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Part of the book series: Issues in Business Ethics ((IBET,volume 42))

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Abstract

This reading explains the general features and particular virtues of Aristotle’s virtue ethics and the application of the ethic to business.

Different men seek after happiness#in different ways#and by different means,and so make for themselvesdifferent modes of life.(Aristotle 2009a, VII. 8.1328b)

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Notes

  1. 1.

    For examples of these points, see (Aquinas 1984; Aristotle 1962; Donahue 1990; Keenan and James 1996; Porter 1990; Statman 1997).

  2. 2.

    The references to virtue throughout are to moral virtues and not intellectual or other sorts of virtues.

  3. 3.

    Telos means “end” or “conclusion.” It is the perfection or complete actuality of a thing. Applied to the human being, the proper telos is happiness (Aristotle 1962, p. 315). Aristotle defines the good “as that which all things aim” (Aristotle 1962, p. 1094a). Martin Ostwald suggests, however, that Aristotle was not the first to frame the concept: “we do not know who first gave this definition of the good” and suggests that it is implied as well in the Platonic dialogues, especially in Republic VI. (Aristotle 1962, 3 ftn 3).

  4. 4.

    (Aristotle 1962, II 6 1106a 1115; Broadie 1991, pp. 24–25).

    Elsewhere Aristotle claims that “well-doing (eupraxia) is the end we seek: action of some sort or other is therefore our end and aim.” (Aristotle 1995, VII 3 1325b 1319).

  5. 5.

    Daniel Goleman describes the flow state in terms of emotional intelligence and as a critical component of managerial success (Goleman 1995).

  6. 6.

    In describing the mean of virtue in Book II, Aristotle uses the example of a famous wrestler named Milo. He then states, “the same applies to running and wrestling.” For this reason, I will use the example of the runner here (Aristotle 1962, II 6 1106b 1105).

  7. 7.

    Philippa Foot argues that because virtues engage the will, they are more than mere individual skills evoked by habit (Foot 1978). See also (Meilaender 1984, p. 9).

  8. 8.

    “Virtuous states do not correspond perfectly with a disposition to any set of acts and, in addition, the virtuous act may be achieved without the virtue. I may face danger without fleeing, but this does not make me courageous. It may, as Hobbes knew, only show that I am still more fearful of some other danger.” (Meilaender 1984, p. 8).

  9. 9.

    For more on the development of virtue, see (Broadie 1991, pp. 72–74).

  10. 10.

    It should be noted at this point that Aristotle’s conception of virtue as something formed by and for society derives from even earlier notions of virtue in Greek society. Prior to Aristotle, in Homeric conceptions of virtue, for example, virtue’s social aspect was emphasized even in a conception of virtue as something associated directly with one’s role in life. While the example of the runner suggests that a remnant of this role-specific conception of virtue remains, Aristotle shifted the focus of attention from the role to the character of the person filling that role. In making this shift, however, he did not espouse a highly individualistic notion of virtue. Instead, he maintained that virtue was constructed by and for society as well as by and for the individual (Nussbaum 1990, p. 378).

  11. 11.

    (Aristotle 1995, 1280b, 1231). In the passages surrounding this quote, Aristotle argues that a city-state cannot be forged through intermarriage or “matters of exchange and alliance” (commerce), but that the polis itself has a purpose—the good life, which “consists in living a happy and truly valuable life” (Aristotle 1995, 1280b 1212- end).

  12. 12.

    See “Politics as the master science of the good” in (Aristotle 1962, 1094a 1018–1094b 1012, glossary, 1311–1313) and (Rawls 1993, p. xxi).

  13. 13.

    (Meilaender, 1984, 4–5). He quickly admits, however, that virtue need not be strongly normative and its weak normativity might be attributable in some cases to its “uncodifiability” or inability to provide detailed guidelines for action (Meilaender 1984, p. 4).

  14. 14.

    These ideas are supported in large measure by the common good arguments related to business by (Alzola 2012; Audi 2012; Beabout 2012; Beadle and Knight 2012; Dierksmeier and Celano 2012; Moore 2012; Sadler-Smith 2012; Sison and Fontrodona 2012; Sisonet al. 2012b; Wells and Graafland 2012).

  15. 15.

