Abstract
Goodpaster asks: “[I]s the concept of moral responsibility, as we are pursuing it, a normative concept or a descriptive concept or a mixture of the two?” (1983: 5). The way I see it the attribution of moral responsibility is a description about what a moral agent has done (or should have done). However, what is required to be a moral agent is normatively decided by us given an understanding of the central abilities that we think the metaphysics of moral agency requires. In other words the attribution of moral responsibility to an agent is an event-description founded on a normative conception of what it should mean to be morally responsible. And what it should mean to be morally responsible involves a thorough understanding of the abilities for moral agency and their moral relevance.
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Notes
- 1.
Moral agents may be attributed with moral responsibility for specific events. An event attributed to a moral agent will be characterised by a certain description of that event. For example, if chemical waste has been dumped into the river, then this event might be described as “the polluting of the river”. Let us assume that “the polluting of the river” is a breach of a negative moral duty if intentionally brought about by a moral agent. A moral agent X who has intentionally brought about “the polluting of the river” may then be correctly attributed with the following moral responsibility: “moral agent X is responsible for polluting the river”.
- 2.
Velasquez (2003) argues that attributions of intentionality to corporations are prescriptive; i.e. we should treat them as if they did possess intentionality. I do not disagree with this interpretation, but it is more precise to say that the conditions for moral agency are prescribed, but when we then attributed moral responsibility to an agent this is a description of what the moral agent has done.
- 3.
“Intentionality” is the property of being about something; for something to have content. For example, intentionality is a pervasive feature of propositional content of many different mental states. Beliefs, desires and intentions are examples of intentional mental states. The attribution of intentionality to an agent does not specifically entail the state of intending, but merely that it has at least one of the several states which contain propositional content.
- 4.
All ethical theories hinge on the existence of moral agents towards whom the prescriptions of behaviour apply. If entities that do not meet the conditions of individual moral agency are to be considered special kinds of moral agents, then it is not clear that our ethical theories are applicable to them. If not, then what types of prescriptions are applicable to them? How are we to treat them and how are they to treat us? Are we to develop an entirely new realm of moral philosophy dealing with the behaviour between them and us (not to speak of their behaviour to each other)?
- 5.
A negative duty is a duty to abstain from a certain action.
- 6.
A positive duty is a duty to perform a certain action.
- 7.
I will generally be referring to a moral agent as “it”. This is because referring to a moral agent as a he or a she tends to imply that the agent is a person which is often associated with the attributes for moral agency. A corporation’s status as a moral agent is precisely the topic of contention so it seems to be misguiding to refer to a moral agent as a he or a she.
- 8.
Moral autonomy does contain moral prescriptions. For example for Kant moral autonomy involves practical reason (i.e. our ability to use reasons to choose our own actions) which itself presupposes that we see ourselves as free. In order to be free an agent must follows his own authority (not an external authority) which involves the self-imposition of universal moral law (e.g. Categorical Imperative).
- 9.
Frankfurt assumes that intentions consist of a desire-belief complex.
- 10.
An autonomous agent does not merely react to external influences; rather it chooses how to act. Animals that merely react to external influences are not autonomous and are not morally responsible for their actions.
- 11.
There is a distinction between internalist and externalist accounts of autonomy (Buss 2008). Internalist accounts focus only on the coherence between an agent’s lower and higher-order desires for autonomous action. Externalist accounts also evaluate whether an agent is responsive to an adequately broad range of higher-order desires (reasons) for and against actions. Frankfurt’s (1971) account is internalist and such a weaker account is sufficient for our present purposes.
- 12.
There are several overlapping accounts of autonomy (see e.g. Bratman 1979; Watson 1975). All “hierarchical” accounts are augmentations of Frankfurt’s view of autonomy (Buss 2008). Central to my argument, and common to all hierarchical accounts, is that autonomy involves the agent’s ability to reflect on its own first-order desires for action. It is not my aim to develop or argue for a particular account of autonomy. Given Frankfurt’s prominence in the autonomy debate I will be relying on his account.
- 13.
An ass may be free to choose between a pile of hay and a sugar cube, but it does not have the autonomy ability to reflect on its choice, and thus cannot choose otherwise than it does.
- 14.
The significance of regarding autonomy as an ability may be further underscore. Under circumstances of coercion a moral agent may be exculpated for intentional actions if the agent desired to choose otherwise but could not. Circumstances of coercion may vary from one situation to another, but it is necessary that a subject has the ability to independently choose an intentional action in order to be the subject of a moral responsibility attribution irrespective of the circumstances. The ability of autonomous choice enables the agent to choose a different course of action from the one that is actually chosen.
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Rönnegard, D. (2015). Necessary Conditions for Moral Agency. In: The Fallacy of Corporate Moral Agency. Issues in Business Ethics, vol 44. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-9756-6_2
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