenvereinbarungen in Europa (Sellier 2013).

  171. 171.

    Monographically Davide Proverbio, I patti parasociali (Kluwer Italia 2010).

  172. 172.

    See Stephen W Mayson, Derek French and Christopher Ryan (note 28), 76.

  173. 173.

    See, e.g., for Italy Art.112 para. 1 Testo Unico.

  174. 174.

    For further details, see Alexander Schall, in Schall (ed), Companies Act (C.H. Beck 2014) sec. 17 marg. n°. 2 and sec. 29 marg. n°. 5 et seqq.

  175. 175.

    See Jeffrey D Bauman, Alan R Palmiter, Frank Partnoy, Corporations, Law and Policy (6. ed, West 2007), 354.

  176. 176.

    For further details, see Karina L Pulec, ‘Legal Restraints on the Use of Shareholders’ Agreements for Structuring Foreign Investment Deals in Russia’ (2012) 45 Cornell Int’l L.J. 487.

  177. 177.

    BGH [1983] NJW 1910; [1987] NJW 1890.

  178. 178.

    For furter details, see Jan Lieder, ‘Schuldrechtliche Nebenabreden im deutschen Gesellschaftsrecht’ in Holger Fleischer, Susanne Kalss and Hans-Ueli Vogt (eds), Aktuelle Entwicklungen im deutschen, österreichischen und schweizerischen Gesellschafts- und Kapitalmarktrecht 2012 (Mohr Siebeck 2013) 231, 244 et seqq.

  179. 179.

    See Jan Schans Christensen, Kapitalselskaber (3. ed, Thomson Reuters 2009), 228; Arne Henn, ‘Das neue dänische Kapitalgesellschaftsrecht’, [2011] RIW 833, 839.

  180. 180.

    Code Buysse I, Corporate Governance Recommendations à l’attention des entreprises non cotées en bourse, 2005; Code Buysse II, Corporate Governance Recommendations à l’attention des entreprises non cotées en bourse, 2009.

  181. 181.

    Finland Central Chamber of Commerce, Improving Corporate Governance of Unlisted Companies, January 2006.

  182. 182.

    Institute of Directors, Corporate Governance Guidance and Principles for Unlisted Companies, November 2010.

  183. 183.

    Guía Colombiana de Gobierno Corporativo para Sociedades cerradas y de Famila, September 2009.

  184. 184.

    For Germany, see § 6 (1) GmbHG: “Die Gesellschaft muss einen oder mehrere Geschäftsführer haben.”

  185. 185.

    Discussing this point Gregor Bachmann, Horst Eidenmüller, Andreas Engert, Holger Fleischer and Wolfgang Schön (note 1) 85 et seq.; Amitai Aviram, ‘Officers Fiduciary Duties and the Nature of Corporate Organs’, 2013 U. Ill. L. Rev. 763.

  186. 186.

    See Dominique Vidal, Droit des sociétés (7. ed, L.G.D.J. 2010) 204 et seq., 517 et seq.

  187. 187.

    Paul L Davies and Jonathan Rickford, ‘An Introduction to the New UK Companies Act: Part II’ [2008] ECFR 239, 261: “This mechanism is available to all private companies, but it is expected to be attractive especially to those with a high degree of overlap between membership and management.”

  188. 188.

    See Rolf Watter/Katja Roth Pellanda, in Basler Kommentar, OR II (4. ed, Helbing & Lichtenhahn 2012) art. 810 marg. n°. 1; most recently with respect to stock corporation law Daniel M Häusermann, ‘Wider das Paritätsprinzip’, [2014] SZW 255.

  189. 189.

    See for Portugal art. 259 CSC; for Spain art. 160 LSC.

  190. 190.

    See Christoph Van der Elst and Erik P M Vermeulen (note 80), 165, 181; from a comparative perspective Sven Hirschfeld ‘Die niederländische “bv” nach dem Gesetz zur Vereinfachung und Flexibilisierung des bv-rechts (flex-bv)’ [2013] RIW 134 et seq.

  191. 191.

