Abstract
Despite prior predominantly positive portrayals of casuistry, the following reading tackles the accusations that casuistry lacks moral force, is unstructured, conventional and insular, subjective, lax, and inferior to modern principle-based methods. It then explores each criticism in depth, compares casuistry to its alternatives, and argues for casuistry as a viable method for moral problem solving.
A bad carpenter quarrels with his tools
(Japanese: こうぼうふでをえらばず, Koukou fude o erabazu)
—Japanese proverb
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Notes
- 1.
(Jonsen 1991, p. 303). In this passage, Jonsen is describing the kinetics (forces on things in motion) behind the case movements in casuistry.
- 2.
(Jonsen 1991, p. 99).
Here, Jonsen explains that “claims” are judgments that one should or should not perform a specific action, “grounds” are statements that set out the factual circumstances in which claims are made, “warrants” are maxims that justify claims in those circumstances, “backing” consists of the theoretical arguments that support warrants, and “modal qualifiers” are mitigating provisions.
- 3.
Even skeptics of casuistry admit this orientation is valid. As Tom Tomlinson points out:
(S)kepticism and relativism are easier in moral philosophy than in real life, because in real life one has to actually make decisions which are justifiable to oneself and which survive scrutiny by others. One needs to be able to provide persuasive reasons for a course of action. If the core content of those reasons is not moral principles, then perhaps it should instead be our settled convictions about actual cases (Tomlinson 1994, p. 7).
- 4.
Citing J. P. Sommerville, Tomlinson makes a similar point: “the worst excesses of casuistry, pilloried by Pascal , were the result not of any belief in the flexibility of principle … but quite the reverse.” (Tomlinson 1994, p. 12).
- 5.
(Tallmon 1994, pp. 103–104). In response to Tallmon , Wildes , states:
If casuistry were viewed as a method of reasoning then one could imagine how it could be transferred from a particular community to the context of secular bioethics . However, an important difficulty for the Jonsen-Toulmin model, and Tallmon’s support of it, is that one cannot have pure method in casuistry without a commitment to some content.
Furthermore:
(T)he method of casuistry, as a form of rhetoric requires some subject matter. There must be some background theory about the moral life that enables the casuists to identify paradigm cases , case description, or maxims . If one draws the distinction between method and contend too sharply one will have a method that is empty and formal and therefore not applicable to all.(Wildes 1994, p. 115, 116).
- 6.
Tom Tomlinson notes the problem of subjectivity regarding paradigm case selection when he states, “(T)he appeal to paradigm cases assumes that the proper ones have been selected for comparison, and in any contentious ethical question, where there are competing ethical considerations or “maxims ”, there will also be alternative sets of paradigm cases to which analogies can be drawn.” (Tomlinson 1994, p. 13).
Loretta Kopelman concurs, stating, “(to reach agreement) about what cases to use as core cases, then, does not necessarily show that they ought to be agreed upon as core cases or illuminate what they are core cases of. Moreover, agreement about core cases does not show what criteria should be used to adopt core cases, or solve the problem of how to deal with marginal cases .” (Kopelman 1994, p. 30).
Finally, Joseph DeMarco points out the main problem with appeals to practical wisdom by methods such as casuistry in noting that such appeals give, “little indication about how such wisdom may be recognized or instilled.” (DeMarco 1991, p. 22).
- 7.
(Kopelman 1994, p. 33).
Elsewhere Kopelman states, “we must use general views about what is relevant; but some of our general views are biased, both in the sense of being unwarranted inclinations and in the sense that they are one of many viable perspectives. This reliance upon general views to determine relevancy creates difficulties for defenders who maintain that case methods of moral reasoning are not only useful, but more basic, reliable or prior to other forms of moral reasoning.” (Kopelman 1994, p. 21).
- 8.
For early accounts of this case, see (Buchholz 1989, pp. 167–169; De George 1993, pp. 130–137, 1999, pp. 240–241; Hoffman 1995, pp. 552–559; Velasquez 1998, pp. 71–72, 73–74, 76, 81–82, 119).
For a complete analysis of the various Ford Pinto cases, see (Werhane 1998, pp. 189–197).
- 9.
Pascal disdained, for example, the sort of reasoning that attempts to avoid falsehood by swearing aloud, “I have not done that” only to “add in a low voice” “to day…(so) that this you perceive is the truth” (Pascal 1656).
- 10.
For more, see (Jonsen and Toulmin 1988, p. 161, 164–175).
- 11.
