Abstract
Expanding upon earlier descriptions of casuistry as a moral method, the author explains here casuistry’s ability to convey normativity (how things ought to be, which things are good or bad, and which actions are right or wrong) and the ways casuistry uses analogy differently than other methods to reach moral judgments.
It is the weight, not numbers of experiments that is to be regarded. (Povinelli 2012, p. xvi)
—Isaac Newton
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Notes
- 1.
Isaac Newton espoused the notion of a mechanical universe with set physical laws. Certain seventeenth century natural philosophers emulated Newton in their philosophical treatises.
- 2.
In Sunstein words, “reasoning by analogy may be the best approach available for people of limited time and capacities” (Sunstein 1993, p. 782).
- 3.
Sunstein concurs, stating, “reasoning by analogy may have the significant advantage of allowing people unable to reach anything like an accord on general principle to agree on particular outcomes” (Sunstein 1993, p. 782).
- 4.
Sunstein states, “analogical reasoning may be especially desirable in contexts in which we seek moral evolution over time” (Sunstein 1993, p. 782).
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Calkins, M. (2014). Normativity and Analogy in Casuistry. In: Developing a Virtue-Imbued Casuistry for Business Ethics. Issues in Business Ethics, vol 42. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-8724-6_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-8724-6_3
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