    See Rolf Watter/Katja Roth Pellanda (note 188), art. 810 marg. n°. 5 et seqq.

  192. 192.

    See Stephen W Mayson, Derek French and Christopher Ryan (note 28), 466 et seq.

  193. 193.

    See Automatic Self Cleansing Filter Syndicate Co v Cuninghame [1906] 2 Ch 34; also John Shaw & Sons (Salford) Ltd v Shaw [1935] 2 KB 113, 114: “If the powers of management are vested in the directors, they and they alone can exercise these powers. The only way in which the general body of the shareholders can control the exercise of the powers vested by the articles in the directors is by altering their articles, or, if opportunity arises under the articles, by refusing to re-elect the directors of whose actions they disapproved. They cannot themselves usurp the powers which by the articles are vested in the directors anymore than the directors can usurp the powers vested by the articles in the general body of the shareholders.”

  194. 194.

    See Brenda Hannigan (note 160), marg. n°. 8-7.

  195. 195.

    See art. 198A Corporations Act; R P Austin and I M Ramsey, Ford’s Principles of Corporation Law (15. ed, LexisNexis Butterworth 2012), marg. n°. 7.120.

  196. 196.

    See § 141(a) DGCL; John Coffee, ‘Bylaw Battlefield: Can Institutions Change the Outcome of Corporate Control Contests’, (1997) 51 U. Miami L. Rev. 605, 608: “Common law decisions have long recognized that a shareholder resolution, passed at a shareholders’ meeting, directing the board to take a specified action was ineffective.”

  197. 197.

    See above, Sect. 13.2.5.2.

  198. 198.

    See Gregor Bachmann, Horst Eidenmüller, Andreas Engert, Holger Fleischer and Wolfgang Schön (note 1) 92 et seqq.

  199. 199.

    See Gregor Bachmann, Horst Eidenmüller, Andreas Engert, Holger Fleischer and Wolfgang Schön (note 1) 94 et seq.; for the UK Laurence C B Gower and Paul L Davies (note 9), marg. n°. 14–18.

  200. 200.

    See Édouard Jean Navez (note 90), 147, 160 et seqq.

  201. 201.

    See Wolfgang Zöllner and Ulrich Noack, in Baumbach/Hueck, GmbH-Gesetz (20. ed, C.H. Beck 2013), § 37 marg. n°. 18.

  202. 202.

    See Laurence C B Gower and Paul L Davies (note 9), marg. n°. 14–21.

  203. 203.

    For further details, see Lars-Göran Sund and Per-Olof Bjuggren, ‘Family-owned, limited close corporations and protection of ownership’ (2007) 23 European Journal of Law and Economics 273, 274.

  204. 204.

    See above, Sect. 13.1.2.3.

  205. 205.

    See the national reports in Susanne Kalss (ed), Die Übertragung von GmbH-Geschäftsanteilen in 14 europäischen Rechtsordnungen (Linde 2003); see also Lars-Göran Sund, Jan Andersson and Edward Humphreys, ‘A European Company and Share Transfer Restrictions’ [2012] EBLR 483, 490 et seqq.; Frauke Wedemann (note 149), 103 et seqq.

  206. 206.

    See also Lars-Göran Sund, Jan Andersson and Edward Humphreys (note 205) [2012] EBLR 483, 490: “[I]n countries with only one general law for all limited companies, such as in Sweden and Finland, fewer restrictions are acceptable.”

  207. 207.

    For the UK, see model article 26(1).

  208. 208.

    For France, see for example art. L. 223-13 and art. L. 223-16. C. com.

  209. 209.

    See art. 2:192a NBW.

  210. 210.

    See art. 8 (1) in conjunction with Annex I, Chapter III, points 6 to 10.

  211. 211.

    See s. 15(1) Companies Act 1965.

  212. 212.

    See art. 2:195 NBW.

  213. 213.

    Art. L. 227-13 and art. L. 227-14 C. com.

  214. 214.

