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Rights Before Courts pp 289–328Cite as

Equality and Minority Rights

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Abstract

The rhetoric of equality has been particularly popular in the post-Communist states of CEE due to the emergence of greater inequality associated with the introduction of the market economy, coupled with deeply ingrained egalitarian societal attitudes. This explains the inclination of constitutional courts to use the equality provisions generously. The Chapter opens with a general discussion of the role of equality in constitutional review. It then focuses on issues of gender and sexual orientation, and also discusses the special case of affirmative action in case law of constitutional courts in CEE. The Chapter then turns its attention to the question of minority rights in CEE. An overview of minority issues in CEE is followed by a discussion of the constitutional design of minority rights, as fundamentally individual rights rather than group rights. Special cases of linguistic rights and of minority representation in public authorities are then discussed. The Chapter concludes that the constitutional rules on minority rights, and, in particular, on the rights of ethnic and national minorities, became something of a problem for constitutional courts: they were, by and large, neither intellectually equipped nor morally and politically prepared to interpret them in an expansive, generous manner. As a result, when it comes to minority rights and ethnic relations in general, the contribution by constitutional courts has been modest and disappointing.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See, e.g., with reference to Bulgarian Constitutional Court, Venelin Ganev, “Bulgaria: The (Ir)Relevance of Post-communist Constitutionalism”, in Jan Zielonka, ed., Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe, vol. I: Institutional Engineering (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2001): 186–211 at 198.

  2. 2.

    Art. 32.

  3. 3.

    Art. 89.

  4. 4.

    For statistics on anti-homosexual views in Poland, see e.g. Helsinki Committee for Human Rights, “Gender Equality: Legal and Institutional Framework On Women’s Rights and Equal Opportunities; De Jure And De Facto Discrimination In Poland”, Polish Law Journal 6 (2001): 149–228 at 216 (for instance, according to a 1996 survey, only 25 % of respondents said that homosexuals should be allowed to hold high public offices, while as many as 63 % would not accept homosexuals in such positions. 71 % of respondents would not permit homosexuals to be teachers; 71 % excluded the possibility of a homosexual marriage, and 88 % would not permit adoption by same-sex couples, id. at 216–17.

  5. 5.

    Decision no. 81 of 15 July 1994, striking down the Criminal Code’s prohibition of homosexual intercourse.

  6. 6.

    Decision 14/1995 of 15 March 1995, striking down a rule of the civil code that defined “domestic partnership” as a woman and a man living together in a common household outside marriage.

  7. 7.

    This is the case of eight constitutions in the region: Bosnia Herzegovina (in the ECHR), Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Russia, Slovakia and Serbia and Montenegro Charter. In addition, two other constitutions (those of Slovenia and Serbia) state that “any other personal reasons” are also impermissible grounds for discrimination.

  8. 8.

    See, generally, Wojciech Sadurski, “The Concept of Legal Equality and an Underlying Theory of Discrimination”, Saint Louis-Warsaw Transatlantic L. J. (1998): 63–104.

  9. 9.

    For more on the question of “immutability”, as a non-starter in the reflection upon discriminatory classifications, see Wojciech Sadurski, Equality and Legitimacy (Oxford University Press: Oxford 2008), pp. 111–124.

  10. 10.

    Decision K. 6/89 of 24 October 1989 (the text on file with the author) at 6. I should add that, in this context, the Constitutional Tribunal is referring to my own book, Wojciech Sadurski, Teoria sprawiedliwosci (PWN: Warszawa 1988) at 94.

  11. 11.

    Decision U. 1/96 of 16 December 1996, discussed in Aldona Domanska, “Analiza treĞci konstytucyjnej zasady rownosci w oparciu o wybrane orzeczenia Trybunaáu Konstytucyjnego”, Studia Prawno-Ekonomiczne 62 (2000): 47–58 at 51.

  12. 12.

    See, e.g., Decision K. 7/90 of 22 August 1990, discussed id. at 53.

  13. 13.

