Abstract
As arguing always bears a subjective imprint, a theory of subjectivity has to be part of an adequate theory of argument. Orientation is related to a subject (a person or collective), which can be modeled as a self-referential system with autonomous control of its activities. These activities are structured by the subject’s “habitus” whose cognitive level is a belief system (orientation system). Within the system, several levels can be distinguished. The lowest level is emotional orientation and the highest level is (existential) meaning. The subject possesses the capacity of self-distanciation, which is required for overcoming the limits of subjective partiality.
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Notes
- 1.
The widely discussed objective of (rationally) “persuading” the addressee is not taken up here. That objective suggests the determination of causal “effects” of argumentative practice. Yet to prove that an addressee accepts or rejects a conclusion “because of ” a particular argument is a (rather tricky) empirical issue.
- 2.
It seems there are exceptions: In the rhetorical tradition, there are versions of the ad hominem argument in which a proponent undermines his credibility by possibly contradicting himself with his thesis. The contradictory relationship may be one between saying and doing (the drinker or smoker who recommends abstinence) or between the current thesis and previous utterances (he always argued against a quota for women, but now, at his favorite female student’s investiture, he presents it as an argument). It is true that, in such cases, an ad hominem argument is usually effective. Nevertheless, we should distinguish between the credibility of the thesis and the proponent’s credibility. Even speakers with a damaged “ethos” (as Aristotle called these features, cf. Introduction, Sect. “Topics – Rhetoric”) may present valid theses. Moreover, apparent contradictions can possibly be clarified and eliminated in a dialogue.
- 3.
- 4.
Claims about the effectiveness of rhetorical figures are notoriously unjustified by rhetoricians and theorists of rhetoric. A reexamination is therefore long overdue (cf. again my critique of Perelman/Olbrechts-Tyteca’s concept of “rhetorical figure” in the Introduction, section “First New Constructions”). After all, the conditions of persuasive communication have been changed significantly by the omnipresence of advertising, with its ingenious as well as sordid tricks. Cf., on this point, my criticism of Katarina Sobota, a scholar of the rhetoric of law. Sobota investigated the function of rhetorical figures in the opinions of the highest German courts and came to the conclusion that the persuasive power of these texts is not based on arguments, but on the use of rhetorical figures. Anyone who tries to understand her studies will note that important terms such as “rhetorical figure,” “argument,” and “persuasion” are not clearly defined at all. The validity of Sobota’s corresponding statements can therefore hardly be tested. In particular, Sobota adopts large parts of the tradition and theory of rhetoric without reexamination. Any statement about the wonderful effects of these figures that has been handed down is simply taken at face value. For details, cf. Wohlrapp (2005).
- 5.
For starters: “individual” in Latin means “indivisible.” “Dividual” has been coined on this basis and means “divisible.” It is well known that Nietzsche, long before Freud, argued and polemicized against the uniformity of the ego; cf., for example, Nietzsche (1966), III, 612. This is quite right with regard to chains of thought which introduce allegations and speculations about this ego that are accessible (some of Descartes formulations are exemplary of this), if at all, from an internal perspective and whose universal validity can, therefore, not simply be assumed. But to conclude that there is no such thing as an ego leads to purely academic debates. The fact that people can refer to themselves (in acting, talking, thinking) is a matter of course. Whoever wants to get to the bottom of this self-reference should perhaps simply sit on a pillow in front of a wall and meditate on the question “Who am I”? (Zen Buddhists affirm that this is an exercise worth pursuing.)
- 6.
Jan Philipp Reemtsma expressed his deep respect for the former boxing champion Muhammad Ali by describing Ali’s individuality not as normal and uniform (“associated”), but as mutable (“dissociated”) at all times. Cf. Reemtsma (1998). This is certainly a fascinating text about a fascinating person. Nevertheless, I do not agree with Reemtsma’s anthropological theory that this is indicative of the individuality of the people of the future. Some contact with non-Europeans, especially with Central Asians and Black Africans, could have enriched the author’s background with regard to the “normal” structure of personality—in fact, even reading Thomas Mann’s Felix Krull carefully might have been sufficient. To my mind, the boxer’s subsequent fate also casts a different light on Reemtsma’s thesis. (However, that was not clear in 1995, when Reemtsma first published the book.)
- 7.
- 8.