    For further details, see Jan Andersson, ‘Redemption of shareholders’ in Paul Krüger Andersen, Nis Jul Clausen and Rolf Skog (eds), Shareholder Conflicts (Thomson Sweet & Maxwell 2006) 161, 164 et seqq.

  215. 215.

    Matthias Oertle and Shelby R du Pasquier, in Basler Kommentar, OR II (4. ed, Helbing & Lichtenhahn 2012) Art. 786 marg. n°. 5.

  216. 216.

    Individual cases listed in James D Cox and Thomas Lee Hazen, The Law of Corporations (3. ed, Thomson Reuters 2010), § 14:10, p. 36 et seq.; see also § 6.27(c)(3) RMBCA.

  217. 217.

    For Germany, see Jochem Reichert and Marc-Philippe Weller, in Holger Fleischer/Wulf Goette (eds), Münchener Kommentar zum GmbH-Gesetz (2. ed, C.H. Beck 2015) § 15 marg. n°. 393; for Switzerland, see art. 787 (3) OR.

  218. 218.

    For further details on all of these, see Robert A Ragazzo and Frances S Fendler, Closely Held Business Organizations (2. ed, West 2012) 396 et seqq.

  219. 219.

    Tett v Phoenix Property and Investment Co Ltd [1986] BCLC 149.

  220. 220.

    For Australia, see Robert Austin and Ian Ramsay (note 195), marg. n°. 21.370.

  221. 221.

    See, for example, Rafe v. Hindin, 288 N.Y.S.2d 662, 665 (App. Div.).

  222. 222.

    Robert A Ragazzo and Frances S Fendler (note 218), 399: “However, reasonableness and arbitrariness are often in the eye of the beholder.”

  223. 223.

    On this, Jochem Reichert and Marc-Philippe Weller (note 217), § 15 GmbHG marg. n°. 408 et seqq.

  224. 224.

    For further details on their form and commercial background, see Holger Fleischer and Stephan Schneider, ‘Tag along und Drag along-Klauseln in geschlossenen Kapitalgesellschaften’ [2012] DB 961; Isabel Sáez Lacave and Nuria Bermejo Gutiérrez, ‘Specific Investments, Opportunism and Corporate Contracts: A Theory of Tag-along and Drag-along Clauses’ (2010) 11 EBOR 423.

  225. 225.

    See for example, Corporation Law Committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, ‘The Enforceability and Effectiveness of Typical Shareholders Agreement Provisions’, [2010] Bus. Law. 1153, 1174 et seq.

  226. 226.

    See the newly added s. 205A(1)(5)(j) Employment Rights Act 1996: “state whether the employee shares are subject to drag-along rights or tag-along rights and, if they are, explain the effect of the shares being so subject.”

  227. 227.

    On judicial review of drag along clauses as a means of preventing abuse under German law, Holger Fleischer and Stephan Schneider (note 224) [2012] DB 961, 967.

  228. 228.

    Minnesota Invco of RSA #7, Inc. v. Midwest Wireless Holdings LLC, 903 A.2d 786 (Del. Ch. 2006).

  229. 229.

    Constable v Executive Connections Ltd [2005] 2 BCLC. 638, 652; also, Brenda Hannigan, ‘Altering the articles to allow for compulsory transfer: dragging minority shareholders to a reluctant exit’ [2007] J.B.L. 471.

  230. 230.

    Tribunale Milano, April 1, 2008, Giur. comm. 2009, II, 1029.

  231. 231.

    See Kamerstukken II 2008/09, 31 058, No. 6, 13; also, Erik Vorst, ‘Aandeelhoudersovereenkomst of statuten: balanceren voor de praktijkjurist’ [2013] WPNR 447, 456 et seq.

  232. 232.

    From a US perspective, §§ 601, 602 Revised Uniform Partnership Act; John A C Hetherington and Michael P Dooley, ‘Illiquidity and exploitation: A proposed statutory solution to the remaining close corporation problem’ (1977) 63 Va. L. Rev. 1.

  233. 233.

    See Margret M Blair, ‘Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business Organisations in the Nineteenth Century’, (2003) 51 UCLA L. Rev. 387.

