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Kantianism and the Historiography of Philosophy

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Models of the History of Philosophy

Abstract

Criticism as the decisive philosophy and the history of philosophy

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Notes

  1. 1.

    K.L. Reinhold, Briefe über die Kantische Philosophie (Leipzig: Georg Joachim Göschen, 1790–1792, 2 vols). The publication of the Briefe in the Teutscher Merkur was broken off in September, 1787, when Reinhold was called to Jena; the eight letters that had thus far appeared in the journal were published in an unauthorised book in Mannheim in 1789 (another edition, entitled Auswahl der besten Aufsätze über die Kantische Philosophie, Frankfurt und Leipzig, 1790). On the editions of the Briefe, cf. A. Von Schönborn, Karl Leonhard Reinhold. Eine annotierte Bibliographie (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, 1991), pp. 69–71, 72, 75–76, and 82–83. See the English translation of the eight letters published in the Teutscher Merkur (with the major additions in the 1790 edition) in K.L. Reinhold, Letters on the Kantian Philosophy, ed. K. Ameriks (Cambridge and New York, 2005).

  2. 2.

    Briefe, II, pp. 177–178; see also Reinhold, Ueber das Fundament des philosophischen Wissens (Jena: Mauke, 1791), pp. 9–12; on this topic, cf. Verra, Dopo Kant. Il criticismo nell’età preromantica (Turin, 1957), pp. 5–31; Gueroult, I/2, pp. 390–393; K.J. Marx, The Usefulness of the Kantian Philosophy. How K.L. Reinhold’s Commitment to Enlightenment Influenced His Reception of Kant (Berlin, 2011), in particular pp. 117–179, 256–294.

  3. 3.

    Aus F.H. Jacobi’s Nachlaß. Ungedruckte Briefe von und an Jacobi und Andere. Nebst ungedruckten Gedichten von Goethe und Lenz, ed. R. Zoeppritz (Leipzig, 1869), vol. I, p. 137; cf. also Reinhold, ‘Ueber den Begriff der Geschichte der Philosophie’, BGPh, I/1 [1791], neue überarbeitete Auflage (Züllichau and Freystadt, 1796), p. 32.

  4. 4.

    ALZ, no. 231 (1788), cols 831–832; see also K.L. Reinhold, Versuch einer neuen Theorie des menschlichen Vorstellungsvermögens (Prague and Jena: Widtmann and Mauke, 1789 [17952]), pp. 76–89 (English transl. of 1789 ed.: Essay on a New Theory of the Human Capacity for Representation, T. Mehigan and B. Empson eds., Berlin and New York, 2011); Briefe, I, pp. 130–135; cf. Marx, The Usefulness of the Kantian Philosphie, pp. 195–196. Reinhold’s outline was discussed in several German reviews, for example in the PhM, II (1790), pp. 436–459 (see also ALZ, no. 357, 1789, cols 418–419; GGZ, 100. St., 1789, pp. 883–884; AM, Bd. 1, 1. St., 1791, pp. 190–191; cf. Die zeigenössischen Rezensionen der Elementarphilosophie K.L. Reinholds, hrsg. v. F. Fabbianelli, Hildesheim, 2003), and even in English ones: see The Monthly Magazine, I (1796), pp. 265–266; cf. G. Micheli, ‘The Early Reception of Kant’s Thought in England’, in Kant and His Influence, G. MacDonald and T. McWalter eds. (Bristol, 1990), pp. 251–252, and M. Class, Coleridge and Kantian Ideas in England 1796–1817 (London, 2012), pp. 29–31.

  5. 5.

    G.G. Fülleborn, ‘Geschichte meines philosophischen Studiums’, BGPh, I/3 (1793), pp. 179–196 (especially pp. 187–188).

  6. 6.

    G.G. Fülleborn, ‘Ueber die Geschichte der ältesten Griechischen Philosophie’, BGPh, I/1 [1791], neue und überarbeitete Auflage (1796), pp. 54–57.

  7. 7.

    K.H. Heydenreich, Einige Ideen über die Revolution in der Philosophie, bewirkt durch Immanuel Kant, und besonders über den Einfluss derselben auf die Behandlung der Geschichte der Philosophie, published as an appendix to the German translation of the history of modern philosophy by Appiano Buonafede (Kritische Geschichte der Revolutionen der Philosophie in den drey letzten Jahrhunderten, Leipzig: Weygand, 1791, vol. II, pp. 213–232; on Buonafede see above, Chap. 6). The essay was later reprinted with some modifications in Originalideen über die interessantesten Gegenstände der Philosophie (Leipzig: Baumgärtner, 1793), vol. I, pp. 1–36.

  8. 8.

    “Wenige Freunde der kritischen Philosophie haben sich bis jetzt einer solchen Bearbeitung unterzogen. Als Muster stehen einige Reinholdische Abhandlungen in den Briefen über die Kantische Philosophie vor Augen” (Originalideen, p. 33).

  9. 9.

