Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Substance, Unity and Identity in Early Leibniz’s Work

  • Chapter
Leibniz’s Metaphysics and Adoption of Substantial Forms

Part of the book series: The New Synthese Historical Library ((SYNL,volume 74))

  • 446 Accesses

Abstract

Adrian Nita (University of Craiova, Romania), in Substance, unity and identity in early Leibniz’s work, addresses the question of continuity and discontinuity in Leibniz’s philosophy of substance, unity and identity. The author gives an indirect answer to the question of how to decide between these alternatives, discussing the unity and identity of substance in the frame-work of the relationship between the notions anima and mens. So, the major question of the paper is: what is the place of the new evaluation of substantial forms in 1678–1679 from the perspective of the unity and identity of substance in their relationship with anima and mens? The author deals with the revival of substantial forms and focuses on the question of the unity of substance from the perspective of the relation between anima and mens and lastly on identity and individuation from the same perspective.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    For comments and useful suggestions on earlier version of the paper, I am indebted to Simo Knuuttila, Pauline Phemister, Roger Ariew, Richard Arthur and to the participants of the Oltenia Colloquium in Early Modern Philosophy (first edition, May 2013). My research was supported by a grant of the Romanian National Authority for Scientific Research, CNCS – UEFISCDI, project number PN-II-ID-PCE-2011-3-0739.

  2. 2.

    Leibniz, To Duke Johann Friedrich von Hannover, autumn 1679; A2.1.754; L 261.

  3. 3.

    Leibniz, To Duke Johann Friedrich von Hannover, var. L2; A2.1.757.

  4. 4.

    See McCullough (1996). See also Ariew (2009, pp. 95–115).

  5. 5.

    See Kabitz (1909), Brown (1999), Kulstad et al. (2009).

  6. 6.

    Leibniz to Conring, 19 March 1678; GP I, 198–199; L 190.

  7. 7.

    Conspectus libelli (summer 1678-winter 1678/1679 (?)), A VI, 4, 1988; L 278–279.

  8. 8.

    Ibidem, L 279–280.

  9. 9.

    Fichant (1994, pp. 9–68).

  10. 10.

    Fichant, (1994, pp. 15–17); see also Fichant (1998, pp. 163–204).

  11. 11.

    Garber (2011, pp. 409–421).

  12. 12.

    This is the reason that Christia Mercer speaks about Leibniz’s “conciliatory eclectism” (Mercer 2001, p. 47; Mercer 2004, Chap. 1). Andreas Blank remarks that while Leibniz’s philosophy is conciliatory, is not eclectic; see Blank (2005, p. 63).

  13. 13.

    Palkoska (2010, p. 94).

  14. 14.

    For a close view on these matters, Woolhouse (2010, pp. 17–21).

  15. 15.

    For a different view that emphasizes some sort of dualism, see Blank (2005, Chap. 5).

  16. 16.

    Ishiguro (1998, pp. 538–541).

  17. 17.

    Later this was labeled as the hypothesis of pre-established harmony; see the letter to Basnage de Bouval, 3/13 January 1696, A II, 3, 7897.

  18. 18.

    Primae veritates (1680–1684); Couturat, 521; L 269.

  19. 19.

    Discours de metaphysique (1686) 12; GP IV, 436; L 309.

  20. 20.

    Discours de metaphysique (1686) 33; GP IV, 458; L 324–325.

  21. 21.

    Discours de metaphysique (1686) 34; GP IV, 459; L 325.

  22. 22.

    See the letters to Foucher, 5/15 July 1695, A II, 3, 7828 and 12 September 1696, A II, 3, 7856–8.

  23. 23.

    “Augustinum puto Pythagoreae et Platonicae scholae placita secutum. Nam per Pythagoram inprimis de Mentis immaterialitate et immortalitate dogma ex oriente allatum in Graecia inclaruit. Plato autem longius progressus vidit, non alias vere substantias esse quam Animas, corpora autem in perpetuo fluxu versari. Cogitata horum emendavit atque etiam auxit Augustinus ad normam christianae sapientiae, hunc Scholastici, sed longo intervallo, sunt secuti. Mihi summa rei videtur consistere in vera Notione substantiae, quae eadem est cum notione Monadis, sive realis Unitatis et ut ita dicam Atomi Formalis; vel puncti essentialis, nam materialis Atomus dari non potest, unde frustra in materia quaeritur Unitas, et punctum Mathematicum non est essentiale sed modale, unde continuum ex punctis non constat, et tamen quicquid substantiale est ex unitatibus conflatur” (Leibniz to Fardella, 3/13 September 1696, A II, 3, 7964).

