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Socio-economic Rights

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Rights Before Courts

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Abstract

Regardless of philosophical controversies over whether socio-economic rights properly belong in constitutions, the omission of such rights was never a plausible political option for constitution-makers after the fall of Communism. The chapter opens with a discussion of how the controversies over constitutionalization of those rights affected their constitutional design in CEE, and then discusses constitutional catalogues of socio-economic rights, the status of those rights, the drawing of distinctions between different categories of rights by constitutional courts (illustrated by social security cases), and two special cases regarding the right to work and the right to education. An overall picture of the output of constitutional courts in this field is ambiguous. Some decisions frustrated to a very high degree the governmental plans for reform, especially in the field of social security systems. On the other hand, there were numerous instances in which the constitutional courts reinterpreted the right in question in such a manner as to make it compatible with the new reality of a socio-economic system and thus rendered the right more realistic, more relevant, and more appropriate considering the systemic changes to, and the fiscal realities of, the post-communist state.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The Political Dimension of EU Enlargement: Looking Towards Post-Accession, Report of the Reflection Group chaired by Jean-Luc Dehaene (Robert Schuman Centre at the EUI, Florence 2001), http://www.iue.it/RSC/pdf/dehaenereport.pdf at 18.

  2. 2.

    For a discussion of different “political orientations” influencing constitution-making in post-communist Poland, see Piotr Winczorek, “Axiological Foundations of the Constitution of Poland”, St. Louis-Warsaw Transatlantic L. J. (1997): 59 at 61–62.

  3. 3.

    Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Stefaan Van der Jeught, “Human Rights Protection Under the New Constitutions of Central Europe”, 20 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 20 (1998): 475–506 at 491.

  4. 4.

    See, e.g. the public opinion survey by the reputable OBOP institute in Poland, in June 2002. 65 % of respondents believe that the State should look after the welfare of its citizens; 53 % believe that budget expenditure for social-welfare purposes is more important than spending to stimulate economic growth; 62 % believe that the State should subsidise employment if this is necessary to fight unemployment, even if it is not economically profitable. See “Opinia spoleczna: milo juz bylo”, Rzeczpospolita (Warsaw) 13 August 2002 at A-1, also at http://www.rzeczpospolita.pl/wydanie_020813/publicystyka/publicystyka_a_3.html

  5. 5.

    Tadeusz Zielinski, Panel discussion, in Konstytucja w sáuĪbie demokracji; Constitution in Service of Democracy, conference papers: The International Centre for Development of Democracy Foundation, 10–12 March 1995, Cracow, at 211–212.

  6. 6.

    Id. at 212–213.

  7. 7.

    Herman Schwartz, “In Defense of Aiming High”, East Europ. Constit. Rev. 1:3 (Fall 1992): 25–28 at 26–27.

  8. 8.

    Id. at 27.

  9. 9.

    Id. at 28.

  10. 10.

    See Cécile Fabre, “Constitutionalising Social Rights”, Journal of Political Philosophy 6 (1998): 263–84 at 268–70.

  11. 11.

    See, in particular, Henry Shue, Basic Rights (Princeton University Press: Princeton N.J. 1980) at 39–40, 55–56.

  12. 12.

    This understanding is not equivalent to the notion of a “programmatic” right, because the latter requires the state to have a program. A “minimal” use of the right merely requires that, if there is a program, it must not be arbitrarily denied to some beneficiaries.

  13. 13.

    Schwartz, supra note 7 at 27. It is important to note that this was not the only function of socio-economic rights prescribed by Professor Schwartz in his article.

  14. 14.

    With the partial exception of Scandinavian states, see footnote 32 below.

  15. 15.

    E.g. German Constitution, art. 20.

  16. 16.

    See, e.g., Constitutions of Belgium, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Greece, Spain and Portugal.

  17. 17.

    See, e.g., Spain and Italy.

  18. 18.

    Art. 14 (1) and (2) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.

  19. 19.

    Art. 24 (1) and (3).

  20. 20.

    Art. 15.

  21. 21.

    Art. 33 (2).

  22. 22.

    Art. 34.

  23. 23.

    Art. 35.

  24. 24.

    Art. 36.

  25. 25.

    Art. 35, 2nd sentence.

  26. 26.

    Art. 33 (1).

  27. 27.

    Art. 26.

  28. 28.

    Art. 25. These two latter provisions (Articles 26 and 25), which draw on the equivalent provisions of the European Social Charter and the Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers, use the language of “rights” (“The Union recognises and respects the rights….”). However, I believe that it is more accurate to view them as descriptions of policy directives; similarly Agustín José Menéndez, “The Sinews of Peace: Rights to Solidarity in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Union”, in Erik Oddvar Eriksen, John Erik Fossum & Agustín José Menéndez, The Chartering of Europe: The Charter of Fundamental Rights in Context (ARENA Report 8/2001, Oslo 2001): 201–26 at 215.

  29. 29.

    See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37 (1973) (finding no fundamental right to public education); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972) (finding no fundamental right to adequate housing).

  30. 30.

    Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983).

  31. 31.

    For a general discussion, see Wiktor Osiatynski, “Rights in New Constitutions of East Central Europe”, Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 26 (1994): 111–66 at 138–45.

  32. 32.

    This is not entirely accurate; the Nordic constitutions contain some socio-economic rights (in particular, the right to work and a commitment to full employment) but, by and large, they are not exhaustive and are not accompanied by a “social state” clause. This may be partly explained by the fact that, with the exception of the Swedish Instrument of Government (1974), they originate from the first half of the nineteenth Century, although they have been amended many times. As one commentator has noted, they “retain the liberal character of the time of their adoption”, see George S. Katrougalos, “The Implementation of Social Rights in Europe”, Columbia Journal of European Law 2 (1996): 277–312 at 294.

  33. 33.

    Ulrich K. Preuss, “Patterns of Constitutional Evolution and Change in Eastern Europe”, in Constitutional Policy and Change in Europe (J. J. Hesse & N. Johnson eds., 1995): 95–126 at 103; see also Jon Elster, “The Impact of Rights on Economic Performance”, in Andras Sajo, ed., Western Rights? Post-Communist Application (Kluwer: The Hague 1996): 347–59.

  34. 34.

    Preuss, supra note 33 at 101.

  35. 35.

    Id.; see also Andrzej Rapaczynski, “Constitutional Politics in Poland: A Report on the Constitutional Committee of the Polish Parliament”, in A. E. Dick Howard, ed., Constitution Making in Eastern Europe (Woodrow Wilson Center Press: Washington 1993): 93–132 at 107–8.

  36. 36.

    Andras Sajo, “How the Rule of Law Killed Hungarian Welfare Reform”, East Europ. Constit. Rev 5:1 (Winter 1996): 31–41.

  37. 37.

    For excerpts of one of the central decisions in this series, Decision No. 43/1995 of 30 June 1995 concerning social security benefits, see László Sólyom & Georg Brunner, Constitutional Judiciary in a New Democracy: The Hungarian Constitutional Court (University of Michigan Press: Ann Arbor, 2000): 322–32. For a discussion, see Herman Schwartz, The Struggle for Constitutional Justice in Post-Communist Europe (University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 2000) at 92–93; Bojan Bugaric, “Courts as Policy-Makers: Lessons from Transition”, Harv. Int’l L.J. 42 (2001): 247–88 at 251.

  38. 38.

    Jerzy Ciemniewski, “Sejm i Senat w projekcie Konstytucji RP”, in Józef Krukowski (ed.), Ocena projektu Konstytucji RP (Towarzystwo Naukowe Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego: Lublin, 1996): 37–47 at 41.

  39. 39.

    Leszek Garlicki, “Orzecznictwo Trybunaáu Konstytucyjnego w 1993 roku”, Przegląd Sądowy (1994, no. 10): 31–52 at 37.

  40. 40.

    Leszek Garlicki, “Orzecznictwo Trybunaáu Konstytucyjnego w 1997 roku”, Przegląd Sądowy (1998, no. 6): 35–58 at 55.

  41. 41.

    See, e.g., Jon Elster, “Constitution-Making in Eastern Europe: Rebuilding the Boat in the Open Sea”, Public Admin. 71 (Spring/Summer 1993): 169–217 at 198.

  42. 42.

    Herman Schwartz, in Konstytucja, supra note 5: 215–23 at 221.

  43. 43.

    Cass R. Sunstein, “Against Positive Rights”, East Europ. Constit. Rev. 2:1 (Winter 1993): 35–39 at 36.

  44. 44.

    Id. at 37. For a more recent exposition by Sunstein of his views on constitutional socio-economic rights, see Cass Sunstein, Designing Democracy: What Constitutions Do (Oxford University Press: Oxford 2001) at 221–38.

  45. 45.

    Albania art. 52; Belarus art. 41 (1); Croatia art. 57; Czech. Charter art. 26; Estonia art. 28; Hungary art. XIX; Latvia art. 109; Lithuania art. 52; Moldova art. 47; Poland art. 67; Romania art. 43; Slovakia art. 35 and 39; Ukraine art. 46; Serbia and Montenegro Charter art. 42, Montenegro art. 55; Serbia art. 39.

  46. 46.

    E.g., Poland art. 67; Montenegro art. 55; Serbia art. 39.

  47. 47.

    Albania art. 52; Belarus art. 47; Estonia art. 28; art. 70E; Latvia art. 109; Lithuania art. 52; Moldova art. 47(2); Poland art. 67; Slovakia art. 39 (1); Ukraine art. 46.

  48. 48.

    Belarus art. 47; Hungary art. XIX (1); Lithuania art. 52; Moldova art. 47 (2); Poland art. 67.

  49. 49.

    Belarus art. 47; Croatia art. 57; Hungary art. 70E; Latvia art. 109; Lithuania art. 52; Moldova art. 47(2); Poland art. 67; Romania art. 46; Slovakia art. 38 (1); Ukraine art. 46.

  50. 50.

    Belarus art. 47; Estonia art. 28; Lithuania art. 52; Slovakia art. 39 (1); Ukraine art. 46.

  51. 51.

    Hungary art. XIX (1) (widows and orphans); Lithuania art. 52 (widows); Moldova arts. 47(2) (widows), 49(3) (orphans).

  52. 52.

    Russia, Bulgaria, Macedonia, and Slovenia all include provisions for social security. The Russian Constitution (art. 39) provides for social security in cases of old age, illness, disability, and loss of breadwinner. The Bulgarian Constitution (art. 51) provides for social security only in cases of old age, disability or temporary unemployment. The Macedonian constitution only provides for social security in cases of temporary unemployment (art. 32) and then states that all other social security rights will be determined by law (art. 34). The Slovenian constitution (art. 50) provides that all those who fulfil the conditions laid down by law will receive social security benefits.

  53. 53.

    Georgia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

  54. 54.

    See, generally, Viktor Mavi, “The Right to Health and the New East European Constitutions”, Journal of Constitutional Law in Eastern and Central Europe 3 (1996): 213–24.

  55. 55.

    Belarus art. 45; Croatia art. 58; Czech Charter art. 30; Estonia art. 28; Latvia art. 111; Lithuania art. 53 (although note that this constitutional provision uses the language of the State’s duty to take care of people’s health rather than of an individual right to health care); Macedonia art. 39; Moldova art. 36; Romania art. 43; Russia art. 41; Slovakia art. 40; Ukraine art. 49.

  56. 56.

    Poland art. 68; Serbia art. 30.

  57. 57.

    Bulgaria art. 52; Slovenia art. 51; Montenegro art. 55; Serbia art. 30.

  58. 58.

    Albania art. 55; Bulgaria art. 52; Georgia art. 37.

  59. 59.

    Hungary art. 70D.

  60. 60.

    Bulgaria art. 55, Macedonia art. 43, Slovenia art. 72.

  61. 61.

    Croatia art. 69.

  62. 62.

    Belarus art. 49; Lithuania art. 41; Moldova art. 35; Poland art. 70; Romania art. 32; Russia art. 43; Slovenia art. 57; Ukraine art. 53.

  63. 63.

    Albania art. 57; Bulgaria art. 53; Czech Charter art. 33; Hungary art. XI (2); Latvia art. 112; Slovakia art. 42.

  64. 64.

    Croatia art. 65; Georgia art. 35; Macedonia art. 44; Serbia and Montenegro Charter art. 43, Montenegro art. 62. Two constitutions are unclear about the specific level at which free education is guaranteed: The Serbian Constitution mentions all “regular education” (art. 32), and the Estonian provides for such a right to “school-age children” (art. 36).

  65. 65.

    Belarus, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Ukraine, Montenegro and Serbia.

  66. 66.

    In addition, five other constitutions establish a good environment as an aim for the state, though not enforceable as a right.

  67. 67.

    Belarus art. 48; Russia art. 40; Slovenia art. 78; Ukraine art. 47.

  68. 68.

    Albania art. 59; Poland art. 75.

  69. 69.

    Belarus, Croatia, Czech Republic, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia and Ukraine.

  70. 70.

    Bulgaria, Hungary, Macedonia, Slovenia, Montenegro, and Serbia.

  71. 71.

    Three Baltic states: Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. In fact, Lithuania falls in between this and the first category, with a middling number of work-protection and other rights.

  72. 72.

    Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Georgia.

  73. 73.

    Rett R. Ludwikowski, Constitution-Making in the Region of Former Soviet Dominance (Duke University Press: Durham 1996) at 230.

  74. 74.

    Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Russia, Ukraine, Montenegro, and Serbia.

  75. 75.

    For example, in Hungary.

  76. 76.

    In January 1991, the federal parliament of Czechoslovakia adopted the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms as a constitutional act. Even before the formal dissolution of the federation, the two republics adopted slightly different legal strategies towards the Charter, in their respective constitutions: The Slovak Republic incorporated the Charter into its constitution (of September 1992) while the Czech Constitution (of December 1992) stated that the Charter formed a part of the constitutional order of the Republic without incorporating it directly, see Czech Rep. Const. art. 112 (1).

  77. 77.

    Czech Charter art. 41; Slovakia art. 51.

  78. 78.

    Russia art. 39.

  79. 79.

    E.g., Czech Charter arts. 32(5)–(6) (providing assistance to parents raising their children); Slovakia art. 43(2) (providing the right of access to the cultural heritage).

  80. 80.

    Albania, Moldova, Poland, and Slovenia.

  81. 81.

    Poland art. 81.

  82. 82.

    Id. at art. 67 (1).

  83. 83.

    Article 81 states that certain rights, listed earlier in the Constitution, can be claimed only within the limits defined by a particular statute. These rights include: minimum income (Art. 65 para 4), full employment and state bodies to combat unemployment (Art. 65 para 5), safety and hygiene at work (Art. 66), days free from work and annual paid holiday (Art. 66 para. 2), assistance to handicapped persons (Art. 69), protection of families and special protection of mothers (Art. 71), protection of the environment (Art. 74), satisfaction of needs of accommodation, combating homelessness and protection of tenants’ rights (Art. 75), and protection of consumers’ rights (Art. 76).

  84. 84.

    Zdzisáaw Czeszejko-Sochacki, Leszek Garlicki, Janusz Trzcinski, Komentarz do ustawy o Trybunale Konstytucyjnym (Wydawnictwo Sejmowe: Warszawa, 1999) at 35.

  85. 85.

    The Polish text was published in Rzeczpospolita (Warsaw), 15 November 1992. For an English translation, see “Draft of the Charter of Rights and Freedom”, St. Louis-Warsaw Transatlantic L. J. (1996): 73–84. For useful discussion on this issue, see generally Stanislaw Frankowski, “Lech Walesa’s Draft of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms: An Overview”, St. Louis-Warsaw Transatlantic L. J. (1996): 65–72. This constitutional draft was eventually aborted, and disowned by President Walesa himself.

  86. 86.

    “Draft of the Charter”, supra note 85, Chap. V.

  87. 87.

    Id. art. 48.

  88. 88.

    Decision 31/1990, quoted in László Sólyom, “Introduction to the Decisions of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Hungary”, in Sólyom & Brunner, supra note 37 at 36.

  89. 89.

    Péter Paczolay, “Human Rights and Minorities in Hungary”, J. of Const. L. in E. and Cent. Eur. 3 (1996): 111–26 at 121.

  90. 90.

    Sólyom, supra note 88 at 35.

  91. 91.

    Id. at 37.

  92. 92.

    Summarized in “Constitution Watch: Hungary”, East Europ. Constit. Rev. 9:1/2 (Winter/Spring 2000): 18–21 at 20–21.

  93. 93.

    As a general proposition (not in the context of CEE), the thesis of non-justiciability of the socio-economic rights of individuals, and of the socio-economic duties of the State, was strongly refuted by K. D. Ewing, “Social Rights and Constitutional Law”, Public Law (1999): 104–23 at 119–21.

  94. 94.

    Czeszejko-Sochacki et al., supra note 84 at 163: a breach of a “programmatic norm” (including those that proclaim socio-economic rights, the details of which are to be spelled out by legislators) happens when “the legislator incorrectly interprets a provision of the Constitution that defines a particular goal or task of public authorities, and, in particular, enacts a statute that provides for such measures that cannot lead to that goal and thus breaches constitutional liberties or rights”.

  95. 95.

    Jon Elster, Claus Offe & Ulrich K. Preuss, Institutional Design in Post-communist Societies (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1998) at 87.

  96. 96.

    Decision K. 1/88; the full text of the Decision on file with the author.

  97. 97.

    Id. at 7 (section III.1 of the Decision).

  98. 98.

    Id. at 8, section IV of the Decision. The use of the notion of “ratchet” requirement is mine, not the Tribunal’s.

  99. 99.

    Decision K. 21/95 of 25 February 1997, discussed in Jerzy Oniszczuk, Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w orzecznictwie Trybunalu Konstytucyjnego (Zakamycze: Kraków, 2000) at 457.

  100. 100.

    See e.g. Decision K. 7/89 of 8 November 1989. According to Professor Garlicki, there is a sharp difference between the early stage of Constitutional Tribunal jurisprudence, when this programmatic nature of socio-economic rights was very pronounced, and the later stage when the Tribunal had no doubts about treating these rights as a basis for evaluating laws, see Leszek Garlicki, “Orzecznictwo Trybunalu Konstytucyjnego w 1993 roku”, Przegląd Sądowy (1996, no. 7–8): 110–38 at 119.

  101. 101.

    See Decision K 8/96, of 17 July 1996, invalidating a law that prohibited the indexation of pensions. The Tribunal announced that the non-indexation of pensions (that is, a failure to adjust them to the rise of costs of living) amounts to a violation of the pensioners’ constitutional rights to their pensions.

  102. 102.

    Czeszejko-Sochacki et al., supra note 84 at 163.

  103. 103.

    Tadeusz Zielinski, “Prawo do chleba, mieszkania i pracy”, Gazeta Wyborcza (Warsaw), 27 August 1996 at 12.

  104. 104.

    Decision of the Bulgarian CC no 12/1997 of 25 Sept. 1997, described in the Bulletin on Constit. Case-Law 3 (1997) at 357, originally published in Bulgarian in Darzhaven Vestnik no. 89 of 7.10.1997.

  105. 105.

    For similar reasons, the Romanian Constitutional Court invalidated, in 1998, a provision of the law on the social protection of unemployed persons. This law stated that those who had completed secondary education and were in vocational training were not eligible for unemployment benefits; Decision no. 81/1998 of 19 May 1998, summarised in Bull. Constit. Case-Law 1998 (2): 288–89, ROM-1998-2-004. This was meant to remove students benefiting from student grants from the group of those eligible for unemployment benefits, but one of the consequences was that those who had been working prior to (or during) their studies, and then lost their employment while studying, were denied unemployment benefits. The Court, in invalidating the provision, argued (among other things) that the exercise of one right (education) cannot be used as the ground for curtailing another (unemployment benefit).

  106. 106.

    Interview with Professor Todor Todorov, Justice of the Constitutional Court of Bulgaria, Sofia 11 May 2001.

  107. 107.

    Id.

  108. 108.

    Id.

  109. 109.

    Id.

  110. 110.

    Approximately US$ 32 at 2001 exchange rates.

  111. 111.

    Interview with Professor Todor Todorov, Justice of the Constitutional Court of Bulgaria, Sofia 11 May 2001.

  112. 112.

    See Venelin I. Ganev, “Bulgaria: The (Ir)Relevance of Post-communist Constitutionalism”, in Jan Zielonka (ed.), Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe, vol. 1: Institutional Engineering (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2001): 186–211 at 186, 198.

  113. 113.

    Decision U-I-86/96 of 12 December 1996, English translation available at http://www.us-rs.si/en/casefr.html

  114. 114.

    Section 10 of the Decision.

  115. 115.

    See Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts (Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1999) at 169–72.

  116. 116.

    The 23 March 2010 Judgement of Czech Constitutional Court, Pl. ÚS 8/07.

  117. 117.

    Id, para 81.

  118. 118.

    Id, para 85.

  119. 119.

    The 5 July 2010 Judgement of Polish Constitutional Tribunal, P 31/09, OTK ZU No 6/A/2010, 57.

  120. 120.

    The 26 September 2007 ruling of the Lithuanian Constitutional Court, Case No 35/04-37/04-72/06.

  121. 121.

    Part III.2.

  122. 122.

    The Political Dimension of EU Enlargement, supra note 1 at 38.

  123. 123.

    E.g. in Poland in 2001, around 18 % of the labour force was unemployed; in the Czech Republic, 8.2 %; in Hungary, 5.8 %, OECD Quarterly Labour Force Statistics, No. 1 (2002), Paris.

  124. 124.

    Bob Hepple, “A Right to Work?”, Industrial Law Journal 10 (1981): 65–83 at 73.

  125. 125.

    They are those of Albania (art. 49), Belarus (art. 41), Bulgaria (art. 48), Croatia (art. 54), the Czech Republic (art. 26), Macedonia (art. 32), Slovenia (art. 49), Romania (art. 38), Slovakia (art. 35), Ukraine (art. 43), Serbia and Montenegro Charter (art. 40), Montenegro (art. 52), and Serbia (art. 35).

  126. 126.

    See Sólyom, “Introduction”, supra note 88 at 35.

  127. 127.

    Estonia (art. 29), Georgia (art. 30), Hungary art. XII (1), Latvia (art. 106), Lithuania (art. 48), Moldova (art. 43), Poland (art. 65), Russia (art. 37). The only Constitution which contains no work-related rights is that of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

  128. 128.

    Five constitutions contain a general provision granting the right to be trained for work, namely, the Constitutions of Belarus (art. 41) (although this does only apply to those who are unemployed through no fault of their own), the Czech Republic (Czech Charter art. 26), Estonia (art. 29(3)), Slovakia (art. 35), and Ukraine (art. 43). In addition, some constitutions grant the right to be trained to specific groups in society. Thus, the Czech Charter (art. 29) and Slovak Const. (art. 38) provide for training for the young. Those of Moldova (art. 51), Poland (art. 69), Romania (art. 46), and Slovenia (art. 52) provide for training for the disabled. The Slovak Const. (art. 38) also provides for training for the unhealthy.

  129. 129.

    The quotation is from the Const. of Bulgaria, art. 48; see also similarly Slovenia (art. 66) and Ukraine (art. 43). The Const. of Georgia has a slightly different type of provision, stating at art. 32, inter alia, that “The state must help the unemployed to find work”.

  130. 130.

    Albania art. 59, Belarus art. 41, Poland (art. 65).

  131. 131.

    The old Constitution (of 1952) contained article 68, which was kept in force until 1997: “Citizens … shall have the right to work, that is, the right to employment paid in accordance with the quantity and quality of the work done”.

  132. 132.

    Decision K. 14/91 of 11 February 1992.

  133. 133.

    Decision K. 7/96 of 7 January 1997.

  134. 134.

    Art. 65.

  135. 135.

    Decision K. 33/98 of 26 April 1999.

  136. 136.

    See discussion of this case in Oniszczuk, supra note 99 at 466.

  137. 137.

    Decision 8/1993 of 27 February 1993, transl. in East Europ. Case Reporter of Const. Law 1 (1994): 247–48.

  138. 138.

    Decision U-I-344/94, of 1 June 1995, transl. in http://www.us-rs.si/en/casefr.html

  139. 139.

    Section 6 of the Decision. As the text of the Decision further reveals, this was in response to one of the petitioner’s arguments, that the conditions for appointment to the position of notary mean, in the words of the Court, “a reintroduction of the former criteria on socio-political (un)suitability”, Section 9 of the Decision.

  140. 140.

    Section 14 of the Decision.

  141. 141.

    Section 12 of the Decision.

  142. 142.

    Decision of Slovenian Constitutional Court, case No U-I-278/07, Official Gazette RS, No. 94/2009 and OdlUS XVIII, 47.

  143. 143.

    Decision of 4 March 1999, http://www.lrkt.lt/1999/n9a0304a.htm

  144. 144.

    See Sect. 10.3, pp. 404–405.

  145. 145.

    Decision of 12 February 2002, http://www.lrkt.lt/angdoc.htm

  146. 146.

    The 2 October 2012 Judgement of Polish Constitutional Tribunal, K 27/11, OTK ZU No 9/A/2012, 102.

  147. 147.

    The 7 May 2013 Judgement of Polish Constitutional Tribunal, SK 11/11, OTK ZU No 10/A/2013, 113.

  148. 148.

    Part II.2.1 of the Judgment.

  149. 149.

    Part II.6.

  150. 150.

    Decision no. U-I-222/1995 of 9 November 1998, summarised in Bull. Constit. Case-Law 1998 (3): 403, CRO-1998-3-018. Another, much more marginal, example was the decision of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal that upheld a provision of a statute on anti-alcohol measures, against a challenge of inconsistency with the state’s constitutional duty to protect public health (under an old Constitution, superseded in 1997), Decision no. K. 3/97 of 23 June 1997. The challengers (a group of MPs) claimed that a provision on temporary, one-off licenses to sell alcohol during public open-air events was too lax and, as a result, did not guarantee sufficient protection against alcohol abuse, thus unconstitutionally endangering public health. The Tribunal rejected this claim on the basis that the provision under challenge did not constitute a “drastic” breach of the legislature’s duties stemming from the constitutional provisions on health protection. However, note that this decision, strictly speaking, was not made under a “right to health” heading.

  151. 151.

    The 12 November 2005 Decision of the Hungarian Constitutional Court, case no 43/2005; http://mkab.hu/letoltesek/en_0039_2007.pdf

  152. 152.

    The 19 June 2007 Decision of the Hungarian Constitutional Court, case No 39/2007; http://mkab.hu/letoltesek/en_0039_2007.pdf

  153. 153.

    The 26 March 2009 Decision of the Constitutional Court of Slovenia; case No U-I-218/07-8; http://odlocitve.us-rs.si/usrs/us-odl.nsf/o/FC826F17AA45C83EC12575F6002B3293

  154. 154.

    Decision SK 18/99 of 8 November 2000, see Wybór tez i sentencji Orzeczen Trybunaáu Konstytucyjnego, II Polrocze 2000 (Wydawnictwo TK, Warszawa 2001), at 30–33.

  155. 155.

    Note that, in Polish, the word “schools” includes also tertiary education institutions such as universities.

  156. 156.

    See, e.g., Decision K. 8/96 of 17 July 1996.

  157. 157.

    The Croatian Constitutional Court invalidated, in 1998, a provision of the 1993 Code on Equating Retirement Incomes, on the basis that the code demanded that pensions increase relative to changes in the cost of living, rather than relative to the increase of average incomes, see “Constitution Watch: Croatia”, East Europ. Constit. Rev. 7: 3 (Summer 1998): 8–9 at 9.

  158. 158.

    See The Political Dimension of EU Enlargement, supra note 1 at 19.

  159. 159.

    See text accompanying notes 154–155 above.

  160. 160.

    Andras Sajo, “Welfare Rights in the Post-Communist Constitutional Experience”, in Mihaela Serban Rose, ed., Constitutionalism in Transition: Africa and Eastern Europe (The Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights: Warsaw, 2003): 41–73.

  161. 161.

    See Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue (Harvard University Press: Cambridge Mass., 2000), chapters 8 and 9.

  162. 162.

    See Sajo, supra note 160 at 54.

  163. 163.

    See pp. 183–84.

  164. 164.

    Sajo, supra note 160 at 61 and 64.

  165. 165.

    Id. at 55.

  166. 166.

    See János Mátyas Kovács, “Approaching the EU and Reaching the US? Rival Narratives on Transforming Welfare Regimes in East-Central Europe”, in Peter Mair & Jan Zielonka, eds, The Enlarged European Union: Diversity and Adaptation (Frank Cass: London, 2002): 175–204 at 197.

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  1. University of Sydney, Sydney, Australia

    Wojciech Sadurski

  2. University of Warsaw, Warsaw, Poland

    Wojciech Sadurski

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Sadurski, W. (2014). Socio-economic Rights. In: Rights Before Courts. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-8935-6_7

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