    The essay was published in Wittenberg in 1797 and contained some critical observations on the theories that had been propounded in an article published anonymously by Tennemann in Niethammer’s Philosophisches Journal (II, 1795, pp. 325–326); Tennemann replied to Grohmann’s criticisms in the ‘Einleitung’ to the first volume of the Geschichte (p. ix); Grohmann revived his theories in the essay, which was actually a reprint, with some modifications, of an earlier text of his, ‘Was heißt: Geschichte der Philosophie?’, in Neue Beyträge zur kritischen Philosophie und insbesondere zur Geschichte der Philosophie, J.Ch.A. Grohmann and K.H.L. Pölitz eds., I (1798), pp. 1–78.

  10. 10.

    K.F. Stäudlin, Geschichte und Geist des Skepticismus: vorzüglich in Rücksicht auf Moral und Religion (Leipzig: S. L. Crusius, 1794), 2 vols, pp. X-563 and 309 (reviewed by Tennemann in Niethammer’s Philosophisches Journal, I/3 (1795), pp. 274–284). The historical exposition is preceded by four essays on the spirit and form, origins, effects and history of scepticism. For Stäudlin, Kantian philosophy clarifies the connection between religious and moral convictions and protects them from attacks on the part of scepticism; the same “eclectic mix of scepticism, Kantianism and Christianity” is also present in other works by the same author, among which it is worth mentioning his Geschichte der Moralphilosophie (Hannover: Helwing, 1822, pp. xxii, 1055); see J.C. Laursen, in DECGPh, III, pp. 1122–1125.

  11. 11.

    Beiträge zur Charakteristik der neueren Philosophie, zur Vermittlung ihrer Gegensätze (Sulzbach: Seidel, 1829, pp. xxx-498). A second edition of the work, much enlarged and with changes, was published under the title of Beiträge zur Charakteristik der neueren Philosophie, oder kritische Geschichte derselben von Descartes und Locke bis auf Hegel (Sulzbach: Seidel, 1841, pp. xx-1051). Immanuel Hermann Fichte (1796, Jena – 1879, Stuttgart), son of Johann Gottlieb, studied philology and philosophy in Berlin, where he obtained his habilitation in 1818 with a work De philosophiae novae Platonicae origine; he taught for over ten years in Düsseldorf, then in Bonn from 1836 to 1842, and finally in Tübingen, to where he was invited in 1842, remaining there until 1862, when he abandoned teaching.

  12. 12.

    I.H. Fichte, Vermischte Schriften zur Philosophie, Theologie und Ethik (Leipzig: Brockhaus, 1869),vol. I, p. 54. On Immanuel H. Fichte’s criticism of Hegel cf. A. Hartmann, Der Spätidealismus und die Hegelsche Dialektik (Berlin, 1937), pp. 127–166.

  13. 13.

    H.M. Chalybäus, Historische Entwicklung der spekulativen Philosophie von Kant bis Hegel. Zu näherer Verständigung des wissenschaftlichen Publicums mit der neuesten Schule dargestellt (Dresden: Grimmer, 1837; Dresden and Leipzig, 18392; Leipzig, 18433; 18484; 18605). Chalybäus contributed several articles to the journal founded and edited by Immanuel H. Fichte, Zeitschrift für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie. Of historiographical interest is the essay ‘Philosophie der Geschichte und Geschichte der Philosophie’, that appeared in vol. I (1837), pp. 301–338, where the author discusses Hegel’s Vorlesungen on the philosophy of history and the works on history of philosophy by K.L. Michelet, L. Feuerbach and J.F. Fries, criticising the dialectic interpretation of history. Some years later, Chalybäus also dedicated an essay (Die moderne Sophistik, Kiel: Schwers, 1842) to criticising Hegelian dialectics itself.

  14. 14.

    “Fichte has been misunderstood by almost all parties, and that not only during his lifetime, but in part even in our own days. By this we mean, that the opinion has been generally entertained that his Idealism was really of no importance, and that it was not worth while to give oneself the trouble of studying it. In attempting to study the philosophy of our days, his writings have been generally wholly left out, and yet it is there, and there only, that we can obtain the key to the understanding of all modern philosophers” (Chalybäus, Historische Entwickelung, 2nd ed., p. 149).

  15. 15.

    Historical Survey of Speculative Philosophy, from Kant to Hegel […] Translated from the fourth edition of the German by Alfred Tulk (London: Longman, Brown, Green and Logmans, 1854); Historical Development of Speculative Philosophy, from Kant to Hegel. From the German […] by the Rev. Alfred Edersheim (Edinburgh: Clark, 1854).

  16. 16.

    • *Revised and updated by Giuseppe Micheli.

    The GGA, no. 70 (3rd May, 1804), pp. 689–691, report that foreign professors were paid a salary of 1,500 roubles, full professors 2,000 roubles, and were given the honorary, hereditary title of Hofrat, adviser to the court.

  17. 17.

    Cf. GGA, no. 98 (22nd June, 1805), p. 973; no. 154 (28th September, 1805), pp. 1535–1536; no. 208 (28th December, 1807), p. 2080; no. 160 (6th October, 1814), pp. 1596–98.

  18. 18.

