Abstract
This chapter seeks to address the widespread concern that judges should have some knowledge of the community they live in so that justice is administered ‘in the name of the people’. In considering ways to develop public confidence in the judiciary, we challenge the assumption that the composition of the highest courts is the core instrument for achieving a fair reflection of the community in the judiciary. Public confidence in the courts is gained by procedures in various forms and shapes relating to the institutional structure of the judiciary. There may be the use of lay participants, or there may be substantial lay participation in selecting individual judges. Besides, it is arguable that the popular acceptability of judicial decisions is, or can be, enhanced by the style of judgments and reasoning. Ultimately, however, views differ on whether lay participants can be used to gain the respect of the community. It may be that recruitment among professional lawyers remains the best way forward, provided (1) that they need not necessarily be drawn solely from the ranks of legal practitioners but may (in some courts) include academics or other professionals, (2) that the composition of the judiciary does not reflect a perceived wider social exclusion of some minority groups, and (3) that there is judicial training in social problems with which many judges may be personally unfamiliar.
This report was also published in: Turenne, Fair Reflection of Society in Judicial Systems – A Comparative Study, Springer, 2015, pp. 1–21.
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Notes
- 1.
G. di Frederico. ‘Independence and Accountability of the Judiciary in Italy. The Experience of a Former Transitional Country in a Comparative Perspective’ (2004) at 15.
- 2.
AWG Group v. Morrison Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 6, para. 29 [Mummery LJ].
- 3.
J. Resnik and D. Curtis, Representing justice: invention, controversy, and rights in city-states and democratic courtrooms (2011) at 104.
- 4.
CEPEJ, Checklist for promoting the quality of justice and the courts (2008) at 2.
- 5.
G. Barden and T. Murphy, Law and Justice in Community (2010) at 4.
- 6.
US. CONST. Amend. VI; see also Blakely v. Washington 542 US 296 (2004) at 306. Individuals with personal knowledge of the disputants or events cannot be members of the jury, however.
- 7.
The guidelines sent to reporters are included in the Annex. We received reports from the following (21) countries: Argentina (Professor Sebastiàn Elias, Universidad de San Andrés, Buenos Aires), Australia (Justice Susan Kiefel (High Court of Australia) and Cheryl Saunders, Laureate Professor, University of Melbourne Law School), Belgium (Professor Maurice Adams, Professor of Comparative Law at the University of Antwerp, and Dr Benoit Allemeersch, Leuven University), Canada (Professor Stéphane Bernatchez, University of Sherbrooke, Québec), the Czech Republic (Professor Michal Bobek, College of Europe, Bruges), Denmark (Professor Ditlev Tamm, University of Copenhagen), Finland (Professor Pia Letto-Vanamo, University of Helsinki), Germany (Professor Michael Lothar, University Heinrich-Heine, Düsseldorf), Greece (Professor Nicolaos Klamaris, University of Athens), Hungary (Dr Balázs Fekete, Pázmány Péter Catholic University), Ireland (David Prendergast, Trinity College Dublin, and David Kenny, University College Dublin), Italy (Professor Pier Giuseppe Monateri, University of Turin), Netherlands (Professor Ton Hol, University of Utrecht), Poland (Professor Margareta Kol, University of Lodz), Portugal (Professor Cristina Machado de Queiroz Leitão, University of Porto), Serbia (Professor Dušan Nikolić, University of Novi Sad), Romania (Dr Lavinia Lefterache, University of Bucarest), Slovenia (Ms Nina Betetto, Vice-President, the Supreme Court of the Republic of Slovenia), Switzerland (Professor Luc Gonin and Dr Olivier Bigler, Université de Neuchâtel), United States of America (Professor Mortimer Sellers, University of Baltimore School of Law), Venezuela (Professor Allan Brewer-Carías, Universidad Central de Venezuela). Not all contributions are included in this volume, but they can be found in national publications or communicated upon request.
- 8.
Neil MacCormick stated that ‘politics is essentially concerned with the power of decision making in human communities on matters of communal interest or importance, with competition for that power and with its exercise. As for law, the essence is not power but normative order…Law is about institutional normative relations between normatively recognised persons of all sort’, N. MacCormick, ‘Beyond the Sovereign State’ (1993).
- 9.
Legitimacy refers to the acceptance of a court by the parties, the citizens and society at large. It justifies public trust in the court on the basis of various factors, such as the selection of judges, their independence and the reasoning supporting the Court’s judgments, see J.E. Soeharno, ‘From Rechtsstaat to Ruler in the Rule of Law: an Inquiry into the Increased Role of the Judiciary’ (2006) at 157.
- 10.
See Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Venezuela OEA/Ser.L/V/II.118, doc. 4 rev. 2 (2003), para. 174.
- 11.
European Commission, Final Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council On Progress in Romania under the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism COM(2012) 410 at 4.
