Abstract
The chapter aims to defend an externalist conception of evolutionary psychology by integrating the two forms of externalism found, respectively, in cognitive science and evolutionary biology, which were until now been pursued independently. We call this conception of evolutionary psychology “externalist evolutionary cognitive science”. However, adopting an externalist position is easier said than done, especially on the empirical and experimental front. To this day, externalism (both in cognitive science and evolutionary biology) is mostly limited to conceptual arguments, methodological prescriptions and speculative interpretations of scientific work. To integrate the two forms of externalism, we propose to trade internalist idealizations in cognitive science and evolutionary biology with another set of idealizations, inspired by work in mobile robotics as well as in developmental cognitive neuroscience. We start however by explaining in more detail what exactly internalism and externalism in those disciplines are.
Translated by Frédéric-I. Banville, with a revision by Amanda Leigh Cox.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
Such a position is stated in Faucher and Poirier (2001) as well as in Poirier et al. (2008); here it is developed and defended. For an outline of a similar position, see Anderson (2008). The hypothesis we propose is also compatible to some extent with what we call “evolutionary developmental psychology” as defended, among others, by Bjorklund and Blasi (2005).
- 3.
- 4.
An animat is an artificial autonomous adaptive agent inspired by biology; it can be physical (a robot) or virtual (simulation).
- 5.
For a defence of reductivism in psychology, see (among others) Bickle (2008)
- 6.
Reductivism should not be confused with reductionism, the latter of which consists of showing that a given property emerges from the interaction of certain lower-level properties attributed to components of the system. This form of reduction is closely associated with emergence (Wimsatt 1986), and holds that the property is in fact a property of the system. Reductivism, on the other hand, holds that the property is not a property of the system, but really a property of one of its components.
- 7.
See also Bechtel and Richardson (1992), who discuss research strategies.
- 8.
- 9.
It is important to note that while we have discussed mechanisms of revision of fundamental attributions as distinctive, such a separation is of theoretical and conceptual value rather than historical or sociological.
- 10.
- 11.
Evolutionary Psychology is sometimes externalist in one of the two senses we outlined here, and at times in both. For instance, discussing DST and the study of the mind, Griffiths and Gray (2005: 418) point out that the research tradition in developmental psychology from which DST comes from is carried on by some authors, like Bjorklund (see among others Bjorklund and Blasi 2005, where DST is explicitly defended), but that these lessons have been forgotten in the evolutionary study of the brain and that an official “comeback” of this tradition would not be a bad thing. This view appears indeed to make a come back in the Evolutionary Psychology literature, see for instance Tooby et al. (2003) and Barrett (2007). For an admittedly much rarer example of the possibilities of psychological externalism in Evolutionary Psychology, see Kosslyn (2007).
- 12.
See Bredeche, Chap. 29, this volume.
- 13.
See Schoenauer, Chap. 28, this volume.
- 14.
In what follows, when we say a robot’s capacity is “genetically determined,” we mean that it is encoded in the artificial genome of the genetic algorithm that generates the evolution of the robot population and that, given the simple genotype-phenotype relationship specific to this sort of simulation, the capacity is present at the beginning of the robot’s life.
- 15.
- 16.
For a recent overview of the literature, see Pascalis and Kelly (2009).
- 17.
The fusiform gyrus is not the only region activated during face recognition. Other areas such as the occipital face area (OFA) as well as the posterior regions of the superior temporal sulcus (STS) are implicated in face recognition. Furthermore, as noted by Forest (2010), there appear to be some prosopagnosia cases that do not involve damage to the fusiform gyrus (Rossion et al. 2003). This leaves open the possibility that the fusiform gyrus is necessary but not sufficient for facial recognition, and that we could be better off saying the fusiform gyrus is part of a specialised face recognition system.
- 18.
There are three types of information in facial features (Beaudoin et al. 2009: 8). Firstly, information about facial features, also called componential information. For instance: a nose with a distinctive wart or sporting spectacles. Secondly, “first-order” relational information, which is information which defines the position of facial features relative to one another. In humans, such information is extremely stable: eyes are above the nose and the nose is above the mouth. Thirdly, “second-order” relational information about the distance between features, such as distance between the eyes.
- 19.