  234. 234.

    See Edward B Rock and Michael L Wachter, ‘Waiting for the Omelet to Set: Match-Specific Assets and Minority Oppression in the Close Corporation’ (1999) 24 J. Corp. L. 913, 919, 922: “beneficial lock-in”.

  235. 235.

    See Edward B Rock and Michael L Wachter (note 234) (1999) 24 J. Corp. L. 913, 923: “But the very provisions that protect against opportunistic exit create the problem of opportunistic lock-in.”

  236. 236.

    See also the categorisation by Paul Pieter de Vries, Exit rights of minority shareholders in a private limited company (Kluwer 2010) 7 et seq.: “Exit rights can be divided into the following four categories: (a) winding-up remedies; (b) oppression remedies; (c) appraisal rights; and (d) exit rights at will.”

  237. 237.

    See Gregor Bachmann, Horst Eidenmüller, Andreas Engert, Holger Fleischer and Wolfgang Schön (note 1) 37 et seqq.

  238. 238.

    Stephen W Mayson, Derek French and Christopher Ryan (note 28), 583 et seqq.

  239. 239.

    Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd [1972] 2 WLR 1289.

  240. 240.

    Stephen W Mayson, Derek French and Christopher Ryan (note 28), 567 et seqq.

  241. 241.

    Robert A Ragazzo and Frances S Fendler (note 218), 627 et seqq.

  242. 242.

    Robert A Ragazzo and Frances S Fendler (note 218), 639 et seqq.; see also §§ 226, 352, 353 DGCL.

  243. 243.

    For further details, see Mette Neville, ‘Conflicts in small and medium-sized enterprises’ in Paul Krüger Andersen, Nis Jul Clausen and Rolf Skog (eds), Shareholder Conflicts (Thomson Sweet & Maxwell 2006) 87, 102 et seqq.

  244. 244.

    Mette Neville, ‘Shareholder Conflicts in the European Private Company (SPE)’ in Heribert Hirte and Christoph Teichmann (eds), The European Private Company – Societas Privata Europaea (SPE) (De Gruyter 2013) 193, 228 et seq.

  245. 245.

    For more, see Paul Pieter de Vries (note 236), 253 et seqq.

  246. 246.

    See Christoph Stäubli, in Basler Kommentar, OR II (4. ed, Helbing & Lichtenhahn 2012) Art. 821 marg. n°. 19.

  247. 247.

    Lutz Strohn, in Holger Fleischer and Wulf Goette (eds.), Münchener Kommentar zum GmbH-Gesetz (2. ed, C.H. Beck 2015) § 34 marg. n°. 178 and relevant notes.

  248. 248.

    Lutz Strohn (note 247), § 34 GmbHG marg. n°. 186.

  249. 249.

    BGHZ 116, 359, 369.

  250. 250.

    For further details, see Reinier Kraakman, John Armour, Paul Davies, Luca Enriques, Henry B Hansmann, Gerard Hertig, Klaus J Hopt, Hideki Kanda and Edward B Rock, The Anatomy of Corporate Law, (2. ed, Oxford Univ Press 2009) 99.

  251. 251.

    For Spain see Art. 346 LSC, for Portugal Art. 240 CSC.

  252. 252.

    For further details, see Lutz Strohn (note 247), § 34 GmbHG marg. n°. 183 et seqq.

  253. 253.

    See Harm-Jan de Kluiver, ‘Private Ordering and Buy-Out Remedies Within Private Company Law: Towards a New Balance between Fairness and Welfare?’ (2007) 8 EBOR 103, 111 et seqq.; Mette Neville (note 244), 193, 233 et seqq.

  254. 254.

    See Novak, Korporativniî ûrist 2009, n° 6, 24 et seq.

  255. 255.

    Law Commission, Shareholder Remedies, 1997, Cmnd 3769, marg. n°. 3.66.

  256. 256.

    For example, Hans-Friedrich Müller, Das Austrittsrecht des GmbH-Gesellschafters (Carl Heymanns 1995) 41 et seqq.

