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The Foundations of Law: Juridical Objectivism Versus Jus Naturalism and Juridical Positivism

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Methodological Misconceptions in the Social Sciences

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Abstract

We develop here some specifications on law, primarily a criticism of natural law, juridical positivism and contractualism. We show that the question of power can (and must) be faced head on, not only in relation to the evasive attitude of jusnaturalism, but also the relativist attitude, the unconstrained notion of power typical of juridical positivism, and some forms of contractualism. A more substantial notion of power is required if it is to be possible to overcome key deficiencies that mar these various doctrines of law (deficiencies which the various proponents of these theories are happy to identify in rival theories). Having emphasized some recent confusions surrounding juridical thought and concerning core aspects of juridical phenomena, we delineate, in the light of our methodological categories, a doctrine that we denominate juridical objectivism, aimed at remedying the drawbacks of the doctrines of law previously considered.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    (Bobbio 2011).

  2. 2.

    (Kelsen 1994), p. 126.

  3. 3.

    Ibidem, p. 124.

  4. 4.

    (Kelsen 1963), p. 403.

  5. 5.

    (Kelsen 1994), p. 140.

  6. 6.

    Preface to (Bobbio 2011), p. XVIII.

  7. 7.

    (Rawls 1971).

  8. 8.

    (Nozick 2000).

  9. 9.

    (Irti 2005).

  10. 10.

    (Ortega y Gasset 1994).

  11. 11.

    In fact, Ortega’s notion of right was derived from his study of the Roman imperial state.

  12. 12.

    (Ortega y Gasset, ibidem, 1994), p. 244.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Former ISAE Director of Research, Via Voltaire 18, 00137, Rome, Italy

    Angelo Fusari

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  1. Angelo Fusari
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Fusari, A. (2014). The Foundations of Law: Juridical Objectivism Versus Jus Naturalism and Juridical Positivism. In: Methodological Misconceptions in the Social Sciences. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-8675-1_8

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