    Decision K. 14/91 of 11 February 1992, discussed id. at 53.

  14. 14.

    Decision no. P. 2/87 of 3 March 1987 (the text of the decision on file with the author), pp. 12–13 (italics added).

  15. 15.

    Domanska, supra note 11 at 52.

  16. 16.

    See the 14 March 2006 decision Pl. US 30/04.

  17. 17.

    Decision No 47 of 17 May, 1994.

  18. 18.

    Id.

  19. 19.

    Id.

  20. 20.

    Decision U-I-107/96, of 5 December 1996.

  21. 21.

    Id., para. 16.

  22. 22.

    Id., para 28.

  23. 23.

    Ken Jowitt, New World Disorder. The Leninist Extinction (University of California Press: Berkeley, 1992) at 322.

  24. 24.

    On Poland, see Helsinki Committee, supra note 4 at 156. According to Eleonora Zielinska of the University of Warsaw, the difference in average wages between men and women in Poland varies between 30 and 40 %, see “Praw kobiet nie wprowadzimy czarodziejską rozdzka” (Interview with Professor Zielinska), Rzeczpospolita (Warsaw) 17 April 2002, at A9; on Czech Republic, see 2002 Regular Report on Czech Republic’s Progress Towards Accession, Commission of the European Communities, Brussels 9 October 2002, SEC (2002) 1402, available at http://europa.eu.in/comm/enlargement/report2002/cz_en.pdf, at 30. Unequal treatment of women as regards working conditions, remuneration, professional training and career opportunities has been noted by the EU Commission regarding almost every CEE candidate state in the annual reports on these countries’ progress towards accession; see, e.g., for Slovakia, 2002 Regular Report on Slovakia’s Progress Towards Accession, Commission of the European Communities, Brussels 9 October 2002, SEC (2002) 1410, available at http://europa.eu.in/comm/enlargement/report2002/sk_en.pdf, at 29.

  25. 25.

    Helsinki Committee, supra note 4 at 163.

  26. 26.

    For statistics in Poland, see id. at 190–91. For some other examples: In Romania only 11 % of deputies and 9 % of senators are women; see 2002 Regular Report on Romania’s Progress Towards Accession, Commission of the European Communities, Brussels 9 October 2002, SEC (2002) 1409, available at http://europa.eu.in/comm/enlargement/report2002/ro_en.pdf, at 34.

  27. 27.

    Decision Kw. 5/91 of 24 September 1991.

  28. 28.

    Decision K. 15/97 of 29 September 1997; Decision K 35/99 of 5 December 2000.

  29. 29.

    Decision K 15/99 of 13 June 2000.

  30. 30.

    Decision K 27/99 of 28 March 2000.

  31. 31.

    Decision K. 15/97 of 29 September 1997, Orzecznictwo Trybunaáu Konstytucyjnego, Rok 1997 (C.H. Beck: Warszawa 1998): 367–86.

  32. 32.

    The decision of the Supreme Court of 14 May 1996, discussed and cited in the decision of Constitutional Tribunal 15/97, id. at 373–74. The Supreme Court had considered the matter not from the point of view of the constitutionality of the relevant rule, but as a top judicial appellate body, in the process of so-called “extraordinary appeal” from a decision of the Supreme Administrative Court (NSA), which had considered the matter in 1993.

  33. 33.

    Id., cited at 373–74.

  34. 34.

    Id. at 376, quoting its decision P. 2/87 of 3 March 1987.

  35. 35.

    Id. at 378.

  36. 36.

    Id. at 378.

  37. 37.

    Id. at 381.

  38. 38.

    Id. at 381.

  39. 39.

    Id. at 381.

  40. 40.

    Id. at 382.

  41. 41.

    Decision 9/1990, discussed in Kim Lane Scheppele, “Women’s Rights in Eastern Europe”, East Europ. Constit. Rev. 4:1 (Winter 1995): 66–69 at 69.

  42. 42.

    Id. at 69.

  43. 43.