  257. 257.

    See Paul Peter de Vries (note 236), 253 et seqq.

  258. 258.

    See BGHZ 9, 157, 161 et seqq.

  259. 259.

    See note 20.

  260. 260.

    See Laurence C B Gower and Paul L Davies (note 9), marg. n°. 19-11.

  261. 261.

    For limitations on the power to alter the articles in order to expropriate the shares of the minority see R P Austin and I M Ramsey (note 195), marg. n°. 10.070.

  262. 262.

    See Cass. com., 23.10.2007, JCP E 2007, 2433.

  263. 263.

    See BGHZ 9, 157, 178.

  264. 264.

    See North West Transportation Co Ltd v Beatty (1887) 12 App Cas 589; from an Australian perspective Gambotto v WCP Ltd (1995) 182 CLR 432.

  265. 265.

    See Cass. com., 12.3.1996, Rev. soc. 1996, 554.

  266. 266.

    See Susanne Kalss and Johannes Zollner, Squeeze out (Manz 2007), § 1 GesAusG marg n°. 22.

  267. 267.

    See Holger Fleischer, in Klaus Hopt and Herbert Wiedemann (eds), Großkommentar zum Aktiengesetz (4. ed De Gruyter 2007), § 327a marg. n°. 8 with further references.

  268. 268.

    Expressly Gregor Bachmann, Horst Eidenmüller, Andreas Engert, Holger Fleischer and Wolfgang Schön (note 1) 31; Neville (note 243), 87, 91.

  269. 269.

    See Laurence C B Gower and Paul L Davies (note 9), marg. n°. 20-11: “Small companies emulate marriages in the frequency and bitterness of their breakdown.”; in detail Martha M Ertman, ‘Marriage as a Trade: Bridging the Private/Private Distinction’, (2001) 36 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 79.

  270. 270.

    See OLG Brandenburg, ZIP 2009, 1955; Cass. com., Rev. sov. 2004, 337; Re Mc Carthy Surfacing Ltd [2009] 1 BCLC 622, 651 et seqq.; Brodie v. Jordan, 857 N.E.2d 1076 (Mass. 2006).

  271. 271.

    See BGHZ 111, 224; Cass. com., Rev. soc. 2012, 38; Irvine v Irvine [2007] 1 BCLC 349; Carlson v. Hallinan, 925 A.2d 506 (Del. Ch. 2006).

  272. 272.

    See Gregor Bachmann, Horst Eidenmüller, Andreas Engert, Holger Fleischer and Wolfgang Schön (note 1), 37 et seq.

  273. 273.

    For a list of self-help measures available under Australian and British law see Elizabeth Jane Boros, Minority Shareholders’ Remedies (Clarendon Press 1995), 104 et seqq.

  274. 274.

    See Gregor Bachmann, Horst Eidenmüller, Andreas Engert, Holger Fleischer and Wolfgang Schön (note 1) 48.

  275. 275.

    See Melvin Eisenberg, ‘The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contracts’, (1995) 47 Stan. L. Rev. 211, 251.

  276. 276.

    See Gregor Bachmann, Horst Eidenmüller, Andreas Engert, Holger Fleischer and Wolfgang Schön (note 1) 48 et seq.; fundamentally Thomas S Ulen, ‘Cognitive Imperfections and the Economic Analysis of Law’, (1989) 12 Hamline L. Rev. 385, 386.

  277. 277.

    See Brian Cheffins, Company Law. Theory, Structure and Operation (Clarendon Press 1997) 273; similarly Laurence C B Gower and Paul L Davies (note 9), marg. n°. 20-11; Robert A Ragazzo, ‘Towards a Delaware Common Law of Closely Held Corporations’, (1999) 77 Wash. U. L. Q. 1099, 1130: “One can simply not expect a two-person dry-cleaning operation to run with the same level of attorney supervision as a Fortune 500 company.”

  278. 278.

    See Douglas K Moll, ‘Shareholder Oppression & Reasonable Expectations: Of Change, Gifts, and Inheritance in Close Corporation Disputes’, (2002), 86 Minn. L. Rev. 717, 763 et seqq.