  24. 24.

    Systeme nouveau (1695) 3; GP IV, 479; L 454. See also the letter to Foucher, 12 September 1695: “Mais dans les realités où il n’entre que des divisions faites actuellement, le tout n’est qu’un resultat ou assemblage, comme un trouppeau de moutons; il est vray que le nombre des substances simples qui entrent dans une masse quelque petite qu’elle soit est infini puisqu’outre l’ame qui fait l’unité reelle de l’animal, le corps du mouton (par exemple) est soubsdivisé actuellement c’est à dire qu’il est encor un assemblage d’animaux ou de plantes invisibles, composés de même outre ce qui fait aussi leur unité reelle, et quoyque cela aille à l’infini, il est manifeste, qu’au bout du compte tout revient à ces unités; le reste ou les resultats, n’estant que des phenomenes bien fondés” (A II, 3, 7857).

  25. 25.

    “Cependant puisqu’il faut necessairement qu’il se trouve dans la nature corporelle des veritables unités, sans lequelles il n’y auroit point de multitude ny de collection, il faut que ce qui fait la substance corporelle, soit quelque chose qui reponde a ce qui s’appelle moy, en nous, qui est indivisible et pourtant agissant, car estant indivisible et sans parties, ce ne sera plus un estre par aggregation, mais estant agissant, ce sera quelque chose de substantiel. … Il paroist meme que dans toutes les especes organiques, il y doit avoir quelque chose qui reponde a l’ame, et que les philosophes ont appellée forme substantielle, qu’Aristote appelle entelechie premiere, et que j’appelle putestre plus intelligiblement la force primitive pour la distinguer de la secondaire qu’on appelle force mouvante qui est une limitation ou variation accidentelle de la force primitive” (Systeme nouveau pour expliquer la nature des substances et leur communication entre elles, aussi bien que l’union de l’ame avec le corps (1695), GP IV, 473).

  26. 26.

    Monadologie (1714) 18, 19, 29; GP VI, 609–611; L 644–645.

  27. 27.

    Disputatio metaphysica de principio individui (1663) § 5, A VI, 1, 12.

  28. 28.

    Dissertatio de arte combinatoria (1666), GP IV, 32; L 73.

  29. 29.

    Confessio naturae contra atheistas (1669), GP IV, 109; L 112.

  30. 30.

    Confessio naturae contra atheistas (1669), GP IV, 109–110; L 113. Note that in translating mens by l’esprit, Lucy Prenant loses the point in which I am interested. See Témoignage de la nature contre les athées, in Oeuvres de GW Leibniz, translated by Lucy Prenant, vol. 1, Aubier Montaigne, Paris, 1972, pp. 69–74.

  31. 31.

    De transsubstantione (1668), A VI, 1, 509; L 116.

  32. 32.

    Look (1999), Blondel (1893), Boehm (1938), Robinet (1969, pp. 83–103).

  33. 33.

    Garber (1982, pp. 168).

  34. 34.

    Theoria motus abstracti (1671), G IV, 230.

  35. 35.

    Letter to Hobbes, 13/22 July 1670, GP I, 82–85; L 105–107.

  36. 36.

    Letter to Arnauld, November 1671; GP I, 72–73; L 149.

  37. 37.

    About element communes, see Dyck (2005, pp. 21–40). See also Garber (1982, pp. 160–184).

  38. 38.

    Paris Notes, L 160. The same idea, but with “soul”, not with “mind”, is sustained in Monadology: “It is clear from this that there is a world of creatures, living beings, animals, entelechies, souls, in the smallest particle of matter” (Monadology 66, GP VI, 618; L 650).

  39. 39.

    Paris Notes, L 162.

  40. 40.

    Letter to Wedderkopf (May 1671), A II, 1, 117–118; L 146–147.

  41. 41.

    Confessio philosophi (1672/1673), A VI, 3, 146; Sleigh Jr., pp. 100–101 (armonikoteros).

  42. 42.

    Confessio philosophi (1672/1673), A VI, 3, 141; Sleigh Jr., pp. 88–89.

  43. 43.

    For more details on the relationship Leibniz-Hobbes, see Wilson (1999, pp. 223–243).

  44. 44.

    Confessio philosophi (1672/1673), A VI, 3, 145; Sleigh Jr., p. 101.

  45. 45.

    Confessio philosophi (1672/1673), A VI, 3, 146; Sleigh Jr., p. 101.

  46. 46.

    A VI 3, 148; Sleigh Jr., p. 105.

  47. 47.