Karl Popper’s dictum of a “third world” of theories (Popper (1972)) is naive metaphysics as long as it simply refers to the reification of mental activities. It is of the same kind as the assumption of a kingdom of God (existing independently of us) or a transcendent world of Ideas. Such reifications ignore that what we talk about are possibilities and results of our own abstractions. There are, however, ways to address the sphere of the mind reflexively. In my opinion, the most impressive achievement in this area is G.W.F. Hegel’s philosophy. Hegel does not simply talk “about” the mind, but offers a construction according to which we humans activate the mind in our thinking. Moreover, he claims that if we carry out this reflection radically, we are part of the process in which the universe thinks itself through and comes to understand itself. This is more daring than Popper’s idea, and, in contrast to the latter, it is not naïve.
- 9.
For an extensive theoretical foundation of this view, cf. George Herbert Mead’s “Symbolic Interactionism,” in: Mead (1934), especially Part III, “Self,” Chapters 22, 25, 27.
- 10.
Kant (1998), Critique of Pure Reason, B 158, Fn: “The I think expresses the act of determining my existence. The existence is thereby already given, but the way in which I am to determine it, […], is not yet thereby given. For that self-intuition is required […].”
- 11.
Ideas about what constitutes a human being as a person are manifold. I cannot survey all these suggestions in their entirety. However, I would at least like to mention Daniel Dennett’s proposal (cf. Dennett (1987), partly based on Harry Frankfurt; cf. Frankfurt (1971)). Dennett enumerates six conditions for personhood: intentionality, rationality, embeddedness in the world, self-referential intentionality, reciprocation, and reflexive self-transformation. To my mind, the possibility of reflexively adding higher levels to intentionality is particularly useful, as well as the role played by social interaction and, finally, the assumption that the person is, as a matter of principle, capable of reflective conduct. What is missing, however, is an account of how intentional states are stabilized in praxes, in customs, and in the habitus. Furthermore, Dennett neglects the role of theory and research as conditions of rationality and the level of meaning, or of confidence, as the basis of beliefs. But this criticism is probably due to the focus of my theory of subjectivity, which, unlike Dennett’s, aims at understanding argumentation. The concept of person which I consider to be the most profound today was developed by the German philosopher Robert Spaemann; cf. Spaemann (2006).
- 12.
In this regard, even Hegel tells us to be wary of an exaggerated psychotherapeutic optimism that all “id” could become “ego”: “Thus a person can never know how much of things he once learned he really has in him, should he have once forgotten them: they belong not to his actuality or subjectivity as such, but only to his implicit self.” Hegel (1971), (Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences), § 403.
- 13.
- 14.
Translator’s note: German children learn that if they clean their boots and place them on the doorstep on the eve of Saint Nicholaus Day, which takes place every year on December 6, Saint Nicholaus will come at night and reward them by putting candy and other gifts into their boots.
- 15.
Cf. Colón’s reports of strange stories told by the Indios: about a country whose inhabitants had an eye in the middle of their foreheads and about islands so rich in gold that they consisted more of gold than of soil (Jane (1968), 68–69, 114–116: Colón’s log, entries from November 23 and December 22, 1492 (however, the language barrier and the Spaniards’ strange lust for gold certainly had a part in this, too)), or cf. Nigel Barley’s witty account of how the Dowayo in West Africa dealt with “truth” (Barley (1986)).
- 16.
It is well known that sociobiologists, neuroscientists, and geneticists are currently on a mission with this message, which is truly not a gospel. Cf., for example, Dawkins (1976).
- 17.
Currently, maps of the inner world are quite popular; cf. for instance in Gosepath (1992), 21 ff., and in Steinvorth (2002), 76 ff. They are problematic, however, insofar as they suggest that differences in the inner regions, layers, or competences are something like the rivers, coastlines, or mountains of the external world. As is well known, it was one of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s major concerns to break this suggestion. Cf. the arguments against a “private language” in the Philosophical Investigations (Wittgenstein (2009), §§ 243 ff.).
- 18.
It is an enthralling idea that a system could develop in an environment from which it receives no information. This is the reason for the fact that Humberto Maturana’s writings caused such a stir (cf. Maturana (1994, 1998)). In broad daylight, however, this turns out to be much less exciting, because such systems are “structurally coupled” with their environment, i.e. they occur in a form in which they do not respond to a single environmental event with specific actions, but perceive such events as changes to their interior and, if possible, adapt this interior accordingly.
- 19.
- 20.
Cf. Gehlen (1988).
- 21.
The concept of interest arises in the context of the standardization of economic states of affairs (bonds, etc.) in Roman law. In the Middle Ages, its meaning shifted to “interest” in the financial sense. In modern times, this has been generalized to private gain, whereby the morality of interests became an issue. Enlightenment thinkers sought to find a reconciliation. In Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, Kant speaks of “rational interests” and demarcates them from “pathological interests.” Kant still regards it as a matter of course that general and particular interests need to be distinguished and that the latter are problematic. In Hegel’s work, interests are associated with the preservation of one’s identity, while the subject still has to account for the development of this identity. Today, we deal (or struggle) with a use of the concept according to which an interest has become an argument that is barely questionable: If something is in someone’s interest, it is part of his identity—and it is every person’s right that her identity is acknowledged.