  279. 279.

    Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366 (Del. 1993).

  280. 280.

    Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 515 (Mass. 1975).

  281. 281.

    BGHZ 65, 15, 18.

  282. 282.

    See Marc Amstutz and Fernand Chappuis (note 166), § 803 marg. n°. 6 et seqq.

  283. 283.

    See Maarten J Kroeze, in Asser Serie, Rechtspersonenrecht (Kluwer 2015), 206 et seqq.

  284. 284.

    See Maurice Cozian, Alain Viandier and Florence Deboissy (note 109), marg. n°. 402; recent monograph Anne-Laure Champetier de Ribes-Justeau, Les abus de majorité, de minorité et d’égalité (Dalloz 2010).

  285. 285.

    See Mario Campobasso (note 76) 345 with further references.

  286. 286.

    See Mario Campobasso (note 76) 344: “La dottrina prevalente […] tende ad applicare in materia il principio di correttezza e buona fede nell’attuazione del contratto (art. 1375), o un piú generale principio di correttezza nel procedimento deliberativo.”

  287. 287.

    See Javier Megías López, ‘Opresión y obstruccionismo en las sociedades de capital cerrades: abuso de mayoría y de minoría’, [2014] 47 Anuario jurídico y económico escurialense 13.

  288. 288.

    See Filip Truyen, ‘Shareholder conflicts in small and medium sized companies – Remedies for shareholders’ abuse of authority and improper retention of dividends’, in Paul Krüger Andersen, Nis Jul Clausen and Rolf Skog (eds), Shareholder Conflicts (Thomson Sweet & Maxwell 2006) 131, 135.

  289. 289.

    See Paul Davies, Introduction to Company Law (1. ed, Oxford Univ Press 2002) 231: “The common law does not perceive the controlling shareholders to be in a fiduciary position towards non-controlling shareholders, so that basis for the individual shareholder to restrain the power of the majority as it reveals itself in shareholder decision-making is not available.”

  290. 290.

    See Carruth v ICI Ltd [1937] AC 707, 765.

  291. 291.

    See Stephen W Mayson, Derek French and Christopher Ryan (note 28), 577 et seqq.

  292. 292.

    See RP Austin and I M Ramsay (note 195), marg. n°. 10.430 et seq.

  293. 293.

    See BGHZ 65, 15, 18 et seq.

  294. 294.

    Re Guidezone Ltd [2000] 2 BCLC 321, 355.

  295. 295.

    See Saul D Harrison & Sons Plc, Re [1995] 1 BCLC 14, 19.

  296. 296.

    For further details, see Jeffrey D Bauman, Alan R Palmiter, and Frank Partnoy (note 175), 385 et seq.

  297. 297.

    Cass. com., 18.4.1961, D. 1961, 661: “contrairement à l’intérêt général de la société et dans l’unique dessein de favoriser les membres de la majorité au détriment de la minorité”.

  298. 298.

    For a comparative overview Holger Fleischer, ‘Das Beschlussmängelrecht in der GmbH: Rechtsdogmatik – Rechtsvergleichung – Rechtspolitik’, [2013] GmbHR 1289.

  299. 299.

    See RGZ 85, 311, 313 et seq.

  300. 300.

    See BGHZ 95, 330, 340; Hanno Merkt, in Holger Fleischer/Wulf Goette (eds), Münchener Kommentar zum GmbH-Gesetz (2. ed, C.H. Beck 2015), § 13 marg. n°. 310.

  301. 301.

    Laurence C B Gower and Paul L Davies (note 9), marg. n°. 17-13.

  302. 302.

    See Philippe Merle (note 25), marg. n°. 199.

  303. 303.

    See BGH NJW 1990, 2627, 2628.

  304. 304.

    See Arad Reisberg, ‘Shadows of the Past and Back to the Future: Part 11 of the UK Companies Act 2006 (in)action’, (2009) 6 ECFR 219, 231.

  305. 305.