    Robert Audi lists six dimensions of virtue (field, target, beneficiaries, agential understanding, motivation, grounding), explaining each in turn (Audi 2012, pp. 274–276).

  16. 16.

    For summaries of the Johnson & Johnson Tylenol case, see (Buchholz 1989, pp. 212–232).

  17. 17.

    (Aristotle 1962, VI 5 1140a1128–1130). The contemporary understanding of Gk. phronēsis as “prudence ” derives from Cicero ’s Latin translation of the Greek term as providentia, meaning a sort of divine foresight. This term was subsequently interpreted as cautiousness, circumspection, and care. For more, see (Beabout 2012, p. 420; Hariman 2003).

  18. 18.

    (Orland-Barak 2010). Orland-Barak argues further that, mentoring involves “learning to plan and improvise; observing the consequences and sources of participation systematically; appreciating the contexts within which others work; responding to the situational constraints of a particular strategic action; and improvising conditions of free open dialogues to promote practitioners’ self-understandings” (Orland-Barak 2010).

  19. 19.

    The full quote is “Wisdom is the supreme part of happiness; and reverence towards the gods must be inviolate. Great words of prideful men are ever punished with great blows, and, in old age, teach the chastened to be wise” (Sophocles 2000).

  20. 20.

    (Dierksmeier and Pirson 2009) considers the future orientation of business by contrasting Aristotle’s theory of household management to the management of modern corporations. Otherwise, the term “prescience ” is not used much in business except in the context of planning. See (Waitman 2008). “Moral prescience ” is used mostly in passing in healthcare literature as in (Lundberg 2002).

  21. 21.

    Aristotle explains in full: “To the thinking soul images serve as if they were contents of perception (and when it asserts or denies them to be good or bad it avoids or pursues them). That is why the soul never thinks without an image” (Aristotle 1928). For more, see (Lowe 1983).

  22. 22.

    For more on moral imagination , see (Johnson 1993; Kekes 1991; Moberg 2002, 2003; Moberg and Calkins 2001; Moberg and Seabright 2000; Seabright and Schminke 2002; Tierney 1994; Vidaver-Cohen 1997; Werhane 1999, 2002).

  23. 23.

    Hayek argues further that such a system governed by “planners” ultimately leads to the individual being enslaved by powerful overseers. The Road to Serfdom , as he calls it, is the final end of a system in which the individual is made subservient to the collective (Hayek 1945, 2007).

  24. 24.

    In this way, Hayek concludes, church leaders increasingly evidence a loss in faith in supernatural revelation and “appear to have sought refuge and consolation in a new ‘social’ religion which substitutes a temporal for a celestial promise of justice” (Hayek 1978, p. 66). Even if this is not the case, the prevalent use of the term “social justice” by religious leaders suggests that the redistributionist ideals of socialism have found a moral imperative with strong support within large segments of Christendom.

  25. 25.

    (Aristotle 1962, V 3 1131a 1127–1128, 1995, VI.3 1318a 1325–1329). Aristotle observes further that inequalities and injustices will inevitably emerge in the formation of political systems. In the first case, if justice consists of the will of the majority, the majority will consider their own interests and act unjustly by confiscating the property of the rich minority. In the second case, if justice consists in the will of the few, the oligarch who owns more than all other owners of property will claim to be the sole ruler and tyranny will result (Aristotle 1995, VI.3 1318a 1330–1337).

  26. 26.

    For a good summary of whistleblowing and its criteria, see (Dasgupta and Kesharwani 2010; Near and Miceli 1996). Other excellent whistleblowing resources include (Bok 1980; Callahan et al. 2004; Chertow et al. 1993; Davis 1989; Miceli and Near 1992; Near and Miceli 1985; Painter 1995; Radin and Calkins 2004).

  27. 27.

    As John Rickaby explains, “The term cardo means a hinge, that on which a thing turns, its principal point … The origin of the fourfold system is traceable to Greek philosophy; other sources are earlier, but the Socratic source is most definite. Among the reporters of Socrates, Xenophon is vague on the point; Plato in The Republic puts together in a system the four virtues adopted later, with modifications by St. Thomas .” (Rickaby 1999).

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Calkins, M. (2014). Aristotle’s Virtue Ethics. In: Developing a Virtue-Imbued Casuistry for Business Ethics. Issues in Business Ethics, vol 42. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-8724-6_8

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