In essence, the Jansenist-Jesuit dispute concerned the role of grace (efficacious and sufficient) in salvation. Pascal summarizes the dispute in the following passage:
In one word, then, I found that their difference about sufficient grace may be defined thus: The Jesuits maintain that there is a grace given generally to all men, subject in such a way to free-will that the will renders it efficacious or inefficacious at its pleasure, without any additional aid from God and without wanting anything on his part in order to act effectively; and hence they term this grace sufficient, because it suffices of itself for action. The Jansenists , on the other hand, will not allow that any grace is actually sufficient which is not also efficacious; that is, that all those kinds of grace which do not determine the will to act effectively are insufficient for action; for they hold that a man can never act without efficacious grace. Such are the points in debate between the Jesuits and the Jansenists ; and my next object was to ascertain the doctrine of the New Thomists. “It is rather an odd one,” he said; “they agree with the Jesuits in admitting a sufficient grace given to all men; but they maintain, at the same time, that no man can act with this grace alone, but that, in order to do this, he must receive from God an efficacious grace which really determines his will to the action, and which God does not grant to all men.” “So that, according to this doctrine,” said I, “this grace is sufficient without being sufficient.” “Exactly so,” he replied; “for if it suffices, there is no need of anything more for acting; and if it does not suffice, why- it is not sufficient.” (Pascal, The Provincial Letters—Letter II January 29, 1656, 1999).
- 12.
(Jonsen and Toulmin 1988, p. 249). See, too (Jonsen, “Casuistry,” 1986, p. 79).
- 13.
Pascal capitulates, stating:
Reverend Sir,
If I have caused you some dissatisfaction, in former Letters, by my endeavours to establish the innocence of those whom you were labouring to asperse, I shall afford you pleasure in the present by making you acquainted with the sufferings which you have inflicted upon them. Be comforted, my good father, the objects of your enmity are in distress! And if the Reverend the Bishops should be induced to carry out, in their respective dioceses, the advice you have given them, to cause to be subscribed and sworn a certain matter of fact, which is, in itself, not credible, and which it cannot be obligatory upon any one to believe- you will indeed succeed in plunging your opponents to the depth of sorrow, at witnessing the Church brought into so abject a condition.
(Pascal, The Provincial Letters—Fragment of a Letter XIX Addressed to Father Annat, 1999). See also (Jonsen and Toulmin 1988, pp. 231–249)
- 14.
Legalism in both the theological and secular sense, is the strict adherence to the law, with special attention given to the letter of the law rather than its spirit.
- 15.
In his testimony to the House of Representatives’ Committee on the Judiciary in response to a question about whether or not Monica Lewinsky ’s statement that there was “no sex of any kind in any manner, shape or form, with President Clinton ,” was an utterly false statement, Clinton answered: “It depends on what the meaning of the word ‘is’ is. If the—if he—if “is” means is and never has been, that is not—that is one thing. If it means there is none, that was a completely true statement….Now, if someone had asked me on that day, are you having any kind of sexual relations with Ms. Lewinsky , that is, asked me a question in the present tense, I would have said no. And it would have been completely true.” (Office of the Independent Counsel 1998).
- 16.
In answer to Rep. Bob Inglis’ question “Did he lie to the American people when he said “I never had sex with that woman?” Gregory Craig said: “what he (Clinton ) said, is that he did not have sexual relations and I understand you’re not gonna like this, Congressman, because you will see it as a hair splitting evasive answer, but in his own mind his definition was not…” Inglis: “ok, I understand that argument…”(Sandel 2011, 16:54).
- 17.
(Kendall et al. 1998, Preface). In full:
PREFACE In addition to the factual, legal and Constitutional defenses we present in this document, the President has asked us to convey a personal note: What the President did was wrong. As the President himself has said, publicly and painfully, “there is no fancy way to say that I have sinned.”
The President has insisted that no legalities be allowed to obscure the simple moral truth that his behavior in this matter was wrong; that he misled his wife, his friends and our Nation about the nature of his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky . He did not want anyone to know about his personal wrongdoing. But he does want everyone—the Committee, the Congress and the country—to know that he is profoundly sorry for the wrongs he has committed and for the pain he has caused his family, his friends, and our nation.
But as attorneys representing the President in a legal and Constitutional proceeding, we are duty-bound to draw a distinction between immoral conduct and illegal or impeachable acts. And just as no fancy language can obscure the fact that what the President did was morally wrong, no amount of rhetoric can change the legal reality that the record before this Committee does not justify charges of criminal conduct or impeachable offenses.
The Framers, in their wisdom, left this Body the solemn obligation of determining not what is sinful, but rather what is impeachable. The President has not sugar-coated the reality of his wrongdoing. Neither should the Committee ignore the high standards of the Constitution to overturn a national election and to impeach a President.
- 18.
The full rendering of the United States of America Solemn Oath states, “Do you solemnly swear or affirm that you will tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?”
- 19.
Impeachment is a fundamental constitutional power belonging to Congress and a two-stage process that begins in the House of Representatives with a public inquiry into allegations and culminates with a trial in the Senate. It can be traced to ancient Greece and English Common Law and is reserved for grave offenses such as perjury—which is the deliberate and willful giving of false, misleading, or incomplete testimony after he or she has taken an oath to speak the truth .
- 20.
For a good example, see (Treviño and Weaver 2001).
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Calkins, M. (2014). Criticisms of Casuistry. In: Developing a Virtue-Imbued Casuistry for Business Ethics. Issues in Business Ethics, vol 42. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-8724-6_6
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