- 22.
An example of talk about “interests” that is definitely over-the-top can be found in statements about an embryo’s “justified interest in nidation” (a phrase taken from Antonio Autiero’s article in Lexikon der Bioethik; cf. Autiero (2000)).
- 23.
For this characterization of humans as beings in need, cf. Wilhelm Kamlah’s anthropology, Kamlah (1973). Kamlah defines “need” as “justifiable desire” (justified wish). This was uncontroversial in Erlangen at the time. Lorenzen provides a similar definition; cf. Lorenzen (1969), §7. This simple distinction between wish and need, which is indispensable for a civilized life, becomes problematic if justifications are no longer uncontroversial. But just as the occurrence of dusk is no reason to abandon the distinction between day and night, so the reference to controversial cases is no objection to the difference between need and desire.
- 24.
Cf. Gosepath (1992).
- 25.
In the Republic, Plato taught that people exceed the framework of a healthy polis once they want more than they need and drop the distinction between desires and needs (cf. Plato (1964), Republic, 369a–373e). It then becomes the “luxurious” or “sumptuous” city (polis tryphosa), which is expansive and needs warriors.
- 26.
Cf. the argument against Callicles in Plato’s Gorgias, 482c–527e (Plato (1964)).
- 27.
The chapter on the “culture industry” in the Dialectic of Enlightenment (cf. Horkheimer and Adorno (2002)) is not only still relevant today. In fact, its relevance has even multiplied over the 60 years since the book’s publication in 1947.
- 28.
Cf. Wohlrapp (2007).
- 29.
Aristotle (1936), Metaphysics, I.1.
- 30.
Cf. Thomas Nagel, who explores the possibility that one day an intelligent bat could reflect on the workings of optical sense perception in human beings (Nagel (1974)).
- 31.
In Ancient Greece, the view existed that humans, by their very nature, only want what is good and right. Of course, this did not go unchallenged. However, the arguments exchanged in this debate are still instructive. Cf. again Plato’s Gorgias in Plato (1964), Gorgias.
- 32.
This impulse is also notable as a compelling moment within the—otherwise conceptually unfinished—notion of the “universal auditorium” (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969), §7). For a discussion and critique of the universal auditorium, cf. below in the Introduction, “First New Constructions” and Sect. 7.7.1.
- 33.
This “normal orientation” could perhaps be described as a “veil of knowledge,” in a negative analogy to John Rawls’ famous metaphor (cf. Rawls (1971), § 24: The Veil of Ignorance).
- 34.
I took this expression from Geert-Lueke Lueken’s contribution to argumentation theory (Lueken 1992), which does not develop it very far conceptually. The corresponding term in anglophone countries is “belief system.” There are different definitions for “belief,” but none of them map seamlessly onto the concept of “orientation.” Especially the question under discussion here, whether “belief ” expresses mere acceptance or also conviction (cf. Cohen (1989)), can remain unsettled (or be treated on a case-by-case basis). If a theory is taken as orientation, it structures one’s attention in acting. It does not have to be determined in advance whether this theory is taken to be real or merely possible. In the case of research theses, it would even be preferable not to decide this question prematurely (in the sense of a balance between distance and commitment). In short, the “orientation system” completes, in a pragmatic manner, the concept hinted at by the “belief system.”
- 35.
Formulations like “given up easily” or “hardly ever abandoned” are purely intuitive and perhaps unsatisfactory. To my mind, however, we cannot say much more here. Quine formulated rules that were supposed to describe and standardize this adherence to or abandoning of theories: on the one hand, he claimed, we need to take care not to change the belief system too much when dealing with objections; on the other hand, we aim at the greatest simplicity possible in doing so (cf. Quine (1961), 20–46 and Quine (1974), 2–4). These rules were formulated for the natural sciences, but they are not even observed there (cf. Gähde (1997)). For our way of dealing with theories in everyday life and philosophy, they are hardly more than interesting mental exercises.
- 36.
Gosepath (1992) presents a systematic refinement of this ideal aiming at a general competence in critical reasoning and is not small-minded in other respects, either. Yet, Gosepath does not address the question of how people can change, even though he realizes (44) that, under the requirement that one person’s wishes or maxims be rationally consistent, Paul and Saul cannot be the same person—which is counterintuitive, of course.
- 37.