The inversion effect is not the only effect discovered by researchers (see Baudoin et al. 2009; Duchaine and Yovel 2008; McKone et al. 2007). Other effects have been suggested which can be grouped under the label “holistic effects”, for instance, “composite effects” or “effects of the whole on the parts”. The composite effect is demonstrated by taking two halves (one upper, one lower) of two different celebrities’ faces. The two halves (either aligned or slightly misaligned) are then presented to a subject. The subject is then asked to determine to whom the upper (or lower) half belongs. Subjects are faster in recognising the half-face in the misaligned condition than they are in the aligned condition. The effect of the whole on the part comprises cases in which the recall or perception of a feature is improved when presented in a normal face rather than in a face in which features are scrambled or, simply, when the feature is presented alone.
- 20.
Duchaine and Yovel (2008: 351) discuss the case of children born with cataracts and who receive corrective operations between 2 and 6 months after birth. Despite their subsequent experiences with faces, these subjects display problems with facial recognition which are carried into adulthood (for instance, they do not experience the composite effect). These cases suggest that there is a window during which learning occurs. Some believe these sorts of windows are typical of psychological capacities that rely on maturation rather than on information from the environment. A cognitive capacity relies on maturation if its development is primarily determined internally (by genes, for instance) rather than externally (by relying on environmental input, for instance). For example, Chomsky (1979) compares linguistic development to that of an arm: Chomsky asserts that the growth of an arm does not depend on information external to the arm (even though growth requires environmental input). The arm’s growth is therefore not the result of learning; it is a result of maturation.
- 21.
There is more than one definition available; for an overview of some of these definitions, see Poirier et al. (2008).
- 22.
- 23.
Johnson and his colleagues sometimes refer to “embrainment” (Sirois et al. 2008: 224) to indicate that development is not only the product of interaction between a brain and the environment, but also of the brain’s structures among themselves.
- 24.
Greebles are a category of novel object used as stimuli in some psychological studies. They share a small number of parts that are arranged in different configurations. It thus makes it difficult to recognise an individual greeble on the basis of a single feature and encourages the subject to use the relationships between features instead.
- 25.
We should therefore nuance Tarr and Cheng’s assertion that facial recognition should be seen as a case of perceptual expertise acquired by most people (Tarr and Cheng 2003: 23). Instead, we should say it partially depends on an expertise acquired by most people. Bukach et al. (2006) cite an experiment that clearly demonstrates the role of expertise in facial recognition. We know that when subjects are asked to process two faces simultaneously, a subject’s performance is affected, which is not the case if one of the faces features have been randomly distributed. Subjects were then asked to process a face and the object of their expertise (greebles or cars, for instance) at the same time. In this manipulation, experts in car recognition to whom cars were presented at the same time as faces show a lower holistic face processing than those who are car recognition novices. This suggests that demands on expertise and demands on holistic face information processing involve the same cognitive resources.
- 26.
In this section, we will discuss facial recognition in babies as if it was conducted independently from other sensory modalities. Nevertheless, it appears that the mother’s voice as heard during foetal gestation is also a part of “mother recognition”. If we deprive a child from the auditory input of their mother’s voice, the child’s facial recognition of their mother is impeded (Pascalis and Kelly 2009).
- 27.
In the latest edition of his book (2005), Johnson mentions a face detector using lower spatial features which involves not only the superior colliculus but also the pulvinar nuclei and the amygdala. The idea that this subcortical system is widely responsible for the control of juvenile visual behaviour thus remains valid in his view.
- 28.
See more recently Macchi-Cassia et al. (2004).
- 29.
This precision is important, as will be demonstrated. It draws our attention to the children’s bias, which alone is probably insufficient to distinguish between faces and other objects which share structural properties with faces. It is necessary to involve another mechanism to sufficiently explain children’s interest in faces; such a mechanism is described in Sect. 3.3.
- 30.
They propose that prosopagnosia cases could be explained not by the unresponsiveness of the fusiform gyrus to face-type stimuli (it sometimes is responsive), but by a lack of specificity in activation patterns as well as by the activation of regions not normally activated during facial recognition (i.e. inferior frontal gyrus). If this was the case, prosopagnosia patients would have activation patterns similar to those of children.
- 31.
This would explain some atypical capacities of autistics, such as their capacity to abstract a local component from its general context. See Happé and Frith (2006) view this as part of the cognitive profile of autism.
- 32.
Pierre Poirier and Luc Faucher benefited from a research grant from the Social Science and Humanities Research Council, and L.F. of a research grant from the Centre de Recherche en Éthique de l’Université de Montréal (CRÉUM). We thank the editors of this volume for their comments.
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Poirier, P., Faucher, L. (2015). Externalist Evolutionary Cognitive Science. In: Heams, T., Huneman, P., Lecointre, G., Silberstein, M. (eds) Handbook of Evolutionary Thinking in the Sciences. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-9014-7_32
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