    For examples of such publicly stated views in Poland, see Helsinki Committee, supra note 4 at 218–19.

  44. 44.

    Decision 14/1995 of 13 March 1995, translated in East European Case Reporter of Constitutional Law 2 (1995) at 194–200, and in László Sólyom & Georg Brunner, Constitutional Judiciary in a New Democracy: The Hungarian Constitutional Court (University of Michigan Press: Ann Arbor, 2000) at 316–22. The references below are to the latter edition.

  45. 45.

    Id. at 318.

  46. 46.

    Id. at 320.

  47. 47.

    Id. at 320.

  48. 48.

    Decision No 154/2008 of 15 December 2009.

  49. 49.

    Id. Part III.1.3.

  50. 50.

    Id.

  51. 51.

    Id. Part III. 3.1.

  52. 52.

    Id. Part III.3.2.1.

  53. 53.

    Dissenting opinion by Judge A. Bragyova, Part 2.

  54. 54.

    Id.

  55. 55.

    The 2 July 2009 decision of The Slovenian Constitutional Court, case No U I 425/06-10; available in English on: http://odlocitve.us-rs.si/usrs/us-odl.nsf/o/2D889887E4205F81C1257604003479FC

  56. 56.

    Id. para 12.

  57. 57.

    Id.

  58. 58.

    Id. para 13.

  59. 59.

    Decision no. 81 of 15 July 1994, Curtea ConstituĠională – Decizii de Constatare a Neconstitu-ĠionalităĠii, 1992–1998 (Editura Militarăa: Bucureúti, 1999): 335–39. The quotations that follow are from the English translation of the Decision, on file with the author.

  60. 60.

    Articles 11 (treaties ratified by the Parliament become part of the domestic law), 20 (the precedence of ratified international covenants on human rights over domestic law, in cases of conflict) and 26 (the right to privacy).

  61. 61.

    In the words of the Court, art. 200 was unconstitutional in so far as it applied “to same-sex relations between adult consenting persons, that are not committed in public and do not produce public scandal”.

  62. 62.

    E.g. the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms [hereinafter: Czech Charter] Art. 29.

  63. 63.

    E.g. the Czech Charter art. 29.

  64. 64.

    E.g. Ukraine art. 24.

  65. 65.

    E.g. Hungary art. 66 (old Constitution).

  66. 66.

    E.g. Bulgaria art. 47.

  67. 67.

    E.g. Romania art. 46.

  68. 68.

    Art. 29 (2).

  69. 69.

    Art. 6.

  70. 70.

    Art. 34 (3).

  71. 71.

    Decision Pl. US 53/04 of 16 October 2007; available in English at: http://www.concourt.cz/view/pl-53-04

  72. 72.

    Id.

  73. 73.

    Art. 70 A.

  74. 74.

    Decision No. 9/1990 (IV.25), discussed in Peter Paczolay, “Human Rights and Minorities in Hungary”, Journal of Constitutional Law in Eastern and Central Europe 3 (1996): 111–26 at 114–15.

  75. 75.

    Quoted id. at 115.

  76. 76.

    Quoted id. at 115.

  77. 77.

    Id. at 116.

  78. 78.

    See Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Duckworth: London, 1977) at 223–39.

  79. 79.

    See Andras Sajo, “Protecting Nation States and National Minorities: A Modest Case for Nationalism in Eastern Europe”, U. Chi. L. Sch. Roundtable (1993): 53–74.

  80. 80.

    See Peter S. Green, “Roma Seeking Sense of Unity to Combat Racial Bias”, New York Times 10 May 2002. The marginalisation, victimisation, economic and political discrimination and extremely poor living conditions of the Roma minority have been noted by the EU Commission regarding almost every CEE candidate state in the annual reports on these countries’ progress towards accession; see, e.g., for Slovakia, 2002 Regular Report on Slovakia’s Progress Towards Accession, Commission of the European Communities, Brussels 9 October 2002, SEC(2002) 1410, available at http://europa.eu.in/comm/enlargement/report2002/sk_en.pdf, at 30; for Lithuania, 2002 Regular Report on Lithuania’s Progress Towards Accession, Commission of the European Communities, Brussels 9 October 2002, SEC(2002) 1406, available at http://europa.eu.in/comm/enlargement/report2002/lt_en.pdf, at 30; for Hungary, see 2002 Regular Report on Hungary’s Progress Towards Accession, Commission of the European Communities, Brussels 9 October 2002, SEC(2002) 1404, available at http://europa.eu.in/comm/enlargement/report2002/hu_en.pdf, at 31; on Czech Republic, see 2002 Regular Report on Czech Republic’s Progress Towards Accession, Commission of the European Communities, Brussels 9 October 2002, SEC(2002) 1402, available at http://europa.eu.in/comm/enlargement/report2002/cz_en.pdf, at 3–32.

  81. 81.

    There are some minor exceptions to this rule; for example, in the 2002 parliamentary elections, four Roma members of Parliament of Hungary were elected.

  82. 82.

    Sajo, supra note 79 at 54.

  83. 83.

    See Wiktor Osiatynski, “Rights in New Constitutions of East Central Europe”, Columbia Human Rights Law Review 26 (1994): 111–166 at 134–35.

  84. 84.

    As one observer has noted: “Hungarian politics fosters the interests of Hungarian minorities living abroad rather than those of non-Hungarian minorities who live on the territory of the Hungarian state”, Osiatynski id. 137. These words written in 1994 became even more valid when, with the controversial “status law” adopted by the Hungarian parliament in June 2001: the law provides for rights and certain preferences for ethnic Hungarians who live beyond Hungary’s borders, such as the right to work in Hungary for a 3-month period each year, financial support for public-transportation costs as well as assistance for ethnic-Hungarian students from neighbouring states to study in universities in Hungary, and also assistance to ethnic Hungarians who live in their home countries who have more than two children in Hungarian-language schools, see “Constitution Watch: Hungary”, East Europ. Constit. Rev. 10:4 (Fall 2001): 18–21 at 18–19.

  85. 85.

    They were not all ethnic Russians but also other nationalities for whom Russian was the mother tongue (such as Belorussians, Ukrainians etc.).

  86. 86.

    Vello Pettai, “Democratic Norm Building and Constitutional Discourse Formation”, paper presented at the workshop “Rethinking the Rule of Law in Post-Communist Europe”, European University Institute, Florence 22–23 February 2002 (text on file with the author), at 23.

  87. 87.

    For details, see Antonina Zhelyazkova, “The Bulgarian Ethnic Model”, East Europ. Constit. Rev. 10 (Fall 2001): 62–66 at 62–63.

  88. 88.

    In 1992, the population census showed Turks constituting 9.4 % of population at that time, and Roma, 3.7 %, see id. at 66.

  89. 89.

    See Nikolai Petrov, “Political Institutions and the Regulation of Ethnic Conflicts: Russia’s Experience”, paper presented at Conference on “Legal Framework to Facilitate the Settlement of Ethno-Political Conflicts in Europe”, Baku 11–12 January 2002 (text on file with the author), at pp. 2–3.

  90. 90.

    Id. at 7.

  91. 91.

    Id. at 3.

  92. 92.

    Will Kymlicka, “Western Political Theory and Ethnic Relations in Eastern Europe”, in Will Kymlicka & Magda Opalski, eds., Can Liberal Pluralism be Exported? Western Political Theory and Ethnic Relations in Eastern Europe (Oxford University Press 2001): 13–106 at 61.

  93. 93.

    In Sect. 8.6 of this chapter.

  94. 94.

    Albania art. 20; Belarus art. 15 and 50, Croatia art. 15, Czech Charter art. 25, Estonia art. 52 and 37, Georgia art. 38, Hungary art. XXIX (1), Latvia art. 114, Lithuania art. 37, Macedonia art. 48, Moldova art. 35, Poland art. 35, Romania art. 6 and 32, Russia art. 26, Slovakia art. 34, Slovenia art. 11 and 61, the Ukraine art. 10 and 53, Serbia and Montenegro Charter art. 52, Montenegro art. 34 and 68–73, and Serbia art. 49 and 32.

  95. 95.

    Art. 6.

  96. 96.

    Art. 68 (2). See also the constitutions of Albania art. 20, Belarus art. 50, Czech Charter art. 25, Macedonia art. 48 (4), Slovakia art. 34, Romania art. 32 (3), the Ukraine art. 53, Serbia and Montenegro Charter art. 52, Montenegro art. 68 and Serbia art. 32.

  97. 97.

    Art. 48 (2).

  98. 98.

    Art. 51 (2).

  99. 99.

    Art. 68 (2) and (3).

  100. 100.

    Art. 73.

  101. 101.

    Art. 7.

  102. 102.

    Art. 48.

  103. 103.

    Heading at art. 64.

  104. 104.

    Art. 64.

  105. 105.

    See András László Pap, “Representation or Ethnic Balance: Ethnic Minorities in Parliaments”, Journal of East European Law 7 (2000): 261–339 at 289.

  106. 106.

    This particular quote is taken from article 6 of the Romanian constitution. The following constitutions have similar provisions: Albania art. 20; Croatia art. 15; Czech Charter art. 25; Georgia art. 38; Latvia art. 114; Lithuania art. 37; Macedonia art. 48; Poland art. 35 (1), although Section 2 of the same article uses the language of group rights; Romania art. 6; Slovakia art. 34; Slovenia art. 61, although note the exception relating to Hungarian and Italian minorities; Ukraine art. 53 and Serbia art 32.

  107. 107.

    Art. 68 (4). But note that the statute on the rights of national and ethnic minorities adopted on 7 July 1993 uses both the language of collective and individual rights, see Paczolay, supra note 74 at 123.

  108. 108.

    Thus, art. 64 states that: “The autochthonous Italian and Hungarian ethnic communities and their members shall be granted the right to…”.

  109. 109.

    Art. 35 (2).

  110. 110.

    Art. 35 (1). For other examples of the mixed use of both group- and individual rights language, see Estonia art. 49–51.

  111. 111.

    As an account of the actual, authoritative legal situation of the United States this is certainly an over-simplification: the rejection of group rights is not absolute in the United States law. For example, when the U.S. Supreme Court allowed Amish families to keep their children out of school up to a certain age (see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1994)), or when it upheld Native American tribal law that imposed patrilineal kinship rules that limited women’s marital choices (see Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978)), it clearly recognised the legal weight of group-based claims for treatment different to that accorded by universally binding legal rules. Similar group-based thinking is visible in the enhanced legal protection of those who are victims of crimes motivated by hatred of a group (in the form of enhanced punishment for hate crimes, see Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993)). On the qualified nature of the group/individual rights distinction in U.S. law, see Jack Greenberg, “Affirmative Action in Higher Education: Confronting the Condition and Theory”, Boston College Law Review 43 (2002): 521–621 at 580–81.

  112. 112.

    See Dimitrina Petrova, “Racial Discrimination and the Rights of Minority Cultures”, in Sandra Fredman, ed., Discrimination and Human Rights: The Case of Racism (Oxford University Press: Oxford 2001) at 65; Miriam J. Aukerman, “Definitions and Justifications: Minority and Indigenous Rights in a Central/East European Context”, Human Rights Quarterly 22 (2000): 1011–1050 at 1029–30.

  113. 113.

    The terminology is of J.A. Laponce, discussed by Aukerman, id. at 1029.

  114. 114.

    See Sajo, supra note 79 at 70–71.

  115. 115.

    Michel Rosenfeld, “Can Human Rights Bridge the Gap between Universalism and Cultural Relativism? A Pluralist Assessment Based on the Rights of Minorities”, Columbia Human Rights Law Review 30 (1999): 249–84 at 254.

  116. 116.

    Brian Barry, Culture and Equality (Polity: Cambridge, 2001) at 134.

  117. 117.

    “All post-communist states of the region claim adherence to liberal constitutionalism, and no national minority … would question main liberal tenets”, Nenad Dimitijevic, “Ethno-Nationalized States of Eastern Europe: Is There a Constitutional Alternative?”, Studies in East European Thought 54 (2002): 246–69 at 247, emphasis added.

  118. 118.

    Tibor Várady, “On the Chances of Ethnocultural Justice in East Central Europe”, in Kymlicka & Opalski, supra note 92: 135–49 at 147–48.

  119. 119.

    Quoted in Stephen Deets, “Reconsidering East European Minority Policy: Liberal Theory and European Norms”, East European Politics & Societies 16 (2002): 30–53 at 49.

  120. 120.

    Alexander Ossipov, “Some Doubts about ‘Ethnocultural Justice’”, in Kymlicka & Opalski, supra note 92: 171–85 at 175.

  121. 121.

    Petrova, supra note 112 at 66. See similarly Rosenfeld, supra note 115 at 257.

  122. 122.

    Aukerman, supra note 112 at 1032.

  123. 123.

    Boris Tsilevich, “New Democracies in the Old World”, in Kymlicka & Opalski, supra note 92: 154–70 at 159.

  124. 124.

    Kymlicka, supra note 92 at 89 n. 44.

  125. 125.

    The Constitutions containing no provision relating to an official language are those of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Russia.

  126. 126.

    The exception, containing no such right, is the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

  127. 127.

    Belarus art. 50, Bulgaria art. 36 (2), Croatia art. 15 (2), Czech Charter art. 25 (1), Georgia art. 38 (1), Hungary art. XXIX (1), Russia art. 26, Slovakia art. 34 (1), Slovenia art. 61, Ukraine art. 10, Serbia art. 49, Montenegro art. 68.

  128. 128.

    Of this group, only the Constitutions of Croatia, Hungary, Ukraine and Montenegro do state in express terms that the right is for minority groups.

  129. 129.

    Albania art. 20 (1), Latvia art. 114, Lithuania art. 37, Macedonia art. 48 (2), Moldova art. 10 (2), Poland art. 35 (1), Romania art. 6 (1).

  130. 130.

    Macedonia art. 7 (2) and (3), Serbia art. 8, Montenegro art. 9, and Serbia and Montenegro Charter art. 52.

  131. 131.

    Czech Charter art. 25 (2), Estonia art. 51 and 52, Slovakia art. 34 (2), Slovenia art. 62, and Montenegro art. 72. The Constitution of Montenegro uses both these techniques for official uses of minority languages. The Estonian Constitution states that the right to an official use (not the exclusive official use!) of a minority language exists when the majority of the residents of any given locality belong to the minority in question.

  132. 132.

    Albania art. 20 (2), Belarus art. 50, Bulgaria art. 36 (2), Czech Republic art. 25 (2), Estonia art. 37 (4), Hungary art. XXIX (1), Macedonia art. 48 (4), Moldova art. 35 (2), Romania art. 32 (3), Russia art. 26, Slovakia art. 34 (2), Ukraine art. 53, Montenegro art. 68, Serbia art. 32, and Serbia and Montenegro Charter art. 52. The Estonian Constitution only allows for this right to be exercised in schools specially established for minorities.

  133. 133.

    Belarus, Czech Republic, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine, Montenegro, Serbia.

  134. 134.

    Macedonia art. 48 (4) and Moldova art. 35 (3).

  135. 135.

    Art. 36 (1).

  136. 136.

    Albania art. 28 (1), Bosnia and Herzegovina (ECHR) art. 6 (3) (a), Croatia art. 24 (2), Estonia art. 21 (1), Poland art. 41 (3), Romania art. 23 (5), Montenegro art. 22, and Serbia and Montenegro Charter art. 16.

  137. 137.

    Albania art. 31, Bosnia and Herzegovina (ECHR) art. 6 (3) (e), Czech Charter art. 37 (4), Moldova art. 118, Romania art. 127 (2), Serbia art. 123 and Serbia and Montenegro Charter art.16.

  138. 138.

    Decision 8/96 of 26 August 1997, summarized in Bull. Constit. Case Law (1997, no. 2): 252–53, SVK-1997-2-007.

  139. 139.

    Decision U.br.49/98 of 20 May 1998, described in Bull. Constit. Case Law (1998 no. 2) at 326, MKD-1998-2-004.

  140. 140.

    Decision U.br.36/98 of 25 November 1998.

  141. 141.

    Decision U.br. 32/99, of 9 June 1999, described in Bull. Const. Case-Law 1999 (2) at 286–87, MKD-1999-2-007.

  142. 142.

    Art. 27.

  143. 143.

    Janusz Trzcinski, Remarks about Article 27, in L. Garlicki, ed., Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej: Komentarz (Wydawnictwo Sejmowe: Warszawa 1999) (loose leaf).

  144. 144.

    Id. at 4 (quoting, approvingly, J. Boc).

  145. 145.

    Id. at 4.

  146. 146.

    Decision W. 7/96 of 14 May 1997, Orzecznictwo Trybunaáu Konstytucyjnego: Rok 1997 (C.H. Beck: Warszawa 1998) at 770–96.

  147. 147.

    Trzcinski, supra note 143 at 3; Jerzy Oniszczuk, Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w orzecznictwie Trybunalu Konstytucyjnego (Zakamycze: Kraków, 2000) at 230.

  148. 148.

    Decision W. 7/96, at 773.

  149. 149.

    Id. at 796.

  150. 150.

    Professor Trzcinski’s authoritative status on this particular issue is beyond any doubt because, before having written the constitutional commentary from which this excerpt is quoted, he had authored the Constitutional Tribunal’s decision of 14 May 1997.

  151. 151.

    Trzcinski, supra note 143 at 4–5.

  152. 152.

    Petai, supra note 86 at 22.

  153. 153.

    Vello Pettai, “Definitions and Discourse: Applying Kymlicka’s Models to Estonia and Latvia”, in Kymlicka & Opalski, supra note 92 at 267, footnote omitted.

  154. 154.

    See Kymlicka, supra note 92 at 76–9.

  155. 155.

    Pettai, supra note 86 at 26.

  156. 156.

    President Meri initially vetoed the law, and after the parliament (the Riigikogu) adopted the law without any of the amendments postulated by the President, the President exercised his constitutional right to challenge the law before the Constitutional Review Chamber. I am indebted for this description of the decision and its background to Pettai, supra note 86 at 26–29.

  157. 157.

    Decision 3-4-1-1-98 of 5 February 1998, summarised in Bull. Const. Case Law 1998 (1): 37–8, EST-1998-1-001.

  158. 158.

    Pettai, supra note 86 at 28.

  159. 159.

    In November 1998 the Constitutional Review Chamber considered a challenge, which reached it via a lower court, to the original Language Act (not the 1997 amendments) requirements for local deputies; see id. at 28–29.

  160. 160.

    Id. at 29.

  161. 161.

    Pap, supra note 105 at 262 and 267.

  162. 162.

    Id. at 263.

  163. 163.

    For a more detailed description, see id. 284–85.

  164. 164.

    Id. at 285–86.

  165. 165.

    Art. 59 (2).

  166. 166.

    See Pap, supra note 105 at 286–88.

  167. 167.

    See Stephen Deets, “Reconsidering East European Minority Policy: Liberal Theory and European Norms”, East European Politics & Societies 16 (2002): 30–53 at 45–48.

  168. 168.

    Art. 80 (3).

  169. 169.

    For a detailed description of the complicated system, see Pap, supra note 105 at 288–89.

  170. 170.

    Art. 68 (3).

  171. 171.

    Art. 68 (4).

  172. 172.

    Paczolay, supra note 74 at 125.

  173. 173.

    Deets, supra note 119 at 49–51.

  174. 174.

    See Pap, supra note 105 at 320–24.

  175. 175.

    See 2002 Regular Report on Hungary’s Progress Towards Accession, Commission of the European Communities, Brussels 9 October 2002, SEC(2002) 1404, available at http://europa.eu.in/comm/enlargement/report2002/hu_en.pdf, at 20.

  176. 176.

    The Law on Parties of July 1991, see Pap, supra note 105 at 279–80.

  177. 177.

    Art. 11 (4).

  178. 178.

    Pap, supra note 105 at 280, footnote omitted.

  179. 179.

    See id. at 282–83.

  180. 180.

    Decision 19/98 of 15 October 1998, summarised in Bull. Constitution. Case Law 3 (1998) 460–62, SVK-1998-3-010.

  181. 181.

    Decision U-I-283/94 of 12 February 1998.

  182. 182.

    For descriptions and analysis of the decision, see Emil Konstantinov, “Turkish Party in Bulgaria Allowed to Continue”, East Europ. Constit. Rev. 1:2 (Summer 1992): 11–12; Jean-Piere Massias, Droit constitutionnel des États d’Europe de l’Est (Presses Universitaires de France: Paris, 1999) at 161–62; Anna M. Ludwikowska, Sądownictwo konstytucyjne w Europie Srodkowo-Wschodniej w okresie przeksztalcen demokratycznych (TNOiK: Torun 1997) at 137–39; Herman Schwartz, The Struggle for Constitutional Justice in Post-Communist Europe (University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 2000) at 172–73.

  183. 183.

    There was a second constitutional ground cited by the petition: the ban on organisations that call into question the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country, or that foment ethnic or religious enmity and the violation of the rights and freedoms of citizens (Art. 44 (2)). The petitioners claimed that, by favouring a policy of ethnic assimilation of Bulgarian Moslems into the Turkish minority, the MRF promotes ethnic and religious confrontation. Both for our purposes, and in the argument of the Court, the claim based on Art. 11 (4) was dominant.

  184. 184.

    See Kymlicka, supra note 92 at 55.

  185. 185.

    Antonina Zhelyazkova, “The Bulgarian Ethnic Model”, East Europ. Constit. Rev. 10:4 (Fall 2001): 62–66 at 65.

  186. 186.

    See Konstantinov, supra note 182 at 11.

  187. 187.

    Quoted in Venelin Ganev, “Foxes, Hedgehogs and Learning: Notes on the Past and Future Dilemmas of Postcommunist Constitutionalism”, paper presented at the workshop “Rethinking the Rule of Law in Post-Communist Europe”, European University Institute, Florence 22–23 February 2002, at 12.

  188. 188.

    There are 12 judges on the Constitutional Court but only 11 took part in the consideration of the MRF case (one judge was ill). The rule that the constitutional requirement of “more than half of the votes of all Justices” (art. 151 (1)) means a requirement of at least seven (regardless of the number of Justices participating in the vote) for the decision of unconstitutionality does not have a clear textual mooring but, as Ganev explained, evolved as an established practice that can now can be viewed as a constitutional convention, see Venelin Ganev, “The Rise of Constitutional Adjudication in Bulgaria”, in Wojciech Sadurski, ed., Constitutional Justice, East and West (Kluwer Law International: The Hague, 2002): 247–64 at 253.

  189. 189.

    Id.

  190. 190.

    Zhelyazkova, supra note 185 at 65.

  191. 191.

    See Cindy Skach, “Rethinking Judicial Review: Shaping the Toleration of Difference?”, paper presented at the workshop “Rethinking the Rule of Law in Post-Communist Europe”, European University Institute, Florence 22–23 February 2002.

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  1. University of Sydney, Sydney, Australia

    Wojciech Sadurski

  2. University of Warsaw, Warsaw, Poland

    Wojciech Sadurski

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Sadurski, W. (2014). Equality and Minority Rights. In: Rights Before Courts. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-8935-6_8

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