- 12.
Values, practices and concepts are integrated into the operation of legal institutions and the interpretation of legal texts in a specific way in each legal system, J. Bell, ‘English Law and French Law – Not So Different?’ (1995) at 70.
- 13.
D. Grimm, ‘Domestic Courts and International Courts: an Illustration and a Conclusion’ (2009) at 127.
- 14.
1 A. de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (Francis Bowen trans., Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 4th prtg. 1948) (1835) at 282.
- 15.
1 A. de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (Francis Bowen trans., Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 4th prtg. 1948) (1835) at 286.
- 16.
See L. I. Appleman, ‘The Lost Meaning of the Jury Trial Right’ (2009) at 405.
- 17.
However in England there is also a clear trend to constrain how juries return verdicts, normally by requiring them to give a simple verdict of ‘guilty’ or ‘not guilty’. But this method might raise doubts whether the jury actually understood the law at all.
- 18.
G. Barden and T. Murphy, note 5 at 6.
- 19.
A v. SSHD [2004] UKHL, para. 42.
- 20.
P. Pettit, ‘Representation, Responsive and Indicative’ (2010) at 431. Judicial decision-makers cannot be agent in relation to a principal, for fear of undermining the principle of judicial impartiality.
- 21.
M. de S.-O.-l’E. Lasser, Judicial deliberations: a comparative analysis of judicial transparency and legitimacy (2004).
- 22.
J. Mance, ‘The Common Law and Europe: Differences of Style Or Substance and Do They Matter?’ (2006) at 10.
- 23.
S. Turenne, ‘Judicial Responses to Civil Disobedience: A Comparative Approach’ (2004) at 379.
- 24.
M. Tushnet, ‘Popular Constitutionalism as Political Law’ (2006).
- 25.
M. Tushnet, note 24.
- 26.
P. Sales, ‘Strasbourg Jurisprudence and the Human Rights Act: a Response to Lord Irvine’ (2012) at 253.
- 27.
D. Kommers, The Constitutional jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany (1997) at 21–22.
- 28.
Art. 20 III Basic Law.
- 29.
34 BVerfGE 269 ‘Princess Soraya’, see D. P. Kommers, The Constitutional jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany (1997) at 125.
- 30.
G. Fletcher, ‘Two Modes of Legal Thought’, Yale Law Journal (1981) at 978: As Fletcher writes, ‘We can assert the truth about [one interpretation of a right] and even make a persuasive case for our position. A consensus might emerge for [that] particular conception […]. But the consensus can be at most tentative. A better vision of [the right] always remain possible’, op.cit. at 982.
- 31.
R. v S. (RD) [1997] 3 SCR 484, para. 119.
- 32.
R. v S. (RD) [1997] 3 SCR 484, para. 4.
- 33.
J. F. McGarry, ‘Pionering Efforts: NJI’s Social Context Education Project’ (2009).
- 34.
‘Intellectual capacity’ refers to a ‘high level of expertise in your chosen area or profession’, the ‘ability quickly to absorb and analyse information’, an ‘appropriate knowledge of the law and its underlying principles, or the ability to acquire this knowledge where necessary’. The personal qualities expected are ‘integrity and independence of mind’, ‘sound judgement’, ‘decisiveness’, ‘objectivity, the ‘ability and willingness to learn and develop professionally, and the ‘ability to work constructively with others’. The ‘authority and communication skills’ refer to an ‘ability to explain the procedure and any decisions reached clearly and succinctly to all those involved’, the ‘ability to inspire respect and confidence’, the ‘ability to maintain authority when challenged’.
- 35.
Report of the Advisory Panel on Judicial Diversity, 2010, recommendation 20.
- 36.
S. Shetreet and S. Turenne, Judges on Trial. The Independence and Accountability of the English Judiciary (2013).
- 37.
The Dutch Supreme Court is striving to achieve a balanced mix of people from the judiciary, the advocacy, academia and the tax world. It also aims to achieve a higher percentage of female members, since the current percentage is still 16 % of the total number of judges.
- 38.
L. Sossin ‘Should Canada Have a Representative Supreme Court?’ (2009) at 3.
- 39.
Oral Evidence before the Constitution Committee, Q 220, HL Committee on the Constitution, Twenty-Fifth Report on Judicial Appointments (2012), para. 84.
- 40.
R.E. Goodin, Innovating Democracy. Democratic Theory and Practice After the Deliberative Turn (2008), chapter 12.
- 41.
R.E. Goodin, Innovating Democracy. Democratic Theory and Practice After the Deliberative Turn (2008).
- 42.
See the distinction, by the European Court of Human Rights, between a presumption of personal impartiality on the part of the judge, that is, a presumption that none of the Court’s members is showing bias or personal prejudice, and the requirement of institutional impartiality, in the sense that the tribunal must offer guarantees sufficient to exclude any legitimate doubt on the impartiality of the institution, Findlay v. United Kingdom [1997] 24 EHRR 221, para. 73.