    See Philippe Merle (note 25), marg. n°. 199.

  306. 306.

    See Gregor Bachmann, Horst Eidenmüller, Andreas Engert, Holger Fleischer and Wolfgang Schön (note 1), 66.

  307. 307.

    See Crosby v. Beam, 548 N.E.2d 217 (Ohio 1989).

  308. 308.

    See Bagdon v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 916 F.2d 379, 384 (7th Cir. 1990).

  309. 309.

    See above Sect. 13.6.1.

  310. 310.

    See Stephen W Mayson, Derek French and Christopher Ryan (note 28), 577.

  311. 311.

    See Robert A Ragazzo and Frances S Fendler (note 218), 627 et seqq.

  312. 312.

    See RP Austin and I M Ramsay (note 195), marg. n°. 10.430 et seq.

  313. 313.

    See BGHZ 129, 136.

  314. 314.

    See Anne-Laure Champetier de Ribes-Justeau, Les abus de majorité, de minorité et d’égalité (Dalloz 2010).

  315. 315.

    See Javier Megías López, ‘Opresión y obstrucccionismo en las sociedades de capital cerrades: abuso de mayoría y de minoría’, [2014] 47 Anuario jurídico y económico escurialense 13.

  316. 316.

    See Mario Campobasso (note 76) 345.

  317. 317.

    See, for example, Parkinson v Eurofinance Group Ltd [2001] BCC 551.

  318. 318.

    See Douglas Moll and Robert A Ragazzo, The Law of Closely Held Corporations (Aspen Publishers 2009), Chapter 7.101[D][e] under the heading “Oppression of the Majority by the Minority”.

  319. 319.

    See Wolfgang Zöllner, in Baumbach/Hueck, GmbH-Gesetz (20. ed., C.H. Beck 2012), § 47 marg. n°. 108.

  320. 320.

    See Cass. com., 9.3.1993, JCPE 1993, II, 448.

  321. 321.

    Maurice Cozian, Alain Viandier and Florence Deboissy (note 109), marg. n°. 383: “La jurisprudence de la Cour ne manque pas d’hypocrisie.”

  322. 322.

    See note 317.

  323. 323.

    See from a German perspective Harald Knies, Das Patt zwischen den Gesellschaftern der zweigliedrigen GmbH (Peter Lang 2005); from a French perspective Anne-Laure Champetier de Ribes-Justeau (note 314), 21: “Enfin, l’abus d’égalité et susceptible de prendre place dans les sociétés partagées à parts égales entre deux personnes.”

  324. 324.

    See Gregor Bachmann, Horst Eidenmüller, Andreas Engert, Holger Fleischer and Wolfgang Schön (note 1), 76 et seq.

  325. 325.

    See Gregor Bachmann, Horst Eidenmüller, Andreas Engert, Holger Fleischer and Wolfgang Schön (note 1), 78.

  326. 326.

    See Douglas K Moll and Robert A Ragazzo (note 318), marg. n°. 7-149 – 7.150: “The conventional explanation for the harm of deadlock is that socially useful assets are unable to be productively deployed when disagreements between the corporation’s decision-makers paralyse the company from taking action.”

  327. 327.

    See BGHZ 80, 346, 348; OLG München GmbHR 2005, 428.

  328. 328.

    See Ng Eng Hiam v Ng Kee Wei (1964) 31 MLJ 238, 240.

  329. 329.

    See Cass. com., Rev. soc. 1982, 804.

  330. 330.

    For a good overview James D Cox and Thomas Lee Hazen Cox (note 216), 14:12.

  331. 331.

    See Kans. Stat. Ann. § 17-6804(d).

  332. 332.

    See Gregor Bachmann, Horst Eidenmüller, Andreas Engert, Holger Fleischer and Wolfgang Schön (note 1), 79.

  333. 333.

    Generally from the French perspective Michel Jeantin, ‘Le rôle du juge en droit des sociétés, in Mélanges Perrot (Dalloz 1996), 149; Jaques Mestre, ‘Réflexions sur les pouvoirs du juge dans la vie des sociétés, [1985] Rev. juris. com. 1985, 81; from a German perspective Frauke Wedemann (note 149), 564 et seqq.