    Cf. GGA, no. 189 (26th Sept., 1804), pp. 1881–87; Marino, pp. 284–287; cf. also above, p. 536.

  19. 19.

    Ueber Ursprung is a work that deals with the problem, similar in part to that of Kant and Herder, of man’s origin, history, and destiny. “An open view of a scientific naturalistic nature” means for Buhle, first of all, freedom from Biblical revelation, from all myths, and the possibility of the “conjecture” of man’s being born of “mother Earth”, as is the case of all other living beings, even though man belongs to a far superior degree of reality. He is opposed to both “materialism” and “spiritualism”, which in its purest form is found only in Descartes, to whose concept of the soul only Aristotle, among the ancients, came close with his doctrine of nous. On the contrary, Buhle maintains a view that he calls “dynamism”. “In general, I consider the soul in a purely dynamic way (rein dynamisch), like a compound of forces, joined within to a principal force to which they belong and which they serve, and these forces constitute with it and through it a person, a subject” (Ueber Ursprung, p. 51). He likens this concept of the soul to the Aristotelian concept of entelechia (cf. p. 52 and note). The consideration “of the probable destiny of the animating forces on our Earth after the death of individual organisms” leads him to concede the survival of all types of souls (“vernichtet kann sie [die blosse reine Lebenskraft] durch den Tod nicht werden als lebendige Realität”: p. 94), which, when separated from the body, seek in a way unknown to us new organisms to which they may become united, in a kind of metempsychosis. The same is true of the animal psychic forces that exist in man (senses, instinct, fantasy, memory, etc.). The destiny, however, of the highest forces of souls on Earth, the human rational spirit in its theoretical and practical relations, is different (pp. 100–101). On the basis of the characteristics of reason, which is superior to all animal faculties (he stresses the capacity for abstraction [p. 101], the language and the moral faculties), Buhle believes that this spirit can survive death in personal identity; nonetheless, we can still raise “some doubts on the basis of rational arguments” concerning this question and, he states, “the how (das Wie) of this survival” remains totally “in obscurity” (p. 155).

  20. 20.

    See K.L. Reinhold, ‘Vorlesung über den Begriff der Geschichte der Philosophie’, BGPh, no. 1 (1791), pp. 3–35; G..F.D. Goess, Über den Begriff der Geschichte der Philosophie und über das System des Thales (Erlangen, 1794). On this debate cf. L. Geldsetzer, ‘Der Methodenstreit in der Philosophiegeschichtsschreibung (1791–1820)’, Kant-Studien, LVI (1966), pp. 519–527; Braun, pp. 206–240.

  21. 21.

    The theorisation of the history of philosophy, as carried out above all by Heumann and Brucker, is called histoire pragmatique by Braun, pp. 89–137; on the concept of pragmatic history and the pragmatic method, cf. also above, pp. 536–537.

  22. 22.

    Entwurf, § 248, p. 183. On the possibility of an a priori history of philosophy, for Kant and for J.C.A. Grohmann, cf. Micheli, Kant storico della filosofia, pp. 11–12, 247–254; see also above pp. 757–762 (Kant) and p. 779–780 (Grohmann).

  23. 23.

    In NADBibl., xxxv, 1 (1798), pp. 39–43; Buhle’s reply in Lehrbuch, III, ‘Anhang’, final pp. (unnumbered) after p. 448.

  24. 24.

    It should be mentioned that a reviewer in the ALZ, no. 196 (13th July, 1802), pp. 89–94, finds the division of the Geschichte into centuries unsatisfactory and complains about the lack of a periodization that would be “better suited to the purpose” (pp. 93–94).

  25. 25.

    I. Kant, Geschichte der Philosophie, in Id., Vorlesungen über die Metaphysik, ed. K.H.L. Pölitz (Erfurt, 1821), p. 8: “No people had properly begun to philosophize before the Greeks; everything previously had been represented by images, and nothing by concepts” (see Kant, Gesammelte Schriften, Akademie Ausgabe, XXVIII, p. 53514–16); see also Kant, Logik Jäsche [1800], Akademie Ausgabe, IX, p. 2715—20 (see above, pp. 728–730).

  26. 26.

    Cf. Gesch. des philosoph. mensch. Verstandes, pp. 22–23, footnote, where one can find an extensive overview of erudite eighteenth-century literature on the subject. Among others: J.S. Bailly, Lettres sur l’origine des sciences et sur celle des peuples (London and Paris,1777); Id., Lettres sur l’Atlantide de Platon (London and Paris, 1779) (on these works cf. above, Chap. 2 , Introd., p. 85); A. Court de Gébelin, Monde primitif analysé et comparé avec le monde moderne (Paris, 1773–1782), 9 vols; Abbé Delille, Origine des premières sociétés (Amsterdam, 1770); P.S. Pallas, Observations sur la formation des montagnes (St. Pétersbourg,1777); C. von Linné, Necessitas historiae naturalis Rossiae, in Id., Dissertationes variae, t. VII, diss. cxlviii, II ed. (Erlangen, 1789); furthermore, contributions from the Göttingen expert Ch.G.. Heyne, Opuscula academica (Göttingen, 1785–1812).

