Action and Deontology

Abstract

This chapter is concerned with the deontology of actions. According to the presented approach, actions and not propositions are deontologically loaded. Norms direct actions and define the circumstances in which actions are permitted, prohibited, or mandated. Norms are therefore viewed as deontological rules of conduct. The definitions of permission, prohibition, and obligatoriness of an action are formulated in terms of the relation of transition of an action system. A typology of atomic norms is presented. To each atomic norm a proposition is associated and called the normative proposition corresponding to this norm. A logical system, the basic deontic logic, is defined and an adequate semantics based on action systems is supplied. The basic deontic logic validates the closure principle. (The closure principle states that if an action is not forbidden, it is permitted.) A system which annulls this principle is also presented. In this context the problem of consistency of norms is examined. The problem of justice is discussed. The key role plays here is the notion of a righteous family of norms.