  334. 334.

    See above, Sect.13.6.1.2.

  335. 335.

    See Victor Joffe, David Darke, Giles Richardson, Daniel Lightman, Timothy Collingwood, Minority Shareholders (4. ed, Oxford Univ Press 2011), marg. n°. 7.239.

  336. 336.

    See RP Austin and I M Ramsay (note 195), marg. n°. 10.430 et seq.

  337. 337.

    See Robert A Ragazzo and Frances S Fendler (note 218), 639 et seqq.

  338. 338.

    See L Timmerman and A Doorman, ‘Rights of minority shareholders in the Netherlands’, in Evanghelos Perakis (ed), Rights of minority shareholders, XVIth Congress of the International Academy of Comparative Law (Bruylant 2004).

  339. 339.

    See Reto Sanwald, in Martin F Nussbaum, Reto Sanwald and Markus Scheidegger, Kurzkommentar zum neuen GmbH-Recht (Cosmos-Verlag 2007), art. 821 marg. n°. 26.

  340. 340.

    See BGE 136 III 278; Lukas Beeler/Hans Casper von der Crone, ‘Auflösungsklage nach Art. 736 Abs. 4 OR’, [2010] SZW 329.

  341. 341.

    Gregor Bachmann, Horst Eidenmüller, Andreas Engert, Holger Fleischer and Wolfgang Schön (note 1), 70.

  342. 342.

    See Frauke Wedemann (note 149), 565.

  343. 343.

    See Holger Fleischer and Jennifer Trinks, ‘Minderheitenschutz bei der Gewinnthesaurierung in der GmbH – Ein deutsch-spanischer Rechtsvergleich’, [2015] NZG 289, 293 et seq.

  344. 344.

    See Forest Hodge O’Neal, Robert Bruce Thompson and Blake Thompson, Oppression of Minority Shareholders and LLC Members (2. ed, West 2009), § 9:20: “Compelling declaration of dividends”; see also § 41(a)(8) Model Stat. Close Corp. Supp.

  345. 345.

    See on the cautious line taken by the English courts after the introduction of the unfair prejudice remedy in 1948 and their more active role in recent years Paul Davies (note 290), 233 et seq.

  346. 346.

    See as regards Delaware Symposium, ‘The Delaware Court of Chancery: Change and Continuity’, [2012] Col. Bus. L. Rev. 387-798; as regards the Netherlands Josephus Jitta (ed), The Companies and Business Court from a Comparative Perspective (Kluwer 2004); Maarten J Kroeze, ‘The Dutch Companies and Business Court as a Specialized Court’, in Louis Bouchez, Marco Knubben, Joseph A McCahery and Levinus Timmerman (eds), The Quality of Corporate Law and the Role of Corporate Law Judges (Amsterdam Center of Corporate Finance 2006), 143.

  347. 347.

    In this sense Sandra K Miller, ‘Minority Shareholder Oppression in the Private Company in the European Community: A Comparative Analysis of the German, United Kingdom, and French Close Corporation Problem’, (1997) 30 Cornell Int. L.J. 381, 415.

  348. 348.

    See with respect to company law Guiseppe B Portale, ‘Minoranze di blocco e abuso del voto nell’esperienza europea: dalla tutela risarcitoria al ‘gouvernement des juges’ ?’, [1999] Europa e dir. priv. 153; for a more general picture the national reports collected in Marcel Storme/Burkhard Hess (eds), Discretionary power of the judge: limits and control (Kluwer 2003).

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    Holger Fleischer

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Fleischer, H. (2017). The Law of Close Corporations. In: Schauer, M., Verschraegen, B. (eds) General Reports of the XIXth Congress of the International Academy of Comparative Law Rapports Généraux du XIXème Congrès de l'Académie Internationale de Droit Comparé. Ius Comparatum - Global Studies in Comparative Law(), vol 24. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-024-1066-2_13

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