  27. 27.

    Cf. Gesch. des philosoph. mensch. Verstandes, pp. 30 and 36, where the work by F.V.L. Plessing, Memnonium oder Versuche zur Enthüllung der Geheimnisse des Altertums (Leipzig, 1787), is cited (on Plessing see, above, pp. 651 and 740–742).

  28. 28.

    He refers to the works by D. Tiedemann, Dialogorum Platonis argumenta exposita et illustrata (Zweibrücken, 1786); W.G. Tennemann, System der Platonischen Philosophie (Leipzig, 1792–1795); J.J. Engel, Versuch einer Methode, die Vernunftlehre aus platonischen Dialogen zu entwickeln (Berlin, 1780); J.C.S. von Morgenstern, De Platonis Republica commentationes tres (Halle, 1794); see also the extensive bibliography that Buhle gives in the foreword to the chapter on Plato in the Lehr., II, pp. 3–16.

  29. 29.

    Buhle seems to support a similar theory in Ueber Ursprung und Leben, where the Aristotelian conception of the soul is frequently cited positively (pp. 37, 52, and 151); however, the doctrine of the nous seems to Buhle to lead Aristotle to maintain the immortality of the soul in one sense but in another sense to deny it (Ueber Ursprung, p. 151).

  30. 30.

    Cf. Gesch., I, pp. 592–595: supporters of the existence of “Eastern philosophy” were J.L. von Mosheim, Dissertationum ad historiam ecclesiasticam pertinentium volumen, III ed. (Altona and Lubeck, 1767), and, above all, Brucker, II, Ch. iii: ‘De philosophia orientali’, pp. 639–652 and VI, ‘Appendix’, pp. 400–418; adversaries, on the contrary, were Ch. Meiners, Grundriss der Geschichte der Weltweisheit (Lemgo, 1786), p. 160, and D. Tiedemann, Geist der spekulativen Philosophie (Marburg, 1791–1797), III, pp. 96–101. On the exclusion of African and Oriental peoples from the history of philosophy in the historiography of the late Enlightenment (from Meiners onwards), including that of Kantian inspiration, cf. P.K.J. Park, Africa, Asia, and the History of Philosophy (Albany, 2013), pp. 11–29 and 69–95.

  31. 31.

    Cfr. Tiedemann, Geist der spekulativen Philosophie, III, pp. 263–433.

  32. 32.

    A.H.L. Heeren, Geschichte des Studiums der classischen Literatur seit dem Wiederaufleben der Wissenschaften (Göttingen, 1796) (it is the 4th section of his Geschichte der Künste), I, p. 183 (quoted by Buhle).

  33. 33.

    Heeren, Geschichte des Studiums, I, pp. 285 sqq. (quoted by Buhle).

  34. 34.

    The syntagm “reiner Peripateticismus” imitates Brucker’s (IV1, pp. 148–352) genuina Aristotelis philosophia, by which he, too, defines sixteenth-century Aristotelianism, in contrast to Scholasticism, beginning with one of the most significant figures, Pomponazzi, as Buhle does here.

  35. 35.

    ALZ, no. 115 (1805), cols 249–254 (on Kant cols 251–252; on the post-Kantians col. 254). The Literatur-Zeitung of Erlangen, no. 40 (1802), col. 317, had also criticised the Lehrbuch for the lack of space reserved for the great minds of the modern age (Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, and Wolff) and expected the work to be reduced to “ein gedankenloses Hinschreiben für Verleger und Käufer” and to fail to become a treatise valid “um Erweiterung und Bereicherung der Wissenschaften zu thun”.

  36. 36.

    This is attested by the copy of the review which is preserved in the Göttingen University Library, in which the names of the reviewers have been added by hand.

  37. 37.

    Degérando1, I, pp. 149–150, observes: “mais il [i.e. Buhle] a peu insisté sur quelques analogies que ces différences ne détruisent point”.

  38. 38.

    Degérando1, II, p. 254, notes: “Les éléments de l’histoire de la philosophie de Buhle [perhaps the Lebrbuch, the last volume of which appeared in 1804] ont un grand mérite d’ordre, de clarté et de précision. Par-tout où cet écrivain a travaillé d’après lui-même, il ne laisse rien à desirer; mais on peut regretter qu’il n’ait pas toujours donné la même étendue à chaque partie, la même originalité à chaque exposition […]”.

  39. 39.

    The French translation of the Geschichte by A.J.L. Jourdan occasioned a censorial intervention by the Catholic Church; the Sacred Congregation of the Index, with a decree dated 27th November 1820, included Buhle’s Geschichte in the Index librorum prohibitorum (List of Prohibited Books); on this matter see I. Tolomio, ‘L’olivetano Mauro Talucci censore della Storia della filosofia moderna di J.G. Buhle’, in Monastica et Humanistica. Scritti in onore di G. Penco, ed. F.G.B. Trolese (Cesena, 2003), pp. 829–853.

  40. 40.

    He is alluding to Giovanni Triffon Novello and his 7 volumes Sui principi e progressi della storia naturale (Venice, l809-1811), on which see above, Chap. 4, Introd.

