Abstract
The concept of thetic validity (validity of theses) is the central point of the present pragmatic and dialectical approach. Validity should be seen as the primary aim of argumentation. It is located between mere opinion and true knowledge. An extensive discussion of the definition of thetic validity leads to the criterion of the “absence of open objections.” Verdicts of validity are relative to the states of argumentation that have been achieved and refer to an “open forum of arguments.” The concept of thetic validity is discussed with regard to universalism, relativism, and pluralism, in contrast with the ideas of Habermas, Peirce, Perelman, and others.
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- 1.
If I may take the liberty to say this, with a nod to Hegel’s metaphor for philosophy in the Preface to the Philosophy of Right, thetic reason is the intelligence of the owl—yet, pace Hegel, not of Minerva, but of Athena, who was elder and therefore wiser than the former and realized that even in the twilight of the day “all is but a woven web of guesses” (Xenophanes; Fragment 34). Consequently, she does not wait for her flight until all figures have grown old and gray. As she gets blinded by sunlight, she contents herself with hunting in the shade and, in all other matters, counts on the processes of acclimatization and on the evolution of her eyes.
- 2.
Translator’s note: “reasonable” is used to translate the German “einsichtig,” which is derived etymologically from the noun “insight” (“Einsicht”) and can mean both “having insights” and “being reasonable.”
- 3.
Bühler wrote about “speech act” and “speech action” (cf. Bühler (1990), 57 ff.) around the same time that Wittgenstein wrestled with the concept of “language games,” and thus many decades before Austin (1962) and Searle (1969) initiated “speech act theory.” For the “Aha moment” of “inner illumination”; cf. Bühler (1930), 14 (cf. also above, Chap. 1, note 35).
- 4.
Cf. Descartes (1993). Descartes believed that his insight into the existence of his ego-consciousness indicates something objective. This is the typical mistake we make when we suddenly and intensely understand something that has been puzzling us for a long time.
- 5.
Karl Popper describes Bohr’s, Heisenberg’s, and Einstein’s different interpretations of quantum mechanics such that, although all three had arrived at the same state of knowledge and argumentation, they differed markedly in their insights, which is why they drew such very different consequences. While for Einstein, the state that had been reached was merely provisional (and the wave–particle duality merely a “stopgap”), Heisenberg had the “vision of an ‘illuminating simplicity’ […] [which] made him feel ‘this is it’: this was the end of the road, the final truth” (Popper (1982), 8). Bohr, on the other hand, acknowledged quantum mechanics, “partly in despair” (9), as the last step in physics: it is no longer comprehensible, he argues, because it is not a description of reality. However, this has to be accepted because “in the atomic region […] no such reality existed” (10). Hence, while Einstein hoped to continue physics as a theory of reality, Bohr and Heisenberg agreed that “an act of ‘renunciation’ of our understanding was needed” (10).
- 6.
Cf. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969), § 2. The contact of minds.
- 7.
Cf. Kant (1998), Critique of Pure Reason A821/B849: we ought to test whether “the grounds that are valid for us have the same effect on the reason of others.”
- 8.
This can even be tested empirically, at least in part: Does a person who has spent his adolescence playing ego shooter games live differently than someone who grew up reciting Friedrich Schiller’s “Song of the Bell” or “Honor to Woman” (“To her it is given/to garden the earth with the roses of Heaven!”)?
- 9.
Cf. Descartes (1993): the truth of “cogito-sum res cogitans,” which has been developed in the second meditation, is characterized by the fact it has been perceived “clearly and distinctly” (clare et distincte). In the third meditation, these properties are posited as the criteria for truth: “And thus I now seem able to posit as a general rule that everything I very clearly and distinctly perceive is true.”
- 10.
There are great examples of this, also in the history of science; for example, Darwin’s decades-long adherence to his thesis of the origin of species by “natural selection.” There was a flurry of objections to this, which he was initially unable to refute; however, over time refutations were found, for instance, regarding the objection that there were “missing links” (the absence of extinct intermediate links in the fossil record). Darwin produced an exhaustion of the thesis which was initially just an excuse (fossils are hard to find), but which was later spectacularly confirmed by the discovery of the archaeopteryx fossil in the oolitic slates of Solnhofen.
- 11.
Peirce distinguished between “genuine” or “living” and “pen” or “paper doubts.” Researchers are people who have real doubts—in my formulation: they feel the gap in orientation; philosophical skeptics, however, express formal or empty doubts (if they cannot gain absolute certainty about a matter). Cf. Peirce (1965b), Sections 370–374 (from “The Fixation of Belief”).
- 12.
Cf. Klein (1980), 26.
- 13.
Cf. Grewendorf (1975), 142–150.
- 14.
Cf. Barth and Krabbe (1982), 67 ff. [The sample dialogues largely deal with the existence of God, so the role of the (dogmatic, stupid) proponents is designated as “Pope,” whereas the (clever, cheeky) opponent is addressed as “Olga.”].
- 15.
- 16.
I describe a “substantial” gap as a gap that cannot be bridged on the basis of our currently available knowledge. Sometimes this is formally established, such as in the case of circular arguments. Cf. Wohlrapp (1978).
- 17.
Wassermann (1930), 156 ff.
- 18.
Madariaga (1939), 283.
- 19.
That this research landscape is simply characterized by the disinterested search for truth is unlikely. Some recently publicized events justify a healthy dose of skepticism. In 1997–1998, the Rowett Research Institute in Aberdeen/Scotland experimented with transgenic potatoes as feed for rats. The lead scientist, Arpad Pusztai, concluded that the feed weakened the immune system of the animals significantly. When he tried to make these results public, he was fired.
- 20.
Douglas Walton has dubbed a variant of this fault “Monday morning quarterbacking”; cf. Walton (2011), 208.
- 21.
This is the problem of “potentiated ignorance,” which I have addressed in Chap. 5.
- 22.
Cf. Plato (1964), Gorgias 476a and 482c.
- 23.
Cf. Toulmin (1958), Chap. II: Probability.
- 24.
Toulmin (1958), 101. Klein suggested (Klein (1980), 18–19) that this should not be regarded as a weakening of the validity claim, but as a weakening of the thesis. I am happy to follow this proposal because it avoids a fourth possible judgment besides “valid,” “invalid,” and “undecidable”—namely, “probably valid.” Pragmatically speaking, there is no difference between asserting that the sentence “Peterson is probably Protestant” is valid and asserting that the sentence “Peterson is Protestant” is probably valid.
- 25.
Cf. Toulmin (1958), 48 ff.
- 26.
Much is still open at this point and will be fixed by decisions which may be tainted by arbitrariness. Hence, many social scientists only take those statistics seriously which they have examined themselves.
- 27.
The theoretical basis of these approaches is the subjective interpretation (“degree of belief”) of the probability theory of Thomas Bayes. For details, see de Finetti (1972).
- 28.
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969).
- 29.
Cf. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969), § 7: The universal audience.
- 30.
Joseph Kopperschmidt, the editor of the German translation of The New Rhetoric, tries very hard in his Preface to emphasize the difference between the new and the old rhetoric: while the old one sought only approval, the new one aims at validity (Kopperschmidt (2004), VIII–XI). Unfortunately, this is true only with regarding the intentions of the two authors.
- 31.
Cf. Kamlah and Lorenzen (1984), Chapter IV, § 1.
- 32.
Cf. Habermas (1973).
- 33.
Cf. Habermas (1996), 107. This “parsimonious discourse principle” for action norms subsequently generates the “principle of democracy.” It states that only those laws are legitimate which “can meet with the assent (Zustimmung) of all citizens” in a legal process (110). Surely this principle captures much of the intuitions that converge under the label “democracy.” If we keep in mind, however, that in currently existing democratic countries this “assent (Zustimmung) of all citizens” is formally equated with their participation in parliamentary elections, then we become aware of a huge gap which cannot be bridged satisfactorily by pointing to the necessity of representation. Does the Habermasian principle of democracy suggest, then, that a large number of important post-war laws and governmental decisions that were rejected by a majority of the German population (rearmament, emergency legislation, implementation of nuclear power for purposes of energy generation, EU enlargement, European monetary union, introduction of genetic engineering) should be considered illegitimate? It is unclear whether Habermas himself would make this claim, and I do not think he would. Rather, I believe that in case of such disputes, he would pay less attention to the opinions of all citizens than to the rationale for passing these laws. It, however, means that in any given case, it is less the assent (of all citizens) that is decisive, but rather the quality or intelligibility of the presented arguments.
- 34.
Cf. Alexy (1989).
- 35.
Cf. Habermas (2003), 247–48: “‘Truth’ is a justification-transcendent concept that cannot be made to coincide even with the concept of ideal warranted assertability.” For a justification of this view, Habermas refers to Albrecht Wellmer, and he partially even adopts Crispin Wright’s ideas (cf. my critique in Chap. 1). Habermas’ perspective is “pragmatic” in the sense of a moderate reference to lifeworld concerns and to the performative nature of speech. A reference to further praxes or even to the practice of research regarding problems of orientation cannot be found in his work.
- 36.
“The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is what we mean by the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real.” Peirce (1965a), Collected Papers, Vol. V, 268, or 5.407.
- 37.
Based on an already existing literary topos, Newton wrote that he was able to see farther than, say, Descartes because he was standing “on the shoulders of giants.” Robert Merton has traced the history of this topos (in Merton (1965)).
- 38.
Cf. Hacking (1983), 107.
- 39.
For the distinction between a criterion of truth and a definition of truth, cf. Skirbekk (1977), Introduction.
- 40.
“Truth is that consensus which would ultimately be reached by an unlimited research community if the research process were to be continued under ideal communicative […] and epistemic […] conditions, thus critically transcending any factual consensus—i.e. being potentially infinite.” (Apel (2002), 133, emphasis in original; Trans. T.P.). A very similar formulation can be found a year later in Apel (2003), 196.
- 41.
Cf. the texts by Apel’s student Dietrich Böhler, in particular Böhler (1998).
- 42.
This is the way we might make sense of the “Rhetorical Relativism” recommended by Manfred Kienpointner (Kienpointner (1992), 153–165). Along this line, Kienpointner regards it as “desirable to become acquainted with new aspects of reality—which, after all, will always be perspectively shortened by one’s own language game” (156; Trans. T.P.). Most people will probably be happy to agree with this. But what is missing in this account is the dark side of the matter: These “new aspects” could turn out to be highly problematic—fantastic and cruel rites of initiation, conceptions of honor which give us the creeps, etc.
- 43.
For a much more elaborate refutation of semantic relativism, cf. Donald Davidson’s famous essay on the conceptual scheme and the possibility of translation (Davidson (1974)). Although Davidson mentions the link from language to practice in that essay (6–7), his thinking is not really pragmatic, but analytical and empirical: the decisive factor for the truth of judgments is supposed to be “the tribunal of experience” (14). That Davidson discusses experience without any reference to questions of constitution clearly matches the nature of the debate in which he intends to place his essay, but it weakens his contribution to the problem of semantic relativism—whose conclusion is, of course, quite right.
- 44.
The motivation of the founder of modern cultural relativism, the German–American anthropologist Franz Boas, was to deny the claim that the standards of the white race are universal. Thus he wrote in 1887: “… civilization is not something absolute, but … it is relative, and … our ideas and conceptions are true only so far as our civilization goes” (Boas (1887), 589). A contemporary voice is Geertz (1984).
- 45.
Cf. McLean and Aspel (1970). Empedocles fragment 17.
- 46.
Its author Georg Ernst Stahl was able to demonstrate experimentally that sulfur consists of sulfuric acid and phlogiston, and was honorably mentioned by Kant in the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason (Bxiii). Kant regarded Stahl as one of the more recent natural scientists on whom “a light [had] dawned” and who knew, by their deeds, how to make nature “respond” to their questions.
- 47.
“About morality […] some people, philosophers included, are inclined to be relativists: they hold that there are many alternative moral codes specifying what counts as good or bad conduct, but no facts by virtue of which some of these codes are more ‘correct’ than any of the others.” Cf. Boghossian (2006), 3; that passage also includes further references to genuine moral relativists.
- 48.
Translator’s note: This remark refers to the murder of Dutch film director Theo van Gogh by a Dutch-Moroccan Muslim in Amsterdam in November 2004.
- 49.
In contemporary philosophical debates, especially in the United States, relativism is usually confronted with some version of realism. Cf., for example, Norris (1997). To my mind, this is a poor strategy. On the one hand, philosophically speaking, realism is a very weak position, and on the other hand, it has nothing to say about cultural and normative disciplines. Accordingly, as I already mentioned in the text, people are inclined to perceive “moral relativism” (reductively) as a cognitive view.
- 50.
Cf. Lueken (1998).
- 51.
Cf. Mittelstraß (1992).
- 52.
To avoid misunderstandings: This view does not commit us to the claim that the Earth used to be flat—a claim that, due to reflexive changes, could not even be satisfied (cf. problem of incommensurability, Chap.5.5). Instead, when we say that people used to believe that the Earth was flat, it involves a distancing from the old knowledge. If, however, this distancing is supported by new, previously inaccessible (epistemological) arguments, then it is not relativistic. The state of argumentation representing the old knowledge is closed with regard to the epistemic theory that was available in relevant dialogues at that time. The revision of the state of argumentation that has now become possible is therefore not “expanded internally” (cf. Chap. 7.4), but it is “intervening.” It is backed by action possibilities (of assessing the shape of the earth) which are new, but which can also be regarded as an extension and improvement of possibilities enabled by old praxis. This way, we can position ourselves outside that old system of knowledge without having to dramatically detach ourselves from it.
- 53.
According to Albrecht Wellmer (1986), 100, relativism is the shadow of absolutism as both are committed to the desire “to anchor truth in an Archimedean point […] which is located outside of our factual discourses” (Trans. T.P.). I think that this is only partially true. To be sure: an “Archimedean point” in the sense of something solid for all time is not at our disposal. But there are anchors of validity outside our factual discourses: our felicitous praxes (cf. Chap. 1) and the belief that we will be able to develop these further in a way that is consonant with human dignity (cf. Chap. 10).
- 54.
In Wohlrapp (1995c), I proposed that “seeking out equivalences” could be a way of accessing foreign cultures and discussed this proposal with examples.
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Wohlrapp, H.R. (2014). Validity. In: The Concept of Argument. Logic, Argumentation & Reasoning, vol 4. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-8762-8_7
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