- 43.
M. Cappelletti, ‘Who Watches the Watchmen? A Comparative Study on Judicial Responsibility’(1983) at 7–9.
- 44.
S. Shetreet, ‘On Assessing the Role of Courts in Society’ (1980) at 399-402.
- 45.
As noted above, Sect. 1.1.
- 46.
Lord Hailsham, ‘The Independence of the Judicial Process’ (1978) 13 Israel LRev 1 at 8-9.
- 47.
J. Bell, Judiciaries within Europe. A Comparative Review (2006).
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Annex
Annex
1.1.1 TOPIC I. B The Independence of a Meritorious Elite: The Government of Judges and Democracy
Judicial selection is tied to the idea of ‘merit’, but the meaning of this term and the processes of selection vary. This panel aims to consider the institutional setting, the legal cultures and the practices that relate to the selection of judges, in light of one specific question: if justice is to be done in the name of the community, how far do the decision-makers need to reflect the community, either in their profile or in the opinions they espouse?
1.1.1.1 A. Judicial Selection
National reporters are invited to report on the provisions (constitutional, statutory and/or customary) designed to secure independent judicial selection for appellate and supreme courts. Reporters are requested to examine the eligibility criteria (statutory or not); how professional competence and integrity are defined; the appointment, composition and role of the selection body, with a focus on the eligibility criteria, responsibilities and function(s) of lay members (if any); any consultative mechanism; the process of selection, and the standard of selection. More generally, to what extent does judicial selection in their country bear out the idea that judicial appointments should reflect the diversity of the community?
Particular attention should be paid to the traditions, practices and/or debate(s) informing the judicial selection. Thus, national reporters are invited to report on the expectations and character of the judicial work which seems to inform the selection process and criteria in their country. To this purpose, reporters are asked to illustrate the role of appellate and supreme courts judges in shaping the law, e.g., by making a new rule or interpreting texts to find a solution to a particular case, and/or ruling on social disputes.
National reporters are also invited to relate the mode of judicial selection to its institutional context. Thus, in some countries, the competence of Judicial Councils in the area of judicial selection may reflect a model of judicial responsibility and accountability where disciplinary proceedings and the budget may also fall under the control of these Judicial Councils. The role of judicial education-providers or of legal practitioners’/professional associations may be relevant to the extent that they too shape the skills of judicial office-holders and a common understanding of their role.
1.1.1.2 B. Lay Participants in the Judicial Decision-Making Process
National reporters are invited to report on whether there are lay participants in their judicial system (in general or specialist courts). Lay participants are understood as lay assessors, or people who act as judges without being professional judges, or judges who are not lawyers. If there are no lay participants, reporters are invited to explain the reasons for this. If there are lay participants, reporters are asked to explain the history of why they have a role. They are also requested to explain their role today, considering i) the appointment of lay participants, ii) whether lay participants swear the judicial oath, iii) the composition of benches where lay participants serve and iv) their relationship with any professional judge who may be involved in making a decision with them. Reporters may also generally consider whether i) experts who may take part in the judicial proceedings and/or ii) the use of jury trials may fulfil the function(s) of reflecting society.
1.1.1.3 C. Judicial Legitimacy
National reporters are invited to consider the extent to which lay input in judicial selection and lay participation in judicial proceedings, or their absence, are part of checks and balances over professional judges and/or reflect a specific understanding of public confidence in the administration of justice. Lay participation may also reflect other values, such as the idea of effectiveness of the judicial system. Reporters are also asked to explain the history behind the position today on these two topics. In doing so, they may highlight some distinct interactions between institutions, legal professions and some specific values such as impartiality, separation of powers, transparency and/or the requirement of a fair representation of civil and/or political society in the composition of courts and tribunals.
1.1.2 THEME I. B L’indépendance d’une élite méritoire: Le gouvernement des juges et la démocratie
La sélection des juges est liée à l’idée de ‘mérite’, mais la signification de ce terme et les procédures de sélection sont variables. Ce panel a pour but d’examiner le cadre institutionnel, la culture juridique et les pratiques relatives à la sélection des juges au regard d’une question en particulier: si la justice est rendue au nom de la société, dans quelle mesure est-il bon que ceux qui décident au nom de la société reflètent la société, soit par leur profil ou par les prises de positions qu’ils adoptent?