  41. 41.

    Critica della ragione pura di Manuele Kant, traduzione dal tedesco (Pavia: Bizzoni, 1820–1822), I, pp. 8 and 15–88 (‘Della vita e delle opere di Kant’). See, among other things, Mantovani’s notes to the last pages of the Critique, concerning the “history of reason”, where he points out the importance of criticism as the hermeneutic tool for the whole of the history of philosophy. Before Kant, he writes, “we did indeed have the means by which to determine the characteristics of philosophical systems in antiquity, but not those to understand them perfectly and make them comprehensible to others since it was impossible for us to state the reason for their origin from the dispositions of pure reason” (Critica della ragione pura, VIII, p. 202); thanks to Kant, this is now possible. This note by Mantovani literally translates a passage from Buhle, without naming him, however (cf. Gesch., VI, p. 635).

  42. 42.

    This evaluation is also true of the second half of the nineteenth century: cf. Picavet, p. 4: “Tiedemann, qui professe une philosophie où entrent des éléments empruntés à Locke, à Leibniz et à Wolff, s’est efforcé d’exposer sans parti pris les systèmes, et d’en déterminer la perfection relative. Buhle, qui se rattache à Kant et à Jacobi, a fait preuve d’une immense érudition; Tennemann, qui juge les systèmes du point de vue kantien, a étudié avec beaucoup de soin les sources”.

  43. 43.

    R. Klibansky, De dialogis de vera sapientia Francisco Petrarcae addictis, in Nicolai de Cusa Opera omnia, V, Idiota (Hamburg, 1983), p. lxvi.

  44. 44.

    Most probably, Tennemann refers here to the eleventh Brief (vol. 1, Leipzig 1790, pp. 288–332, already published as the eighth Brief in the Teutscher Merkur in September 1787, 3, pp. 247–278); regarding this text by Reinhold, which presents a historical character and contains a history of the “rational psychology of the ancients”, see K.L. Reinhold, Letters on the Kantian Philosophy, ed. K. Ameriks (Cambridge and NewYork, 2005), pp. xxxiii-xxxv, 104–123 and 201–205; see also A. Pupi, La formazione della filosofia di K.L. Reinhold (Milan, 1966), pp. 93–103, and K. J. Marx, The Usefulness of the Kantian Philosophy (Berlin, 2011), pp. 158–167.

  45. 45.

    On the structure of the work, cf. J.-L. Vieillard-Baron, ‘Le système de la philosophie platonicienne de Tennemann’, Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, LXXVIII (1973), pp. 513–524 (repr. in Id., Platonisme et interprétation de Platon à l’époque moderne (Paris, 1988), pp. 78–90).

  46. 46.

    See above, pp. 771–773.

  47. 47.

    Tennemann refers to the following essays: K.L. Reinhold, ‘Ueber den Begriff der Geschichte der Philosophie’, BGPh, no. 1. (1791), pp. 5–35 (on this essay, cf. Pupi, La formazione, pp. 308–313); G.F.D. Goess, Ueber den Begriff der Geschichte der Philosophie und über das System des Thales (Erlangen: Palm, 1794); G.G. Fülleborn, ‘Was heißt den Geist einer Philosophie darstellen’, BGPh, no. 5 (1795), pp. 193–203; C.A. Grohmann, Ueber den Begriff der Geschichte der Philosophie (Wittenberg: Kühne, 1798); Id., ‘Was heißt: Geschichte der Philosophie’, Neue Beyträge zur kritischen Philosophie und insbesondere zur Geschichte der Philosophie, C.A. Grohmann und K.H.L. Pölitz eds., I (1798), pp. 1–78. In addition to these writings, he names the two following methodological essays by C. Garve: De ratione scribendi historiam philosophiae (Leipzig: Breitkopf, 1768), and Legendorum philosophorum veterum praecepta nonnulla et exemplum (Leipzig: Breitkopf, 1770); surprisingly, neither here nor elsewhere does Tennemann make any reference to Brucker’s ‘Dissertatio praeliminaris’; this is explained by the thesis that only after the kantian ‘revolution’ could the history of philosophy become an object for explicit and conscious theoretical reflection. In his ‘Einleitung’, he merely mentions Reinhold’s essay and discusses Grohmann’s former essay; he provides a more complete discussion of these theoretical essays in the Uebersicht and the Revision, where he also examines the methodological and theoretical contributions which appear in Tiedemann’s Geist and Buhle’s Lehrbuch. These discussions have been defined as ‘Methodenstreit' (cf. L. Geldsetzer, ‘Der Methodenstreit in der Philosophiegeschichtsschreibung: 1791-1820’, Kant-Studien, LVI, 1966, pp. 519–527; Geldsetzer, pp. 19–46; see also S. Di Bella, La storia della filosofia nell’Aetas Kantiana Naples, 2008). In reality, the value of these contributions is varied, and they owe their success to Tennemann, who grouped them together under the definition “writings on the concept of history of philosophy”, and included them in the bibliography prefaced to his Geschichte (pp. lxxviii-lxxix) and the Grundriss (§ 2, p. 2); from this source, they were taken up and incorporated in the bibliographical sections of many later manuals, and finally in Freyer’s history of the historiography of philosophy (cf. Freyer, pp. 123–136 and p. [1] [‘Literatur’]). In the Grundriss of 1812, besides the aforementioned theoretical texts, Tennemann cites his own ‘Einleitung’, as well as the following essays: C. Weiss, Ueber die Behandlungsart der Geschichte der Philosophie auf Universitäten (Leipzig: Kramer, 1799); F.A. Carus, ‘Ideen zur Geschichte der Philosophie’, in Nachgelassene Werke (Berlin: Barth u. Kummer, 1809), vol. 4; and C.F. Bachmann, Ueber Philosophie und ihre Geschichte (Jena: Cröker, 1811). In any case, these writings denote the interest felt by Kantians towards the problem of a critical foundation of the history of philosophy. In addition to the works quoted by Tennemann, let us mention K.H. Heydenreich, Einige Ideen über die Revolution in der Philosophie, bewirkt durch Immanuel Kant, und besonders über den Einfluß derselben auf die Behandlung der Geschichte der Philosophie, in the appendix to his translation of Buonafede’s history of modern philosophy (Kritische Geschichte der Revolutionen in der Philosophie in den drei letzten Jahrhunderten (Leipzig: Weygand, 1791), II, pp. 213–232).

  48. 48.

    A “pragmatic” history displays the causal arising of one event from another (see Gesch., I, pp. xxi-xxiii; Uebersicht, p. 330). On the meaning and history of the expression “pragmatic history”, cf. P. Pédech, La méthode historique de Polybe (Paris, 1964), pp. 21–22; on the use of this term in German historiography of the late eighteenth century, with reference to Tennemann as well, cf. A. Lalande, Vocabulaire technique et critique de la philosophie (Paris, 19608), pp. 1272–1274, and G. Kühne-Bertram, ‘Pragmatisch’, in Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, vol. 4, cols 1243–1244; on the concept of “pragmatic” history in the philosophical historiography of the late eighteenth century, see above, pp. 536–537, 794–795.

  49. 49.

    “Ohne die erste [die Zeitfolge], zweite [die Wahrheit und Bestimmtheit] und dritte [der pragmatische Geist] ist keine Geschichte, ohne die vierte [die Zweckmäßigkeit] keine Geschichte der Philosophie möglich” (I, p. xxxix).

  50. 50.

    Gesch., I, pp. lvi-lvii; as regards the preference that Tiedemann himself had already expressed for reading the works of philosophers rather than indirect testimonies, see above, pp. 678–679. Buhle also lays special emphasis on a first-hand reading of the texts written by philosophers (see above, p. 827).

  51. 51.

    Cf. Models, II, pp. 540–541 (Brucker); see above, pp. 674–675 (Tiedemann) and p. 799 (Buhle).

  52. 52.

    Cf. Kant, KrV, A 852-856/B 880–884: the history of philosophy that closes the first Critique is formulated “from a merely transcendental viewpoint, i.e. from the viewpoint of the nature of pure reason”; this position is typical of the Kantians (as concerns Buhle, see above, pp. 797–799).

  53. 53.

    Other similar arguments are present in Meiners; but in Tennemann they are theoretical rather than sociological and recall those found in Kant’s Vorlesungen as well as in his works on the philosophy of history (see above, pp. 573–574 and 726–728). On the exclusion of African and Oriental peoples from the history of philosophy in the historiography of the late Enlightenment (from Meiners onwards), including that of Kantian inspiration, cf. P.K.J. Park, Africa, Asia, and the History of Philosophy, pp. 11–29, 69–95.

  54. 54.

    Cf. especially B. Böhm, Socrates im achtzehnten Jahrhundert (Leipzig, 1929), pp. 7–71 (on the image of Socrates spread by Fr. Charpentier), 72–111 (on the parallel drawn between Socrates and Christ), 112–158 (on moral religion), pp. 220–227 (on Mendelssohn’s Socrates), pp. 227–238 (on Eberhard’s Socrates).

  55. 55.

    Hegel was to judge Tennemann’s theory as “nonsense”: Tennemann, writes Hegel, seems to believe that “the philosopher possesses his thoughts as if they were external objects: a philosophical idea, however, is something totally different, and instead of being possessed by, it possesses a man. When philosophers discourse on philosophical subjects, they follow of necessity the course of their ideas; they cannot keep them in their pockets; and when one man speaks to another, if his words have any meaning at all, they must contain the idea present to him. It is easy enough to hand over an external object, but the communication of ideas requires a certain skill; and there is always something esoteric in this, in such a way that philosophers are never purely exoteric” (Hegel1, II, pp. 21–22; Hegel2, p. 377).

  56. 56.

    On this point, see the exhaustive observations formulated by M. Isnardi Parente, ‘Noterelle marginali alle hegeliane Lezioni di storia della filosofia. La dottrina platonica delle idee’, La Cultura, IX (1971), especially pp. 152–157.

  57. 57.

    Tennemann refers to the extensive works by F.V.L. Plessing, Memnonium, oder Versuche zur Enthüllung der Geheimnisse des Alterthums (Leipzig: Weygand, 1787), 2 vols (the second volume is devoted to Plato) and Versuche zur Aufklärung der Philosophie des ältesten Alterthums (Leipzig: Crusius, 1788–1790) 2 vols (the first volume is devoted to Plato), and to the short but significant Latin dissertation by Gottlob Ernst Schulze, De ideis Platonis dissertatio philosophico historica[…] (Wittemberg: Dürr, 1786), pp. 28 (on these texts, see M. Wundt, ‘Die Wiederentdeckung Platons im 18. Jahrhundert’, Blätter für deutsche Philosophie, X (1941), p. 156; A. Pupi, ‘Introduzione‘ to G.E. Schulze, Enesidemo (Bari, 1971), pp. 17–19; T. Gloyna, ‘Idee – Substanz oder Begriff? Zum Wandel des Platon-Verständnisses im 18. Jahrhundert’, in Platonismus im Idealismus, ed. B. Mojsisch et al. (Leipzig, 2003), pp. 7–10 (on Plessing).

  58. 58.

    On the subdivision of Scholasticism into periods within the Protestant historiographical tradition, cf. Models, I, pp. 56–57 (Peucer) and pp. 400–403 (Tribbechow); II, pp. 517–518 (Brucker).

  59. 59.

    Reference to Diderot’s entry ‘Locke’, in Encyclopédie méthodique: Philosophie ancienne et moderne (Paris, 1791–1794), vol. I, p. 129: “[…] De là une grande règle en philosophie, c’est que toute expression qui ne trouve pas hors de notre esprit un objet sensible auquel elle puisse se rattacher, est vide de sens”. On the Encyclopédie méthodique see above, Ch.1.4).

  60. 60.

    This is attested by the copy of the review which is preserved in the Göttingen University Library, in which the names of the reviewers have been added by hand.

  61. 61.

    Cf. J. Kirchner, Das deutsche Zeitschriftenwesen, seine Geschichte und seine Probleme (Wiesbaden, 1958), I, pp. 201–202.

  62. 62.

    This course of lectures was largely publicized in the newspapers and was attended by a fairly numerous audience, among whom the young William Hamilton; the lectures, except for the first, were transcribed in shorthand, with a view to preparing a publication, which, however, was not carried out; the material was published for the first time in 1949 by K. Coburn and is now available in its entirety (Lectures 1818–1819: On the History of Philosophy, 2 vols, ed. J.R. de J. Jackson, in Coleridge, Collected Works, Princeton, 2000).

  63. 63.

    Coleridge, Collected Works, 12: Marginalia, vol. 5, pp. 691–816.

  64. 64.

    Marginalia, p. 714; and he adds: “The fact is, that Tennemann had so long and with so much comfort and convenience, often too with such real advantage, employed Kant’s Critique of the Pure Reason, as a Carpenter’s rule for Reasoning, that he had at length identified with Reason itself” (p. 756); “[…] [I]t is not, I fear, without cause objected to Tennemann, that he turns the Critical Philosophy into Dogmatism” (p. 771).

  65. 65.

    “How strongly Kanteanism, in letter rather than spirit, influenced Tennemann is evident from his inconsistencies with regard to Plato […]. This vehement Prejudice has rendered this Volume of little value – not sufficiently minute or learned to be a store-house of facts – & for the rest, he [Tennemann] saw nothing but in the light of its agreement or disagreement with Kantean Mechanique [i.e. a ‘mechanical’ version of Kant’s system]. This is painfully true in his account of the Eclectic [i.e. the Neoplatonic] Philosophers. From the date of the Volume [1807] it is evident, that Tennemann had two objects in view, first, to shew the identity of the Neoplatonic System, especially as exhibited by Plotinus and Proclus, with the Natur-philosophie of Schelling and his School, 2nd to confute the latter under the name of the former […]” (Marginalia, pp. 742–743); and, a little later, referring again to Tennemann’s pages on ancient Neoplatonism, he observes: “This is no longer a History of Philosophy; but a polemic Tract against Neo-kantian Anti-kantians, Fichte under the name of Plotinus and Schelling of Proclus” (p. 753). Nevertheless, except for its rigid adherence to the letter of Kantianism, Coleridge, like many others during the first half of the nineteenth century, appears to appreciate Tennemann’s Geschichte for its richness in materials as well as for subdividing the latter under specific headings: “A valuable work, and what is at present a desideratum in Literature, might be composed by selecting the historical and dogmatic facts from Tennemann’s work, omitting his partial interpretations secundum principia Kantianismi – or rather abridging them as much as possible, in order to return them as the Sense which the words would bear, if the Philosopher, from whom the Dogma is extracted, had been exclusively a Categoric or Verstandsphilosoph [i.e. a philosopher of the intellect or Verstand, as opposed to Vernunft or reason]: while in an opposite Column should be given the Sense, which the same words would bear, if we suppose him to have used them as Symbols of Ideas […]. The Subdivisions, and Modifications, as Materialists, Idealists, Sensationists, Conceptionists, &c &c would find their own places […]. I can imagine a map in which the different great genera of Philosophy might be represented as Rivers, while instead of towns and Cities there would be the names of the Professors in the different ages” (Marginalia, pp. 691–692; see also Jackson, Introduction to Lectures 1818–1819: On the History of Philosophy, pp. lvi-lxvii, and J. Vigus, Platonic Coleridge, London, 2002, pp. 93–124).