    Leibniz (1961, p. 25, 29, 35, 37, 39, 71, 77, 83, 87, 89, 93, 101). Moreover, in a footnote, Belaval maintains that Leibniz draws a distinction (under Descartes’s influence, of course) between souls as principles of life (animae) and souls as principles of reflexive thinking (mentes). It is true that Leibniz makes this distinction, but it would be good to make it visible in translation, as Sleigh Jr. does.

  48. 48.

    On Leibniz’s atomism, as a continuator of tradition from the seventeenth century, as articulated by Sennert and Gassendi, see Richard Arthur (2003, pp. 183–227), Blank (2010, 189–210), Beeley (1996, chaps. 4–14), Moll (1978).

  49. 49.

    Gassendi (1658, vol. II, pp. 193–658), Gassendi (1684, vol. 5, pp. 409–626 and vol. 6).

  50. 50.

    Leibniz, New System 3. Also, in the letter to Burnett from 18 may 1697 (GP III, 205), he declares that even in 1661 he was an atomist.

  51. 51.

    See the Letter to Conring, March 19, 1678, GP I, 193–199; L 186–191.

  52. 52.

    See Nita (2013, pp. 149–160).

  53. 53.

    For relative identity, see Geach (1962).

  54. 54.

    See Nita (2012).

  55. 55.

    See Nita (2012).

  56. 56.

    Nita (2013, p. 159).

  57. 57.

    On the individuation in Leibniz, see McCullough (1996, Chaps. 1–40), Cover and O’Leary-Hawthorne (1999), Mugnai (2001, pp. 36–54), Ariew (2009, pp. 95–115), Mare and Ariew, supra, Chap. 2.

  58. 58.

    For a different point of view, see Ariew (2009, pp. 95–115).

  59. 59.

    “a singular substance does not need as individuating principle anything but its entity, i.e. the intrinsic principles which constitute its entity” (Suarez, Disputationes metaphysicae, sectio VI, 1; reprint Hildesheim, 1965, vol. 1, p. 180).

  60. 60.

    Ariew (2009, p. 101), Garber (2009, p. 58).

  61. 61.

    Mugnai (2001, p. 37). See also Cover and O’Leary-Hawthorne (1999, pp. 28–29).

  62. 62.

    De transsubstantione (1668 (?)), A VI, 1, 508–512; L 117.

  63. 63.

    De transsubstantione (1668 (?)), A VI, 1, 508–512; L 118.

  64. 64.

    Confessio philosophi (1672/1673), A VI, 3, 147; Sleigh Jr., pp. 102–103.

  65. 65.

    Confessio philosophi (1672/1673), A VI, 3, 148; Sleigh Jr., pp. 104–105.

  66. 66.

    “You speak of astounding things, which, I believe, have not come into the mind of any scholastic even in a dream, but which, nevertheless, no one can disavow, for they are taken from practical experience. For no man reasons otherwise when he must distinguish things that are entirely similar” (Confessio philosophi (1672/1673), A VI, 3, 148; Sleigh Jr., pp. 104–105).

  67. 67.

    A VI, 3, 392.

  68. 68.

    For a different interpretation, see Mugnai (2001), Ariew (2009).

  69. 69.

    “it is necessary that a mind is added to matter, i.e. that incorporeal substances are supposed to exist” (A VI, 3, 67).

  70. 70.

    Meditatio de principio individui (1 April 1676), A VI, 3, 490; Parkinson, p. 51.

  71. 71.

    See Catherine Wilson (1999, p. 236), Yvon Belaval in Leibniz (1961, p. 25, 29, 35, 37, 39, 71, 77, 83, 87, 89, 93, 101).

  72. 72.

    Monadologie (1714) 18, GP VI, 609–610; L 644.

  73. 73.

    Monadologie (1714) 19, GP VI, 610; L 644.

  74. 74.

    Monadologie (1714) 29, GP VI, 611; L 645.

References

  • Arthur, Richard. 2003. The Enigma of Leibniz’s Atomism. Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy 1: 183–227.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ariew, Roger. 2009. Descartes and Leibniz on the Principle of Individuation. In Branching off. The Early Moderns in Quest for the Unity of Knowledge, ed. Vlad Alexandrescu, 95–115. Bucharest: Zeta Books.

    Google Scholar 

  • Beeley, Philip. 1996. Kontinuität und Mechanismus. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner.

    Google Scholar 

  • Blank, Andreas. 2005. Leibniz: Metaphilosophy and Metaphysics. 1666–1686. Munich: Philosophia Verlag.

    Google Scholar 

  • Blank, Andreas. 2010. Biomedical Ontology and the Metaphysics of Composite Substances. 1540–1670. Munich: Philosophia Verlag.