1.1.2.1 A. La sélection des juges
Les rapporteurs nationaux sont invités à exposer les dispositions (constitutionnelles, législatives et/ou coutumières) qui ont pour but d’assurer la sélection indépendante des juges des cours d’appel et des cours suprêmes. Les rapporteurs sont invités à examiner les critères d’éligibilité (législatifs ou non); la définition de la compétence professionnelle et de l’intégrité requise; la procédure de nomination, composition et rôle de l’autorité de sélection, avec une attention particulière portée aux critères, responsabilités et fonction(s) des membres qui ne sont pas juges professionnels (si applicable); tout mécanisme consultatif à l’œuvre; la procédure de sélection, et le niveau de sélection. De façon générale, dans quelle mesure la sélection des juges dans le pays des rapporteurs nationaux donne-t-elle corps à l’idée que la sélection des juges devrait refléter la diversité de la société ?
Une attention particulière pourra être portée aux traditions, pratiques et/ou débats qui nourrissent les procédures et critères de sélection des juges. Les rapporteurs nationaux sont ainsi invités à présenter les attentes et le caractère des taches judiciaires qui semblent éclairer les procédures et critères de sélection des juges dans leur pays. Dans ce but, il est demandé aux rapporteurs d’illustrer le rôle des cours d’appel et cours suprêmes dans la création du droit, par exemple en développant une nouvelle règle, ou par leur interprétation du droit qui apporte une solution à une affaire précise, ou bien encore en prononçant un jugement en matière de controverses sociales.
Les rapporteurs nationaux sont aussi invités à placer le mode de sélection des juges dans son contexte institutionnel. Ainsi, dans certains pays, la compétence de Conseils de la Magistrature dans le domaine de la sélection des juges est susceptible de refléter un modèle de responsabilité judiciaire au sens large (‘judicial responsibility and accountability’) tel que les poursuites disciplinaires et le budget sont aussi sous le contrôle de ces Conseils de la Magistrature. Le rôle formateur des institutions chargées de la formation judiciaire ou des associations des professions juridiques/associations professionnelles est susceptible d’être pertinent dans la mesure ou ils forment les compétences des magistrats et une compréhension commune de leur rôle.
1.1.2.2 B. La participation de ‘non-professionnels’ dans la décision judiciaire
Les rapporteurs nationaux sont invités à faire un état des lieux de la participation ou l’absence de participation de non-professionnels dans leur système judiciaire (qu’il s’agisse de juridictions spécialisées ou à compétence générale). Le terme ‘non-professionnel’ désigne les assesseurs qui ne sont pas juges professionnels; ceux qui occupent une fonction juridictionnelle sans être juge professionnel, ou bien/et ceux qui sont juges sans être juriste. S’il n’y a pas de participation de ‘non-professionnels’ au système judiciaire, les rapporteurs sont invités à expliquer les raisons pour cela. S’il y a bien une participation de ‘non-professionnels’ au système judiciaire, il est demandé aux rapporteurs d’expliquer les raisons historiques de cette participation. Il est aussi demandé aux rapporteurs d’exposer le rôle de cette participation aujourd’hui, en considérant i) la sélection des membres non-professionnels ii) la question de savoir si ces membres prêtent le serment du magistrat, iii) la composition du panel auquel le membre non-professionnel prend part iv) la relation entre les membres non-professionnels et tout juge professionnel qui pourrait être implique dans la prise de décision avec eux.
Les rapporteurs peuvent aussi considérer, de façon générale, si i) les experts qui peuvent prendre part à la procédure judiciaire and/ou ii) le recours au jury populaire sont susceptibles de remplir la/les function(s) de représentation de la société.
1.1.2.3 C. Légitimité des juges
Les rapporteurs nationaux sont invités à considérer dans quelle mesure la participation d’individus qui ne sont pas juges professionnels, ou bien son absence, à la sélection des juges des cours d’appel et/ou des cours suprêmes, fait partie de procédures de contrôles et de contrepoids (‘checks and balances’) au pouvoir des juges professionnels et/ou reflète une conception spécifique de la notion de confiance du public dans l’administration de la justice. Cette question s’applique aussi à la participation de non-professionnels du droit à la procédure judiciaire. Cette participation ou non-participation est aussi susceptible de refléter d’autres valeurs, comme l’idée d’efficacité du système judiciaire.
Il est aussi demandé aux rapporteurs d’expliquer les raisons historiques à l’appui de leur présentation des positions sur ces deux sujets. Ce faisant, les rapporteurs sont susceptibles de mettre en lumière des interactions distinctes entre les institutions, les professions juridiques et certaines valeurs telles que l’impartialité, la séparation des pouvoirs, la responsabilité des juges, la transparence, et/ou l’exigence d’une juste représentation de la société civile et/ou politique dans la composition des cours et tribunaux.
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Turenne, S. (2017). The Independence of a Meritorious Elite: The Government of Judges and Democracy. In: Schauer, M., Verschraegen, B. (eds) General Reports of the XIXth Congress of the International Academy of Comparative Law Rapports Généraux du XIXème Congrès de l'Académie Internationale de Droit Comparé. Ius Comparatum - Global Studies in Comparative Law(), vol 24. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-024-1066-2_1
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