Taking recourse to many details and instructive illustrations, Luc Ciompi develops the idea that states of affairs always somehow “feel” a certain way, that we also get to know and recognize them by way of such feelings, and that certain transitions are (not) compelling to us because they feel right (or not); cf. Ciompi (1988). Cf., for example, his reference (195) to the difficulties of Renaissance astronomers who attempted to imagine that the planetary orbits are elliptical: after all, the paths established for such “affect-logical” schemata would have been (perfect) circles.
- 38.
Cf. Erikson (1950), especially Chapter VII.1, “Trust vs. Basic Mistrust.”
- 39.
Cf. Jaspers (2003).
- 40.
- 41.
Cf. Lorenzen (1987), 272–273: “Sinngehalt.”
- 42.
From Latin religio reconnection.
- 43.
As far as I know, this idea comes from Walter Benjamin; cf. Benjamin (1999).
- 44.
The Enlightenment thinker Johann Friedrich Oberlin—a pastor in Alsace who corresponded with Kant and, among other things, looked after the schizophrenic poet Lenz (cf. Büchner’s drama Lenz)—settled disputes with the help of a wooden board that is still on display in the Musée Oberlin (Waldersbach/Alsace) today. Oberlin prepared this board by gluing painted triangular slats onto it in such a way that, from one perspective, it showed the picture of a rose and, from another perspective, the picture of a cross. The pastor placed this board between the contending parties and asked what they saw in the picture. After very different responses were given, he urged the parties to exchange positions. Supposedly, this lesson helped settle many disputes.
- 45.
Trans. Naomi Replanski, cf. Replanski (2012), 157.
- 46.
Cf. Kuno Lorenz’s clarifications in Lorenz (1969).
- 47.
Cf. Hegel (1977), Phenomenology, Chapter VIII, Absolute Knowing.
- 48.
An often-repeated objection to Hegel’s philosophy is that it conceives of the single person as nothing but a mote of dust in the process of the mind’s self-fulfillment. For a possible resolution of this problem, cf. my attempts on transsubjectivity in Chap. 10.
- 49.
Cf. Colón’s detailed descriptions in Jane (1968), 164: logbook, entry of Feb. 14, 1793. On the journey back, just south of the Azores, Colón sails into a hellish storm with the two remaining caravels (he had already been forced to leave the Santa Maria behind). The entire crew vows ceremoniously to embark on a pilgrimage should they be saved. Apparently unmoved by the fury of the elements, Colón writes a long account of his discoveries for the Spanish royal couple. This account is wrapped in an oilcloth, placed in a sealed barrel, and thrown into the sea. The barrel has never been found, but a copy of the text (which the man prudently produced as well) survived and was distributed as a pamphlet all over Europe under the title “First Letter from the New World” (cf. Jane (1968), 191 ff.).
- 50.
Cf. the account of historian Jules Michelet, who is roused into such an enthusiasm by his own descriptions of that night that he concludes resoundingly: “Vive la France!” Cf. Michelet (1952), Vol. I, 217.
- 51.
Cf. Rousseau (1998) (Social Contract), 15.
- 52.
- 53.
Cf. Ernst Cassirer’s paper on Kant and Rousseau: Cassirer (1965).
- 54.
John Rawls’ idea of the “veil of ignorance” (cf. Rawls (1971), § 24) can also be read as (very clever) fiction that corresponds to our modern self-conception and makes this idea of the ability to distance oneself from oneself comprehensible.
- 55.
- 56.
Cf. Milgram (1974), 176.
- 57.
- 58.
The most prolific writer on argumentation theory by far, Canadian scholar Douglas Walton is convinced that slavery in ancient Rome was already “absolutely wrong”; cf. Walton (1992b), 99.
- 59.
Cf. Hegel (1977), Phenomenology, Preface.
- 60.
The “prisoner’s dilemma” (cf. Rapoport and Chammah (1965)) is a well-known problem of rational choice theory. It is generally understood to mean that cooperation and solidarity do not pay and, for that reason, cannot be rational. Some conclude that this indicates the end of all community based on reasonable autonomy (cf., for example, Becker (1987)); others point to the rashness of such conclusions (Sen (1999)). In recent days, theorists have begun to review the assumptions underlying the model of “rational behavior” by testing empirical predictions derived from these assumptions. Test subjects were asked to decide either selfishly or cooperatively when faced with the promise of real rewards. The results clearly show that human decision-making deviates quite strongly from the “rationality” that the model calls for. Cf. Fehr and Schmidt (2001) for details.
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Wohlrapp, H.R. (2014). Subjectivity. In: The Concept of Argument. Logic, Argumentation & Reasoning, vol 4. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-8762-8_3
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