    Google Scholar 

  • Blondel, Maurice. 1893. De vinculo substantiali sed de Substantia composita apud Leibnitium. Paris: Alcan, 1893; repr. Blondel, Maurice, Œuvres complètes, tome I, Paris, PUF, 1995.

    Google Scholar 

  • Boehm, A. 1938. Le Vinculum substantiale chez Leibniz. Paris: Vrin.

    Google Scholar 

  • Brown, Stuart (ed.). 1999. The young Leibniz. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cover, J.A. and O’Leary-Hawthorne, J. 1999.. Substance and individuation in Leibniz. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Dyck, Corey W. 2005. Descartes and Leibniz on the concept of substance and the possibility of metaphysics. In Descartes and Cartesianism, eds. ND Smith, JP Taylor, 21–40. Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fichant, Michel. 1994. La réforme de la dynamique. De corporum conscursu (1678) et autres textes inedits. Paris: Vrin.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fichant, Michel. 1998. Science et métaphysique dans Descartes et Leibniz. Paris: PUF.

    Google Scholar 

  • Garber, Daniel. 1982. Motion and metaphysics in the young Leibniz. In Leibniz: Critical and Interpretative Essays, ed. Michael Hooker, 160–184. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Garber, Daniel. 2009. Leibniz: Body, Substance, Monad. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Garber, Daniel. 2011. Materia, force, and corporeal substance in Leibniz’s philosophy. In Materia. A cura di Delfino Giovannozzi, pp. 409–421.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gassendi. 1658. Opera omnia, 6 vols. Lyon: Laurentii Anisson, Ioan. Bapt. Devenet.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gassendi. 1684. Abrégé de la philosophie, 7 vols. Ed. Fr. Bernier, second edition, Lyon: Anisson, Posuel et Rigaud.

    Google Scholar 

  • Geach, PT. 1962. Reference and Generality, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ishiguro, Hide. 1998. Unity without simplicity: Leibniz on Organisms. The Monist 81.4: 534–552.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Leibniz. 1961. Confessio philosophi. La profession de foi du philosophe, ed. Yvon Belaval. Paris: Vrin.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kabitz, W. 1909. Die philosophie des jungen Leibniz. Hildesheim: Winter.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kulstad, M., Loemker, M., Snyder, D. (eds.). 2009. The Philosophy of the Young Leibniz. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag.

    Google Scholar 

  • Look, Brandon. 1999. Leibniz and the ‘Vinculum substantiale’. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag.

    Google Scholar 

  • McCullough, Laurence B. 1996. Leibniz on individuals and individuation. The persistence of Premodern Ideas in Modern Philosophy. Kluwer: Dordrecht.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Mercer, Christia. 2001. Leibniz’s Metaphysics. Its Origin and Development. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Mercer, Christia. 2004. Leibniz and His Master. The correspondence with Jakob Thomasius. In Leibniz and His Correspondents, ed. Paul Lodge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Moll, Konrad. 1978. Der Junge Leibniz. Stuttgart: Fromann-Holzboog, 3 vols.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mugnai, Massimo. 2001. Leibniz on Individuation: From the Early Years to the Discourse and Beyond. Studia Leibnitiana XXXIII/1: 36–54.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nita, Adrian. 2012. Leibniz on subject and individual substance. Filozofia nauki XX. 2(78): 57–67.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nita, Adrian. 2013. Essays on Theodicy after three hundred years. Revue roumaine de philosophie 57, issue 1: 149–160.

    Google Scholar 

  • Palkoska, Jan. 2010. Substance and intelligibility in Leibniz’s metaphysics. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag.

    Google Scholar 

  • Robinet, Andre. 1969. Du nouveau sur la Correspondence Leibniz-Des Bosses. Studia Leibnitiana I/2: 83–103.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wilson, Catherine. 1999. Atoms, minds and vortices in De Summa rerum: Leibniz vis-à-vis Hobbes and Spinoza. In The young Leibniz and his philosophy (1646–1676), ed. Stuart Brown. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

    Google Scholar 

  • Woolhouse, Roger. 2010. Starting with Leibniz. London: Continuum.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Craiova, Craiova, Romania

    Adrian Nita

Authors
  1. Adrian Nita
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Adrian Nita .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Facultatea de Stiinte Sociale, Universitatea din Craiova, Craiova, Romania

    Adrian Nita

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2015 Springer International Publishing Switzerland

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Nita, A. (2015). Substance, Unity and Identity in Early Leibniz’s Work. In: Nita, A. (eds) Leibniz’s Metaphysics and Adoption of Substantial Forms. The New Synthese Historical Library, vol 74. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-9956-0_3

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation