Human Rights, Human Dignity, and the Human Life Form

Abstract

In his article Human Rights, Human Dignity and the Human Life Form, Thomas Hoffmann argues that in order to undermine relativism it is important to formulate a justification as to why human rights apply equally and in equal manner to all human beings as such. It is possible to do so by referring to the term of human dignity that refers anaphorically to generic sentences that articulate the concept of human nature. But the concept of human nature should not be understood in the same way as the empiricistic mainstream of modern philosophy understands it. That means that the concept of human nature should not be understood as an empirical (e.g. biological or sociological) predicate that is an extensional (Fregean) concept, i.e. a set of elements. Rather, a concept is a form, as Hoffmann says (with reference to e.g. Aristotle or Hegel). The concept of human nature is a special form: a form of life, i.e., a lifeform. A lifeform is also a norm that determines what is in general naturally good for the individuals that exemplify this lifeform. If you understand the concept of human nature this way, then you are able to justify why human rights apply equally and in an equal manner to all human beings as such, as Hoffmann argues.