  66. 66.

    Cf. Hegel1, I, p. 133; Hegel2, p. 90; and, as far as medieval philosophy is concerned, cf. Hegel1, III, p. 123; Hegel2, p. 720; the verdict on Wendt’s additions concerning more recent post-Kantian philosophy, is, however, highly critical: “[…] It is astonishing to see how [in this work] anything is passed off as philosophy, without distinguishing whether it is important or not; and these so-called philosophies grow out of the ground like mushrooms […]” (Hegel2, p. 91; Hegel1, I, p. 136).

  67. 67.

    The French translation made by Cousin (see The Athenaeum, no. 137, June 12 (1830), pp. 354–356, and no. 139, June 28 (1830), pp. 386–388) and later on the English translations made by Johnson and Morell were used in Great Britain “as a handbook in colleges” (see The British Quarterly Review, 1886, p. 597) approximately up to the 1880s (the last reprint of Morell’s edition dates to 1878); the same happened in France and in Italy with the translations made by Cousin, Longhena, and Modena, respectively. However, the Grundriss did not only enjoy success as a manual for students: in 1865, the French physiologist and physician Claude Bernard read it in Cousin’s French translation, made a summary of it, and wrote a commentary on it (cf. C. Bernard, Philosophie. Manuscrit inédit (Paris, 1954), pp. 1–24); in the United States, in the 1830s and 1840s, it became well-known and widely employed (both in Cousin’s and in Johnson’s translations) by some exponents of the New England Transcendentalism (cf. H.A. Pochmann, German Culture in America, Madison, 1957); James Murdock availed himself of the Grundriss (in the 1829 German edition) as a source for his successful essay Sketches of Modern Philosophy Especially among the Germans (Hartford, 1842, 18462), p. 2). The young Edgar Allan Poe as well availed himself of Tennemann (in addition to Schlegel and Tiedemann) for three articles he writes about the ‘Philosophy of the Antiquity’ (Southern Literary Messenger, vol. 2, Nov. 1836, pp. 739–740; vol. 3, Jan. 1837, pp. 32–34; Feb. 1837, p. 158; cf. M. Alterton, Origins of Poe’s Critical Theory (New York, 1965), pp. 105–110).

  68. 68.

    The translation of the Grundriss by abbot Modena, who taught the history of philosophy at the University of Pavia and used the manual for his lessons, occasioned a strong, although belated, censorial intervention on the part of the Church of Rome; with regard to Modena’s translation, the Sacred Congregation of the Index, with a decree dated 5th April 1845, included Tennemann’s Grundriss in the Index librorum prohibitorum (List of Prohibited Books); the reasons for this condemnation are all to be found in Tennemann's Kantianism, in addition to his positive judgments on authors condemned by the Church, such as Bruno, Campanella, Spinoza, and others. Tennemann’s Grundriss was forbidden “absolute quocumque idiomate”, that is, not only the German original version or Modena's translation, but also all the other translations, however mended and expurgated; on this matter, cf. Tolomio, Italorum sapientia. L’idea di esperienza nella storiografia filosofica italiana dell’età moderna, pp. 144–159.

  69. 69.

    The anonymous reviewer of the Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung observes: “The philosophers named in the title have already found many adversaries, but certainly none of them has penetrated more deeply into the spirit of the critical system and their systems, and is on the same level as these three philosophers as far as acumen and knowledge are concerned. […] This work deserves one of the highest places in the more recent history of philosophy, and it is a highly significant contribution to this very history” (ALZ, IV, 1803, nos 320–321, col. 353).

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  1. Dipartimento di Filosofia, Sociologia, Pedagogia e Psicologia applicata, Università di Padova, Piazza Capitaniato 3, Padova, 35139, Italy

    Giuseppe Micheli

  2. Università di Trieste, via P. Revoltella 3/1, 34134, Trieste, Italy

    Bruno Bianco

  3. Dipartimento di Filosofia, Pedagogia e Psicologia, Università di Verona, Lungadige Porta Vittoria 17, Verona, 37132, Italy

    Mario Longo

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  1. Dipartimento di Filosofia, Sociologia Pedagogia e Psicologia applicata, Università di Padova, Padova, Italy

    Gregorio Piaia

  2. Dipartimento di Filosofia, Sociologia Pedagogia e Psicologia applicata, Università di Padova, Padova, Italy

    Giovanni Santinello

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Micheli, G., Santinello, G., Bianco, B., Longo, M. (2015). Kantianism and the Historiography of Philosophy. In: Piaia, G., Santinello, G. (eds) Models of the History of Philosophy. International Archives of the History of Ideas Archives internationales d'histoire des idées, vol 216. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-9966-9_11

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